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The Naval Miscellany

EDITED BY

SIR JOHN KNOX LAUGHTON, R.N., D.LITT.

HON. FELLOW OF CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

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PREFACE

I HAVE to apologise to our members for the delay in the preparation of this volume, due mainly to my own shortcomings. I can only hope that, now that it appears, it will win for me a ready forgiveness, bearing with it, as it does, the work of so many and such distinguished colleagues; to whom, as well as to the private owners of papers included in the volume, I venture, in the name of the Society, to offer my most hearty thanks. For myself, too, I would very sincerely thank the many kind friends who have assisted me in trying to solve some of the curious conundrums which have presented themselves—*e.g.*: ‘les voiles embossées’; ‘scipper thrum cappsons’; ‘there ’s life in a musle yet’—phrases which, I am afraid, I have given some of them cause long to remember.

It will be seen that in the first two articles, dating from the early sixteenth century, the custom of the Society has been departed from and the original spelling has been preserved. Where so many of the words and phrases are obsolete and their meaning uncertain, it would have been practically impossible to do otherwise: to attempt it, even, would have been incongruous.

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VOYAGE OF THE BARBARA
TO BRAZIL

ANNO 1540

EDITED BY
R. G. MARSDEN

INTRODUCTORY

THE earliest voyage of English seamen to Brazil of which any record has come down to us was made by Sir Thomas Spert and Sebastian Cabot in 1526.¹ William Hawkyns was there in 1530 and 1531, and in 1540 Robert Reniger; in 1542, one Pudsey, who was with Reniger in 1540, built a fort there;² from which we may infer that these were not isolated voyages, and that something of a regular trade had been established. Little, however, is known of these early voyages, and of Hawkyns' voyage Hakluyt says that it was 'a thing in those days very rare especially to our nation.' The French were certainly before us. The pilot of the *Barbara*, it will be seen, was a Frenchman, as were also the spechemen or interpreters; and others of the twelve Frenchmen on board her had probably made the voyage before. Amongst the records of the Admiralty Court there are many indications that Frenchmen were acquainted with South American and West Indian waters. In 1539-41 some English and French merchants were associated in a voyage to Brazil,³ and in 1545 Norman and Breton seamen were trading to South America.⁴ Fifty years later there was a considerable force of Frenchmen in the province of Rio Grande,⁵ which was one of the districts visited by the *Barbara*. The *Monsieur de Rochepottes*

¹ Hakluyt, x. 2-6; ed. 1904. *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, xx. 115.

² Hakluyt, xi. 23-25.

³ *Adm. Court Libels* 9, No. 61; *Libels* 11, No. 54.

⁴ *S. P. Foreign, Spain*, Cal. 1545, pp. 205, 217, 409.

⁵ Hakluyt, xi. 64 *seq.* As to the French in Brazil, see C. de la Roncière, *Hist. de la Marine Française*, iii. 278 *seq.*

mentioned below, who disputed the right of the Barbara's people to trade in the country, may be the Sieur de Rochepot, governor of Picardy, who in about 1539 brought some Easterling prizes to England during the war between France and the Emperor, thereby raising an important question as to the jurisdiction of the English Admiralty to adjudicate upon prizes taken by a foreign captor.¹

The account of the Barbara's voyage, which is here given, is contained in the first volume of a series amongst the records of the High Court of Admiralty at the Public Record Office, which was formerly known as 'Examinations of Pirates,' and is now amalgamated with a larger series now known as 'Oyer and Terminer,' of which it forms No. 34. The documents contained in these volumes are the depositions of witnesses taken before the judge or other official of the Admiralty Court, preparatory to the trial of persons arrested for piracy. The earliest volume is of date 1535-6, the year in which an important statute² was passed, which provided a new tribunal and new procedure for the trial of piracy. Before this date piracy had been tried either by the judge of the Admiralty, in whose court the procedure of the civil law was followed, or in early times by the king's courts of the common law. Long experience had proved that both tribunals were unsatisfactory and inefficient; scarcely any records of the Admiralty Court earlier than the sixteenth century have been preserved, but an examination of those of the common law courts leads the present writer to think that before that century the punishment of the crime of piracy was extremely rare. Henry VIII., whilst reorganising the Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Courts, for the first time by the statute of 1536 established a more efficient tribunal; it consisted of the judge of the Admiralty or other civilian (i.e. practitioner in the Admiralty Court) and one or more of the

¹ Merriman's *Life and Letters of Thomas Cromwell*, i. 299; *ibid.* ii. 230, 233, 242, 277; *Adm. Court Libels* 4, Nos. 27, 28, 37, 38, 40; *ibid. Exemplifications*, Nos. 179, 182, 258.

² 28 Hen. viii. c. 15.

common law judges ; and the statute provided that the procedure was to be that of the common and not of the civil law. Piracy has been tried by commissioners appointed under the Act of Henry VIII. almost down to the present day.

The case of the *Barbara* was one of the first which came under the new Act. When the news of the captures made by her off the Spanish and African coasts reached the Emperor, his ambassador in England was instructed to demand satisfaction ;¹ and on 2nd January, 1541, Chapuys wrote to his master that since the lord admiral had dined with him the English pirates had been arrested, and he adds, ' they will no doubt be promptly executed.'² The records of the Admiralty Court show that proceedings were taken against the owner of the *Barbara* and some of her crew in November 1540 and in the early months of 1541.³ Whether the unfortunate deponents, whose statements are given below, or others of the few survivors who reached Dartmouth, were executed, or even put upon their trial, is not clear. No indictment or other record of a trial has been found,⁴ and probably those of the survivors, who were able to escape arrest, did so. John Chaundelor or Chandler, owner of the *Barbara*, does not appear to have suffered, for he is mentioned in the records as owner of the *Mary Fortune*, with which ship he was trading in 1543-5.⁵ It is doubtful, also, whether much of the spoil was recovered, although the *San Barbara* of Seville, the prize into which the people of the *Barbara* of Dartmouth transferred themselves and their belongings after abandoning their own ship, was arrested soon after

¹ *Letters and Papers, Hen. viii.* (1541) No. 70 ; *Add. MSS.* 28591, p. 274.

² *S. P. Foreign, Spain*, Cal. VI, pt. 1, No. 148 ; *Letters and Papers, Hen. viii.* (1541) No. 421.

³ *Adm. Ct. Acts* 3, November 3, 1540 ; *ibid.* January 5 and 14, and February 4, 1540 (old style).

⁴ But the Admiralty Court records of this date are meagre.

⁵ *Adm. Ct. Libels* 12, Nos. 185, 187 ; *ibid. Warrant Books* 1, February 25, 1544.

her arrival at Dartmouth, and an inventory taken of what was left of her cargo and gear. Most of her sugar had by this time been made away with, as had also the gold and other spoil from the earlier captures. The anxiety shown by the Spanish prosecutors to recover the Barbara's charts, including the very excellent 'goodly cardé' of the Indies, is significant. The identity of names of the captor and prize, Barbara of London and Barbara of Seville, will be noticed; it was a coincidence, and not a ruse on the part of the captors; a Spanish document shows that the full name of the Seville ship was the San Barbara.

It has been thought better, in this case, to depart from the usual custom of the Society and not to attempt to modernise the spelling of the documents printed below; they are printed as written, except that the punctuation is slightly altered and many capital letters are omitted.

VOYAGE OF THE BARBARA TO BRAZIL,
A.D. 1540

Anno 1540. The examinacyon of George Mone and John Wardall, late maryners of the Barbara of London, and of John Phellyppes, capytayne, and Thomas Robynson, the boy of the same shyppe, with the names of all the maryners.

Die Sabbato quarto die mensis Decembris
anno domini 1540 et anno xxxij^{co} regni
regis supremi domini nostri Henrici
octavi.

Elizabethhe Griffithe of Erithe late wiffe to John Griffin of Erithe one of the quarter masters of the Barbara of John Chaundelors saithe that her husbände had withe hym in the sayde shyppe towarde her vyage to Brasell thes parcelles folowyng :—

- In primis, in redy money v^{li}.
- Item a whistell and a cheyne of sylver, price xlvs viij^d.
- Item a shyppe cheste, price xx^d.
- Item a cape of newe blacke fryseadowe.
- Item a coote of blacke say withe sleeves, newe.
- Item a dublet of blewe chaungeable chamlette.¹
- Item a jerken of white fustyan.

¹ Camlet, a kind of soft stuff.

- Item a jerken of grene clothe.
 Item a frise coote, white newe, withe sleeves.
 Item ij payr of longe hoose, one blacke, an other white.
 Item ij payre of breches to the knee, one payr grene, thother blewe, withe ij payr of white shorte hoose to the same.
 Item one payr of longe breches, white.
 Item vj shurtes, one of fyne hollan, withe a white bande, thother v of bokeram and canvas.
 Item a blacke cappe withe a dubble turfe and my lorde Lyles¹ badge in the sylver theron.
 Item a newe blacke velvett nyght cappe.
 Item a blacke clothe cappe withe a sengle turffe,² newe.
 Item on handgonne and a sworde and a bukler and a dagger withe an yelowe hafte hangyd withe a cheyne of iron.
 Item on newe blacke frise mantell.
 Item a strawe sacke of newe canvas withe a pillowe and a pilloweberre.

The names of the maryners that wer in the Barbara of London when she departed oute of the havon of Portesmowthe towards the lande of Brasile the day of in the yere of our lorde god a thousand fyve hundrethe xl^{ty}.

- Roberte Browne, master.
 John Awodde, masters mate.
 Wyllyam Hare, quarter master.
 Rycharde Dowdale.
 John Griffyn, kylled withe Podde.

¹ Arthur Plantagenet, Lord Lisle, Vice-Admiral to Henry, Duke of Richmond, Lord High Admiral, 1525-1536.

² Tuck.

Thomas Jones.
John Podde, boteswayne, slayne.
Davy Hogens.
John Sorsby.
John Moyns.
Chrystofer Lorde.
Willyam Poor.
John Gardener, kyllled withe Podde.
Thomas Herson.
James Gold.
Wyllyam Powng.
Roberte Quarles.
Rycharde Torell.
Willyam Templer, kyllled withe Podd.
Roberte Alen.
Olde None Coke.
John Pett, dyed in an Ile not inhabyted.
John Stagge, hic notat de homo¹ Galli, etc.
Pers Weste.
Chrystofer Paynten.
Roberte Spellar.
John Wardall.
Edwarde Gremell.
John Breges.
John Hokes.
Rycharde Everton. Hic ille est qui vidit Podde
occisum, in frusta secatum, tostum, et
comestum per silvestres.²
John Cockes.
Thomas Doly.
Nicholas Cocke.
John Kempe.
John Griffin.
Edwarde Filpott.

¹ Sic.

² This is he who saw Podde slain, cut up into pieces, cooked, and eaten by the savages.

John Kynge, blowen over the borde into the see.
 Clemente Thompson, kyllled wit Podde.
 Morres Carpenter.
 Blase Carpenter.
 John Deboyes, carpenter.
 Blase Chaundelor.
 Thomas Robynson.

Gonnars.

John Lamme.
 Bartlemewe Smalwood.
 George Smalwood, kyllled withe Podde.
 Roberte Sherwood.
 Griffin, Gonner.
 Roberte, Gonner.
 Peter, Gonner.
 Thomas Smythe.
 Rycharde Barlowe.
 Thomas Byges, servaunte.

Marchauntes.

John Grene.
 John Capli.
 Willyam Taylor.
 John Deane.
 John Coke.
 Myghell Hawkens.
 George Moone.
 John Panytt.
 Chrysofer Barnes.
 Henry George, of Portesmowthe, baker, dyed at
 Cape Tybroon.

The names of them that dyed on the see.

Thomas Jones, maryner.
 Symon Cowper, taylor.

Rycharde Dowdale.
 John Shewerisbery.
 Rychard Noon, stuarde.
 John Ortor.
 Rycharde Taberer.
 Roberte Wood, master, dyed in the Raunge of
 Dertemowthe.
 Roberte Alen, coke.
 Chrysofer Paynten, dyed outewardes.

The names of suche as wer slayne in thile of Brasile.

John Podde, boteswayne.
 John Griffin, quarter master.
 John Gardener.
 Willyam Templar.
 Clemente Tompson.
 George Hobarde.
 George Smalwood, John Poddes servaunte.
 Anthony Gybyns.
 Wyllyam Longe.
 John Smythe.
 John Preste.
 John Foreste.

Item xij Frenchemen and iiij boyes.

Thyese seven persones be comen to London.

Wyllyam Hare, dwellyng at Berkyng in Essex ;
 Davy Hogens, at Genyens in Pety Wales ;
 Roberte Spellar, lyeng at the same house ; Roberte
 Quarles, dwellyng at Tower hill ; Edwarde Gremell,
 dwellyng at Saynte Katheryns ; Roberte Gonner,
 lyeng at Saynte Katheryns ; John Wardall, at
 hoste in Saynte Katheryns.

Die Mercurii x^{mo} die mensis Novembris
 anno domini 1540 et anno xxxij^o regni
 regis supremi domini nostri Henrici
 octavi.

George
 Moone. Georgius Moone borne in the Parysshe
 of Asshe in the countye of Surrey of the
 age of xxvij yeres, saithe that he hathe
 dwellyed withe Sir Anthony Browne frome the age
 of vij yeres or theraboute untyll the age of xvij.
 And frome thens he came to Wyllyam Locke,
 mercer, where he dwelled iij yeres; and frome
 hym to John Maynerd, and frome hym to John
 Preston, beyng part owner of the Barbara of
 London; in whiche shyppe before December laste
 paste he made ij voyages frome London to the Bay.
 And sens the same December he was purser in the
 same shyppe tyll Mydlent Sondag foloweng, at
 what tyme he was discharged of the saide office of
 pursers shyp by John Chaundelor and Richarde
 Glasyer, owners of the same shyppe. At whiche
 tyme she was redy to take her vyage
 towarde the lande of Brasile, esshypped
 withe an hundrethe persones, whereof he
 exteamythe abouts xij to be Frenchemen.
 And so the Wennysday after the sayd
 Mydlent Sondag they departed frome
 Portesmowthe havon, and sayled to Calshote
 Poynte, havyng the sayd Chaundelor and Glacyer
 withe them, who there departed to Hampton;
 sayeng that the same ther owners before ther
 comyng frome Portesmowthe had geven them
 a comysson in writyng under the Mayors seale
 there, the effecte of whiche comysson
 was that they shulde do no robery but
 folowe ther vyage like honeste men;

The
 departyng
 of Chaunde-
 ler's ship
 from Ports-
 mouthe.

The effecte
 of the
 comysson

geven unto the mary-ners by thowners. and in case they dyd otherwise ther sayd owners dyscharged them and charged this inquisite and his company therwith. At whiche sayd Calshote Poynte they taryed at ther anckers untill Passion Sunday, sayeng that there iij Frenchemen and one Englishe man, Cowper, departed frome the sayd shyppe. And saithe that the same Passion Sunday they departed frome Calshote and sailed on ther vyage and passed by the Neldes,¹ and so sailed till they came to Falmowthe the Wenynday foloweng, where they taryed untill the Fryday nyght nexte foloweng. And they departed and made saile untill Fryday nexte foloweng, whiche was Good Fryday, but withe what wynde he cannot tell. At what tyme he supposithe they wer as farre as Cape Saynte Vyncente. And frome thens they sette ther course to the Islande of Canerithe.² And frome there they set ther course Southe Southe Weste towards a place in the lande of Brasile called Parnaboughe.³ And fyrther saithe that they sayled withoute comyng at any lande untill May day, havyng a fayre wethur. And the same day they arryved at a goodly Ilande,⁴ whiche they named Phelippe and Jacobbes Ilande, because ther wer no people inhabityng therin ; sayeng that the same Ilande was full of small trees and fowles, where they founde freisshe water. And there dyvers of ther company wente on lande and fette⁵ freisshe water for the shyppe. Sayeng that at ther comyng by

¹ Needles.² Canaries.³ Pernambuco.⁴ Fernandó Noronha ; see Bryges' deposition, below.⁵ Fetched.

Cape Saynte Vyncente they mette withe dyvers shyppes under saile ; and certen of ther company withe ther cocke boate, in the mornyng on Good

On Good Fryday in the mornyng they toke a Byscayne. Fryday, aboute the breke of day, borded one of the same shyppes, beyng a Biscayne, as he supposithe, havyng salte in her goyng towards Irelande, and brought her almoste on borde them. And then sente the cocke on borde them, beyng

harde under the Cape. And then the master Hare, Wardall, and other wente on borde the sayd Byscayne ; and at ther comyng on borde this

The master, Hare, Wardall and other wente on borde her. inquisite saw the master of the Biscayne ymbrase Wardall aboute the myddell. And saithe that ther master leavyng parte of his company aborde the Biscayn shyppes came on borde the greate shyppes agayne. And then certen of ther company,

The master of the Byscayne ymbraced Wardall. whome he dothe not nowe remember, toke the sayd cocke and bourded a small carvell, a Portyngale, and toke oute of her certen bredde and oyle, and then put the Biscaynes of the fyrste

The sayde Good Fryday mornyng they toke a small carvell and put the Biscaynes into her. shyppes they toke and sent her away, and manned the Byscayne withe parte of ther company, Thomas Harryson beyng master, nowe sycke at Dartemowthe, with William Hare, one Frencheman for pilott, and dyvers other maryners and gonners, beyng furnysshed with parte of the

The mann- yng of the Byscayne. greate shyppes ordynaunce, and so appoynted her to wayte uppon the same shyppe. And so the same ij shyppes

Tharryvyng of the Barbara in Brasell. sayled to the sayd Ilande where they toke in the freysshe water. Frome whiche Iland they sayled to the mayne lande of Brasile where they arryved the iiiijth day

of Maye nere a place called Potaiewe,¹ and there came to an ancker within half a myle of the mayne lande, where they rod iij or iiij dayes. In whiche tyme they sente the boate withe the specheman and certen wares on lande sondrey tymes, where they spake withe the people of the countrey, and had frome them white hennys and cockes and a grene popyniay. And one tyme they brought a man of that countrey on borde, and an other tyme ij men, and sent them on land agayne. And

the depart-
yng of the
shyppe from
the place of
her fyrst
arryvall.

ancker and turned to the estewarde, pur-
posyng to fetch the countrey where the
Brasell wood growethe, and manned a
boate called a gondale,² and sente the
Byscayne before and the boate after to

serche the way for fear of daungers, Sayeng that the master gave commaundement to one Rycharde Dowdale, then master of the Biscayne, that in case he founde any daungers he shulde shote a gon. Whiche Dowdale beyng as far before them as they

The
Biscayne
strake a
a rocke.

myght almoste discry strocke a rocke and shotte no gon, but wente romer from the lande and so sailed to seawarde. Sayeng that about iij of the clocke in thafter none

of the same day, the sayd shyppe beyng aboute the place where the Biscayne turned to see, strake

The shyppe
strake
uppon a
legion of
rockes and
stake there
ij howres.

uppon a lege of rockes, and so stake uppon them aboute ij houres, in whiche tyme they gotte her of agayne and returned backe to the same place they came frome, and there came to an ancker before nyght. And the sayd Biscayne

¹ Hakluyt, xi. 66, Petiguar. In a modern map there is a place on the coast called Pititinga.

² This seems to have been the ship's long boat.

and the gondale came to the same place to them ;
 where she lay at ancker aboute viij
 The shyppes returnyng to the place of her fyrst arrayvall lay there viij dayes.
 dayes. Sayeng that the morowe after
 ther comyng backe to an ancker they
 manned furthe the gondale and the Bis-
 cayne againe, in whiche Byscayne this
 inquisite was. And so the boate wente
 before a longe by the mayne, and the
 Byscayne followed. And the nexte daye after
 the departyng frome the shyppes they loste the
 sight of the boote, whome they sawe not agayne
 in viij dayes folowyng. In whiche tyme this
 inquisite and his company plyed up estewarde
 alongeste the quoaste after the gondall, and
 wente dyvers tymes on lande by the way,
 where they sawe naked people of the countrey,
 and nothyng to by or sell. And then aboute
 thende of the sayde viij dayes the sayd gondale
 came unto them, and ther boteswayne told
 them that he had sene dyvers kynges of the
 countrey and brought ij styckes of Brasile withe
 them, seyng that they caryed withe them certen
 wares, but they mette withe nothyng in the
 countrey to bye or sell withall, and so they re-
 turned backe agayne to the shypp. And within
 a day after they weyd ther ancker and
 sailed to the westewarde to a place called
 The shyppes sayled westwarde and came to the Kennyballes.
 the Kennyballes,¹ in the sayd lande of
 Brasyle, beyng aboute ij or iij dayes
 saylyng frome Potaiewe, and there mored
 the shyp, wher she taryed a monethe,
 the shypp beyng nere the lande ; where
 they wente dayly on lande and bought
 The byeng of cotten wolle.
 cotten wolle, popyniayes, monckyes, and
 dyvers other straunge bestes of that

¹ On a chart of 1536 (*Add. MSS.* 5413), the country of the 'Caniballes' is shown between Cape St. Roque and Trinidad.

country. In whiche tyme the people of the country brought unto them above iij or iiij tonne of cotten wole, whiche was bought for the shyp. And fyrther saithe that after the sayde monethe, the viijth day of June, in the mornyng before day

The runyng away of the Frenchmen. all the Frenchmen beyng aborde shyp (savyng ther pilotte, a barber, a trumpeter, the pilottes boye, and one Jakes Warrocatte) [ran away].¹ Sayng that

Monsher Rochepottes servaunte. in the meane tyme, whiles they lay at the Kennyballes, there came a servaunte of Monsher Rochepottes, a Frenchman, unto ther Capytayne, charging and commaundyng hym in

his masters name to avoyde the lande there. And ther capytayne sayd that in the name of his master, the Kynge of England, he woulde not avoyde. And he saithe that then they had a bowthe on lande, whiche had stande there by the space of a monethe before. Sayeng that the sayd viijth day of June, after that the Frenchmen

The boteswayne with the other Frenchmen and never came agayne. wer goon away, the boteswayne, John Pod, withe dyvers other to the number of ix persones folowed, of whiche the boteswayne and vij never came agayne. And then the same day a greate number of the people of the country came downe to ther bowthe, and there because a man

of that country had shotte ther master, beyng in the bowthe, thoroughe the arme, wherfore one of the company strake hym uppon the necke withe a billette, they shotte at the master and the company, and they at them agayne. And

The setting of the then the same company set ther bowthe a fyer. And the master and his company

¹ These words have fallen out.

bowthe were fayne to forsake the same, and gate
 on fyer. them on borde, where they taryed at ther
 They taryed anckers iiij dayes after. In whiche tyme
 at the they sawe ther Frenchemen that ron
 Kenny- balles iiij away frome them come downe to the
 dayes after bowthe withe many men of the countrey
 ther bowthe withe them, and there assembled. And
 was brent. after that they taryed aborde shyppe
 still aboute iij or iiij dayes after. In whiche tyme
 they gotte iij of the salvages on borde them, of
 whiche one was loused and swamme on lande and
 scaped, and thother ij they brought away withe
 them. And further saithe that the master and
 the company at that tyme sette ther barcke on
 fyer, and then departed thens withe ther
 They brent greate shyppe, takyng oute of the same
 the Bis- barcke her sailes and other thynges that
 cayne at the they thought necessary for them, savyng
 Kenny- the salte, whiche they lefte ther still,
 balles. and then made saile to the westwarde,
 They sayled vj saylyng aboute vj dayes, in whiche
 dayes west- tyme they pumped very ofte, havyng
 warde frome the Kenny- fayre wethur till they came to an
 balles and Ilande, whiche the pilotte called Trinitie
 pumped Ilande,¹ and sayled betwene that Ilande
 ofte. and the mayne lande. And frome thens
 they sayled to a place of themperours,
 called Saynte Domingoes, whiche is in-
 habited withe Christien folkes. And nere
 They mett to that place they met withe a Spanysse
 a shyppe of shyppe of Cyvile laden withe suger and
 Cyvile by roughe hydes, goyng to Saynte Domyngoes
 Saynte for vyctuell, (as they sayd), whiche shyppe
 Domyngoes whiche they withoute feightyng they toke, savyng
 whiche they toke, laden that they shotte ij or iiij peces at her,
 withe suger.

¹ Trinidad.

and then she strake, and they bourded her
 withe ther greate shypp, and toke her

They mette
 the Galion
 the ngyht
 before they
 toke the
 Spaynyard. withowte hurtyng of any man. And
 further saithe that before the sayd night
 they toke the same Spaynyard they sawe
 an other shypp whiche this inquysite
 supposithe to be called the Galion of

The shotyng
 of gounes
 betwene
 them and
 the Galion. Civile. And the sayd Galion shotte a
 pece to lyewarde, and they an other, and
 after that asked of whense the Barbara
 was, and the pilotte sayd of Fraunce,
 and the Captayne sayed of England.

And theruppon the sayd Galion shotte
 at them ij peces, and one of the sayd peces strake
 under the captaynes cabon. And then they shotte
 at them agayne the hole syde, and myssed them,
 and then charged ther sayd ordynaunce agayne
 and shotte and strake them, but in howe many
 places he cannot tell. And after that

The goyng
 away of the
 Galion. the sayd Galion toke the way to seawarde.
 And then this inquisite and his company
 thought it not beste to folowe them be-

cause ther shypp was in so greate leke. And
 after that they toke the sayd Spaynysshe shypp
 ladon withe suger and roughe hides and put Johne

They
 bounde the
 Spayn-
 yardes the
 fyrste
 nyght. Awood, masters mate of the Barbara,
 Willyam Hare, and other into the sayd
 Spaynysshe shypp, and bounde the
 Spaynyardes the fyrste nyght in ther
 owne shypp, and the nexte brought them
 on borde the Barbara, and put xiiij of the

sayde Spaynyardes in the Barbara in a cabon, and
 other xiiijth¹ put to the pompe to labor withe
 thenglysshe men, and when they were wery
 they put them into the cabon that wer

¹ Sic.

at the pumpe, and put them that wer in the cabon to pumpe also. And frome thens sayled alongeste the quoaste to a place called Cape Tibron,¹ whiche is counted to be aboute an C leages. Where the sayd Barbara and the sayd Spaynysshe shyppe came to an ancker at nyght, and there rode all that nyght untill the mornynge, and then sent ther boate on lande withe commandemente to serche the grounde to bryng the shyppe on lande. At the returne whereof they brought the sayde shyppe lowse and ron her on grounde withe her foresaill, and pumped after that abowte ij houres, and then began to unlade ther vyctualles in to the sayd Spaynysshe shyppe, beyng unladyng aboute vj or vij dayes. Where they wente on lande dyvers tymes and sawe nothyng. The vyctualles that they toke oute of ther sayd shyppe was aboute x tonnes of sydre, all ther bakon, and all ther stocke fische, withe part of ther biskett and parte of ther ordynaunce withe powther and shotte. For receavyng wherof they caste oute of the sayde Spaynysshe shyppe aboute iiij^{xx} and vij chestes of suger or theraboute, as he harde the company say. In whiche place ther wente frome the sayde shyppe the pilotte, the pilottes boye, ther barber, ther trumpeter, and the ij salvages into the wilde cuntry, of whome they never harde agayne. At whiche place they lefte xxvjth of the Spaynyardes that they had taken withe ij bootes and sailes to helpe them selfe withall, and every man

The
Barbara
and the
Spaynysshe
shyppe
came to
anckers at
Cape
Tybron.

Then ron
the Barbara
on grounde.

And taryed
vj or vij
dayes to
unlade her.

They caste
iiij^{xx} vij
chestes of
suger into
the see.

The goyng
away of the
pilotte, ther
barbour,
ther trum-
petour and
ij salvages.

¹ Cape Tiburon, at the west end of Hayti.

a sworde and the vytaill, with all other merchaundyse that was left in the Barbara, and all her anckers and cables, and moche ordynaunce. But what bargayne or agreemente was made betweene the capytayne of the Barbara and the Spaynysshe shypp for byeng sellyng choppyng or chaungyng he knowethe not. But what became of the Spayn-

yardes he cannot tell. And so they departed whomewardes towardes Englande, withe what course he cannott tell. And within iij dayes after or therabowth they landed at certen ilandes, and sought for freysshe water and at the fyrste founde noon, but at thother they dyd fynde. And taryed aboute the sayde ilandes aboute viij or x dayes, ands so departed homewardes, and found noe more lande. They departed frome the sayd ilandes aboute the xvjth day of Auguste, and so

sayled tyll Fryday nyght nexte afore Bartlemewe day. At what tyme a greate wyndy storme began uppon them, and dured till Sunday at mydnyght foloweng, that they wulde not bere any saile. In whiche storme one John

Kynge, a maryner of ther company, was blown into the see. And the same Sunday they cutte ther mayn maste over bourde for fere. And after the cuttyng of the maste the same nyght the storm ceased. Whiche doon they prepared them selfe

withe dyvers remedies to come homewardes, and by the waye determined amongeste themselves to have fallen withe Ireland, but yet contrary to that purpose they fell withe Usshante. And frome thens sayled straight to Dartmowthe, and there came to an ancker in the Raunge, where they taryed at ancker all that

The
departyng
towardes
England
frome the
Ile of Cape
Tybron.

The
begynnyng
of a greate
storme.

Kynge, a
maryner,
was blown
over bourde
and the
cuttyng of
ther mayn
maste.

nyght. And the nexte mornynge, beyng Thurrysday, after the Mayor of Dartmowthe and certen other men of that towne had ben on borde, they hevvd ther ancker and came into the havon. And

Barlowe, with other, toke iij or iiij chestes of suger furthe of the shyppe at Dartemowthe. saithe that, whiles they lay in the Raunge, Barlowe and certen other of ther company toke certen suger loffes, to the number of iij or iiij chestes and put them into a barcke of Appesham¹ and wente towardes Lyme withall, havynge in his company James Golde of Portemowthe. And more he cannot tell, as he saithe.

Sabbato xiiij^o Novembris anno 1540 et anno xxxij^{do} regni regis supremi domini nostri Henrici octavi.

John Wardall. The deposicion of John Wardall one of the company of the sayde shippe called the Barbara of London written in the Counter in the Pultry in London; who deposithe and saithe that they departed owte of Portemowthe havon in a shippe called the Barbara of London, owner of her master Chaundelor and Master Glasyer of London, and bownde towards the Ile of Brasile; sette oute from the sayde havon

before named in Marche aboute the later yende therof, and sayled frome thence to Falmowthe, and there remayned iiij dayes for certen besynes of our captaynes. Sette oute from thens to Cape Saynte Vincente in Spayne, but all that way we mette nother shyppe nor boate untill the tyme we came to the sayde place of Cape Saynt Vincent before written, whiche was

¹ Topsham.

viiijth dayes saylyng and thethur we entered on good Fryday in the mornynge, a quarter before daye, and there we mette xx^t sayles of shyppes. And then our master

The master, the pilotte, the boteswayne and John Grene, the merchaunte, with iij of the company toke a barke of xli^{ty} tounes at Cape Saynte Vincent.

Roberte Brown and our pilot the Frenche-man and John Podd, our Boteswayne, and John Grene, whiche was our merchaunte, dyd comaunde our cocke to be howssed over borde, and they foure enteryd into the same cocke, themselves fyrste, and did comaunde iij other of the company to goe with them. Insomuche that so doynge they departed withe the cocke frome us, and we knowing nothyng of ther mynde and entente till suche tyme they returned agayn and brought withe them a barke of xli^{ty} tonne withe

certen ordynauce, that was ballested withe salte; and when they had brought her to oure shyppe the master and the pilotte sayd unto us whiche remayned still in the shypp ther wordes expressed herafter:—My mates and felowes

all, we have taken this barcke that ye se here withe the consent of us iiij presente, not as no robbery, as ye shall knowe all openly, but this is our entente, that we have taken this barcke to helpe us at our nede in our vyage, whiche ye know is dangerous, consydering that this barcke is very nedefull to us to have for our purpose, we knowing the jeopardy of our vyage that suche we muste nedes have for the saffegarde of our shypp and

The cause of takyng of the barcke declaryd to the company by the master and pilotte when they brought her to the shyppe.

wares whiche we have charge of for the synguler prouffet pryncypally of our owners, and savegarde of our owne lyfes, also to ayde us and our shyppe and goodes when we shall come to the

lande to lade Brasell,¹ where our shyppe cannot
 be able to goe, because of her great
 drawght; so that we take it for our
 necessary commoditie for our vyage,
 and so doying we do no manifeste here²
 unto you all, that what so ever shalbe
 hereafter layde to our charge for the takyn
 herof we will make answer at all tymes
 when nede shall requyer and shall con-
 tente and paye for her to the uttermoste
 to who so ever shall demaunde it lefally
 by right, and will clyerly dyscharge you all
 beyng of oure felowshyp at this presente
 tyme. Furthermore they commaunded
 us to goe aborde of her, and to set her
 men all on borde of an other barcke
 that dyd ryde besyde her, withoute any
 maner of hurte by worde or deade, and
 so we dyd. And then I tolde our
 capytayne and master withe the pilotte
 and merchaunte that I dyd knowe very
 well to whom this barcke dyd belonge,
 and sayd that the men in her dyd knowe
 me also; and the master dyd aske me
 how they dyd knowe me, and I answeyrd
 that by ther owne confession before
 them they confessyd that they had taken
 me before. For the which cause I
 desyred the master and the pilot to
 delyver the same barcke agayne for this
 consyderacion, because that I was withe
 them in sute in Spayne, and as yet
 beyng at no yende therof; wherfore
 this myghte be a greate cause to hynder
 me of my suete because they do knowe

The barcke
 was taken
 for the
 necessary
 proffette of
 the vyage.

The
 maryners
 wer com-
 mandyd to
 put the
 people of
 the barcke
 in another
 barcke
 rydyng by
 them.

Wardall
 tolde his
 company
 he that
 knewe to
 whom the
 barcke dyd
 belonge.

Wardell
 desyred
 that the
 barke might
 be delivered
 agayne be-
 cause
 thowner

¹ Logwood.² Sic; qy. harm or hurt.

therof had me. For the whiche wordes they wer
 taken hym agreued withe my sayeng, and called
 before that. me at ther pleasure, sayeng I shulde not

nede to make no answer for that barcke,
 for they wer sufficient to make answer for it at
 all tymes; I shulde not nede to be troubled
 therefore, for they wolde dyscharge me and bade
 me take no thought for yt. So we departed from
 thens and never troubyld no man nor childe but
 only the same barcke whiche before is mencioned,
 and so saylyed tyll we came towarde the quoaste of
 Barbarie, alonge till that we had syghte of Islandes

of Cabdevarda,¹ and frome thence sette
 They over towarde the Ile of Brasell; so that
 arryved on Phelippe and Jacobbes day in the
 nere Brasell morning we fell with an ilande in the
 at an see, and there wente on lande with our
 Iland boate and found nother man nor childe,
 where cotten and boate and found nother man nor childe,
 peper and peper there growyng. And there
 grewe. and peper there growyng. And there

we dyd tary all day, and that nyght
 wente on borde withe our boate, and so
 The ymmediatly departed and sayled from
 cummyng of the thens unto the lande of Brasell, and
 shypp to Brasell. fell with the land in iiij dayes after
 Brasell. ensueng. This don we ankered, and

our pilot withe our specheman went on lande to
 here news, and ymmediatly came on borde agayne
 and toulde us. Here is no brasell to get, for we be
 fallen xl^{ty} leages to lye warde² of that place wherethe
 brasell dothe growe, for the people sayde that they
 wolde not brynge it so farre unto us. Then, this
 sayng, they sayde ther was no remedy but that
 we muste nedes go thither witheoure shyp.
 And as we were turnyng thothurwarde, we

¹ Cape Verd.

² Sc. Leeward.

stake on the rockes with the shyppe, and
 like to have loste her clene, so that we
 They
 stacke on had her of agayne, and she was sore
 the rockes leake, and the pilotte then sayde that
 with the it was not possible to turne¹ thether
 shyp lyke
 to lose her. with our shyppe, the way was so
 dangerous, wherfore our shyppe shall re-

mayne still here, and we will sende furthe oure
 greate boate and barcke and put our wares in them,
 they do drawe but lytle water and be nymble
 and therefore they be necessarieste for to goe
 and come to fetche our ladyng hether.

The barcke This doon they departed frome us and
 and the was frome us xij dayes yende they
 boote wer returned to us agayne, and were in
 xij dayes greate jeopardy of losyng bothe boote
 frome the and barcke. And the people of the
 shyp. countrye toulde us that it was not possible

The people tolde them to have no brasell there, for because we
 they wer to were so farre shotte to lyewarde of it.
 farre lye- And then oure pilotte dyd say, to tarry
 ward of the here and to spende our vyctuell it is but
 brasell. folly and have no proffet ; for here is a
 place to lyewarde of us which is called

The return- Callybalde, which I know very well,
 yng of the and it is a C leages hense, and thethur I
 shyppe to will, and there we shall have oure ladyng
 Callybalde. of cotten and beastes in a shorte space.

And thethur we came and there ankoryd, and
 our pilotte with our specheman wente on shore,
 and dyd speake withe the people ; and so
 doon they dyd come on borde us, and they
 sayde they wer glad of our comyng and
 promesed us to have of ther commodyties for
 our wares gladly, as our specheman tolde us.

¹ i.e. to windward.

This doon our master commaunded us withe the captayne and pilotte to goe a shore and there to build an house ; and at ther commaundment we so dyd, and caryed wares on lande, and dyd bye and sell with them for cotten ; and there we were for the space of xijth dayes, and bought certen cottens in them for our wares. And there came to us a Portyngale and a Frencheman and certen of the same countrey with them by lande, and asked of us whence we were, and we sayd of Englande, and he demaunded us wherfore we dyd enterprise to come there. We answered we came for the trade of merchaundyse as they and other doe with us, etc. And then he commaunded us in his kynges name for to avoyde the countrey, and not to tary therin upon payne of a further dyspleasure to us hereafter ensueing.

The buyld-
yng of the
bowthe at
Callybalde.

A Portyn-
gale and a
Frenche-
man came
to them.

Thanswer
of the
Barbara to
the
Frenche-
man.

A Frenche-
man sent
withe one
of that
countrey to
cut ther
cables.

Then we made hym answer that we wolde not departe for hym for thuttermoste that he coulde do in any weys to us. And upon the sayd answer he departed in a greate fury, and sayd he wolde make us repente the tyme that ever we dyd enterprise so boldeley and wolde not avoyde at his commaundemente, and so wente his wey. And we contynued in our trade with the people of the countrey still.

So that the nexte nyght after foloweng, aboute xij of the clocke at nyght, the same Frencheman whiche was with the Portyugale before, and a man of the same countrey, whiche the Portyugale dyd sende with hym alongeste on the water to our shyppe for thentente that they

wolde have cut our cable that our shyppes shulde have dreven on the rockes. And we beyng in watche, parceavyng thentente of the sayde Frencheman and thother, dyd take them and kepte them till the nexte day in the mornyng, and our captayne dyd demaunde wherfore that they dyd come, and they sayd that they came to by part of our wares; and then we tolde the Frencheman that we wolde ponysshe hym onlesse that he wolde shewe us the tryythe wher fore he dyd come. And he sayd that in case he wolde not dooe me no hurte, I wolde tell you the truthe of oure purpose for comyng hether. Oure Captayne answeyrd and sayd he wolde not. And then he dyd confesse the tryythe as is before rehersyd, that it was to cut our cable, etc. And

then we kepte hym with us iiij dayes, and at the iiij dayes ende we dyd cary hym on lande to helpe us to doe our besynes. And in suche tyme as we wer moste besyeste aboute our cheffe besynes

he dyd scape away frome us. Then the thrydde nyght after that he was thus goon oure specheman and xijth moe of the Frenchemen of our company which did use to lye on shore in oure house to make our markettes withe the people of that countrey dyd ron away in that sayd nyght, and caryed withe them all the wares whiche were on lande

in our bowthe withe them clene, and had withe them an Englyshe man, whiche was our cockswayne. And in the mornyng our boate came on lande so sone as we coulde se; and then ij of our company beyng Englysshe men whiche wer smethes and lay on lande in a forge that they wrought in besydes our bowthe, dyd shewe us that oure Frenchemen

They kepte
the French
man iiij
dayes.

The speche-
man and xij
Frenche-
men withe
one Eng-
lysheman
ran away
and toke all
the wares
withe them.

wer goon away in the nyght, and lefte nothyng
in ther bowthe. And this we heryng

John Podde and xvth of the company followed the Frenchman. John Podde and fyvetene other of our company folowed them, and made greate speede after to feche them agayne. And then when they wer ij leages above in the wodds they besett our company withe people of the countrey, and so in

conclusion set uppon them, and dyd slay them all save one man by the councell of the Frenchman and the Portyngale, and at that tyme we were at the water side besye within our

bowthe. And the same after none there came above a m^{ll} of the people and sette oure bowthe on fyer, we beyng within ; in so moche as then they burned all our cotten that we had bought that we saved not a dell of it. Then we fought with them iiij houres by the clocke, and in conclusion we beate them of, but dyvers

of our men were hurte. And at the

The company of the Barbara fought iiij howres at the burnyng of the bowthe. laste we gotte oure boate and wente on borde of oure owne shyppe, and rode there till the nexte day in the mornyng. And then we sent our boate on shore and caused a banner of truse to be set up to them, and withe it a sworde and hatchett, and withe it a letter wherein

was written to the Frenchmen, yf they had any of our men that wer a lyfe, to sende them to us, and we wolde geve them ther

The nexte day the people of the country shotyng at them dyd beate them owne askyng for them. This doon the people of the countrey returned agaynste us agayne, and a greate number of them, and dyd shote at us, and beate us of the lande, and wolde not suffer us to lande ther no more. And at that tyme we

frome the lande. toke iij of them and brought them on
 borde with us, and there we dyd ride
 that daye, and coulde not be suffered
 to come on lande; in so moche that then
 oure captayne and our other officers sayde,
 Masters ye se that we cannot be sufferyd to doe
 our besynes as touchyng our purpose, wherfore
 it shalbe moste meatiste for us to get us home-
 warde, for here we doe but lose tyme, and our
 victualls are almost goon. And therunto they
 dyd all agree, for you see after what facion our
 Frenchemen have betrayd us. And then oure
 officers sayd, Felowes, ye see that we have loste our
 men, and nowe we have not men to furnysshe our
 shypp and our barcke bothe. Wherfore I and all
 we do thincke moste meate to man our
 shyppe well, and to sett fyer on oure
 barcke, to thentente that our enemyes
 shall have no proffet therby to do us,
 nor noe other dyspleasure therwith. And thus
 ymmedyatly we departed, and wer comyng home-
 warde. And ther barste a greate leake upon
 our shypp throughe the hurte we had
 before that. We had moche besynes
 to kepe our shypp uppe with iij pumpes
 goyng bothe nyght and day for the space
 of a monethe and more. And at the
 laste we did fall withe an ilande that is
 called Spanyoll,¹ whiche is the Emperours
 Inges; and not xx^{ti} leages of the lande.
 We there in a mornyng had syght of a
 shypp, whiche to our estimation was
 about ij C. or therabouts, that was in
 the wynde of us. And we shewed hym
 a banner of trowse to thentente we wolde

The burn-
yng of the
barcke.

A greate
leake brake
uppon the
shyp, hav-
yng iij
pumpes
goyng by
the space of
a monethe
and then
came to an
iland called
Spanyoll.

Thesyght of
a straunge

¹ Hispaniola, Hayti.

shyp, to have talked withe hym, to have had
 whom they shewed a his counsell for oure leake. But in no
 banner of wise he wolde not come nere us to speake
 truce. withe us, so that we kepte hym company
 all day tyll the nyght came. Then he
 came rowme withe us, and asked us of

whence oure shyppe was, and we answered of
 Englande. And then withe that worde he bade
 us, Amayne, Vyllaynes, and shote of his

A straunge shyp at hole syde of ordynaunce at us. And
 nyght after then he caste aboute on thother syde
 they mette of us also, and shotte all his hole
 shot of syde at us agayne to thentente to have
 bothe her soncke us. And so he departed from us.
 sydes of And then oure shyppe was sore leake, so
 ordynaunce that we purposed to runne her on lande
 at the Barbara. to save oure selves. And the next day
 Barbara. after we perceaved that it was no remedy,

The meat-nyng of the but that oure shyppe wolde syncke, and
 shippe we chaunced to meate with the same
 withesuger shyppe whiche we have brought home,
 brought and dyd take her for the savegarde of
 into Eng- oure owne lyfes. For we shewed hym
 land by the daunger that we dyd stande in
 Chandelors the because that our shyppe leaked, and then
 maryners. we dysyeryd hym instantly that if he

The com- we dyd knowe any harborowe or any other
 municacion dyd knowe any harborowe or any other
 had by the place that we myght goe unto for our
 maryners of savegard we wolde rewarde hym as he
 the Barbara wolde demaunde hym selfe, and wolde geve
 with them hym his shyppe withe all his goodes every
 of the shyp pennyworthe yf that he coulde brynge
 with suger us where we myght stoppe our leake.
 for the re- And he made us answer and sayd that
 covering of an har- he dyd knowe no harborowe in all that
 borowe for the Barbara. quoaste but one which goythe unto the
 the Barbara towne of Saynte Domyngoes, whiche is the chyeffe

towne of the Emperours Enges, and that was¹ a dry harber, and that he dyd knowe no place but it was deepe shoore to. And then we asked hym what remedy, and he sayde here is a place of C leages hense, if ye can possible kepe her up so longe. And we made answer and sayd, we woll do that we canne to brynge her there. And then we withe moche

greate payne sayled tyll tyme we came to the same place, and kepte her up. And then we ron her on the shore to save as moche of our vyctuallys as we coude for to brynge us with home. And then with all spede possible we wente for to save her vyctuell, in so moche that we saved xiiij pipes of sydre, xxⁱⁱ kentall of byskette, xxvj peces of ordynaunce. And all the reste of our goodes we gave

holely to the Spaynyardes for the behoufe of thowers and merchauntes of the same shyppe whiche we brought over with us. And so they wente aboute to save yt, and did save it whiles we were takyng in oure vytayll into this shyppe etc. And more in the meane tyme that we were besy takyng in of

vytaylls oure pilotte, our barbor, oure trumpeter, and tooe men of the salvages which we purposed to have brought whome with us, when that they sawe the shyppe loste dyd ronne awaye. So we caryed our vytail on borde of this shyppe that ther was no remedy but we wer compelled to caste over borde a C chestes

of suger for because the shyppe was so soore lade that she coude not take in oure vyctuell on lesse we had caste

The pilot,
the barbor,
the trum-
petor and
the ij
salvages
forsoke the
shyp where
she was ron
on ground.

A C chestes
of suger
was caste
over borde

¹ Qy 'not' omitted.

to take in away the sayd suger. So this don when
 ther vytayl that we had that we could save we called
 furthe of the the Spaynyards unto us and sayde, Ye
 Barbara. Barbara.

se what case we stande in, in so moche
 that we be compelled by very necessitie
 to doe that we doe to you ; and so we instantly
 desyer you to reporte us and no other wayes.
 This done we lefte them all on the shore save
 iiij, whiche fowre one was the master, and
 an other the pilotte for to bere witnes and to
 justifie to the kinges grace after what sorte we dyd
 take them and use them for our dyscharge.

Yt was a And so we departyd frome the countrey
 monethe and came homeward. Yet it was a
 or they monethe or ever we coulde get owte
 could gette frome the ilands, and we wer on many
 frome the of them to feche freisse water, but we
 ilandes. coulde fynde none. So in conclusion

we gote clyer frome them, but we had
 moche syckenes. Fyrste so when we were a C
 leagues frome lande ther rose suche a
 tempeste that we were compelled to
 cutte downe our mayne maste, or ells
 we had ben loste. Then ther fell greate
 sycknes amonge us, and our men dyed
 many of them for lacke of vytaylls, for
 we were xj weks or we se any lande
 nor shyppe, till the tyme we came on the
 quoaste of Englande. And the fyrste we
 met withe beyng a Spaynyarde. We

asked, What newes in Englande? And
 he sayde, Good. And so we departed
 frome hym and enteryd into Darte-
 mowthe havon. And then ther came
 on borde of us the Mayor of Darte-
 mowthe, and asked of us : From whens we came,
 and howe we came by that shyppe? And

then he commaunded us in the kynges name and my lorde Admyralles that we shulde not medle withe no goodes there tyll suche tyme he dyd knowe my lordes pleasure, and so commaunded us oute. And this¹ we departed and came oure wayes levying the shyppe and goodes with the hym and with the iiij Spanyardes that we brought with the us. Moreover when we enteryd into the sayd havon of Dartemowthe of lxxxxiiij men we wer no more but xiiij whole men, for all the reste was dedde and sycke.

Of lxxxxiiij
men late
maryners of
the Barbara
there came
to Dartemowthe
but xiiij
whole men.

This is the true recorde of all the hole vyage. And I desyer you to be good to me even as I have deserved and none otherwise, consydering the greate paynes and daungers I have bydden in this vyage withoute any proffette; and desyer your good favour towardes my deservynges, as ye have ben my good master ever hethurunto withoute any deservyng on my party. Ser I beseche you, remember what case I stande in here, for no man canne be sufferyd to speake with me here, and money have I none to helpe me, as God so helpe me. Wherfore for the love of God remember beyng youre poore servaunte and dayly bedesman whiles I lyfe as you knowe, for youre mastershypp knowethe that I have ben in greate trouble and daunger; wherfore, I desyer you to be good master unto me, as my hole trust is in you nowe and ever. Amen.
per me JOHN WARDALL.²

Wardell
affyrmyth
this to be
the true
declaration
of ther
vyage.

¹ Sic, qy. 'thus.'

² The signature is in the same hand as the body of the document. In the last paragraph Wardall seems to be addressing his owner, John Chaundler, who had been ordered to bring in these depositions.

[Here follows a deposition of Thomas Robynson, a boy of thirteen. It is for the most part a repetition of that of Wardall, with a few variations and additions. After turning back from Cape San Roque to the westward they took about ten weeks to reach St. Domingo, passing on their way islands called by their pilot Christ's Island, Trinity Island, Our Lady's Island, St. John's Island, and St. Nicholas' Island. The Frenchmen, or some of them, he states, were taken as interpreters ('spokesmen').]

Veneris tercio Decembris anno 1540 et
 anno 32 regni regis Henrici 8 coram
 magistris W. Gonson¹ et Arthuro² Huse
 in domo et in presencia mei Rogeri
 Huntte Registrarii, etc.

John Phelyppes of London, merchant, late Capitayne of the Barbara of London saythe the same ship departyd from Portysmouth in March last towards the lande of Brasyle, saying that he was shippyd for capitayne by the consent of John Chandeler, John Preston, and Richard Glasyer, merchanntes of London, owners of the said shippe; whiche owners hyryd this inquisyte and ther maryners for the thrydd.³ And saythe that after they wer hyryd he this inquisyte layd furthe xx^{li} and a bove of his owne money emonyest the maryners as he saythe. And before ther goyng furthe there was communicacyon emongest the company of the shippe that it wer very mete for them in ther viage to have a barke tattende⁴ upon the said shippe, and so after puttyng of

¹ Clerk of the ships.

² Mistake for Anthony. Huse (or Hus) was judge of the Admiralty.

³ Or thryddes. Qy. third share of proceeds of voyage.

⁴ Sc. to attend.

certayne Frenchemen furthe of the same shippe, whome this inquysyte thowght not mete for to goe with them, he gave warnyng to Thomas Handcock of Portysmowthe that he shuld not suffer the sayles of a crayer of the kynges, lyeing in Portysmowthe, to be on borde for fere of the sayd Frenchmen. And saythe that in London before that this Inquisite went to Portysmowthe the sayd Glasyer and Chaundler by the counsell of one Robert Nycoll of Depe, pylot of the said shippe, brought certayne orys,¹ whiche wer not mete for the same shippe nor for her bote, and sent them to the shippe at Portsmowthe, with other provysyon of the said shippe. And further saithe that the sayd pilotte dyvers tymes tolde this inquysite that seyng they had suche ores on borde mete for a barcke, they shulde meate withe fysshermen ynoughe uppon the quoaste of Barbaria, emongeste whiche fysshermen they wolde provide a barcke; Sayeng that they wer ij dayes saylyng betwene the Ile of Wight and Falmowthe, where they tarryed ij days to take in freisshe water, and to bye other necessaryes for the shype, as hoose for the pumpes, bred and other thinges. And from thens they sayled to Cape Saynt Vyncente withoute seyng of any lande, and there met with divers barckes, bothe latten and square, to what number he cannot tell. And uppon Good Friday in the mornyng they fell with the sayd Cape. Sayeng that after they had descryed the sayd barckes the sayd pilotte moved this inquysite to take one of the sayd barckes. Upon whiche mocion this sayd inquysite moved the same to the hole company of the shypp. And they all agreed therunto. And when they came amongeste the bovesayd barckes comyng all plyeng by the

¹ Sc. oars.

quoaste under the sailes, they put furthe the cocke of the sayd Barbara aboute viij or ix of the clocke on the sayd Good Fryday mornyng. Into whiche cocke enteryd John Podde the boteswayne, William Hare, Thomas Joones, and others to the number of viij persones or therabout, withe bowes arrowes swordes targettes and halfe hakes¹ withe powther and shotte for them. Whiche Podde and his company rowed to one of the sayd barckes,

Takynge of
the furste
barcke.

and with the shotte of bowe and gon they bestowed the men in her, and toke her and brought her to the shypp, and so came on borde withe the sayde cocke boate.

The second
barcke.

And then the sayde pilotte takyng moe of the company of the sayd Barbara wente into the sayd cocke and boarded an other barcke to se whether that they had taken or thother was moste meateste for them. And then the sayde pilote came on borde the shyppe agayne, and there determined the furste barcke to be most meateste for the purpose, and so put the men of the fyrste barcke into thother barcke to carry

Goodes of
the furst
barcke.

them on lande. In whiche fyrste sayde barcke they had dyvers peaces of ordynance, bothe greate and small, certen salte, jerres of oyle, byskett and wyne.

And oute of the seconde barcke wherin they put the sayde men they had certen fruyte and nothing elles. And then they manned the sayd fyrste barcke, and so saylyd togethurs towardes the quoaste of Brasile. And by the way, before they

The thyrde
barcke or
carvyll
takyn.

came to the Canaries, they met with a small latten carvell that came from Barbaria, to whome they sente ther sayde barcke for speche, and at ther

¹ A smaller size of hackbut, an early firearm.

meatyng layde her on borde. With whiche doying the inquisite was dyscontentyd, and for that caused the cocke boate of the greate shyppe to be had over borde, and wente in her hymselfe withe the master and dyvers other maryners. And at his comyng on borde the sayde carvell he loused and caused to be unloused those maryners of the same carvell that his company of the barcke had bounde before; and beddyng and other thynges whiche his sayd company had taken frome the sayde carvell into the barcke, he caused to be delyveryd agayne. And after that this inquysite the master and others, wente into the barcke, and William Hare, the captayne of the barcke delyvered to the master of the Barbara a lethur bagge withe a locke aboute

the necke, a fote longe and some Conyes¹ of whate more, havyng the lethur stryngge, golde. wherunto the locke was fastened, cut.

In whiche bagge ther was certen quened² golde of Morisco quones,¹ and small peaces of golde, by estimacion aboute iijⁱⁱ weight in all. The whiche bagge the sayde master dyd then delyver to this inquysite. And then they departed from the sayde carvell and came on bourde the Barbara. At what tyme John Podde, boteswayne, delyveryd this examinant an other lyke lethur bagge, withe a locke aboute the necke, and the stryngge also cutte, beyng aboute halfe full of amber grise, supposyng that the remnannt aswell of the golde as amber grise that lacked furthe of the sayde bagges was taken out by Hare, Wardall, Hair Woodall Quarles in the Tower Strete and the Quarleys. reste of the company of the barck and

¹ Coins.

² Coined.

shared amongstesthem. Sayeng also that they had certen almons and dates furthe of the same carvell. And he saithe that the company of the barcke dyd hurte a man of the same carvell in the heed, whiche desyred to have some saufe,¹ and this inquisite sent him some. And then Podde, the boteswayne cutte the sayles of the sayde carvell in dyvers places because they shuld not folowe them. And then they departed and folowed ther course towarde the lande of Brasile tyll they came as far the Canaryes. And comyng nere

unto an Ilande called Gonnera² they mette
 A Span-
 ysshe shipp
 of ij^c.
 withe a Spaynysshe shyppe of CC tonne
 unto whome they sent ther sayde barcke
 for to have spoken withe her. And the

barck, perceavyng that she made away, shotte at her to cause her to tary. And the sayd shyppe seyng that shotte at the barcke agayne. And so they shotte so longe one with another that the barcke chased her to the shore. Whiche doone the barcke returned to the shyppe, before whiche returne the greate shyppe had shotte ij gonnes shottes at the sayde Spaynyarde. At what tyme all the company of the Barbara were willing that this inquisite shulde have folowed her to the shore withe ther shyppe, which thyng this inquisite refused to doe. And so lefte the Spaynyard and folowed ther sayde course towarde the lande of Brasile. And in ther waye the company of the Barbara called for the sayde bagge withe golde, saying they wolde have it shared amongstesthem. And theruppon this inquisite delyveryd

The shar-
 yng of the
 golde.
 it to the company, and then the quarter
 master shared the same amongstesthem ;
 whereof this inquisite had no part. And

¹ Salve ?

² Gomera.

so fell with the quoaste of Brasile, at a place called Potenyewe, and ther came to an ancker within half a myle of the shore; and incontynente had oute the boate, and sente ther spechman on lande for to knowe whether they might have ther ladyng of brasell ther or noe. Where they spoke with the people of the countrey whiche answered them that they wold speake with the kynges of the countrey therabout, and make them answer. And afterwarde the sayde people sente them answer that ther was warre betweene them and other people of the countrey there, that they could not fatche the brasell. And theruppon this inquysite and his company determyned to departe estwarde, entending to recover the place where brasell dothe growe, and to sente the barcke before to descrye; and incontynente folowed with the greate shyppe by the space of that day and the nexte night, and the barke saylyng betwene her and the shore. Whiche barke the nexte mornyng after founde rockes nere to the shore; whiche then there¹ came to an ancker. And then an houre after that, the shyppe beyng about vj leages frome the shore under her sayles strake uppon other rockes and brake the same rockes and turned of, and so came backe agayne to the place where she lay at Potaiewe, and ther anckeryd; and the barcke after her, and came to an ancker also; where they taryed aboute viij or x dayes. In whiche tyme they sente the greate boote called the gondale with xxⁱⁱ men in her unto a place where the brasell woode dyd growe nexte unto them, beyng aboute xxⁱⁱ leages frome the shyppe; and within ij dayes after they sente the barke after the barcke.² Whiche bothe

¹ Sic.

² Sic. Qy. mistake for 'boat.'

returned within viij dayes, sayeng they had ben on lande and the people answeyrd them that they wolde no brasell brynge. After whiche answer had they concluded within them selves to saile to the westwarde unto a place called Caymond,¹ in the quoast of Kennyballes, there to trucke ther wares for wolle cotten. Where within the space of iij dayes they came to an ancker, and sente ther boote on lande withe spechemen to conclude with the people of the countrey to provide them wolle cotten for ther wares ; whiche people they founde tractable. To whiche place ther repared to thym a Portyngale and a Frencheman, beyng servanntes as they sayde to Monsher de Rochepotts, withe spechemen in a galion of his, they beyng at a place called Harrycourte,² xij leages frome ther shyppe. And the sayde Portyngale dyd forbydde them in his masters name that they shulde not medle any further in those. To whome this inquisite answered that in his masters name, kynge of Englande, he wolde trade in that lande contentyng the people for suche thynges as he toke of them. And theruppon dyd sende a letter to the capytayne of the sayde Monsher de Rochepotts galion, to knowe whether he woulde fortifie the same spechemans doynges or not. Who sent hym answer agayne by wrytyng that the warre whiche he demanded was to make hym good chere, where so ever they mette. And so taryed there, still preparyng woll cotten. In whiche tyme aboute viij Frenchmen beyng sayllers in the same shyppe, of whiche ij had as well practycke as speche of that countrey, departed frome them into

¹ Not identified. Cumana seems to be too far to the westward.

² Not identified.

the country, whiche never came to the shyppe agayne. Whiche meane tyme v of the men departed also, beyng Englysshmen, and the pylotte with them, whiche pylotte came agayne to them. And the sayd Frenchemen stale away divers goodes, and caryed withe them into the same country. And the same mornyng that the sayde Frenchemen departed, the boteswayne withe dyvers of the maryners, to the nomber of x in all, agaynste this inquisites will wente after the Frenchmen to feche them. Whiche boteswayne and his company never came agayne, but onely one man. And the evenyng nexte folowyng the naturalles of the country sett upon this inquisite and his company and fyered ther bowth. And they kepte them of and beate them into a wood neare unto them. And the same nyght recoveryd all ther gere into the shyppe, and there taryed by the space of iiij dayes, sendyng ther boate every day on lande to here news of ther men. In whiche tyme they gote iiij of the men of the country into the shyppe, of whiche iiij salvageis one swamme on lande agayne, and the other ij they kepte. And then seyng ther men returned not they toke all thynges furthe of the barcke, and set her on fyer for lacke of The fyeryng of the furst barke. men to sayle her. And so departed saylyng towardses Saynte Domyngoes by the space of x or xj dayes. In whiche tyme the shyppe appeared to be somewhat leaker then she was before. And within v leagues of Saynte Domyngoes they mette a shyp of Spayne, Ship of iiij^c. about CCC tonne saylyng towardses Saynte Domyngoes. Whiche shyppe halsed¹ the Barbara withe a pece of ordynaunce,

¹ Saluted.

who answered withe a lyke shotte. And so they appoyched and spake togethurs, and incontynente after shotte dyvers peaces of ordynaunce at the Barbara, and wolde have layd her on borde. Who seyng that, in ther defence shotte lykewise them agayne and beate them of, and after that asked

what the Barbara wolde have withe them.

The meet-
yng of the
shippes.

And then this inquysite and his company called them Traytorrs and bade them stryke ther sayles. Who withoute answer

departed frome them, this inquysite and his company folowyng them by the space of v or vj howres. And because they could not overtake them departed toward ther journey. And the nexte daye, beyng nere the sayde Saynte Domyngoes, met an other Spaynysshe shyppe, whome they

the iijth
shippe
takyng.

took withe all ther company on hurte¹ and sayled togetherr an C leagues. In whiche tyme ther leake increased more

and more, tyll they came to a place called Cape Tybron, where they sette ther greate shippe on grounde and searched her somoche as they myght. And desperyng of any recovery of the shyppe they toke oute vytayll and ordynaunce into the Spaynyarde for ther releffe, and so there lefte the Spaynyarde laste taken withe the Barbara,

savyng iiij persones whiche they brought into England with them, and for feare of takyng departed towarde Englande in haste, and travelyng the see aboute x

wekes. In whiche tyme aboute in xxiv or xxv degrees a greate storme of fowle wethur toke them wherin they wer nere loste. And for saffagarde of ther lyffes cutte ther mastes over borde. Whiche fowle wethur shortly after

¹ Sic, unhurt.

amended, and they repayed ther shyppe in the see, and sone after arryved in Darte mowthe.

Beyng demanded for what cause they sayled so farre westwarde as Saynte Domyngoes¹

And further saithe that he had for his parte ij sylver cuppes that wer taken furthe of the fyrste barcke, whiche he hathe solde in the weste countrey for lacke of money for v marckes.

1539. *The later assercyon of George Moone*

In the yere of our lorde 1539, the 9 daye of Marche, departyde the shype called the Barbera of London owtt of the havon of Porchmowthe apon hyr Brasyll vyage unto Cawshott Poyntt, where she rode iiij days, and the 5 daye, the whyche was the Passyon Sondeye, she tooke the see. And the Twesday or Wensday next folowynge she came to Fawmowthe, where she rode yntt² Frydeye att nyght, and then departed. And the poyline³ Sondey we hade syghtt of the Borlynges. And the God Frydey we came to the Cape Sentt

Vensentt, where we tooke a barcke ladyn with Portynggell saltt, the whiche they tooke to weyght⁴ over the shyppe. And in hyr they had ij gobbeletts of sylver, the wiche afterwarde the captayne desyerde of the company, saying they shalbe forthcomynge att all tymes, whattsoever shall come of ytt afterwarde.

j carvell. And owtt of one of the carvelles they hade sertayne pesys of fygges and raysons, jerrys oylle, and byskytt, and ther apparryll. And in lyckas⁵ owt of the other

Oon barck
withe salte
ij gobbeltes
of sylver.

¹ Sic. There seems to be an omission here.

² Until.

³ Following.

⁴ Qy. ballast.

⁵ Like case?

they had jerrys of oylle, and byskytt, with ther apparrell. And ynto one of this carvelles they put the barkys men, and take the barke with them. Of wiche barke

Hair. Wylliam Hare was captayne and Thomas Harryson was master. The Satterday next after they drave a shype a

A iij^{de} shipe. gronde on the Canaryes, the wyche was of Sevell, a shype of vij^{xx} of borden; but they bordyd hyr nott. An other

A carvell. Sondey or Mondey they tooke withe the barke a carvell belonggyng to Portt Sent Mary, the wiche was bownde homewardes and came from the cost of Barbery; owtt of the wiche carvell they had in a caskytt of a merch-

800 ducates. annnttes belonggyng to Porttyngoll wythe viij C dockettes, and of a Jue, the wiche was in the same shypp, a thowsand dockettes and a bage of amber gresse,

1000 ducates. butt I know not the weyghtt, and sertayne dayttes, and a small boxe of gome, the wyche was left in the greytt shype.

Martis vij^{mo} Decembris anno 1540 et anno xxxij^{do} regni supremi domini nostri Henrici octavi.

Thomas Harryson, late of Saynte Katherynes by the Tower of London, maryner, where he hathe ben abydyng sens Bartlemew was xijth monethe, and before that at Newe Castell aboute xij or xiiijth yere, saithe that aboute new yeres day laste this inquisite was shypped by Roberte Browne, master of the Barbara of London, and the iijth quarter masters, to saile the same shypp to Brasell,

for a quarter master his mate. And theruppon attendyd uppon the George of John Chaundelors of London, parte owner of the sayde Barbara, to take in ordynaunce and vytayll to be caryed to Portesmowthe to the same Barbara. And aboute Mydlente laste this inquisite came to Portesmowthe in the sayde George of London, and there one John slayne in Brasell and he this inquisite were chosen by the consent of the sayd Browne, John Philippes the captayne and the quarter masters to be over seers of the watche called the Cundior,¹ the sayd John Chaundelor and Master Glasyer owners of the sayd Barbara beyng present. And about xiiij dayes before Estur, the sayd Barbara departed frome Portesmowthe on her sayd vyage towardes Brasell, and came to an ancker at Calshote Poynte ij days. And frome thens sayled to Falmowthe, where they lay other ij dayes or therabowthe. And then foloweng ther vyage came to Cape Saynte Vyncente uppon Good Fryday aboute the breake of day, where they perceaved many shyppes and barkes, to what nomber he cannot tell. At what tyme the captayne, the master, and the pilott caused the cocke to be put furthe, and gave order to John Podde, Bartlemewe Smallhedde, William Hare, this inquisite, and dyvers other, whose names he dothe not nowe remember, that they shulde goe take a fisser barke beyng under sayle in the calme mornyng aboute iij cable length frome them. Whiche barke this inquisite and his company furthewithe dyd take. And then Browne, the master, John

Good
Fryday.

The furste
barke
takyng.

Browne
Wardall

¹ Cond, cund: to conduct (a ship) = to direct the helmsman how to steer.—*New English Dictionary*, sub tit.

Wardall and certen other of the company, which he cannot nowe expresse, came into the sayd barcke to them, and then the sayd Browne caused the Spaynyardes of that barcke to be put into an other barcke

Podde
Jones.

sayled by them. Sayeng that the sayde Podde and Thomas Joones withe certen other, whome he cannot nowe name,

wente on borde the same seconde barcke before the Spaynyardes were brought to her, but what they dyd there he cannot tell, savyng he saithe that when he came on borde the Barbara he sawe dyvers peaces of figges whiche he supposithe came furthe of the sayd seconde barcke. Beyng interrogated whether any of the Spaynyardes of the fyrste barke that this inquisite and his felowes came unto fyrste dyd take any acqueyntaunce or

Wardall.

ymbrased Wardall, saithe, Noe, albeit

Wardall reported and sayd that he knewe some of the Spanyardes in bothe the barkes. And he further saithe that at the camyng to the Barbara agayne with the sayd barcke that they had taken William Hare was made ruler,

Hair made
ruler.

Bridges.

8 persones

put into

the furst

barke.

and this inquisite appoynted to be nexte hym, havyng one Moyne, Wardall, Kyng,

Brydges, John the boteswaynes servaunte

nowe dwellynge withe Yonge at Portes-

mowth, and the same Yonge withe dyvers

other adymtted unto them to manne the

sayde barcke. And then the greate shyppe and the barke made sayle forewarde on ther vyage bothe togethurs. And aboute iij or iiij dayes after that the greate shyppe descryed a latten barcke under saile. And furthewith the captayne and the master of the Barbara comaunded

Hair.

William Hare to ley on borde the same barke, whiche he dyd, shotyng fyrste one

pece of ordynaunce at her. And when they had bourded her, the sayde Hare and the reste of his company, savyng this inquisite and Moyne, entered into the same barcke peaseably, for it was a merchaunte man of Barbaria, and comyng from thens, as he supposithe. Sayeng further that he knoweteh not what the sayde Hare and his company dyd in the sayd barcke. Albeit he saith that streight wey after that the same barcke was taken the greate shyppe came by her, and then the captayne and the master withe the boteswayne wente upon borde the sayd barcke of Barbaria, the sayd Hare and the moste parte of the company beyng on borde her; and so they taryed in the same barcke aboute an houre. And after that they came into ther owne barcke, where this inquisite saw the sayde Harre delyver to John Podde a bagge of a quarter of a yarde longe withe certen blacke geare therin called amber grice. And then the captayne with the master and Podd wente on borde the shyppe agayne. Sayeng that he sawe nothing elles at that tyme, whiche came furthe of the sayde barcke savyng he saithe that sone after the captayne withe his company were goon on borde the greate shyppe the sayd Hare tolde this inquesite that he had delyvered the captayne and the master certen golde whiche he had in the barke of Barbaria. Furthyr sayeng that frome thens they sailed furthe, and within a day and a nyght after they fell withe the Ilandes of Canary and sayled betwene ij of thislandes, foloweng ther vyage. Sayeng that they were calmed amongeste the same Ilandes aboute a day and an halfe, within whiche tyme they mette withe a Spaynysshe

Hare delyvered a bagge of amber gryse.

Hayr sayd that he delyvered gold founden in the lattyn barcke.

shyppe aboute CC tonne. And there she and the barke shotte iij or iiij peces of ordynaunce one at an other, but whethur shotte fyrste remembrithe not. Albe it he saithe the Spanyarde shotte the barke throughe under water. And after that as they sayled, they had sight of thile of Cabdevarda.¹ And so sayled furthe till they came to an Ilande within ij dayes saylyng of the lande of Brasell. And frome thens sayled and fell to the quoaste of Brasell, comyng to ther anckers aboute a leage frome the lande, where they taryed all that nyght. And the nexte daye Hare, this inquesite, and the reste of the company of the barke, came on borde the shyppe agayne. And saithe that there Podde and one Gryffyn shared the sayde golde, The sharyng of the golde. wherof this inquisite had v hole peces, whiche he suupposithe weyd halfe an unce. And so every man had his parte accordyng as he was in degre in the shyp. Whiche thyng doon, and the sayde barcke havyng in her Rycharde Dowdale and dyvers other to accompeny hym, whose names he cannot reherse, they sayled furthe cumyng² on the quoaste of Brasell. And at the laste the shyppe came throughe a legion of rockes, and beyng paste them returned to the place that they came frome, and came to an ancker, and the sayd barcke withe them. And within ij or iiij dayes after that this inquisite and the pilott of the Barbara withe dyvers other yonge men of the same were appoynted to the barcke agayne, to plye up by the quoaste to seke a place to lade the shyppe withe brasell; and so went furthe, and the greate boate called the gondale, beyng also manned for that purpose, was sente furthe lykewise. And this inquisite and the pilotte

¹ Cape Verd.² Or 'turning,' qy.

and ther company turned uppe aboute xxth leages upon the quoaste of the lande of Brasell, and were furthe aboute vj dayes. In whiche tyme they were on lande ij nyghtes, where they taryed not, for the fyrste nyght they mette wythe ij pore men and ther wiffes. And the nexte nyght they spake withe no body, nor coulde have any maner of knowledge where any brasell woode was. And after that they met withe the gondale boot and her company tolde them that they had ben on lande and had spoken withe people of the countrey, who tolde them that the wood was farre of, as they sayd. And theruppon the barcke and the boate returned agayne to the shyppe. And at ther returne the captayne, the pilot, and the master concluded amongeste them to saile to the Kennyballes for cotten wolle ; where they arryved withe in ij dayes after, and taryed there aboute a monethe. In whiche tyme the company wente on lande, and the capytayne, havng a bowthe made on lande, had merchaundyse on shore, and bought and solde withe people of the countrey. And at the laste aboute ix of ther Frenchemen stale away in a nyght and toke withe them certen wares withe them.¹ And the nexte mornng foloweng Pod the boteswayne, John a Wood, the master's mate, Etterton, and certen other of the maryners, to the nomber in all of a xj persones folowed the Frenchemen ; and the sayde Pod and viij moe xj persones. never came agayne. And the same after none aboute an C salvages came downe to ther bowthe and fought withe the company of the shyppe. And after that towarde nyght the sayde salvages set ther bowthe on fyer. At what tyme the capytayne and the company beyng

¹ Sic.

leste came on borde shyppe, where they taryed aboute iij dayes. And afterwarde they burned ther barke and departed frome thens, saylyng westwarde, for to gette a wynde for to returne towardes England. And at the laste they fell withe certen Ilandes called Trinitie Ilande and other. And frome thens they sayled furthe, and upon a certen mornynge they descried a shyp of CC tonne in the wynde of them, under sayle, whiche shyp came rowme withe¹ them the same nyght foloweng and spake to them, demaundyng of whens they were. And the company of the Barbara sayd, of England, as they told this inquisite, for they spake in Spanysse, that he dyd not understand them. Whiche Spaynyardes dyd then shotte iij peces of ordynaunce at the Barbara, and she as many at them agayne. And withe that the Spanyarde shotte by them on sterne, and stayed and came by them agayne, thynckynge to have layd them on borde, as he supposithe. And then the Barbara shotte at her her hole syde; and withe that the Spanyardes departed frome them. And the nexte day foloweng in the after none, very nere nyght, beyng, as he supposithe within iij leages of Saiynte Domyngoes they mette withe the Spanyard ladon withe suger, in whiche they came to Englande, and bourded her. And then this inquisite, Wood the masters mate, and Hare, with certen other to the

Hare withe
18 persones.

number of xvij persones enteryd the Spanyarde, and bounde the men and put them into ij cabons, and kepte them there all that nyght. Sayeng that frome thens they sayled furthe still aboute iij^{xx} leages of, keepyng ther course by the islande of Spanyold. And at the laste they came to a place called Cape

¹ Sc. bore down to.

Tybron. And there they ron ther shyppe on grounde, at what tyme she was ix foote deepe in water. And there they shifted ther vytelles and parte of ther ordynaunce into the Spanyarde, taryeng there aboute vij day. In whiche tyme the pilotte, ther barbor, ther trumpeter, and ij salvages ron away in to the woodes.

Beyng interrogated what tyme the greate leak fell upon the Barbara, saithe that yt fell upon her the same nyght that the shyp with suger was taken, and after that she was taken. For this inquisite saithe when he and his company enteryd into the sayde shyppe withe suger, the Barbara had but one pumpe goeng, and the nexte mornyng, when he came on borde her, he founde iij pumpes goeng, and the nexte mornyng, when he came on borde her he founde iij pumpes a goyng, and a grete parte [of the]¹ company labored very sore at them. And more he knowethe not, for he fell sycke on Bartlemewe day and so contynued tyll v wekes after his comyng to Dartmowthe.

Die jovis nono die mensis Decembris
anno 1540 et anno xxxij regni regis
supremi domini nostri Henrici octavi.

John a Wood of Saynt Katherynes late masters mate of the Barbara of London saithe that aboute mydlente laste Roberte Browne master of the sayde shyppe sette² this inquisite at Saynt Katherynes and brought hym to John Chaundeler parte owner of the sayde shyppe, where he was hired and appoynted to be masters mate to sayle in the same to Brasile, and to have foure meunys

¹ These words have fallen out.

² Hired.

right and d¹ for his hyer. And theruppon sayled frome London to Portesmowthe in the George of the sayde John Chaundelor withe vytelles and other thynges prepared for the same Barbara, and there came on borde her. And further saithe for the goyng furthe of the sayde Barbara on her vyage and foloweng the same to Cape Saynte Vyncente he deposithe as Thomas Harrison hathe deposed. And saithe that at ther comyng to Cape Saynte Vyncente uppon Good Fryday in the mornyng, aboute the breke of daye, the pilotte ij spechemen and ij other Frenchemen John and one Stagge, that ron away in Brasell, toke a barcke before this inquisite was furthe of his bedde. Sayeng that after hys arrisyng he sawe the sayd pilotte and his company come frome the sayde barcke in the cocke boote of the Barbara, whiche sayde they had taken the same barcke. And untill then this inquisite was nother of councell nor knoweng therof, as he saithe. And the sayde barcke beyng so taken, the pilotte withe certen other of the company wente on borde her agayne, and so toke furthe the men into the cocke boote of the Barbara and into the boote of the sayde barcke, and put them into an other barcke, whiche they bourded. And what they dyd elles withe her he knowethe not. And he saithe that ther was in the fyrste barcke aboute vij or viij wey of salte and certen jerrres of oyle, to the number of xx^{ty}. Sayeng that after the men of the fyrste barcke were sette on borde thother barcke, the pilotte broughte the barcke taken to the buttocke of the shyppe, and there put into her one of the spechemen for pilot, and Thomas Harrison for master, withe vj Frenchemen and

¹ Qy. diet ; the d seems to be followed by a contraction mark.

v Englysshemen, named Stagge and George, beyng lefte in Brasell, and Wardall, John the carpenter's servaunte, and John the boteswayne's servaunte. And that doon they sayled furthe bothe thes shyppes togethur, plyeng ther vyage untill they came to the Canaryes. Sayeng that before they came to Grawnde Canaryes the sayde pilotte and his company beyng in the sayde barcke howsed over ther boote, and bourded a latten barcke, beyng in ther way uppon the highe see in a calme about xl^{ty} leages frome the Grawnde Canaryes ; but what they dyd or had in the same latten barcke he knowethe not. And frome thens foloweng ther vyage they had syght of the Iles of Saynte Jago, otherwise called the Iles of Cape de Vardo. And from thens sayled and fell withe an Ilande called Vernandus Luna,¹ where they toke in freisshe water, beyng dystante aboute xxiiij leages frome the lande of Brasel. Frome whiche Ilande they sayled to the countrey of Brasell and aryved within iij leages of Cape Saynte Rocke² to the estewarde, and there came to an ancker. At what tyme the pilotte and one of the spechemen, this inquisite, and dyvers of ther company wente on lande to knowe howe farre they were frome the place where the brasell dyd growe. And the people sayde they were so farre of that they could not brynge yt downe to the shyppe. And then the pilotte, beyng demaunded howe farre the sayde place was frome them, sayde aboute xij leages, and that it was unpossible for them to plye up thethur withe the shyppe in a hole yere because the wynde blowethe there ever esterly. And theruppon they consotted amongeste them

¹ Fernando Noronha.

² Cape San Roque, the easternmost point of S. America.

to sende furthe ther barcke and ther greate boate to plye up by the shore for to seke the place where the brasell wood dothe growe. Who rowed aboute a xxvth leages of, as they sayde, and returned agayne aboute viij dayes, sayeng that ther spechemen and dyvers of his compeny had ben on lande and spoke withe people of the cuntry who tolde them that the brasell woode was so farre frome them that they coulde brynge none downe to that place. And he saithe that, in the sayde absens of the barcke and the bote, the wynde came to Southe Southe Este. And then the pilot the master this deponent and the compeny of the Barbara entended to turne uppe in the the quoaste, and so weyd ther anckers and made saile. And within ij houres after the pilotte sette the shyppe upon a legion¹ of rockes, and strake dyvers of them, where she sate faste about a quarter of an houre, and at the laste they brought her fore sayle to the staves, and so wrought her of the rockes, and brought her to the place where she lay before at her anckers, and there taryed untyll the returne of the barcke and the boote. After whose returnyng the captayne, pilotte, master, and the company, perceavyng no good to be doon there, sayled westwarde and came to ther anckers at a place called Caymownd in the Kennyballes, where ther specheman and ther pylotte tolde them there was greate good to be doon upon wolle cotten. And theruppon they remayned aboute xiiijth or xvth days and buylde a bowthe on lande, havynge certeyne of ther wares into the same bowthe. And saithe that within x dayes after ther arryvall there certen of ther Frenchemen, to the number of viij or x, desyred

¹ Ledge.

lycence of the captayn, man by man, to goe frome the shyppe. Whiche captayne gave them lycence, this inquisite beyng presente. Albe it he saithe one of the spechemen wente away withoute lycence, as he supposethe. Sayeng that within iij or iiij dayes after suche lycence geven unto them, the same Frenchemen on a certen mornyng in the breake of day and the sayde Stagge ron away frome the bowthe and stale withe them certen handgonnes, swordes, bowes, arrowes, and cutting knyfes, hachettes and coynes. After whose departyng worde therof was brought on borde the shyppe. And theruppon this inquisite and dyvers of the compeny wente on lande. At what time they havng knowledge that the sayde Frenchemen were so ron away in deade this inquisyte, John Podde, Griffithe of Erithe, John Gardener, George Smalwoode, a gonner, and one Great George of London, Rycharde Etterton, one Clemente, a Cornyssheman, and one other whose name he remembrithe not, weopenyd themselves¹ and folowed to have taken this Frenchemen. And beyng goon aboute vj or vij myles frome the shyppe unto the lande, this inquisite dyvers tymes called Podde and the company to returne agayne, declaryng unto them the perelles of the countrey and the people; whiche Podde and his compeny wolde not. Wheruppon this inquisite forsoke them and came back to the bowthe, to the captayne the master, and the reste of ther compeny beyng withe them. After whiche tyme the same day the people of the countrey in a greate number came down to ther bowthe and sette yt on fyer, and wolde have slayne the compeny of the shyppe. Wheruppon they gate on borde shyppe, taryeng

¹ Sc. took weapons, i.e. armed.

there about iij dayes after. In which tyme they burned ther barcke, for lacke of men to guyde her. Sayeng that the nyght foloweng the burned¹ of the barcke the sayde Ettorton aboute one of the clocke not after mydnyght came to the shyp very sore hurte; who sayde that Podde and his company were slayne or taken. After whiche tyme they departed thens. And then the pilotte, the captayne, the master, and the company perceavyng the shyp to have a very greate leake, consortyd to sayle to the Indyons, to get them some soker,² or elles an other shyppe. And in ther waye parte of ther company wente on lande at an Ilande called Trinitie Ilande for freysshe weter. And frome thens sayled within vij leages of Saynte Domyngoes, where they mette a Spaynysshe shyppe of cc and l or theraboute. At what tyme the same shyppe shott at the Barbara iij or iiij peces of ordynaunce and came withe the broode syde of the shyp to have taken her, aboute iiij of the clocke at after none. And then the Barbara shotte at her ij or iij peces agayne. And then the Spaynyarde caste aboute to gette the wynde to come on borde the Barbara on thother syde. And in ther countryng they of the Barbara shotte ther broode syde of ordynaunce at the Spanysse shyppe. And withe that she departed frome them. And they folowed her tyll about iij of clocke in the mornyng. Sayeng that they were purposed to have taken her, because the Spaynyardes bade the Barbara stryke, and cryed, Amayne! Amayne! And further saithe that when they forsoke the Spaynyarde they turned westewarde, because they coulde not double the lande. And the nexte day they came

¹ Sic.² Succour.

twharte withe Saynte Domyngoes aboute none, where they mett the shyppe withe the suger, and shotte one pece of ordynaunce at her, to cause her to stryke, and so borded her and toke her. And withe that this inquisite, William Hare, William Yonge of Portesmowthe, John Yonge's servaunte Brydges of Erithe, Rycharde Barlowe, Blase Sperte, and certen other, to the number of vij in all, enteryd her and bounde the men and put them into ij cabons, and kepte them in the same shyppe that nyght. And the nexte mornynge lowsed them and sente them on borde the Barbara to helpe the pompe. Sayeng that they had iij pompes goyng longe before that tyme, as he saithe. After which tyme they sayled westewarde withe bothe the shyppes untill they came to Cape Tybron, beyng aboute a C leagues frome the place where they toke the Spanyarde. And there they ron the Barbara on grounde, because, as he saithe, they coulede not kepe her above water. And after they had ron her on grounde they taryed there aboute vj dayes, shyftyng ther vytelles and ordynaunce frome the Barbara into the Spanyarde. Where they caste furthe of the Spanyarde aboute a cl chestes of suger, as he supposithe, to make rowme for ther baleste, vytelles, and ordynaunce. Sayeng that they lefte in the Barbara one greate brasse peace, dyvers greate porte peaces, to what number he cannot tell, withe all her apparell, and dyvers merchaundyses, with all her small gonnes. And saithe that they brought aboute vij or viij peaces of ordynaunce, with powther and shotte. And from thens they departed towardes England, leavyng all the Spanyardes withe the Barbara, savyng the pilotte, the master, and ij of ther servauntes, whiche they brought withe them. And saythe they gave the Spanyardes the boote,

and ther owne boate withe maste and sayles, money, and vytell to helpe them. Sayeng further that the pilotte, ther barbor, the trumpeter, and ij salvges ron frome them in the sayde place wher they ron the shyppe on grounde.

Beyng interrogated what money was shared amongeste them by the waye, in ther vyage betwene Cape Saynte Vyncente towarde Brasell and her returne to Cape Tybron, saithe that at Kennyballes, as he supposithe, there was shared amongeste the compeny of the shyp about cc ducketes, before the tyme that Podde was slayne. Sayeng that Podde had the money in his custody, and sente this respondent about xxv^s to lande for his share. And saythe that after ther comyng frome Kennyballes dyvers olde breches, jerkens, and other thynges that wolde have rotted, whiche dyd apperteyne unto Pod and the reste of his compeny that were slayne and taken in Brasell were solde at the maste, but who had the money he cannot tell; but the captayne knoweth, for he caused the geare to be solde. Sayeng also that he cannot tell what was doon withe ther chestes, raymente, money, and other thynges beyng therin, nor who had yt, as he saithe.

Beyng demaunded howe many they were in number lefte of the Barbara's company at what tyme they departed towardes Englande in the Spanysse shyp from Cape Tybron, saithe lx men or therabowte. And in ther vyage towardes Englande there dyed in the Spanysse shyppe John Surysby, boteswayne, two stuardes, Rycharde Dowdale and Thomas Joones, quarter masters, one Kyng which fell over borde withe the see, and dyvers others whose names he cannot rehearse. And at ther enterieng into the havon of Dartemowthe Roberte Browne, ther master, departed.

So that he supposithe ther were not above xxxviij persones that came to Dartemowthe on lyfe, wherof dyed there vij. And further saithe that what became of ther goodes, money, and raymente¹ that dyed in the shypp he cannot tell, for he lay five wekes seke in the shypp, lyke to dye.

And also saithe, that as he rememberthe there was certen amber grise shared amongste them in the shyppe by the newe boteswayne, whereof this inquisite had iij unces ; whiche one master George, at the Bell nere London Brydge, in Thames Streate, namyng hym selfe to be the Kynge's taker, charged this inquisite in the Kynge's name to delyver hym his amber grese, sayeng that he had the Kynge's comyssion to take yt. Wheruppon this inquisite delyvered hym, receavyng for the same iij angelles, because the sayde Master George wolde geve hym no more for yt. And further saithe that he supposithe that the captayne and one Davy, an Irisshe man, abydyng in Pety Wales at Tower Hill, had all Poddes gere, whiche was lefte uppon bourde the shyppe, at what tyme Podd wente on lande in Brasell to folowe the Frenchemen. And more he deposithe not.

Lune, xiiij Decembris anno 1540.

Beyng interrogated where became the pilotte's carde, the master's carde, the master's money, his whistle and other his stuffe and rayments, saithe that the captayne, John Phellippes, had the pilotte's carde, and one Rycherde Rycherde the pilotte's carde, and one Rycherde Stone. Stone of Dartemowthe had the master's cheste and a little carde therein with on

¹ 'Of those' seems to have fallen out.

estrolaby,¹ whiche was the pilotte's, a balestely,² an instrumente belongyng to th office of a pilotte for the nyght, a cape of red clothe, ij payr of hoose, and a shorte,³ withe his beste bonnette. And further saithe that he, this inquisite, was presente uppon bourde the shyppe in Dartemowthe havon at what tyme the sayde master

Roberte Browne delyvered unto Stone
 31 pieces xxxj peces of Morisco golde, beyng
 of Morisco worthe iiij^s viij^d a pece. And then the
 golde de- sayde master gave the sayde Stoone
 lyveryd to a popynyay. Sayeng that for the
 Stone. masters whistle and all other his gere

this inquisite cannot tell what became of yt, excepte the captayne can tell, savyng that the sayde Rycharde Stone delyveryd this inquisite furthe of the master's cheste a carde of the master's whiche he bequethed hym in his testamente. And that carde this inquisite brought home withe hym. And saithe also that the sayde master had as many peaces

of golde of Morisco quyne belongyng to
 Thomas of golde of Morisco quyne belongyng to
 Joneys had Thomas Joones whiche dyed in the shypp
 gold to as extended to iiij^{li} v^s, after v^s a peece,
 iiij^{li} v^s. whiche were worthe but iiij^s viij^d a pece.

Beyng demaunded who had Grene
 Grene dyed. his goodes, the purser saithe that one

Gremell of Saynte Katherynes had yt, whome
 Grene made his executour. Sayeng that the
 same Grene had moche amber grise, that he

bought of the company, whiche came to
 Grenell.⁴ Gremelles handes. But what money
 Grene had he knowethe not. And saithe that
 the sayde Grene had a very excellent goodly

1 Astrolabe.

2 Balestilha, cross staff: Smyth's *Sailors' Word Book*.

3 Shirt.

4 Sic.

carde for all the partyes of England, Fraunce, and Bryttagne, Spayne, and Portyngale, the Strayghtes of Malaga, unto Scio, all the quoaste of Barbaria, the quoaste of Gynny, through the Strayhtes of Magalyna, all the quoaste of Brasell, and Kennyballes, all thempirours

Hare had
Grenelle's
carde.

Indions, so alonge the Newe founde lande, withe dyvers other straunge places. Whiche carde William Hare of Berkyng bought of Gremell for ix^s.

Browne.

And further saithe that the master had vij peces of Morisco golde of iiij^s viij^d a pece, which he had in redy money by the deathe of one Pette, stuarde of the shyppe, partly in money, and partly by the gere that he solde in the shyppe of the same Pettes after he was deed, as he saithe.

John Brydges of Erithe, maryner, examyned the xxiiijth daye of Februarye, saithe that when they came to Cape Saynte Vyncente, Wyllyam Hare of Berkyng, John Podde, and others boured a barcke of xx tonne, called a galego, havynge in her salte and certen jerrys of oyle, and set the maryners of that barke they had taken on borde an other latten barcke, oute of whiche barcke they had nothyng but certen peaces of fygges and reasons that he, this inquisite dothe knowe of, for he was not on borde non of them bothe at that tyme as he saithe. But after that he was comaunded by the captayne and master to sayle in her and contynued in her tyll he came to an ilande called Vernando Lunus,¹ on whiche they fell uppon May daye in the mornyng. At what tyme he was comaunded into the greate shyppe agayne. And further saithe that after they sayled frome Cape

1 Fernando Noronha.

Saynte Vyncente they mette a latten barcke aboute the Canaryes, whiche barcke Hare, Wardall, Wyllyam Yonge of Portesmowthe, this inquysite, Bartlemew Smalwood, one Moynes, Harryson, one Blase, a carpenter, and others to the number of x, as he remembrithe, bourded by the comaundement of John Phelippes, captayne of the great shyppe, and the master and other officers of the same. And before the captaynes cummyng on borde Hare had gotte the keyes of the chestes of the same barcke, where he had a bagge of amber gryse and a bagge of Morisco golde, whiche was delyveryd to the captayne of the Barbara, as he this inquysite harde the compeny saye, butt he sawe yt not, as he saithe, for he taryed not on borde that barcke, but wente on borde ther owne barcke agayne. And after that they mette a shyppe of CC, whiche ther captayne commaunded them to bourde, and caused the greate shyppe to shote at her, and the berke also. And she shotte at the barcke and strake her throughe under water ; whiche was mendyd agayne within shorte space. And they chased that shyppe aboute ij houres, and at the laste drave her on grounde aboute the Canaryes, and there they lefte her ; but she came of agayne at the nexte tyde, as he supposithe. And after that sayled straight to the lande of Brasell, where ther Frenchemen ran awaye and ther cockeswayne withe them. And there for lacke of men, and because ther enemyes shulde not folowe them, they sette ther barke on fyre. And further saithe that at the Kennyballes the captayne shered the amber gryse and the golde ; of whiche this inquysite had for his parte v peaces of the same golde, whiche he solde for xx^s, and iij quarters of an unce of the amber grese, whiche he solde to one Thomas Wallys of Erithe for xiiij^s iiiij^d.

Beyng interrogated who had the goodes of them that were dead, saythe that the captayne had all ther mony hym selfe, and devyded ther raymenthe where yt pleased hym. And further saithe that he had of Nownes goodes a flocke bed, whiche he solde for ij^s vj^d, and that he gave to Edwarde Gremell of Saynte Katherynes for makynge the sayde Nownes will a russett hatte, a payre of Wadmoll hoose, a red peticoote, and a payre of myttens, and moore he had not, as he saythe. And the reste of his goodes Lambe the gonner hathe.

Here follow copies of George Moone's and John Wardall's depositions, as above, in the same words. The latter is addressed, 'To the worsshippfull Mr. Houssey, judge of the corte of the Amralltye'; and at the foot is Wardall's signature.

The following inventory¹ is scheduled to a certificate in Latin under the seal of the Admiralty Court, which states that the Barbara of Seville was brought to Dartmouth in August 1540 by some English seamen, having the goods and gear specified in the schedule on board, together with Peter Rivero, her late master or charterer (exercitor), and Roderigo Alvares her late pilot; that she was there arrested by order of Sir John Russell, the Lord High Admiral, and that so much of her cargo and gear as could be preserved was sequestered and brought to London for the benefit of the owners. The certificate is stated to have been made at the request of Rivero and Alvares, and is dated 4th February 1540. At the foot is written :

These parcells of wares and goodes hereunder wrytten weir in the ship named the Barbara of Civile at the tyme of her arryvall in Dartmouth haven.

¹ *Adm. Ct. Exemplifications* 1, Nos. 132, 133, 134.

First ij chests of sugar sowlde in Dartmouth for necessaries of the shipe at	v li
Item chests wherein appereth to be sugar	seven
Item more into other chestes.	

The schedule follows as below :

A testimonyall to bee made at the desyere off Petro Ryvero late master and Redrygo Allveris late pylott in a shyp off Syvell cawlyd the Barbera off the particulers ffoloweing here remaynyng to the use off the ryght owners whyche shyp goodes and men wer brought hethur by on John Phylyps Captayn and other maryners late sayling in an ynglyssh shyp namyd the Barbera off London.

In primis ffor price off ij^o chestes off suger fyve powndes sterlyng. Solde in Dartmowth by Rychard Pridiaux.

Item in chestes wherin aperith to bee suger fyfftye and seven.

Item more in too other chestes a lytell suger.

Item more off cowrse powder off suger twentye and to greatt banelles ; and more seven barylles and vj chestes off casiafistelo ; and more thre score and aleven oxhyds in the heyre.

Item the sayde shyp with on maynmast, one maynard, one foremast, one foreyard, one myssen mast, one myssen yard, one bowe sprytt, one bowe sprytt yard, one mayne corse and a bonnett ther to, one foresayll corse and a bonnett therto, one sprytt sayll and too myssen saylles, off whyche one ys all worne and fowre ankers, three cabulles, one cabelett, one hallser with dyverse other small thinges belonging to the same shyp.

Item twelwe bases¹ with twentye foure chambers,
 too great guns with foure chambers with
 dyverse shott, and too small barylls off gun-
 powder, and lxx spers and dartes.

By me Wyllyam Gonson the xxvjth day
 Janyarii annod^{mi} 1540.

Allso hyt ys reported as well by the sayde
 Spanyardes as bye th ynglyshmen that att Cape
 Tuveron theye threw into the see certeyn chestes
 off suger certeyn vessellss off casiaffistelo and
 manye oxhyedes

By me the sayd Wyllyam Gonson.

One or two other papers relating to the San Barbara have been found.² They are translations of Spanish documents sent to England to enable the insurers of the ship and cargo to recover what was left of her. They are: (1) Proxies to Peter Guttierrez of Seville from Diego Cavalliero and Ruiz Diaz Cavalliero of St. Domingo owners of the cargo, consisting of sugar, hides, and gold, to the value of 2000 ducats of gold; (2) Assignment of the San Barbara by her owner, Thomas de la Isla of Seville, to the insurers. She had been insured for 500 ducats of gold, and the insurance had been paid; (3) Bill of lading for the sugar and hides; (4) Interrogatories and answers of witnesses examined at St. Domingo and Seville, to prove the loss and ownership of the ship and cargo. They add little to the story as told by the seamen of the Barbara of London.

¹ *Adm. Ct. Acts* 3, February 16, 1540 (old style), bond in £120 by John Chaundler to deliver up these guns.

² *Adm. Ct. Examinations* 92, ad med.

THE SEA SCENE
FROM
THE COMPLAYNT OF
SCOTLANDE

EDITED BY
ALAN MOORE

INTRODUCTORY

THE COMPLAYNT OF SCOTLANDE is a work in the Scottish language printed in the year 1549, of which the authorship is uncertain. It has, however, been attributed to one Vedderburn or Wedderburn, Vicar of Dundee, and under his name one of the two copies which the British Museum possesses is catalogued.

In 1801 Mr. John Leyden brought out an edition in quarto with notes and references, and in 1872 the Early English Text Society reprinted the book with an elaborate analysis of the language, matter, manner, and purpose of its contents; even the type was minutely examined. To this edition the reader is referred. With that part of chapter vi., called a 'Monolog Recreative,' which describes a galliasse getting under way, the editor, Mr. J. A. H. Murray, confessed himself unfitted to deal, and turned for assistance to a friend of the late Dr. Furnivall, a Mr. G. M. Hantler, of 'ample naval experience.' Unfortunately Mr. Hantler was unacquainted with the seamanship of the ages preceding his own, for which reason his notes are of little value. Indeed, the editing of this section has been uniformly unfortunate. Leyden never grapples with the difficulties, and M. Jal who was the first serious student of nautical archæology, whose works are known, in treating of this passage in his *Archéologie Navale*, was so much hampered by lack of knowledge of the Scottish dialect, that he missed many points, in the discovery of which he would greatly have delighted. Lastly this sea scene was reprinted, somewhat carelessly, in Laird Clowes' *Royal Navy, a History*.

It might almost be said with truth, that among those who at various times edited these pages were archæologists and seamen, but the seamen were not archæologists,

and the archaeologists, with perhaps one exception, were not seamen.

The language of the *Complaynt* differs so little from English that, once the method of the divergence is grasped, it can readily be understood without previous study; and for this reason it has not been thought necessary to print a translation of the ensuing pages. Since, however, there are many technicalities, and those of diverse origins, it has seemed advisable, not merely to explain the hard words as they arise, but to give a short description of the matter of the piece.

In his 'Monolog Recreative' the author passes from scene to scene rapidly, but not disjointedly, and he discovers a zest for describing his observations not less than that with which, in other parts of the book, he comments on the approaching end of the world, and illustrates the condition of his country from the prophecies of Isaiah.

He leads up to the sea scene naturally and without effort. After telling of a walk through the woods in which he describes the various songs of the birds, which are the same now as then, he explains how he came to the seaside; and then begins an account of those seamen's cries which have changed so much.

He sat down by the breakers and looking out to sea, saw a galliasse at anchor. He said that he heard the words of the sailors without understanding their meaning; and here we may disagree with him; he knew very well what they meant, unless indeed some other hand wrote this part of the book. No man ignorant of terms so numerous and varied as those recorded, could put them down from memory in right order and application, unless he were frequently at sea, and then, no one, who, like the author, displayed such an interest in things around him, would long remain unlearned therein. Be it as it may, however, he gave no explanation of what must, even in his own time, have been obscure to many readers.

While he watched, the master sent the boatswain aloft to keep a look out for possible enemies, and in a short time he reported a sail in sight—a great ship.

Immediately came the master's whistle, and the order to weigh, followed by the song of the men at the capstan, and then their cries as they catted and fished the anchor. When the shank painter was fast, the master whistled again, and ordered two men aloft to the fore yard to let fall the foresail, and then came the command to board the starboard fore tack, tally aft the sheet, and haul the fore bowline. Next the mainsail and maintopsail were set, and hardly had the order to belay the main bowline been given, than the master decided to lace a bonnet to the course. This done, the mainyard had to be hoisted, no small effort, and requiring much song, and then it naturally followed that the topsail needed hoisting too; when the sail was high enough, and the maintop bowline taut, the order was given to change the mizen, and get the yard to leeward. The man at the helm was told to keep her full and by.

From the foregoing we can get an idea of the ship. The author calls her a galliasse, a word that at this time was loosely applied, and about which accurate information is not easily obtained. The earliest example of the word given by the *New English Dictionary* is 1544, and this passage is quoted for the next oldest. The best attempt to describe a galliasse is probably to be found in Mr. Julian Corbett's *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, but much remains obscure. Her essentials seem to have been the possession of oars and sails, greater length in proportion to her beam than a ship built only for sailing, and considerable size. She may be considered to have been something between a galley and a galleon. A galley was built with a view to her propulsion by oars, though she carried sails; a galliasse depended more upon her sails but relied largely upon her oars; while the galleon was a sailing ship, to be rowed laboriously in calms when necessary, but not expecting to use her oars in battle. The rig of the galliasse varied, sometimes, probably always in the Mediterranean, she carried lateen sails only, sometimes as in this case, she was square rigged after the usual fashion of a sailing ship of the period, which was of a type that began in Henry VII.'s reign, and lasted to

the end of Elizabeth's. Such a ship carried a long tapering bowsprit with a great steeve, upon which was set a spritsail, which with its yard was stowed in the head when not in use. Right forward was the foremast, square rigged and raking over the stem, surmounted by a great round top, above which was a little topmast, stepped probably in Henry VIII.'s time, abaft the lower mast head. Amidships rose the tall mainmast, also with its top and topmast, square rigged like the foremast, and aft was the mizen, or in great ships were the main and bonaventure mizen masts, not usually carrying topmasts, but often with an oddly shaped half-top at the mast head. These mizen masts carried lateen sails, the clew of the aftermost being commonly spread by a spar projecting from the stern known as the outlicker. All these masts were ponderously rigged with the exception of the bowsprit, which had no rigging of its own save such as was required for setting the spritsail. No mention of this sail is made in the *Complaynt*, but neither were it expected, for the ship is represented as coming to the wind as soon as she is under way, a point of sailing on which the spritsail could not be carried; and later when she was sailing large, she began to make ready for battle, and the spritsail was not a fighting sail, and had it been set would have had to have been taken in almost at once. Whether she carried a foretopsail or not is not clear, for though topsails are mentioned in the plural, yet the detail of setting only the main topsail is described. It is quite probable that she did not carry one, for it was commonly not fitted in small ships; and it is not unlikely that a large one which counted so much on her oars was also without it.

To return to the story. The galliasse was not kept long upon a wind, presumably only till she was clear of some point or shelf to leeward, for the order to bear up and keep her on her new course was soon given. She then prepared for battle, her flag was shaken out, and her topsails (or topsail) handed, ammunition was sent aloft, and all the ordnance, both great and small artillery, made ready, together with bows and weapons for hand to hand fighting. For better speed, studding sails were set

and her oars got out. It might at first sight seem strange that a ship should take in her topsails when speed was important, previous to setting her studding sails ; but it must be remembered that the topsail at this time was but a small sail, and that the men in the top would be much hindered by it, were it to remain set, for since the ship was before the wind, as long as it was set it would be like a curtain between them and the enemy, which would prevent them from throwing out lime intended to blow to leeward and confound their antagonist before they actually fell on board of him. The discharge of arrows and top-pieces would also be hindered. The people were made to keep still that the ship might sail the better, and so in a short time they came within hail of the enemy ; and his replies being presumably satisfactory, they loosed off great guns and small till the air was full of noise and smoke and smell, which, not liking, the author returned to the fields whence he came, as though a naval engagement were something that anyone might see when out for a walk, should his way lie by the sea shore.

The narrative is so spirited that a few discrepancies that show it to be not entirely an account of a personal experience are easily overlooked ; but when we consider that the enemy was sighted from the top, and that the galliasse sailed to him down the wind, it becomes apparent that we cannot accept as a statement of fact the record that the author could not see his length about him for the smoke, but must take it as a convenient device for leading up to his next scene.

THE COMPLAYNT OF SCOTLANDE.

PART OF CHAPTER VI.

[Brit. Mus. Grenville Library, 5438. Scotland K.]

(Lengthened contractions are denoted by brackets.)

Tha(n) eftir quhe(n) this dyn¹ vas dune, i dreu
 me doune throucht mony grene dail. i beand
 sopit in sadnes, i socht neir to the see syde. than
 vndir ane hingand heuch² i herd mony hurlis³ of
 stannirs⁴ & stanis that tumlit doune vitht the land
 rusche quhilk maid ane felloune⁵ sound. throucht
 virkyng of the suella(n)d vallis of the brym⁶ seye.
 than i sat doune to see the flouyng of the same.
 quhar that i leukyt far furtht on the salt flude.
 there i beheld ane galiasse gayly grathit⁷ for the
 veyr. lyand fast at ane ankir, and hyr salis in
 hou.⁸ i herd mony vordis among the marynalis

¹ The 'dyn' was the songs of birds, previously described.

² Hanging craig. The meanings of Scotch words are taken from Jamieson's *Dictionary of the Scottish Language*, unless otherwise stated.

³ Sounds, especially of falling stones.

⁴ Gravel.

⁵ Dreadful or fierce.

⁶ Raging or swelling.

⁷ Made ready.

⁸ 'Hou' or 'how' is used of anything hollow, e.g. the hold of a ship.—Jamieson. Perhaps here the word refers to the manner in which the sails were furled: under the yards, not upon them in the modern way, in which, if well stowed, the sails

bot i vist nocht quhat thai menit. 3it i sal reherse and report ther crying and ther cal. in the fyrst, the master of the galiasse gart the botis man pas vp to the top, to leuk far furtht, gyf he culd see ony schips. than the botis man leukyt salang quhil that he sau ane quhyt sail than he cryit vitht ane skyrl, quod he, i see ane grit schip. than the maister quhislit and bald the marynalis lay the cabil to the cabilstok ¹ to veynde and veye. than the marynalis began to veynd the cabil vitht mony loud cry. ande as ane cryit, al the laif cryit in that samyn tune as it hed bene ecco in ane hou ² heuch. and as it aperit to me thai cryit thir vordis as eftir follouis. veyra veyra,³ veyra veyra gentil galla(n)dis, gentil galla(n)dis. veynde i see hym, veynd i see hym. pourbossa, pourbossa.⁴ hail al ande ane, hail al ande ane. hail hym vp til vs, hail hym vp til vs. Than quhen the ankyr vas halit vp abufe the vattir, ane marynel cryit

can hardly be seen at a distance ; whereas in the old fashion great bellies and bunches of sail protruded between the gaskets, if the old pictures may be trusted. Or it may be meant that the sails were loosed, but that they were still controlled by the ropes which at that time served for the modern clewgarnets, buntlines, leechlines, etc.

¹ Capstan or perhaps windlass, 'Stok' means a piece of wood, a stock. Cf. anchor-stock for that part of the anchor that was formerly, and sometimes still is, wooden.

² Hollow : see *ante*, p. 75.

³ Virer : to turn or wind about ; virer au cabestan.—Lescallier, *Vocabulaire de la Marine*, 1777. Almost as we should say now, 'heave round.'

⁴ Bosses du bossoir : the anchor stoppers at the cat-head. Bosser le cable : to stopper the cable.—Falconer, *Dictionary of the Marine*, 1769. Bosse ! an order to the sailors who are hauling upon any rope to stopper or belay it.—Lescallier. 'Bossa' means a stopper according to M. Jal : 'pour,' he says in his *Archéologie Navale* 'is an English prefix signifying haste' ; but this seems to be but speculation. On the whole, judging by the context, 'pourbossa' seems to mean 'vast heaving.'

and al the laif follouit in that sam tune. caupon
caupona,¹ caupon caupona. caupun hola, caupun
hola caupun holt,² caupon holt. sarrabossa,³
sarrabossa. than thai maid fast the schank of
the ankyr. And the maistir quhislit and cryit.
tua men abufe to the foir ra,⁴ cut the raibandis ⁵

¹ Capon : the cat-tackle. Caponner : to cat (the anchor).—Lescallier. Caponne : the order to cat the anchor.—Falconer, and similarly in Aubin, *Dictionnaire de la Marine*, edition of 1736.

² Perhaps the same as 'halte !'

³ Serre-bosses : certain short ropes making the office of a shank-painter ; and which serve to hold the flukes of the anchor up to the ship's side.—Lescallier. Serre bosse : the shank-painter.—Falconer, and also Neuman, *Marine Dictionary*, 1799. The whole process of weighing is thus described : heaving up, catting and fishing. The cries 'caupon caupona,' etc., ending in the abrupt 'caupon holt,' have a fine suggestion of heavy hauling completed with effort.

⁴ Fore yard. 'Ra' according to Professor Skeat is properly Scandinavian, though borrowed by various nations of northern Europe—Dutch, German, etc.

⁵ Raibandis. In the Royal Navy, until sails were abolished, 'robands' was the name of the short pieces of stuff with which the sails were bent to the jackstay, or in former times the yard. In the merchant service the word has become corrupted to 'rovings,' and probably few seamen think that the first syllable means 'yard.' Here the raibandis were evidently what are now called gaskets, or at least were used for the same purpose. It is not a little strange that in pictures of this period and earlier, in which ships are represented at anchor with sails furled, no distinction is usually made between robands and gaskets ; where the sail is bent to the yard, there also the furling line is passed. At the present day it is the practice among beachmen and others who use lug sails to leave the ends of the knittles with which the sail is bent to the yard long, which long ends are used in making up the sail, which is thus bent and stowed by the same lines. Some such practice may have been in use in ships in remote times, leaving a tradition that a sail in furling should be made fast at the points of its attachment to the yard. At the period under discussion separate ropes were used for bending and furling as the context shows, for the order is to 'cut the raibandis.' 'To cut sail' was the regular expression where we should say 'to loose sail.' Hence perhaps the phrase, 'to cut and run.'

and lat the foir sail fal, hail doune the steir burde lufe¹ harde aburde, hail eftir the foir sail schiet, hail out the bollene. than the master quhislit ande cryit, tua men abufe to the mane ra, cut the raibandis, and lat the mane sail and top sail fal, hail doune the lufe close aburde, hail eftir the mane sail schiet hail out the mane sail boulene, than ane of the marynalis began to hail and to cry and al the marynalis ansuert of that samyn sound. hou, hou.² pulpela, pulpela.³ boulena, boulena. darta,⁴ darta. hard out steif, hard out steif.⁵ afoir the vynd, afoir the vynd, god send, god send, fayr vedthir fayr vedthir. mony pricis, mony pricis. god foir lend. god foir lend.⁶ stou, stou.⁷ mak fast & belay. Than the master cryit and bald renze⁸ ane bonet⁹ vire the

¹ That is to say, to board the starboard fore tack, which of course tautened the luff (lufe) of the foresail.

² Presumably equivalent with 'yohoe.'

³ Unexplained word.

⁴ Unexplained word. It seems to imply haste or effort, perhaps it may be rendered, 'bear a hand.'

⁵ In illustration of this Neuman's Dictionary may be quoted: 'Die bulinien steif ausoder anholen, to haul up the bowlines.'

⁶ The Early English Text Society's edition suggests 'good foreland' meaning good land-fall.

⁷ Stop, avast.

⁸ 'Renyé' means 'to rein' according to Jamieson, but this is the only instance given. Perhaps 'range a bonnet' is meant, i.e. spread it ready for lacing to the course.

⁹ At this time the usual method of reducing sail was by taking off a bonnet, not by taking in a reef. Mr. H. H. Brindley has drawn attention to the fact that reefs were in use in very early times as well as bonnets. Nevertheless reefs are very seldom mentioned in the sixteenth century, and the writer knows of no example between 1540 and 1650. Bonnets were in use for the courses until 1720, as appears from a document at the British Museum, *A proportion of sea stores for six months for the boatswains of H.M. Ships* (Cup. 651 e (28)). At the present time the French fishermen that sail out of Boulogne use them for

trossis,¹ nou heise. than the marynalis began to heis vp the sail, cryand, heisau, heisau.² vorsa, vorsa.³ vou, vou.⁴ ane la(n)g draucht, ane lang draucht. mair maucht, mair maucht. 3ong blude, 3ong blude. mair mude,⁵ mair mude. false flasche, false flasche. ly a bak, ly a bak. La(n)g suak, la(n)g suak.⁶ that that, that that. thair thair, thair thair. 3allou hayr, 3allou hayr. hips bayr, hips bayr. til hym al, til hym al. viddefullis al. viddefuls⁷ al. grit and smal, grit and smal, ane and al, ane and al. heisau heisau.⁸

their mizens; and in England the east coast barges which carry hay-stacks sometimes have them to diminish the area of their staysails: not for wind but for hay. The Norfolk wherries also use them instead of reefing.

¹ Veer the trusses. At this period the gear for keeping the yard to the mast was complicated and ponderous, and required first slackening and then setting up every time the yard was hoisted or lowered.

² 'Heise' is 'hoist'; 'heisau' may be taken as meaning 'heave ho!'

³ 'Vorser' says Professor Skeat 'is a rare spelling of verser, to overturn or simply to turn.' The crew may have been hoisting the yard with the jeer capstan, though 'ane lang draucht' suggests hauling with the arms.

⁴ *V* is used where *w* is required at the beginning of a word, in the *Complaynt*. 'Vou vou' probably means not much more than 'wow wow.'

⁵ Strength, courage. Northern English and Scottish form of mood. *N.E.D.* Mod, Swed.; Muth, Germ.

⁶ Swack: a large quantity, or a large draught of liquor. It agrees, therefore, very well with the modern word 'swig,' for we swig off a full bowl, and get a swig of the halyards, and the thought of the former helps us in the performance of the latter.

⁷ The Early English Text Society's note explains 'vidde fullis' as 'gallows' birds,' vidde = wuddy, fullis = foulis = fowls. Leyden translates 'viddeful,' 'wrathful.'

⁸ This passage from 'heisau heisau' to its repetition at the end is a true hauling shanty: perhaps the earliest known. Its matter does not differ very greatly from that of the modern variety, which is sung, but not printed. It affords a possible explanation of the author's disclaimer of understanding what the sailors cried.

nou mak fast the theyrs.¹ Than the master cryit top 3our topinellis,² hail on 3our top sail scheitis vire 3our liftaris³ and 3our topsail trossis,⁴ & heise the top sail hear, hail out the top sail boulene, heise the mys3en and change⁵ it oner [ouer] to leuart, hail the linche⁶ and the

¹ Perhaps 'tyes.' In later times the yard hung by the ties, and was hoisted by the halyards, as topsails are hoisted at the present day. But in Henry VIII's time it is not quite clear that 'tye' was not sometimes used for the hauling part.

² Topinellis: 'The lines for haling the topsails, Gl. Compl. Thus Jamieson, but he does not, anywhere that I can find, explain what Gl. Compl. may be. Toppenants: lifts.—Neuman. Probably the topsail halyards.

³ Vire 3our liftaris. At first sight the meaning seems clear: veer or come up your lifts; but why should the lifts be let go when the sail was to be hoisted?

⁴ 'Vire' might have a meaning something like that of the French 'virer,' to turn or wind, and so perhaps obliquely to hoist or tauten; but if this be the meaning, then we are in a difficulty with the topsail trusses. If virer means veer, it is right for the trusses, and wrong for the lifts. It is just possible that 'trossis' were not trusses but braces. (*Cf.* Trissen der blinde: the spritsail braces.—Neuman.) In that case one would expect the braces to be slacked while the yard was being hoisted, and hauled when the sail was sheeted home. But the order to vire the trossis comes before that to hoist the sail, therefore 'vire' should mean 'veer,' and we are in the same difficulty as we were when we supposed 'trossis' to mean 'trusses.' On the whole since, though the operation seems unnecessary, yet the veering of the lifts would not prevent the topsail from being hoisted, while tautening trusses or braces would, and since slacking trusses would be necessary before the yard could be hoisted, it is probable that 'vire' means 'veer' and 'trossis,' 'trusses.'

⁵ Change the mizen, was the ordinary command for shifting it from one side of the mast to the other. The evolution was the equivalent of dipping a lugsail.

⁶ The 'linche' is probably the leach; if so then 'hail the linche and the scheitis' means little more than, haul the mizen sheet. *Cf. supra*, 'lufe' or luff used where tack had been expected; boarding the tack would tauten the luff of the foresail just as hauling the sheet would tauten the leach of the mizen.

scheitis, hail the trosse to the ra. tha(n) the master cryit on the rudir man, mait keip ful and by, a luf. cu(m)na heiar,¹ holabar,² arryua,³ steir clene vp the helme,⁴ this and so.⁵ than quhen the schip vas taiklit, the master cryit, boy to the top, schaik out the flag on the top mast, tak i(n) 3our top salis, and thirl them, pul doune the nok of the ra in daggar vyise,⁶ marynalis, sta(n)d be 3our geyr in taiklene of 3our salis, euerye quartar master til his auen quartar, boitis man, bayr stanis & lyme pottis ful of lyme in the craklene pokis to the top,⁷ and paueis veil the top, vitht

¹ This conning admirably suggests that there was some point to be weathered. 'Full and by' is still in common use; 'a luf,' as we should now say 'luff'; 'cu(m)na heiar' 'high enough,' or 'no nearer.' Then, the point rounded, comes the order to bear up and go large.

² Holabar: haut la barre—Jal., *Arch. Nav.*, i.e. up helm.

³ Arriver: to bear up the helm—Jal, *Gloss. Naut.*; to bear away—Lescallier, *Vocab.*; 'No nearer! arrive!'—Falconer.

⁴ The mixture of expressions, some referring to the ship and some to the helm, is well exemplified in this passage. 'Bear up' of course refers to the tiller, which being borne up the ship bears away. 'steir clene vp the helme' probably means, 'bear the helm right up,' as we should say, 'Hard up.'

⁵ 'This and so': 'as you go,' corresponding with the naval 'very well dice' or thus.

⁶ 'Pul doune the nok of the ra in daggar vyise.' 'The nok of the ra' means the yard arm, which was notched or shapen so that the earrings kept at the yard arms, and did not slip inwards. ('Nock' nowadays means the upper inner corner of a gaff-sail, or staysail with a luff; in a gaff-sail more commonly called the throat. The name may have originally been given to the gaff-jaws, and then have been transferred to the sail.) The meaning of the passage is, stow the yard with one yard-arm in the top. In the *Navy of Venice* by Alethea Wiel several pictures are reproduced showing this method of stowing the topsail yard. Why daggerwise, is not apparent; perhaps because the yard made an angle with the mast like that at which a dagger was hung from the belt.

⁷ Mr. R. Morton Nance points out that 'craklene pokis'

pauesis¹ and mantillis. Gunnaris cum heir & stand by 3our artail3ee euyrie gunnar til his auen quartar. mak reddy 3our ca(n)nons, culuerene moyens, culuerene bastardis, falcons, saikyrs, half saikyrs, and half falcons, slangis, & half slangis, quartar slangis, hede stikkis, murdresaris, pasuolans, bersis, doggis, doubil bersis, hagbutis of croche, half haggis, culuerenis ande hail schot.²

are the craneline pokes or bags, by which ammunition was sent to the top. The craneline with bags attached is frequently shown in old pictures. A sort of davit projected from the top through which the craneline was rove. It may be that in cranelene a line over the *a* has been omitted; from craneline to crank-lene were an easy step. Craneline afterwards had other meanings totally different.

¹ Paveses were painted wooden shields, used also about the bulwarks.

² This seems a great weight of ordnance for a ship of the period, though we know that great numbers of guns were carried. The pieces were usually small ones, and 'canons' were rarely taken to sea according to Capt. John Smith about seventy years later. Most of the names occur frequently in books and MSS. of the period though the weight of both guns and shot varied widely. William Bourne's *Arte of Shooting in Great Ordnance*, 1587, differs considerably from Smith's table, 1626. This being so, it is impossible to give more than a general idea of the different guns.

Cannons were heavy pieces weighing about 8000 lb. and throwing a shot of 60 or 70 lb.

Culverene moyens or demi-culverins, were heavy for their shot; between 3000 and 4000 lb. with a shot of 9 to 12 lb.

A bastard culverin was a little smaller than a demi-culverin.

Falcons and half-falcons were light guns throwing a ball of 2 or 3 lb.

Sakers seem to have been nearly as heavy as demi-culverins, but to have had a shot of no more than 5 to 7 lb.

Slings were small pieces.

Hede stikkis, can only be guessed at. Mr. Carr Laughton suggests that stikkis is the same word as the German *stück* a gun.

Murdresaris, or murderers were small pieces for clearing the waist of boarders, being shot from the cubbridge heads.

ande 3e soldartis & conpang3ons of veyr, mak reddy 3our corsbollis, ha(n)d bollis fyir speyris, hail schot, lancis, pikkis, halbardis, rondellis,¹ tua handit sourdis and tairgis. than this gaye galliasse beand in gude ordour sche follouit fast the samyn schip that the botis man hed sene and for mair speid the galliasse pat furtht hir stoytene salis,² ande ane hundretht aris on euerye syde³ the master gart al his marynalis & men of veyr hald them quiet at rest, be rason that the mouyng of the pepil vitht in ane schip, stoppis hyr of hyr faird.⁴ of this sort the said galliasse i(n) schort tyme cam on vynduart of the tothir schip than eftir that thai hed hailsit vthirs⁵ thai maid them reddy for battel. than quhar i sat i hard the cannons and gunnis mak mony hiddeus crak duf,

Passe volant : the *N.E.D.* gives a reference to Hakluyt 1599.

Doggis : the *N.E.D.* gives this passage and one other, Art. 'Reddition Edin. Castle. 1650. '28 short brasse munkeys alias dogs.'

Bersis or bases were heavy pieces throwing a light shot.

Hagbutis of croche, or harquebuzes a crotch, were hand guns with a forked rest to give ease and precision of aim.

Half-haggis were probably small harquebuses.

Culuerenis presumably means culverin shot, perhaps used collectively for the shot of the great guns, while hail shot may stand for all the small bullets. Hail shot pieces are sometimes met with.

¹ Rondellis : small round targets.

² Stoytene salis : presumably studding sails. This passage is of great interest as furnishing one of the earliest known references to studding sails. At first they were what they have again become, a 'lash up' or temporary fitting.

³ Perhaps a hundred means merely a great number, or it may mean a hundred oars altogether, fifty a side ; but even this seems far too many.

⁴ Faird, her way. This a commonplace of sailing.

⁵ It was the usual practice to hail an enemy and 'wave him amain' before opening fire. See the spirited account of a sea-fight in Smith's *Accidence for Young Seamen*, 1626.

duf, duf, duf, duf duf, the barsis and falco(n)s cryit
tirduf, tirduf, tirduf, tirduf, tirduf, than the
smal artailze cryit, tik tak tik tak tik tak tik
tak. the reik smeuk and the stink of the gun
puldir fylit al the ayr maist lyik as plutois paleis
hed been birnand in ane bald fyir. quhilk generit
sik mirknes & myst that i culd nocht see my
lyntht about me, quhar for i rais and returnit to
the fresche feildis that i ca(m) fra.

THE TAKING
OF
THE MADRE DE DIOS

ANNO 1592

EDITED BY
C. LETHBRIDGE KINGSFORD

INTRODUCTORY

OF all the minor incidents of the naval war in the latter years of Queen Elizabeth there was none more memorable than the capture of the great carrack, the *Madre de Dios*, off the Azores in August 1592. Memorable as well for the greatness of the booty, as for the disputes that its division created between the Queen and the adventurers, of whom Sir Walter Raleigh and the Earl of Cumberland had been the chief. A narrative of the enterprise, written in the Queen's interest, was printed in Hakluyt's 'Principal Navigations.'¹ Another account on the side of Cumberland appears in 'Purchas His Pilgrims,'² whilst a third brief statement on the Queen's behalf is given in Monson's 'Naval Tracts.'³ But none of them can vie in vivid detail with the account (here printed) which Mr. Francis Seall, a gentleman of the Earl of Cumberland, wrote down, and John Stow copied out to lie almost unnoticed for three centuries amongst his Collections, now in the British Museum.⁴ Of Seall himself and his career we know no more than that he took part in this expedition. But he was no doubt, to quote his own words, a valiant gentleman, and could plainly tell a soldier's tale with happy art.

In January 1592, the London merchants received from the Queen an advance of 6,000*l.* prize-money for the ships captured by the London squadron in the previous year, on condition that they applied it to the fitting out of another expedition under Raleigh. The first

¹ vii. 105-118, Hakluyt Society.

² xvi. 13-17, Hakluyt Society.

³ i. 278-86.

⁴ *Harley MS.* 540, ff. 111-114.

intention had been to sail to the West Indies, but this was afterwards changed to a plan to lie in wait for the East India carracks, which were expected off the Azores in July. Raleigh sailed from Plymouth on 6th May; but, in accordance with an arrangement previously made, transferred the command a week later to Sir Martin Frobiser. Before he left the fleet Raleigh instructed Frobiser with the main division to cruise off Cape St. Vincent, whilst Sir John Burgh (frequently, perhaps commonly, written Burrowes) in the Roebuck with a smaller squadron was sent to the Azores. Afterwards Captain Crosse of the Foresight, and then Captain Thompson of the Dainty found opportunities to steal away from Frobiser and join Burgh.¹

The Dainty was a ship of Sir John Hawkyns, who, like some other private adventurers, had taken part in the expedition. The Earl of Cumberland seems to have equipped his squadron independently for a cruise to the West Indies; through from Seall's statement that they were appointed to meet at Terceira, they would, like the others, appear to have been diverted, before sailing, from their original purpose.²

It was known in England that five Portuguese carracks were expected home from the East Indies in the summer of 1592. Of these one was lost in the Mozambique Channel, and a second was never more heard of. With the fate of the Santa Cruz and the Madre de Dios our story is concerned. The fifth, making a fast voyage, escaped Frobiser 'at the Burlinges in a dark night, having sight of her light the 7th July.'³ It is implied in some places that Burgh did not arrive off Flores till 26th July,⁴ but Seall's circumstantial story confirms the statement of the Hakluyt account⁵ that he was already

¹ See more fully *Naval Tracts*, i. (N.R.S. xxii.) 281-7.

² Cumberland alleged that his vessels were intended to waylay the carrack; but Burgh asserted that they stayed only at his persuasion; *Lansdowne MS.* 70, ff. 225, 227.

³ *Ibid.* Art. 30.

⁴ *Ibid.* f. 223; *Naval Tracts*, i. 287.

⁵ vii. 110.

there by 21st June. Hakluyt relates that on that day Burgh, when watering on the island, learnt that one carrack had lately passed, with other four to follow. Thereon he put to sea and quickly discovered one of the carracks, the Santa Cruz, and that same evening might descry one or two of the Earl of Cumberland's ships. Hakluyt barely hints that the carrack had been chased into Burgh's clutches, alleging that on no side was there any way made by reason of a great calm. After reconnoitring the carrack in his boat, Burgh planned to board her in the morning. A storm in the night forced them all to weigh anchor; next day they found the carrack very near the land, and the Portuguese confusedly carrying on shore such things as they could. Purchas¹ has much the same story, save that he alleges that Captain Norton, out of civil respect (and not needing help) consulted with Burgh overnight. Yet if Seall's account be true, both the other narratives have omitted the events of a whole day, in which the chief credit of the first attempt lay with Cumberland's fleet. However, all agree that after the storm the carrack was fired, and her crew entrenched themselves on land. Burgh, says Hakluyt,² soon provided a remedy; for landing one hundred of his men, and easily scattering those who presented themselves to guard the coast, he no sooner drew toward their trenches but they fled immediately. From this making light of the hardness and the extreme march over craggy mountains³ it may be supposed that Seall and his comrades from Cumberland's fleet had most share in the dangerous exploit. Purchas, like Seall, describes how the landing party had to climb on hands and knees up a steep hill, 'on the top whereof stood many islanders tumbling down great stones on them.'⁴ Neither Hakluyt nor Purchas have so much to tell as Seall, except that the former adds that there was taken prisoner Vincent Fonseca, purser of the carrack, who on threat of torture revealed that within fifteen days three other great carracks would arrive.

¹ xvi. 15.

² See *post*, p. 104.

³ vii. 111.

⁴ xvi. 15.

Over the subsequent cruise and the coming of the Foresight and other ships both Hakluyt and Purchas pass lightly. But they have nothing contrary to Seall's story,¹ except that Hakluyt naturally enough describes the Council, at which the consortship was arranged, as held under Burgh's command.

Burgh spread out his fleet six or seven leagues west from Flores, from the north to the south, each ship two leagues at the least distant from one another. So they lay on the 3rd August,² the Dainty, the Dragon, and the Roebuck being the windward-most ships, the Tiger, the Assurance (or Sampson), and the Prudence of London, being next, and the Foresight the leeward-most.³ On that morning the Dainty had first sight of a huge carrack, and being of excellent sail got the start and fetched her up between eleven and twelve of the clock.⁴ In their little ship the English boldly assaulted the great vessel, delivering again and again their peals to hinder her way. The Dragon at 2 o'clock and the Roebuck at 4 o'clock followed next, and continued the fight within musket-shot all day, till at seven o'clock in the evening the Foresight under Captain Crosse came up.⁵ Burgh and Crosse agreed that they must lay the carrack aboard; Burgh in the bow, and Crosse at the main luff. According to Crosse the Roebuck miscarried, so that 'I could not avoid laying him aboard in his quarter.'⁶ In this dangerous position Burgh was soon forced to bid Crosse fall away. The carrack then stood in to the shore, and Hampton, the chief pilot of the fleet, who was on

¹ *Post*, pp. 104-106. It is clear from Seall's account that there was a considerable interval between the burning of the Santa Cruz and the taking of the Madre de Dios. The former event cannot, as Mr. Oppenheim (*Naval Tracts*, i. 288) supposes, have been during the last days of July. Hakluyt supports Seall.

² Seall's date, August 9, is clearly wrong; all the other narratives give August 3:

³ Hampton, *post*, p. 116.

⁴ Thompson, *post*, p. 115.

⁵ Crosse and Hampton, *post*, pp. 116, 120.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *post*, pp. 117, 120. Hakluyt does not suggest that there was any clumsiness.

board the Foresight, advised Crosse that she would escape if she was not laid athwart the bowsprit with some other ship. Hampton was told to do his best, and skilfully brought his ship up, so that his crew could cut the main luff, the fore luff, and the sprit sail suit of the carrack. The Foresight being under the carrack's lee, could not get off again, but lay there two hours till midnight, when the Assurance, or Sampson, came up with news that the Tiger was close behind. Crosse, whilst declaring that the 'fury is past,' agreed that the three companies should enter together. Hampton relates that he told Captain Cocke of the Assurance, that 'though we had so many men slain and hurt, as we might not enter, yet they might enter now with little danger, and small resistance.' Crosse and Hampton, like the writer of Hakluyt's account, had no desire to magnify the share taken by the Earl of Cumberland's ships. So we get no suggestion of the fierce fight which Seall describes so graphically;¹ Purchas, however, states that there was strong resistance, which continued an hour and a half, till the forecastle being gained, the Portuguese stowed themselves in holds.²

To this point Seall told his tale with no more than a natural exaggeration of his own company's share in so dangerous a feat. It was enough for their credit that he should describe simply what he saw. But now, leaving his soldier's story, he must gloze over what followed. To make the most of his ship's share in the fight and the least of their share in the pillage was no doubt the purpose of his writing. He cannot forbear a brag of the booty 'no more than one million pounds sterling.' With such a trifle to plunder, it was all frivolous and false to suppose that a man could catch anything there. But for all his assertion that if he, or any such as he, had gotten anything of worth it had quickly been taken from them, it needs but a little reading between the lines to picture the stripping and spoiling of captives and cabins.³

¹ *Post*, p. 108.

² Purchas, xvi. 16.

³ See *post*, pp. 109-10.

Purchas¹ with less cause for special pleading, wrote boldly: 'The English now hunted after nothing but pillage, each man lighting a candle, the negligence of which fired a cabin in which were six hundred cartridges of powder.' Two hundred men sacking a carrack by candle-light in the dark hours of the morning were not likely to know the full of all that was done. The story of one is no doubt a good sample of others. Thomas Favell, of the Dragon, confessed that he was one of the first that came in Captain More's cabin; with him were Edward Tunkes, corporal of the Tiger and many more. He had in that ship 'first a chain of pearls orient, two rest of gold, four very great pearls of the bigness of a fair pea, four forks of crystal and four spoons of crystal set with gold and stones, and two cods of musk given him by Captain Cawfield.' Corporal Tunkes had a packet of rubies; the master's mate of the Assurance a packet of diamonds, in quantity as big as his fist; the master of the same ship had 150 diamonds.² 'The first ship,' wrote Hernando de Mendoza, the captain of the carrack, 'dealt cruelly with us, though some of us saved some things.' For himself he begged no more than that he might have his compass, map, and astrolabe, without which he could not proceed.³ The crews of Cumberland's ships seem to have got the best of it. Burgh had enough to do to keep the Roebuck afloat, and took nothing from the prize; for when he came to the carrack, she was rifled of all.⁴ Crosse declared that having got a hap by the way he was not on board that night; but he seems to have made up for it next day.⁵ The Dainty's mast had gone by the board, and she drifted five days before she could regain the fleet. Thompson, her captain, then asked Burgh for his share of pillage, since other captains had whole cabins, silk, jewels, and

¹ xvi. 16.

² *Calendar of Hatfield MSS. (Historical MSS. Commission)*, iv. 233-4.

³ *Ibid.* iv. 230.

⁴ So Mendoza states; but Pawson and Rogers of the Dainty alleged that Burgh got much. See *post*, p. 121.

⁵ *Lansdowne MS.* 70, ff. 181, 185.

chains of gold. 'Is there never a chain of gold left?' 'I have something for you,' said Burgh, 'because you were away'; which was a common sailor's chest which had been broken up before.¹

No doubt all that was handy and easy to hide had been handsomely rifled, when Sir John Burgh came aboard the carrack the morning after the fight. Yet he had to take pretty stern measures to cut off the unprofitable spoil and pillage whereunto he saw the minds of many inclined; he could not restore order for a long time, for the Earl of Cumberland's men stood upon their lord's commission and challenged his right. However, in the end he seized the whole to her Majesty's use, and on such a declaration of authority Captain Norton had to yield him the command of the carrack.²

When the chance of further pillage on the spot was gone, all were eager to get home, in the hope for a timely disposal of their booty. A pinnace³ of Norton's came first with the news to England, twenty days before the carrack arrived. Burgh had sent his own report by Captain Crosse in the Foresight. Crosse fell in with Frobiser, on 31st August, in 47° N. Frobiser would have kept the Foresight with him, for having learnt of the plundering he thought well to begin first with her Majesty's ship. But Crosse, as Frobiser reported, carried her away, to dispose of the wealth which he had on board, estimated to be worth ten thousand pounds. 'Disorderly he went from me off the coast of Spain, and as disorderly is he now come from Sir John Burgh.' Frobiser begged that he might be refrained of his liberty till Burgh arrived.⁴ But Crosse brought the Foresight into Portsmouth, and managed to dispose of some of his booty, at least for the time, sending 'ten bags of anil and two bags of cloves, with some casts of armour and other things' for safety to the Isle of Wight. Crosse was deservedly marked for

¹ Thompson, *post*, p. 115.

² Burgh's *Report*, *post*, p. 113; Hakluyt, vii. 115; Purchas, xvi. 17.

³ No doubt the Discovery.

⁴ *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 30.

inquiry; he wrote to his brother John on 20th September: 'all my things are stayed and seized, tell Sir Walter Raleigh if he be not good to me, I shall be the worse for this voyage.'¹ The Foresight had a rich spoil on board. Richard May, who represented the commissioners at Portsmouth, reported that for four or five days Gosport was like Bartholomew Fair; one Warner, a Billingsgate man, kept a warehouse, and bought cloves for a shilling the pound, which he sold for five times that amount, 'and of all sorts of other goods after the like.' May was sorry for the poor and valiant men, who had so ventured their lives. 'I pity their folly that any knave or clown in drinking of pots of ale should so cozen them.'² The Prudence reached Plymouth on 3rd September; she had indigo, cinnamon, cloves, calico, and some other things; but since they were of no great value and much of it seeming to be pillage Drake and his fellow-commissioners thought no action was necessary.³ The bark Band brought into Weymouth a huge spoil of diamonds, rubies, and pearls by the thousand, taken from the ship which was given to the governors of the carrack to transport them into Spain.⁴ When such was the gleanings we can guess what the harvest must have been. Even the little Dainty brought home spoil enough for Richard Goodwyn of the Three Cups at Harwich to buy out of her so much calico, silk, and spices as came to five hundred pounds.⁵ If the whole value of the carrack ran near to a million sterling, as was reported, the plunderers must have got and concealed the greater part of it. If that was an exaggeration, much spoil was no doubt successfully conveyed into private hands.⁶

¹ *Hatfield MSS.* iv. 226; 'anil' is indigo.

² *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 35.

³ *Ibid.* Art. 29. The other Commissioners for the charge of the carrack were William Killigrew, Thomas Peyton, and John Bland.

⁴ *Hatfield MSS.* iv. 237. Purchas also speaks of this second rifling of the Spaniards.

⁵ *Hatfield MSS.* iv. 251.

⁶ *Ibid.* iv. 234-6, for pilfering from the ships in England.

It is easy to imagine what wild talk magnified the greatness of the prize, and with what excitement her coming was awaited. The carrack was delayed at the Azores some days to refit, and when at last she sailed in company with the *Tiger* narrowly escaped shipwreck off Scilly. Her master was John Bedford, Burgh's own officer from the *Roebuck*,¹ who should, in spite of Seall's statement, have been fit for the post. To judge from his name William Anthony, who by Seall's account saved the ship, was a West Cornishman.

When the carrack entered Dartmouth harbour on 7th September the little Devonshire town was in a ferment. Would-be buyers and brokers were already flocking thither to gather their bargains. Even on 4th September Lord Buckhurst had sent his servant to make choice of such stones, pearls, and other goods as he thought fit for him to buy. He naïvely begged the Commissioners to give his servant preferment over others, assuring them that they would find him very useful in warning them of them that come down contrary to order, and of others who might be the most likely purchasers of what was for sale.² Robert Cecil was sent down to help the Commissioners. He wrote to his father from Exeter that every one he met within seven miles of the city that had anything in a cloak, bag, or malle, smelt of the prizes. He had found much plunder in Exeter, and left an impression by his rough dealing on the mayor. He feared the birds be flown for jewels, pearls, and amber, yet doubted not to save in recovering the pillage what should be worth his journey. He would do what he could to suppress the confluence of buyers, of whom there were above two thousand; but in spite of his efforts one had ridden past to warn Dartmouth of his coming.³

The Commissioners and Cecil found it very difficult to deal with the prize. The purser had been released, and the bills of lading had disappeared. The captains 'fell into arguments of taking and boarding and such-

¹ *Hatfield MSS.* iv. 232, 234.

² *Ibid.* iv. 226.

³ *Cal. State Papers*, 1591-94, p. 272.

like points of honour,' but gave little practical help ; some at all events had done very well for themselves, like Crosse, who confessed to having plundered to the value of 2,000*l.* Even on the 8th September, Drake and his colleagues reported : ' We find such confusion and disorder amongst the men of war, and such spoils committed by them, that we know not how redress is ; meaning notwithstanding to do our best endeavours in our examination of the Portuguese that be brought home, being but the meanest sort of them that were taken, for the discovery of that they know. But we fear that small good will be done, unless it fall out by the accusation one of another, which they are very ready to do.'¹ A proclamation threatening pains and penalties had little other effect than to stir discontent. The Privy Council was niggardly in its orders ; mariners, besides the wages due unto them, were to be allowed 20*s.* for any pillage taken from them ; whilst those known to take the benefit of any pillage not recovered were to forfeit their wages ; as for the Earl of Cumberland's men, the pillage taken by them was to be deducted from the portion due to his Lordship, who might be left to recover it if he could.² Seall had some excuse for his complaint : ' martial men are not accounted of in England, longer than present occasion serves to employ them.' Drake was thought to have been too lenient, and Raleigh was sent down as the especial man for the task.³ Though the mariners received Raleigh with 'shouts and joy,'⁴ he could avail little more. The greater part of the booty, and in particular the precious stones, which alone were estimated at 100,000*l.*, escaped the Commissioners' hands. The more bulky goods, pepper, spices, silks, and carpets, were valued at 141,200*l.* All these latter the Commissioners were ordered to have discharged into the *Garland*, the *Roebuck*, and others of the Queen's ships, and sent under

¹ *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 32.

² *Acts of Privy Council*, xxxiii. 218-9.

³ *Lansdowne MS.* 70, f. 88.

⁴ *Cal. State Papers*, 1591-4, p. 273.

Frobiser's command to the Thames.¹ The first intention was to store the cargo in the house called the Friars at Greenwich. But eventually it was brought to the Leaden-hall at London. It is curious that Stow, who had been at the pains to copy out Seall's story, makes no further reference to the Madre de Dios than to record that 'the chapel and other parts of that Hall being employed for stowage of goods taken out of a great Spanish carrack,' a mathematical lecture, which had been formerly read there, was transferred elsewhere.²

The division of the spoil caused much dispute between the Queen and the adventurers. Elizabeth was inclined to claim all as her right, 'challenging the services of her subjects' ships, which are bound to help her at sea'; but yielded to the argument that 'it were utterly to overthrow all service, if due regard were not had of my Lord of Cumberland and Sir Walter Raleigh and the rest of the adventurers, who would never be induced further to venture.'³ Raleigh, who was at the time in disfavour, got 24,000*l.*, which left him out of pocket. Cumberland had 37,000*l.*, on which he did well. The London merchants got 12,000*l.* or double what they ventured. The Queen took the remainder in the shape of the pepper (724,802 lbs.) for which in December 1593 she had an offer of 80,000*l.*, but was advised to hold for an advance of 10,000*l.*; her original subscription in cash was only 3,000*l.*⁴ The Madre de Dios herself remained at Dartmouth. The day after her arrival Drake had reported that she was not conveniently to be removed for the want of sails and other necessaries. She had suffered much from the storm, and had she stayed but two hours longer had been in great peril. So they had given order 'to unrig her, and take down her topmast and yards, because she is so ill anchored and worse cabled.'⁵ After her unlading it was ordered

¹ *Acts of Privy Council*, xxiii. 269, 275.

² *Survey of London*, i. 75.

³ *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 90.

⁴ *Cal. State Papers*, 1591-94, pp. 303, 314, 328, 396; *Naval Tracts*, i. 294-5.

⁵ *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 32.

that 'she should remain at Dartmouth yet awhile, unless she may be sold to better advantage than there is yet any likelihood of.'¹ In Dartmouth Harbour she seems to have rotted away. She was the largest ship that had ever been seen in England; 165 feet long over all, and 46 feet 10 inches beam, with four full decks and three others in poop and forecastle.

The taking of the *Madre de Dios* was memorable not only for the greatness of her spoil, but for the attention which her capture directed to the wealth of the East Indies. It was the desire to share more directly in that wealth which led a few years later to the foundation of the East India Company.

In addition to Seall's account there are here printed also Sir John Burgh's Report on his victory, a letter from Captain Thompson of the *Dainty* to Sir John Hawkyms, and the depositions made by John Hampton, chief pilot of the fleet, and by Captain Crosse of the *Foresight*. All these are of interest as being written by persons who took part in the fight. Burgh and Thompson wrote whilst still at sea, before they could fully understand the disputes which would arise. Hampton and Crosse made their depositions in self-defence, and to that extent are less to be trusted, though no doubt they describe faithfully what they conceived to be their own share in the action. Hampton's account is noteworthy for its clear description of the skilful manœuvre by which the carrack was finally delayed. All four of these documents come from 'Lansdowne MS. 70' in the British Museum. In the same volume are numerous other original papers relating to the capture of the carrack, and to the disposal of her cargo. Further documents are contained in the fourth volume of the 'Calendar of Manuscripts at Hatfield,' published by the Royal Historical Manuscripts Commission in 1892, in the 'Acts of the Privy Council,' vol. xxiii., and in the 'Calendar of State Papers,' 1591-1594. Some parts of the story, which are here passed over briefly, are described more fully by Mr. Oppenheim in his edition of 'The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson,' i. 278-296.

¹ *Acts of Privy Council*, xxiii. 269.

THE TAKING OF THE MADRE DE DIOS

1. A treatise of my Lord of Cumberland's ships voyage, and of their taking of the great Carrack lately brought into Dartmouth. Written by Francis Seall.

To the Worshipful Captain Robert Leyton¹ &c.
The voyage of the Right Honourable the Earl of Cumberland his ships in anno 1592.

On Saturday the 6 of May we disanchored from Plymouth the third time (being twice before driven in there by foul weather), accompanied with divers brave captains, gentlemen, soldiers, and mariners to the number of almost 500, in 7 sail of ships and pinnaces; of which the Tiger was admiral, and Assurance vice-admiral, 2, these were both my lord's; then the Gold-Noble, rear-admiral, 3; the Phoenix, 4; a barke of Barnstaple, 5; the Discovery, a pinnace of my lord's, 6; the seventh was the Grace of Dover, who, staying behind upon urgent occasions, was appointed to meet us at the Islands of Treasora,² according to direction set down (as afterwards she did).

After our departure from England with the first six ships we had for a while reasonable fair weather, and till we were the better part of our way towards the Northern Cape.³

¹ The Captain of the Assurance.

² Terceira, in the Azores.

³ i.e. of Finisterre.

The 12th of the same month we fell with the eastward of the Cape Finisterre, and as low as Mongy,¹ where towards the evening we descried 2 great ships, which afterwards we made for galleasses. The stiffness of the gale continuing still, and the master of the ship perceiving it rather to increase than to minish, resolved to shake off their bonnets. In this meantime the Gold-Noble, which was rear-admiral, who was yet astern of us, seemed to be in some distress, with whom we determined to stand, that we might know what her occasion of bearing up was ; but night coming on we lost sight of her and also of the galleasses, she not happening any more all this voyage into our company ; viz. from the Cape we proceeded to the Burlings,² and from thence as directly as wind and weather would suffer us to sail towards the islands before named, still plying for the westernmost of those islands called Floweris Corve ;³ where we would not at the first discover ourselves, but kept our ships out of ken some eighteen or twenty leagues until the 21 of June, when the Assurance, our vice-admiral, descried a sail unto which she presently gave chase. The Tiger and the rest of the fleet perceiving her, made haste with all the sail they could pack on after the same ship ; and in short time the same forenoon there was no man in the ship contrary of the opinion that she was a carrack. Nevertheless before we could recover her she scaped the Island of Floweres. And as soon as she had opened the southeast point thereof she descried two sail more ahead and to leeward of herself, and not knowing what ships they were,

¹ Perhaps Mugia.

² The Berlenga Islands, twenty miles north of C. da Roca.

³ Meaning Flores and Corvo.

neither what they were that come after them, shot off a piece ; upon reports whereof there came boats from the shore, of whom they inquired what those ships were that were ahead of them. The islanders made answer that the one was the *Roebuck*, a ship wherein Sir John Burgh,¹ a knight of England, commanded, and that other ship that was with him they took for his pinnace, but what they were that gave the chase they could not tell, for they had neither seen nor heard of them till that day. They of the carrack called the *Santa Cruz*,² perceiving two of them which followed to be great ships, whom they knew not of whence to be (whether they were friends or foes), and knowing certainly to be enemies by whom they must needs pass if they proceed, thought best to come to an anchor under the island, determining to ride there till she heard of certain whereto they might trust (of those ships which followed them, which were my Lord of Cumberland's). Now the *Assurance*, our vice-admiral, sent off her long boat to haste good news of them they had in chase, and to return with certain word what they could make her to be. The boat having made good speed both with sail and oars was up with her (where she rode) by eight or nine of the clock the same night, and hailed them, offering under their captain's promise the surety of their lives, if they would come forth and quietly yield their ship and goods unto the Englishmen's hands ; but they scornfully replying bade them begone, or they would send them a token of their good will. The boat with this answer hastened towards the admiral, where she

¹ He always signed his name as John Burgh, but his contemporaries call him Borough, Burroughs, or Burrowes.

² Saint Cruise in the MS.

declared what ship it was, and also what place under the island she then rode. Captain Norton, our general, now understanding what she was, purposed with his own ship, the *Tiger*, and his vice-admiral, the *Assurance*, wherein Captain Leyton commanded, to lay her aboard, if wind and weather would serve us to get into her where she rode. But they of the carrack, knowing by our boat what we were, and dreading the worst, haul themselves nearer into the shore between a great ledge¹ of rocks and the island, carrying all night whatsoever (of account) came next their hands ashore. Our ship, still forcing all the night to come near unto her, might perceive in the morning how she was getting into a most dangerous place to be fetched from, and hardly would she have been brought from thence without the hazard of the best ship in our fleet; which should have been put in practice, if it had pleased God to have furthered us therein (with a favourable wind). By this time also was Sir John Burgh in the *Roebuck* and a small bark of Bristol come up, where the *Tiger* of my Lord of Cumberland and the *Roebuck* came to an anchor within saker shot² of the carrack, where she still rode. Sir John Burgh incontinent consented to our general to land some men a pretty way off from the place where the carrack's men themselves went ashore, on purpose to have brought men on the backs of them that were like to make the greatest resistance from the walls and rocks of the island, whilst the rest either with boats or barks should have assailed her by sea. Upon this, boats of ours and of Sir John's were fraught with men to set on shore,

¹ The MS. has 'leigd.'

² A 'saker,' a small piece of ordnance—a 6-pounder.

armed with piece and pike, sword and target ; and being between the ships and the shore, a mighty gale of wind arose, with abundance of rain in mighty showers, the tempest being so great as forced our ships from their anchor to the sea ; unto whom those which were in the boats were fain to haste back, for the surge was now grown so great on the shore that no boat could land a man (unless they would have rode far about the Island, which had been very dangerous to do). Being now aboard we passed the storm (which continued the most part of that day—22 June) till towards supper time ; but while we were in good hope to obtain the carrack, we might perceive a great flash of fire, which at the first we made to be given on the land, and the rather because at that time we descried a sail at sea, which at first was judged to be a carrack likewise, and this other carrack's consort, and that this fire might be given her for a sign to certify of our being men of war on the coast. But long stood we not wholly on this point, for the ship (I mean the carrack) coming from under an extreme climate and heat of the sun (by reason whereof she was marvellous dry), besides the abundance of pitch, tar, and tallow, with divers sorts of spices and other combustible matter to maintain flame, which procured the fire's forcible attachment mercilessly in a figure of one element to advance the very proportion of a ship. This sight did not a little grieve the whole company in general, who, being come from afar, even now in the best hope of that which they sought for, was by this flame then dissevered from all hope of recovering her. Yet having (as I said before) descried a ship at sea (which by all proportions showed to be another carrack), which made us leave our hopeless carrack, and make

sail unto her, and standing with her all night, which for the most part of the morning-watch was stark calm, by reason whereof we could not come near unto her of all night : the light being broken we had sight of her again, and anon perceived a boat to come from her, which boat when she came near unto us we knew to be a boat of her Majesty's ship called the Foresight, wherein Captain Crosse was commander. To be short, all these ships being come together, and the captains of the ships met, a conclusion was among them to send all their boats ashore full of men to search the Island for such goods as the Portuguese had reserved from the fire. And the same night following was executed according to determination ; but with much hardness of landing, though but small resistance besides an extreme march over the craggy mountains and hills, sharp rocks, and dangerous way through thick woods and stony lanes, the same night to come where the Portuguese first landed and stood upon their guard ; but the Portuguese durst not stand to the first brint of a light skirmish proffered by our men. About this place where they landed, and also in divers other places further off, was found many good things, as musk, taffetas, stitching silk, raw silk, carpets and quilts of rare workmanship, great store of calicoes, both coarse and fine, part of all which things Sir John Burgh, having the chief commandment for that land service by Captain Norton's consent, who was general, took into his custody to the use of her Majesty and the venturers in that fleet. Yet the value of these things not being brought together, could not be very great. Divers likewise that would dive into the water got much pillage. After some day, or two days, stay there, we marched one night into the

country in hope to have found the Portuguese, where they had hid themselves and much of their goods. But they proved lighter of foot than we, and shifted themselves very covertly amongst the thickest of their woods, hills, and mountains, so that we could not seize any of them we sought for. Here I omit a great deal of matter, and follow rather the discourse of our sea voyage. We returned back to our quarters, and being scarcely retired so far when we heard and saw a piece sent from the Tiger, to the end that all companies of men should haste to board. But now, by the way, I must tell you how at our first coming ashore on the island, was taken a Portuguese, who had been purser in the carrack late burnt. This Portuguese Sir John Burgh carried aboard with him. Every man upon the warning used diligence, and being aboard our ships set sail, and standing to the westward as near as we might (for the wind was at W.N.W., or N.W.b.W.), for that some, which had been ashore the same morning, reported that they had seen from the hills the same morning two great sails, and that they bore west, or W.b.S. from the island. But at our putting forth the first day we could not see any, nor in two or three days after. And about that time the Dainty, a ship of Sir John Hawkyns, came into our company ; and not long after there came unto us the Grace of Dover, (a ship at the first spoken of belonging to my Lord of Cumberland's fleet,) who certified unto us that Gold-Noble (which was our rear-admiral, a ship whom we lost company of at the North Cape) had taken a great prize, a ship of 900 tons, her lading chiefly was wine and rice. There was now departed from us (to go home) the bark of Barnstaple, and the bark of Bristol. And now was left the Foresight of her Majesty,

and five of my Lord's of Cumberland, the Roebuck and the Dainty, two ships belonging unto the fleet, which Sir Walter Raleigh should have proceeded to the sea with. These eight made a consortship together unto this effect :—that whatsoever within fourteen days, should be taken by them, or any of them eight, should, so far forth as the goods of any prize came unto, be proportionately levied out unto every venturer, according to the quality or burthen of his ship, both for tonnage and manage. Not long after this consortship, two ships came to the Islands, who before had been in the Indies ; the one of them was named the Dragon,¹ the other, the Prudence ; which two ships stayed with us and made the number of our fleet ten. The 9th of August ² some dozen or fourteen leagues from the Island westward, and in the morning very timely, the Dainty having descried a sail very far to windward of her, set sail and gave chase, the rest of the fleet likewise doing no less (for before our ships were all on hull) ; but the Dainty and the Dragon (not long after her) were the first that came up to her, and, finding her to be no less than a carrack, might not offer any meaner courtesy than to hail them with a cannon. But she, not unthankful, bestowed the like of them again, and by the miss she found no niggard ; for she yielded bountifully both powder and shot, which very unluckily effected a fire endangering of the Dainty, for she struck the foremast by the board and forced her get her farther off (for she made small account of

¹ Also called the Golden-Dragon. Sir John Burgh made a consortship with her captain, Christopher Newport, to last from July 28 to September 10. *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 24. The Dragon and Prudence reached Flores on July 26. *Ibid.* f. 223.

² The true date was August 3 ; see *ante*, p. 90.

these ships). The next that came up with her was the Roebuck, who fought a great while with her, still holding her good tack, till the Foresight of her Majesty came to her. And then did they determine with them two ships to lay her aboard. The Roebuck to lay her aboard before the luff,¹ and the Foresight to lay her aboard in the quarter. And so fitting everything ready, the Roebuck bear up with her, and how missing to lie at the head appointed I cannot tell, but he was aboard in the quarter. The Foresight, attending as it was determined, came thinking to lay the carrack aboard ; but in fine she laid the Roebuck aboard, to the great endangering of them both, but especially of the Roebuck, seeing that she was next the enemy and thrust between two such great ships ; where she received a shot, but from whether of those two she was between I know not, and before she could get clear away from them, they found six or seven foot water in her hold ; so that the company being in good haste to labour, at the same time had enough to do to pump the ship and stop her leak, and left the carrack, as the Dainty had done (reinforced by their enemies), to a better bickering than they could give them ; but his good will is to be accepted. The Foresight, having fitted herself, went aboard again, and continued a very dangerous fight, being close aboard and lashed fast to the carrack's side (who bore her away by their own men's report, all her sails standing, as lightly as if she had been made fast and jammed in her chain holes). Then the Assurance of my Lord of Cumberland's, coming up unto her, laid her aboard, discharging even withal four or five cast pieces and a volley

¹ ' The after part of a ship's bow.'—Falconer, *The Universal Marine Dictionary*.

of small shot, and ranging up along the starboard quarter of the carrack, shot forward into the Foresight's stern, into which all her men, being eager of entering, leapt (some of them) into her. And so both of them together maintained a strong fight, until the Tiger of my Lord of Cumberland's, who was furthest of all to leeward, came up unto them, and had passed by once before the Assurance was aboard ; unto whom they of the Foresight called, desiring that they would with speed come rescue them, for they were in danger and could not get off from thence. They of the Tiger resolved that they would so do, and not only that, but also proceeding farther, would take the carrack (for whom they had waited there all that year), or else, though with the hazard of their lives, burn her or sink her. To effect which resolution they cast about again, and with a great noise and shout (of at the least nine score men), who crying 'God and Saint George for England, a Cumberland, a Cumberland,' advanced themselves on her shrouds and nettings, fighting pellmell with sword and pike, still crying (with the Assurance's men that fought against us on the other side of the carrack, and were ready to enter at once upon the least recoil of the foe) ; God and it forcing the affrighted Portuguese from their fight, and to stow themselves, that shiveringly could yield forth nothing to ease their stomachs but 'A quo deabala est a Cumberland.' But we not to lose the least opportunity entered farther into the ship, where each ship's company, of those three which were then aboard, might bid each other welcome aboard the carrack. And in short time after, or much about this time, the Dragon, before spoken of, came likewise aboard of her. But the companies of valiant gentlemen

and courageous soldiers, with the rest of stout and skilful mariners, that had there most bravely fought, and found themselves near-hand possessed victors, stood not long to give salutations to their friends, but with eager force some tear and cut up the nettings, some break up scuttles, not ceasing to cry 'a Cumberland' till the quaking Portuguese, that before would rehearse nought but a piteous 'diabolas' and 'viliacoes,' now in a corner lamentably pronounceth 'misery corde,' humbly crying for mercy, yielding themselves over again, their ship and goods worthily won, and Englishmen their then victors best deserving thereof; in estimation to be worth (as I have heard some of the Portuguese confess upon examination) four millions of ducats, which amounteth to no more than one million of pounds sterling, or ten hundred thousand pounds. But whereas divers surmise and fain report of much treasure and coin that should be in her when [she] was taken, I dare undertake it is all frivolous and false; for surely there could be no treasure out of the East Indies for the king. Yet this may be. Amongst so many grand cavaliers, merchants, and mariners, there might be good purses, some peradventure to spend when they should come home into their country; some had 100*l.*, two or three, according to their ableness, and truly to think many less; none so much, unless it were some five of them, which had spices or some such ware in the ship; but say they had one thousand pound amongst them all, what were that amongst so many as entered? A man could scarce catch anything there, but one or other of his followers would both hold with him, and share with him. Neither could any man, or two men, have had any great sum; although it might have been their haps,

as it was impossible it should be, to light jump¹ into every man's pocket that had money; seeing they were all as ready as one or two to better and enrich themselves by their advantage. Say there was chains of gold and chains of pearl, why the commanders had the best cabins where they were likeliest to be. And I am sure if either myself or any such as I had gotten anything of worth, it should quickly have been taken from us. Or otherwise, if any man had been suspected of any such matter, why we had by constables of the boroughs² to make a sudden survey, and to cause under deputies to make a privy search in the night. Although what they had themselves, while they made broils and stirs before the mast, they could closely appoint a conveyance out at a back window. But what may not authority do, though a sovereignty be thereby abused. Well, I am able to witness myself of a great many things which I saw myself in cods,³ in great leaden pots,—ambergris, taffetas, sleeve silk and sewing silk, abundance of calicoes, both fine and coarse calicoes, lawns, cinnamon, cloves, mace, with innumerable store of all these and other things, which remained upon the war orlop,⁴ where whatsoever was found being not precious or of rich account (and for such things I have shown before what order was taken) hath always been suffered to go for pillage, and never hath been

¹ Exactly, pat.

² This is obscure, and may be a corrupt reading. Perhaps it should be 'Constables of Sir John Burgh's'; this seems to be confirmed by the reference to the 'abuse of a sovereignty'; see *ante*, p. 93.

³ Bags.

⁴ The lowest deck; plunder found there was pillage, to which those who stormed a ship had a legitimate title.

called to any account, it being fought for, dangerously achieved, and the ship entered and taken forcibly with the dint of sword and push of pike, as this great carrack was, after a most hazardous fight by the fleet; who was also (after the fire which was burning in her sail was given ched, her pump sayd,¹ and all such inconveniences circumvented) rifled; divers men getting, thereby, that which might have done them good all their lifetime, if they might have possessed it themselves. But it is hard for me to say whether any of those men that had pillage shall enjoy any thereof; but God grant they may. The contrary hath never been known in as great matters as this; but martial men are not accounted of in England longer than present occasion serves to employ them, and for that time (neither) but even scarcely recompensed. But I will not stand debating the cause, which is too well known to a great many of gentlemen and others of that profession. I would that every man, that hath no cause to the contrary, would be as ready to reward the painful soldier and seafaring man as that noble Earl of Cumberland. The carrack being thus entered and taken, the next day Sir John Burgh came aboard, where he found Captain Norton, Captain-General of my Lord of Cumberland's ships, whose consent Sir John Burgh had to come home in the carrack, chief commander. After which so haste was made to set the Portuguese ashore, the shrouds with the ropes and sails being fitted, with a fine leading gale of the wind we directed our course for England. Here I have to require that you should

¹ Stow has possibly miscopied his original; but the meaning is clear, 'the fire was checked, and the pump (or well of the ship) drained'; to 'sew' means to 'drain.' Probably we should read 'check' and 'sued.'

not think me over-tedious, being as brief as occasion might suffer me, omitting the circumstance of matter which might have been made, and not touching some matters at all, which to some might seem more frivolous than required to be rehearsed, which for that cause I will put in oblivion. Having had some troubles on the ship by occasion of weather, as many times by calms, many times by much rain and boisterous winds, we were at length hoisted with a most tempestuous gale upon our coast. The fifth of September we had sight of Scilly, the same day the rain increased more upon us (to our great hazard, having the shore east of us, or near thereabouts under our lee) and on the sudden by that excessive storm we had our sprit-sail blown clean from the yard, the air being wondrous thick and hazy; and not long after that was our foresail likewise blown away from the yard; and we being within less than half a league of the shore, which made us hoist another old foresail to the yard, which ere long was riven forth of all the lee bolt-ropes by that extreme flaw¹ of wind, which did mightily hazard our foretopsail, which did a little help us. And well might we have perished on the rocks for all that, had not the grace of Almighty God been more upon us through his mercy, than our deserts would have hoped for. For after a great many debates what were best to be done; as either to stand on as we did, and so should we be endangered by the abundance of rocks, which the then master² had not so good experience of as it was requisite he should have had to conduct so great a charge as was laid upon him; or else to cast about, which way, if the sails might have been trusted unto, had

¹ A gust.

² John Bedford of the Roebuck, see *ante*, p. 95.

been less perilous ; at length it pleased God to stir up a man of good experience, both in navigation and also for his perfect knowledge of those places, as well about Scilly (the place of danger) and likewise for all our coast from that place unto any harbour eastward, whose name was Master William Anthony,¹ a man of my Lord of Cumberland's, who promised by the sufferance of God, if the wind did blow still steadfastly, and those hopeless sails held together as they were, he would bring the carrack through safely from all those rocks, as indeed he did to the comfort of as many as were in the ship. And on the Thursday after we arrived at Dartmouth in Devonshire, where we left our great prize.

Your worship's,
FRANCIS SEALLE.

2. Sir John Burgh's Report.

RIGHT honourable and my singular good lord, the hope which I put your Lordship in by my last letter of meeting the carrack has succeeded happily; for upon the 3 of this month we met with one, and fought with her from ten of the clock in the morning till one or two at night; which I will refer to Captain Cross to make report of to your Lordship, being there present himself. As for the ship she is very rich, but much spoiled by the soldiers, being entered by force, and to which it was not possible for me to give order not of a long time, for that the Earl of Cumberland's men stood upon their lord's

¹ See *post*, p. 119, where Hampton describes him as one of the foremost in spoiling the carrack.

² *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 27.

commission, and thereby challenged as great a commandment as I, notwithstanding that I made it known to the chief of them that I was joined in Her Majesty's commission with Sir Martin Frobiser. I have now taken possession of her in Her Majesty's name and right; and I hope, for all the spoils that have been made, Her Majesty shall receive more profit by her, than by any ship that ever came into England. I must crave pardon of your Lordship that I have not advertised you sooner of this, for my Lord of Cumberland's pinnace¹ stole away unknown to me, and I durst not spare none of the ships till I was passed out of danger of meeting of the King of Spain's Armada, who are daily looked for about the Islands. I will use the advice of the best masters of the fleet for the safe harbouring of the ship; and if the weather be fair, I will bring her up as high as I shall be advised by them I may with safety. I shall not be able to receive direction from your Lordship, because if this wind hold I hope to be in England very soon after this shall come into your Lordship's hands. And so resting always at your Lordship's devotion I will most humbly take leave of you from aboard the carrack, this 11th of August.

Your Lordship's most ready ever
at Commandment,

JO. BURGH.

I most humbly beseech your Lordship to favour my poor credit so much as that I may be joined in Commission to those that shall be sent for Her Majesty for the surveying of the goods. Sir Francis Drake was on the like, and therefore I presume to desire the same.

¹ See *ante*, p. 93.

3. The Report of Captain Thompson of the Dainty, to Sir John Hawkyns.¹

August the 27th,

Worshipful good sir, our bounden duty remembered, having now some better occasion to write than before. It is so the third of this month we espied the carrack. We made with her, and fetched her up between a 11 and 12 of the clock; we boarded her and fought with her, as I would your Worship might understand the truth by others, which shall assure your Worship that you may as boldly claim your Worship's large share and ship's credit as any, be bold of me. Falling off from the carrack, when she was yielded, my mast went by the board. Then I was left all alone, and let me drive in the sea five days before I could make my jury-mast. And then in that time the pillage was divided; for when I came to Sir John Burgh, I asked him for my share of pillage; for other Captains had whole cabins, money, stones, silk, jewels, apparel, whatsoever was in the cabin, chains of gold. And now I hearing of these things came to ask Sir John; and he telleth me that proclamation was made, and he was for the Queen. 'So am I too,' said I, 'I hope; but is there never a chain of gold left,' said I, 'nor apparel?' 'I have something for you,' said he, 'because you were away.' Which was a common sailor's chest,² which had been

¹ *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 54.

² John Pawson, the surgeon of the Dainty, told the Commissioners that it was as high as the table they sat at; John Rogers, the boatswain, that Thompson told him it contained some skeins of silk, a few books of calico, and some rotten spice. *Lansdowne MS.* 70, ff. 181, 185.

broken up before. And so, if your Worship look not out, you are like to get the less. Here is goods enough, though we have none.¹ But we have been the instrument, of my word speak it. Commend me to my good Captain, good Sir. And so I humbly take my leave, this 27th of August. The pinnace and the Foresight came away, and would not come to us; and therefore we could not write; in the latitude of 48, some 180 leagues out the Slieve.

Your Worship's to command,

THOMAS THOMPSON.

4. The Deposition of John Hampton (General Pilot for the whole Fleet) touching the Manner of taking this Carrack, and of such Accidents as have happened in this Voyage.²

August 3. On Thursday in the morning we descried the carrack, being West-South-West. The Dainty, the Dragon, and the Roebuck being the windmost ships; the Tiger, the Sampson,³ and the Prudence of London being next unto them, and the Foresight the leemost ship.

As soon as we saw the Dainty and the Dragon give chase, we made all our sails after them. So we came up unto the carrack the same evening at seven of the clock, and spoke with our Admiral, Sir John Burgh, who being then within musket-shot asked our Captain, if he would second him to lay her aboard. And he answered, with all

¹ But see *ante*, p. 94.

² *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 81.

³ Or the Assurance.

his heart. Then forthwith Sir John laid her aboard at the main luff; and Captain Crosse came aboard the *Roebuck* with his bows over her larboard quarter. And not having lain aboard her half an hour, Sir John and his company called to us to fall off again, saying that they had v. or vj. foot water in hold. Whereupon we fell off, and then Sir John fell off from her also. So the carrack stood in continually East-North-East to the shore, all sails bearing, except her main topsail suit a starboard, which had been cut with the shot of some of the other ships by four of the clock in the afternoon.

The ships now being both off, and the carrack then not six leagues from the shore, I told Captain Crosse that if she was not laid athwart the bowsprit with some ship, that she would escape ashore in spite of all our fleet; whereupon I persuaded him to venture the same Her Majesty's ship in so good a service, and he willed me to do what I therein thought best. And thereupon I commanded him that was at the helm to sheer up along the side of her, until I had brought our mainsail against her foremast, our foresail against her bowsprit, and our spritsail ahead her, requiring him at the helm to keep his helm fast over the starboard. And being fast over her I bid the carpenter, the boatswain's mate, and other tall men, to take axes and to cut her main luff, her fore luff, and her spritsail suit;¹ and by this means within half an hour we brought her by the head. But we being under her lee could not get off from her again, but lay under her lee two hours, from about ten of the clock until twelve at midnight, until any ship came to assist us. Then first the *Sampson*²

¹ Possibly lift; possibly sheet.

² Or the *Assurance*.

came and laid us aboard upon our starboard quarter, and entered her men into us with Captain Cocke. I told them that, though we had so many of our men slain and hurt, as were not able to enter, yet they might enter now with little danger and small resistance. And Abraham Cocke said to me, that the Tiger, their admiral, would be aboard straight, and then they would enter together. Whereupon, she coming forthwith upon the carrack's larboard bow, laying her bowsprit towards the carrack's poop, they entered at once the same three companies, and within a short time possessed the carrack between one and two o'clock in the morning. But for my own part I was so hurt and bruised, as I was not able to enter her, for I was shot into the mouth, thrust into the leg with a pike, hurt with a splinter in my left hand, and so bruised with a great stone on my right thigh, as I remain yet in danger of recovery. Notwithstanding, after that the surgeon had stitched up my lip and dressed my other hurts, the Saturday morning I desired Captain Crosse to go with him aboard the carrack. Which I did to show Sir John how my Lord Warden had appointed me Chief Pilot for the voyage, and if his Worship pleased that I should stay aboard her, I was come for that purpose; which service of mine he willingly accepted, and appointed me the Pilot's cabin, whereof before my coming they told me that Abraham Cocke¹ had had his rifling, as also of the Pilot's chest. So that for my own part, as I am deposed, that I neither brake any chest, barrel, or other thing, nor took any goods out of the hold at any time; but of such spices as lay on the poop I had one canister

¹ Afterwards, however, Sir John Hawkyns reported that he found nothing at Cocke's house. *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 79.

of cinnamon, and one bag of cloves. And touching the disorder that was aboard after my coming, Mr. Bedforde, George Moore, the Master Carpenter, and Nicholas Frost, one of the quarter-masters, with the consent of Captain Newport, and William Anthony, were the men that made the greatest spoil, for they brought up divers chests, some one day and some another, and carried them aft to their cabins; whereof one was a very weighty chest wrapped in cere-clothes as much as vj. or vij. men were able to carry. In witness that this is truth I have subscribed my name the 24th of October, 1592.

JOHN^r HAMPTON.

There is what I caused the Foresights company to put into her out of the carrack the which, as I understand, is stayed at Portsmouth by the Council's order: two bags of anil, two bags of cloves, and a canister of cinnamon.

JOHN HAMPTON.

5. A True Report of the taking of the Carrack.¹

The third of August about four of the clock in the morning, or thereabout, being some fourteen or fifteen leagues west of the Flowers,² the seven sail of ships being spread south and north a league and a half one from the other, the Dainty of Sir John Hawkyns, being the windermost, descried a sail, and presently set sail and gave chase. Next to her the Green Dragon, then the Roebuck, the

¹ *Lansdowne MS.* 70, Art. 86, f. 203.

² Flores.

Sampson,¹ the Tiger, a small ship of London, then the Foresight of Her Majesty, being the leemost of all, set sail, and all gave chase ; but we of the Foresight did not see the chase, neither the Dainty, till nine of the clock or thereabout, at which time the carrack was descried out of a topmast-head. Then putting out as much sail as we were able, we began to winder of my Lord of Cumberland's ships, and near the carrack, being right in the wind of us. About twelve of the clock the Dainty ran up under the carrack's lee, and shot a piece or two, and ran ahead the carrack and cast about again, and fought very well with her. The Green Dragon came up about two of the clock to second her. The Roebuck about four of the clock, and fought very well with small and great shot. By this I had windered the Lord of Cumberland's ships, and had neared the carrack, with turning to and again, so as about eight of the clock at night I was up with her, and hailed Sir John Burgh and asked him what he would do ; who told me he would lay her aboard, if I would second him : then I said unto him there was no way but that, or else we should lose her. Then he told me he would board her in the bow, if I would lay her aboard the luff, which I said I would do. Then he went up with her, and I followed him hard : so he laid her aboard of the broadside ; then could not I avoid laying him aboard in his quarter. After I had a small time lain there, he called to me to clear myself from him, for he had a shot under water ; upon that I loosed off, and he then cleared himself presently from the carrack. Then she stood in still with the land ; and I, seeing that, thought it best to board her again ;

¹ Or the Assurance.

which, after some speech had with the best sort of my company, laid her aboard again athwart her transom, and before made ready axes to cut her luff, which we did as soon as were aboard. Then where she stood in East-and-by-North, we brought her head to lie West, and so continued still aboard her, being three times afire to the great discomfort of divers of my company, and the carrack once in her chains. There we lay till one of the clock or past in fight, without any aid ; at which time, the fury of the fight well overpassed, the Sampson of my Lord of Cumberland's came up, and laid Her Majesty's ship aboard in the quarter, her quarter then being as far up as the carrack's forecastle ; then had they room enough to have boarded the carrack. I bid them enter their men into the Foresight, which they did ; and one Abraham Cocke, that entered, told me that my Lord his great ship was almost come up, and would have been there ere that time, but that she would not wear. Then said I : ' it is no matter, the fury is past, let us enter.' Whereunto he consented ; and I, they, and three hundred Captains, merchants and some other of my company went to enter. My ill hap was to have a knock by the way ; which was the cause I was put aboard my ship again, and went not aboard the carrack till next day, eight of the clock. I think about two of the clock in the morning we were possessed of her, without any harm in the entering to our knowledge. And hereunto we offer to depose.

ROBT. CROSSE,
IHON MERCHANT.

A NARRATIVE
OF THE
BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ

WRITTEN BY
SIR RICHARD STAYNER
REAR-ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET

EDITED BY
PROFESSOR C. H. FIRTH

INTRODUCTORY

THE following narrative is derived from Additional MS. No. 32093 in the British Museum, one of six volumes of historical and private documents formerly belonging to the Malet family and chiefly collected by Sir John Malet, M.P. *temp.* Charles II. The collection which was acquired by the Museum in 1883 was described in the *Fifth Report of the Historical MSS. Commission* (*Appendix*, pp. 308-320), and in the *Seventh Report* (*Appendix*, pp. 428-433), but Mr. A. J. Horwood who drew up the account of the volumes did not appreciate the importance of this particular paper (f. 372). Extracts from the narrative, were printed by myself in an article on 'Blake and Santa Cruz' in volume xx. of *The English Historical Review* and in *The Last Years of the Protectorate*, chapter viii., in 1909 ; but it has not hitherto been printed in full.

The authorship of the narrative is stated in the endorsement which is 'relation of burning of the Spanish ships at Teneriffe by Sir Richard Stayner.' This endorsement is in a later hand, not in the writing of the document. However, the references made by the author to himself in various passages of the narrative confirm this ascription.

It seems to have been drawn up some time after the events related, though from the minuteness of the details as to days and times, it was probably based on Stayner's journals or logs. Stayner died in 1663 ; it must, therefore, have been written between May 1660, since it is

addressed to the King, and October 1663. The plan or 'draught' explaining the position of the ships and forts has unhappily perished. No doubt it became detached from the narrative.

C. H. FIRTH.

It may be noted that, in compliance with the rule of the Society, the spelling has been modernised throughout.

THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ

SIR RICHARD STAYNER'S NARRATIVE

[Additional MS. 32093, ff. 372 seq.]

True Relation of the Destroying the Spanish ships at the Isle of Teneriffe, the 20th April 1657, from the first Intelligence we had of them as we lay before Cales.

The 17th February 1656 General Blake lying in the Bay of Cales with 24 sail of men of war, it being fair weather, the wind at WNW, there came a ship of London from the Barbados, the commander's name Young, who sought for our fleet as he was going from Barbados to Genoa, who told the General that as he came from the Barbados, he fell into a fleet of Spaniards coming from the West Indies, of about 24 sail. He kept company with them several days, and about 170 leagues WbN from the Madeiras, he finding by their course they steered for the Canaries, he made all the sail he could to give us notice of it. He told us he was confident, they had not got the Islands, the winds hanging between the NE and ENE and they steered away ESE.

The General called the vice-admiral and me on board. At that time our advice was that he would put five or six weeks' victuals into six or eight sail of his best frigates, and send them to

meet them ; but he would not hear of dividing the fleet, but called a council and imparted the intelligence to the commanders and required their advice, which also was to send a party to go to the Canaries to meet them ; but the General inquiring what provisions was in the fleet, found not one month's victuals at 6 to 4 men's allowance. This obstructed our going with the fleet or part thereof to look for them ; but the Spaniards did all they could at Cales to fit out a fleet against us from thence. We ordered the fleet we had to lie off Cape of St. Marys, and so to Cape Spratt, the General in the midst, my squadron to the southwards of him and the vice-admiral to the northwards, spreading ourselves as far as we could, north and south.

About the 24th February we had news out of Galicia that there was arrived an aviso from the Spanish fleet, that they were coming home from America, and that they were bound for Teneriffe in the Canaries, and that they had fortified Santa Cruz and all the bay very strong. The General telling the vice-admiral and I of it, we advised him to send 6 or 8 sail to look for them ; but he was very angry with us, and said he would not part the fleet ; charging us to speak no more of it. So we were silent and said no more, only kept our station until the 26th March. Then came the Yarmouth with 19 ships laden with victuals ; we took part out and kept our station with the fleet. We had no more intelligence of the Spanish fleet homewards bound until the 28th following we heard from Tavira,¹ and Faro, that the Spaniards were at the Canaries and had landed the king's plate and all the best of their goods

¹ The MS. has Taveela.

at Santa Cruz. The provisions in the foresaid victuallers being near six months' victuals for the whole fleet, we went to Tavira in Portugal to take it in, a port lying NNW from Cales about 16 leagues. There we had news from St. Lucar and Cales every day and the certainty of the Spaniards being at the Canaries, and that they had fortified themselves so strongly they feared nothing.

The 8th of April we had gotten in all our victuals and watered the fleet; we made way to sail. The General called a council to have advice what to do. All the commanders were for going directly for the Canaries. But the General would go to Cales first. We sailed for Cales that night. Off the bar of St. Lucar road a Plymouth ship whose merchant had been that night on shore. He sent a letter to the General by Capt. Mootham,¹ and told the General it was for certain that the West India fleet were at the Canaries, had fortified themselves strong and had landed their plate. It was calm all day. The 10th I had a letter from Cales from a friend there by a Hollander that came out; which I showed the General, it giving an account of the arrival of the ships at the Canaries and how they had fortified themselves that they thought themselves as secure as if they had been at Cales. The General sent for the vice-admiral; we advised together, and would have had him gone away presently, but the wind was westerly and we not above three leagues from Cales. The General would not agree to it; we lay off and on that night with the fleet. The 11th in the morning the General made a sighne² for the

¹ Peter Mootham, killed in the Four Days' Fight, June 1666.

² As he uses both sighne and signal in apparently the same meaning, but also sighne sometimes with the very clear meaning sign, it is thought better to give in this case the original spelling.

vice-admiral and I again. We still advised him to go, for we had put the nation to a vast charge and had done nothing that year; and that because we had received such certain intelligence of their being there, and that we were so well fitted, we could have no excuse for not going. The General said little. We stayed on board all day.

In the afternoon there came Captain Saddleton in a little private man of war which met them and fought with one of them. He saw them in Santa Cruz Roads and came on purpose to tell us of it. Upon which we spoke to the General again, that we might go, and then he gave his consent to steer away WSW that night; and we desired him that he would dispatch all his business that night, for he sent a vessel to Logust with letters for Lisbon, and to give notice to any that should come to look for us there, that we were gone to the Canaries. That evening the wind came to the NNE; we went away our course.

The 12th in the morning the General called a council of war to have all the commanders' advice. They were all for going to the Canaries to find the Spanish fleet. Then came up the wind to the NE, a fresh gale; we had 23 men of war, 3 victuallers and two ketches in company. The 18th day the General came by the lee about one o'clock, and called a council of war. We all went on board; it was very thick weather, we examined all our reckonings which agreed well together, that Point Negro was between 9 and 10 leagues SWbS from us; before we went from on board we saw it plain. The General asked our judgments, what we were best to do in our business; we all agreed we should go into Santa Cruz road with all speed we could; to that end ordered the fleet to lay their heads to the southwards until 10 of the

clock that night, and then to stand in to Point Negro, to be in with the shore by day, and that every man did make his ship ready to that purpose, that night.

We would have had the General ordered how it should be done, whether with the whole fleet or a part, or whether he would go in first or appoint any man. I propounded 12 sail of the best frigates to go in and the rest stay out, but we could not persuade the General to anything that night. It being very fine weather the General stood to the southwards all night. The 19th in the morning we were run out of sight of Teneriffe, and were got close to the Grand Canary; so the General made a sighne for the vice-admiral and I. We went on board and did wonder what they meant, but seeing it was so, our advice was that we go close to the Isle of Teneriffe that night and have all things ready to go about our work by day light. We staid on board the General all that day, but he would not do anything because it was the Sabbath day. We could by no means get him to order the fleet, but consented we should lie by the shore all night and that I should send in two frigates of my squadron to discover the enemy. I did send the Plymouth and Nantwich. The fleet lay about 3 or 4 leagues off.

The 20th in the morning the two scouts made their signal that the enemy were there; but we, being off shore, could not see the ships under the high land: but they saw our fleet so soon as it was day. So about six of the clock the General called a council, to know what we should do. The commanders, having displeased him so much the Saturday before, said never a word, until he earnestly desired them. Then I told him I had delivered my judgment the 18th day and could

say no more until I knew better. He asked whether it was all the commanders' judgments? They replied, Yes. He then would know what ships those twelve should be. We desired him to name them, so he began and named 4 out of his own squadron first, then 4 out of the vice-admiral's and but 3 out of mine. The commanders spoke to the General that I might command them. The General asked me if I would. I told him, With all my heart. Then he said that was done, and that he with the rest of the fleet would come and batter the castles whilst we destroyed the ships. To that end he bid me do what I would in it. I knowing it not a time to neglect the business, I only gave them this verbal order, to follow me in a line as the General had first named them, which was as per margin [Speaker, Lyme, Lamport,¹ Newbury, Bridgwater, Plymouth, Worcester, Newcastle, Foresight, Centurion, Winsby, Maidstone], and wheresoever I saw the greatest danger I would go, and that they fired not a gun until they were at an anchor, and that they should anchor three or four cables' length from the shore for the veering in their ships after the enemy if occasion were, and the heaving their ships off after they had done their business. They told me they would; so we went about our business and when we came into the bay I found it as in the draft, and the ships riding in that order as near as I can remember, and we came to an anchor as the draft doth show, with the lands lying and the form of their works I am sure very near like the figure.

The two ships that were upon the scout, not

¹ So in all lists, but the name of the place after which she was called is now, more commonly, Langport. For the changes in these ships' names at the Restoration, see *N.R.S.* xxvi. 256.

knowing what order I had given, they came to anchor by the first ships we came to. I stood upon the forecastle of our ship to seek a good berth for the better doing our work. I perceived I might get in between the admiral and vice-admiral to our great advantage, which I did. As the figure will show. We anchored about 8 of the clock and fired but two guns, that was against my will ; the Spaniards firing so thick from the ships and shore put us into some disorder for want of good care in the commanders to prevent it. We went as near as we could with safety and were within pistol shot of the admiral and vice-admiral, and little more of the rear ; they were all great ships that rode near the castle, 1000 and 1200 tons apiece, and of them 7 or 8 : five more six or 800 tons : four more [made] the rest, [whereof] only one 300 tons or thereabouts, the whole number was 17 sail. All these ships were blown up or burnt except five of them taken ; and the admiral and vice-admiral, whom I could have sent going first but they were my barricades, one for the fort and the admiral for the great castle, between 11 and 12 a forenoon ; at which time the General with the remains of the fleet came in and rid to seaboard of us.

When I had got out warps to warp our ship off, we fired in 2 or 3 broadsides into the vice-admiral ; she came on fire and immediately blew up. Then we hove a little further and fired 3 or 4 broadsides into the admiral, and he either by our [shot] or some accident blew up all at once ; no sighne to be seen of her but the carved work of her stern in the water ; this being between 12 and 1 a clock. We hove away as fast as we could a-peek upon our anchor. In the interim, as we were warping off, the General sent to the commanders to burn the

ships they had brought off and had them at their sterns, out of danger ; the General sent to them 3 times before they would burn them ; at last they did. The Swiftsure had one the Bridgewater brought off, the Bridgewater one, the Plymouth one, the Worcester one and the Maidstone one ; all full of goods. We continued warping, and got our ship off about half a mile in a very short time, so that the castle did not strike us upon the visall¹ line. After that we stopt our leaks as fast as they could make them, but our ship was much torn. We had holes between wind and water 4 or 5 foot long and 3 or 4 foot broad, that we had no shift to keep her from sinking but by nailing hides over the holes, and nail butt staves along the sides of the hides, for we had 8 or 9 foot water in the ship that our pumps and bailing would hardly keep her free. I sent to the General to appoint some ship to tow us off ; he appointed the vice-admiral, but the wind came to the EbS, and it was impossible for us to get off, our masts being like to fall as we rode at anchor in smooth water ; our main yard shot off at the quarter, our main top-mast by the board, the fore yard shot by the slings or near the middle. We had not one whole rope over head, nor sail but sprit-sail and sprit-sail top-sail.

Between three and four of the clock the General weighed and the rest of the fleet and left us. [When] the vice-admiral saw that, he weighed likewise, we having a stream cable on board him to tow by ; they being in such a hurry, the shot flying thick, they cut loose ; so we rid by ourselves. The Spaniards seeing we were left alone came down to their forts again, for we had beaten them

¹ So in MS. Probably a miswritten 'vital.'

out of every fort, only the great castle. Then they paid us extremely. So we rid until the sun went down, when the wind came off shore and we set those pieces of sails we had, and cut away our anchor. Our ship got away from the mark Red A¹ and we were forced to keep our guns going still, and the enemy plying hard at us. Just as we past by the great castle, either by our shot or some accident amongst themselves, there was a great quantity of powder blown up. After that, they never fired one gun more at us.

Our ship having way, shot without the point to B²; our fore-mast fell by the board and we had no sooner cleared ourselves of it by cutting it away, but down falls our main-mast. We cut away that presently; then down falls our mizen mast, we had only our bowsprit³ to friend. The Plymouth standing in to us, saw our disaster; she clapt an end of a cable on us and towed us off shore, and we making a sighne, the whole fleet sent boats and 6 or 700 carpenters and seamen, to pump and bail out the water. Until that time I durst not let no boat come on board, no not so much as our own boats, for my men would have left the ship; for the commanders of other ships said we should never save her; yet through mercy we did, but she was almost full of water. We spoiled all our dry provisions that we had and all things else in hold.

The next day we freed our ship of the water, and got up jury masts and mended our leaks as well as we could; but the wind came to the SW and SSW, a hard gale, the 22nd; away we were

¹ The reference is, of course, to the missing draft; it was first written A; and 'Read A' over-written.

² Reference to the draft.

³ MS. has 'boxsplitt.'

forced to go with the fleet, the Plymouth still towed us, having nothing between wind and water but the hides afore-mentioned, until we came into Logust Bay which was the 4th May; encountering sometimes fair weather sometimes foul. There we took off our hides between wind and water, and made it firm with plank, that the ship then was very tight. The 6th May the General ordered me and the Fairfax home to London. Through mercy I got well there the 20th June following.

This being the truth of all the considerable passages we had after we first heard of the Spanish West India fleet, that we destroyed at Santa Cruz in the Canaries, as I shall be deposed on my oath if required.

In this service we had but five men killed outright; ten more died of their wounds and thirty or forty more wounded. All the fleet besides lost not above 8 men and 20 wounded.

Endorsed:— *For His Majesty These.*

EXTRACTS
FROM
A COMMISSIONER'S NOTE
BOOK

ANNIS 1691-1694

INTRODUCTORY

SEVERAL years ago the late Sir Leopold McClintock was so good as to lend me, for the use of the Society, a couple of small MS. books which he had picked up in a second-hand book-shop. They had no pedigree, but their origin is clear enough. They are rather thin octavos, bound in smooth red morocco, richly gilt on sides and backs, and with gilt edges, in the style commonly adopted by the Admiralty throughout the eighteenth century, and which, in itself, would suggest that they belonged to some official connected with the Admiralty were it not that the contents show beyond any practical doubt, that they must have belonged to a commissioner of the navy, in the early nineties of the seventeenth century; very probably to the comptroller, who at that date was Sir Richard Haddock. A few of the entries in the Table of Contents will make this clearer:—

Principal Officers' and Commissioners' Duty jointly considered.

Treasurer's Duty. Comptroller's Duty. Surveyor's Duty (and so on; the duty of all the civil officers who depended on the navy board).

Estimate of the charge of their Majesties' Navy in harbour for one year from 1st January 1690-1 to 31st December 1691 (and for other years).

The present pay of captains (and of all other officers).
Estimate of the charge of building a dry dock—

and so on; but these will be sufficient to indicate the general tendency of the subject-matter, and to mark the

probability that the books belonged to the comptroller or other commissioner—a probability which, in the title, I have assumed as determined.

But mixed promiscuously and quite irregularly with these official entries, are a few, not official, but interesting and—it may be presumed from the nature of the volume—genuine. It would seem that if the owner of the books got hold of an interesting record, letter or memorandum—and Haddock was perhaps a very likely man to get such—he set his clerk to work to copy them in. Unfortunately the clerk, though he wrote decently, was not a man of intelligence, and when copying naval terms or abbreviated expressions from bad writing, was not unlikely to make hideous blunders or omissions, and did, in fact, frequently make them, generally in the most awkward or tantalising places. But overcoming this difficulty as well as can be, some of these papers have seemed well worth preserving; a task in which Sir Leopold's sons have most generously assisted, by putting the books again at the service of the Editor. The extracts here given all relate to the first years of the war with France and are :—

I. The Proposals of Admiral Russell, Mr. Foley, and Colonel Churchill for the defence of the coasting and homeward bound trade.

The name of Admiral Russell fixes the date to 1691–1692, when Russell was commander-in-chief; and 1692 though possible, is improbable, considering the other great interests which were being decided. In 1693 Russell was no longer in command; in 1694 he went to the Mediterranean, and after that was Earl of Orford. Colonel Churchill was the brother of Marlborough, and though a captain in the navy, it was probably his relationship to Marlborough which gave value to his opinion. Who Mr. Foley was, and what value his opinion had, or why it was supposed to have any, cannot now be guessed at. There were two men of the name: one, M.P. for Hereford and Speaker of the House of Commons; the other, M.P. for Stafford and, twenty years later,

one of Bolingbroke's twelve peers ; but at no time, so far as is known, had either of them any connection with the navy.

II. gives, from the most approved source, the explanation of a few terms which are of frequent occurrence in the lists of ships and comments on their efficiency all through the eighteenth century, but especially in the early part of it.

III. is a quaint discourse on the state of the navy. Long before our own time old salts had found out that the service was going to the devil, but in this case there was some reason in the complaint, even if often grossly and ignorantly exaggerated.

From the earliest times it had been the rule for the commander of an English fleet to be a noble or knight, more of a soldier than a sailor, more of a landman than a seaman ; but, and especially since the discovery of America and the long voyages to the Indies or the South Sea, the commanders of single ships were commonly seamen. In this, a change had been made since the Restoration. The appointment of the Duke of York as commander-in-chief, made the navy fashionable. Young men from the court swarmed into the fleet as volunteers ; and following them, many got entered as volunteers, to be shortly commissioned as lieutenants and within the year—if they had or could buy the necessary influence—as captains. And these were not men of the best kind ; they were often men who regarded a command but as a means of recouping themselves for the previous expenditure ; they invented and practised methods of cheating the government, such as defrauding the men in the matters of provisions or slops, hiring their men out to merchant-ships, keeping false muster books, and other modes which live in the records of courts-martial. Seamen-commanders—tarpaulin-captains—were not slow in taking up the wretched example ; but to the seafaring mind the principal crime of the 'gentleman-captains' lay in their utter ignorance of seamanship, naval discipline, or any of the duties of the

profession into which they had forced themselves. This was naturally the point which was most frequently and bitterly commented on by sailors, among whom the question of the day was whether the captain and the lieutenants of a man-of-war ought to be fully qualified to control and direct the motive power of the ship, or whether they should be content, as to that, to be governed rather than assisted by a specialist.

It is interesting to note how, in the present day, a definite change in the motive power has brought the same question again to the front, only to be settled, it would seem, in the same sense as formerly. And while that settlement was still in abeyance, our newspapers and magazines have been flooded with letters and discourses as much or as little to the purpose as those which called for the attention of our forefathers 200 years ago. Of these, this is one. The date of it is clearly fixed as the latter half of 1692; and though the name of the author is not mentioned, we are able to assign it definitely to Richard Gibson, seaman and purser under the Commonwealth, and—to some extent—a follower of Sir William Penn (see Granville Penn's *Memorials of Sir William Penn*, ii. 612 *seq.*). Some of this writer's anecdotes and instances are in almost verbal agreement with those told avowedly by Gibson (*The First Dutch War*, i. (N.R.S. xiii.), pp. 1-30), and much of the discourse, though in a somewhat different form and with many mistakes, has been printed, as by Gibson, in the Introduction to Charnock's *History of Marine Architecture*, vol. i. pp. lxxxv. *seq.*

IV. is a précis of the correspondence between the Earl of Nottingham, Secretary of State, and Russell, commander-in-chief of the fleet, during the spring and summer of 1692; a correspondence which seems to be hitherto unknown except so far as it was abstracted by Burchett in his *Transactions at Sea*.

There is no reason to doubt its genuineness, of which indeed the excessive carelessness, not to say confusion, of the language offers a strong presumption, and which

appears almost certain by the light of its agreement with Burchett's narrative, to which the reader should refer for the continuous history of the battles and the campaign. Burchett was Russell's secretary at the time and was afterwards secretary of the Admiralty. He thus wrote with a full knowledge of all that was done or proposed; and though his ingrained habit of secrecy frequently renders his tale meagre and jejune, what he does tell may be regarded as accurate. The present writer contributed bicentenary articles to the *Army and Navy Gazette* (21st May 1892) and to the *Quarterly Review* (April 1893), which examine in some detail the conditions of the battles and the policy of the French.

V. is a contribution to the story of the failure at Brest in 1694, which has often been commented on—notably and with peculiar virulence by Macaulay; but the only account that has received any wide publicity is that of Lord Caermarthen's *Journal of the Brest Expedition*, in conjunction with which, this will, of course, be considered and read as a sequel to the remarkable correspondence between the Earl of Nottingham and Admiral Russell printed in the following pages (*post*, Section IV.). Those who wish to study the incident more closely—whether with a view to defending the fair fame of Marlborough, or to considering the attack and defence of sea fortresses—I will refer to that mine of information which is contained in the Domestic State Papers of the date. They will find that the preparations made by the French at Brest were very well known by our government; that it was known that the French at Brest were much alarmed at the prospect of an attack, which they had had reason to expect for the last two years, and that Vauban was now directing the defences. Macaulay says that 'Tolmach (I follow Mr. Fortescue's spelling of this name) was completely possessed by the notion that the French were not prepared to repel an attack.' He gives no reference; but if it was so, there had been gross and culpable negligence on the part of the government. They will find that there

was nothing peremptory in Tolmach's instructions ; that what appears to have been intended was a feint in force, to be turned into a real attack if opportunity served. They will find that there were causes of the failure quite distinct from the forewarning of the French ; and that the conduct of Tolmach himself was not without reproach ; that in fact neither here nor anywhere else does he stand out as a general of the first rank, who might be considered a rival or compeer of Marlborough. They will, in fine, perhaps see reason to suspect that Marlborough's part in the transaction was shared with the king, and was a design to draw to Brest large reinforcements from the army in Flanders—which is perhaps a more plausible solution of the enigma than jealousy of a second-rate man like Tolmach, which is incredible, or a desire to stand well with James, though such a wish is not adverse to the other. It is, in fact, permissible to suggest that it was consequent on Marlborough's celebrated letter that in 1694, in Macaulay's phrase, in Flanders 'the tide had begun to turn : the French army made no progress.'

I.—SCHEME OF STATIONS FOR CRUISERS¹

II.

Proposed by	Admiral Russell						Mr. Foley						Col. Churchill						
	3	4	5	6	3	4	5	6	3	4	5	6	3	4	5	6			
	Rates																		
From the Firth to Newcastle	—	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
” Newcastle to Burlington	—	1	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
” Burlington to Yarmouth	—	1	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
” Yarmouth to Harwich among the Sands	—	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Off the North Foreland	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
From the South Foreland to Beachy	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
” Beachy to the Wight	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
” the Wight to Portland	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
” Portland to the Start	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
” the Start to the Lizard	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
” the Lizard, 80 leagues WSW	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
” the Old Head of Kinsale, Cape Clear and 30 leagues SW from it	1	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
In the Irish Channel	2	2	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
In the Channel of Bristol	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
In all	3	11	16	20	3	16	14	12	4	18	15	13	4	18	15	13			

¹ Possibly 1691.

² The 1 here has been omitted, possibly in error. The total is given as 13.

I

II.—EXPLANATION OF DOCKYARD TERMS

An Explanation of the Terms of Distinction commonly used in the Navy, of Ordinary Repairs, Extra Repairs, and Rebuilding.

Abstract

[Ordinary Repair is the annual caulking, tarring, rozing and paying sides and decks, masts also and yards; palpable defects are made good. Extra Repair is more thorough; decayed planks, &c., are renewed; all artificers' work is seen to, and the whole carefully overhauled. Rebuilding consists of virtually pulling the ship to pieces and building into a new ship as much of the old wood as is serviceable. This is dated 16th November 1691, and described as signed by the Commissioners of the Navy. To it 'a larger explication and some other particulars from Mr. Dummer of Chatham' is added, which here follows.]

Defects in Ships, how discovered.

Without separating the several parts that compose the whole one from another, defects are found either by searching all seams, rents, and treenails with a caulking iron, or by boring into the frame with an auger; by observing the ship's chambering or reathing;¹ the pitched seams to crack or spew out its oakum, or by the looseness of rust-eaten bolts. And as the matter is discernible by any of these means, together with a knowledge how long a ship hath been built, so the estimate of charge for repair is made; and all beyond this visibility is conjecture, and no better to be discerned than is the condition of the vessels within a consumptive man before dissection.

¹ Cambering or wreathing: curving or twisting.

An Ordinary Repair is understood to be the annual trimming of the ship in harbour,¹ by caulking all those parts which lie to the weather, and laying on of pitch or other mixed stuff of rozin, tallow &c., upon the same ; and once in three years at furthest, to dock them and burn off the old matter under water ; to search the seams and caulk them as occasion is and to grave them anew, which is to say to pay them all over under water with pitch or other mixed matter, with rozin &c. And in this ordinary trimming and repair we allow only of putting of small pieces, or of plank where the seams are grown too wide, or where knots or rents or a particular plank too much perished to hold oakum for tightness against the weather or other leakage.

An Extra Repair is taken to be such a defect in a ship's outward matter to the weather, that their frames cannot be preserved nor the ship fit for any service at sea by an ordinary trimming, without stripping such decayed materials of the outside planking and wales ; also the in-board works about the bulkheads and sides of the ship that lie to the weather ; therewith putting in short chocks and pieces in such part of the timbering of the frame as in this opening and stripping do appear decayed, and to repair the same all anew ; and many times to drive out all decayed iron bolts in the frame above and under water, placing upon the decks and sides an addition of standards, or riders, or both, that never was there before, for better strengthening the frame of a ship under such repair ; and sometimes the ship is sheathed under water, as the occasion calls for it ; and these works always

¹ i.e. of a ship in ordinary.

requiring a dock, are finished with a good caulking all over and paying the ship with mixed stuff, pitch &c. for to keep the weather from preying on the materials of the body.

Rebuilding is taken to be when neither the ordinary nor extra repair before mentioned will overcome, and so is an entire stripping down of all the out and in-board works, and removing so much of the timber of the frame, beams, standards, knees, &c., as shall be found decayed and rotten, which is many times done to the leaving only one-fourth part of what is in the old frame in the rebuilt ship ; and sometimes it is only taken to be the unmoulding of the frame and the stripping of the out and in-board work, from the top of the sides to 4 or 5 strakes under the lower wales, and to take out the tires of top timbers and upon futtocks, shifting or scarfing¹ the decayed beams and knees, and making the same good again by new material, completing all in-board works and to caulk all over and to grave.

Girdling . . . cannot so properly be called a repair in the matter as a supply of dimensions in breadth to the form of a ship that wants it ; and as occasion requires is from 4 to 8 and 10 inches thick on each side of the ship, in the parts that lie about the water edge in the midships ; and this repair in the form of ships is done to obtain more breadth for their support under a wind, when they are found tender by leaning

¹ When the ends of two pieces of timber are cut square and put together, they are said to 'butt' to one another ; and when another piece is laid upon and fastened to both, this is called 'scarfing the timbers.'—Falconer's *Dict. of the Marine*. But here the term seems rather to mean cutting away the decayed part and restoring the thickness of the beam by a new piece laid on.

or lying down their sides too much to their sails.

Signed by DUMMER AND LEE.¹

III.—REFLECTIONS ON OUR NAVAL STRENGTH

REFLECTING upon the state of this nation as to naval strength in 1652, when the Dutch first made war upon us, we, at beginning of that war having but a small navy, ended the same with more than a double strength, notwithstanding the many smart fights with them before we could obtain the mastery of the sea. And considering the great number of ships of war built since for a further reinforcement, do find ourselves at this day much inferior to the French in naval strength, particularly in the number of seamen, they having no navy then and wanting those natural helps England have to breed seamen by the Flanders, Holland, Hamburg, Baltic and Norway trade, North sea, Island, Westmony² and herring fishery; our New England, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Carolina and Carribbee Islands, increased by Jamaica, our Guinea, Spanish, Portugal and French as well as coasting, and coal trade, our fishery for the river Thames, besides that of watermen and west country bargemen, afford England many more helps to breed seamen than the French.

And also considering the Dutch, their double war (with us) since and the French King's invasion

¹ These may probably be identified with Edward Dummer, Surveyor of the Navy in 1692, and William Lee in 1706. For the technicalities of ship-building the reader can only be referred to Falconer.

² Westmanna, a little island on the South coast of Iceland.

upon them by land and sea in 1672, which greatly impoverished them, do yet retain the same vigour for war and opinion of their neighbours for naval strength and conduct that ever they had, it is visible to me that this defect amongst a troop of other causes, as bad and short victualling, changing one specie for another without giving an equivalent, keeping seamen long without their pay, turning them into other ships with a captain they love not, keeping them over long from their families, not curing the sick with the King's medicines nor well cared for to go abroad after recovery, not eating fresh meat and roots while in port, crowding too many men in a ship; not taking care to get seamen a proper specie of slop clothes, nor a sufficient quantity, over gunning ships in the winter so as seamen seldom lie dry in foul weather; not letting seamen have any plunder or prize money or preferment, and preferring volunteer gentlemen and soldiers in their accommodation aboard before officers and seamen—as Lord Torrington by lodging soldiers in the middle and seamen on the lower gun deck, preferring the ignorant and least able, ashore for money and at sea for favour.

Punishing seamen severely for slight causes springs chiefly from gentlemen commanding in the navy, who for the most part, meet with more accidents, (too many of their own making,) than a seaman captain. I therefore premise—

1. That it's impossible to make war by sea without accidents.

2. That these accidents (if at all) are to be avoided by captains experienced in the well navigating a ship upon any emergency, joined with courage and timely care; as De Ruyter avoided burning in 1666 by a timely anchoring,

as an English fireship came near him, then wanting wind and being maimed in his masts and sails to bear off his ships. The like might have been done to have saved my Lord Sandwich in the Royal James at Sole-Bay, and prevented the Dutch man of war clapping him thwart the hawse or going clear afterwards ; had they in time put a stream cable or hawser out of the middle or lower deck gunroom port, and passed it about to the stream or kedge anchor, and by it rode the Royal James by the stern, the tide would have drove the Dutch ship away.¹

3. Ever since the year 1660, that gentlemen came to command in the navy,² these accidents have been too oft repeated upon us, to the loss of many ships and men unexpectedly, their numerous names and commanders yet to be recovered ; most of which for want of seamanship in not timely and well navigating his ship.

1. Boarding an enemy when they ought not.
2. Doing it unskilfully.

An instance of both cost the nation £500,000 by making a gentleman captain of a 5th rate ; viz., in 1665 the Coventry frigate (Dunkirk built) was sent to the West Indies under the command of Captain Hill³ a Papist gentleman, who in a hurricane was forced ashore upon one of the Carribbee Islands near or in the French's possession, and, as the captain afterwards made report to the

¹ Sir Richard Haddock, the captain of the Royal James, was a seaman from his youth and came of a naval family.

² It suits the writer to forget that Lord Sandwich was a Commonwealth officer, and that Blake himself can scarcely be called 'experienced in well navigating a ship.'

³ William Hill : see Charnock's *Biog. Nav.*, i. 57. It is most improbable, if not impossible, that he was a 'Papist.'

Navy Board, was drove so far up into the land as he thought it impossible to dig her out, and therefore left (or sold) her and her materials to the French, who afterwards got her off, and sent her for all the governors and gentlemen in other islands, to help to take St. Christopher from the English: In her way back (full of French gentry) [she] was met by the Colchester frigate, commanded by Captain Langhorne¹—son to the Major General, a complete gentleman for courage and modesty—which outsailing the Coventry, and being a ship bigger, of more force, and well manned, in health, lately come from England, might easily have took the French ship, had he been of Captain Andrew Ball's mind, who (off Lagos Bay) meeting with a French man of war of equal force, sailing worse but more men, and fighting him hand to hand, being persuaded to board² his enemy, answered Yes, when he could see the blew³ out of the French ship's scuppers; but Captain Langhorne boarded the Coventry forthwith and was put off; before the second boarding, to make it uneasy for the Colchester or fright him from boarding them, the Frenchman showed the inner fluke of his sheet anchor and hung it a cock bill at the luff, over the side [on which] the Colchester approached him: Upon the Colchester's second boarding, this sheet anchor fluke run into

¹ Arthur Langhorne: see Charnock's *Biog. Nav.*, i. 59.

² 'To board' had, at this date two separate meanings: the first and more usual, to close with and possibly run foul of; the other, its later sense, to throw men on board of. This is the only meaning given by Falconer, and is clearly that intended by Captain Ball, but Captain Langhorne's experience would seem to refer rather to the first.

³ Probably a transcriber's error for 'blood': but possibly the author's confused recollection of some half-slang expression.

the Colchester's bow and made so great a hole as to sink her, and drown man and mother's son. No other account but from the French ever came to hand of that ship's loss.

Upon which St. Christopher's came to be taken by the French, and Lord Willoughby¹ was commanded to raise an army, and press all the ships at Barbados to recover that island. In their passage thither a hurricane sunk the ship the general was in and also many others with soldiers aboard never heard of. The residue being too weak for the French at landing, were most of them cut off; and the English of that island, by the consequences attending that mishap, undone; which certainly would have been prevented had a seaman commanded the Colchester. Then the French ship had been taken, and in her the governor and best gentry of the other places held by the French in the West Indies, which in all probability had maimed the French so as to have broke that attempt in the bud.

A like evil attended Admiral Herbert, now Lord Torrington, by his ill boarding the Turk's Tiger so as to run the Rupert's bowsprit between the Turk's main stay and fore shrouds, thereby giving the enemy full scope to kill all appeared in sight, and rake the Rupert fore and aft; so as had not the Mary, Sir Roger Strickland, been in sight and boarded the Turk on the other side, the Rupert had certainly been carried to Algiers by a much less ship than herself.²

A further late instance by the Portsmouth

¹ Francis, 5th Lord Willoughby; see *D.N.B.*

² Charnock (*Biog. Nav.*, i. 261) represents this affair in a very different light. It is certainly incorrect to speak of Herbert as a mere 'gentleman captain.'

frigate,¹ her running aboard a French man of war of much bigger force, thereby losing the said ship to the enemy, to the further loss of many men killed besides those that died afterwards of their wounds and by ill usage, and the loss of those lost for some time from their Majesties' service, to their great damage by long lying in prison and by it, the loss of their health and impoverishing them and their families. This ought to have been avoided, if only for the rottenness of the ship, as not being able to compare strength of timber at sea with a much less ship, as also for their having a packet aboard, besides the overmatch of the enemy.

Which calls to mind a passage reported to have been between General Blake and Captain (afterwards Sir Christopher) Myngs. Myngs who commanding the Elizabeth a 4th rate ship, in 1652, being clean, in the mouth of the Channel met two Dutch men of war of bigger force than himself, homeward bound and foul under water; who, by his courage and conduct, mastered the Dutch and brought them into the fleet in a military triumph, with the Dutch ensigns hanging under the English. When he came under the General's stern, saluted him and at a little distance anchored and took the like salute from his prizes, and then went aboard the General who, well knowing him by his captain, &c., suffered Captain Myngs to stand bare upon the quarter deck for some time; till at last, turning towards him, asked whose coxswain he was? He answered that he was captain of the Elizabeth for want of a better. The General replied he was in the right; for, said he, 'you think you have done a fair piece of service now; but how if the Dutch had carried

¹ Captain George St Lo; see Charnock, ii. 95.

you into Holland? what account could you have given of the loss of the State's ship and men? I will,' said he, 'have none of my captains guilty of any foolhardy actions; for by it they may bring irreparable damages to the state. A coward oft times saves his ship by running away when he ought to fight, and by a private reprimand, as Captain Peacock, Sir Joseph Jordan, etc. had, becomes a stout man; or by yielding too soon, saves men's lives; but a foolhardy captain fights against great odds when he may avoid it, and by it hazards the State's ship and loses a great many men unnecessarily; for you might, by your out sailing them, [have] kept at a distance till you had met with more help, which by firing guns might have given notice'; and so dismissed him, with saying, 'Hereafter, temper your courage with more discretion.' If this was not the very words, all within ()¹ mark was the substance of that great General's reprimands then to that blooming sprig of honour.

So Sir William Berkeley engaged the Dutch fleet with part of his squadron, the rest coming more leisurely after, to the loss of his life,² the ship and several others, with a great slaughter of our men. So the hearkening to the Lord Clifford at Bergen³ and not falling upon the Dutch as soon as they came into port, spoiled a good design and occasioned the taking away many a brave man's life foolishly.

It was a great oversight in my Lord Torrington (when he and his council of flag officers had agreed to fight next day) that he laid not his command

¹ There are no () in the MS. Probably they should have been instead of the quotes ' ' here given.

² In the fight off the North Foreland, 1st June 1666.

³ July 1665.

upon them to disperse this amongst their squadrons; and greater neglect (if not worse) not to bear down upon the enemy at daybreak, while wind, weather, and place, agreed to favour him; for it's hard work to be constantly loading and firing in calms, gunpowder smoke suffocating (by its sulphur and charcoal ingredients) which the coolness of the morning and wind would not only soon have driven from, but have fallen upon the French (had we been as near as we ought) with a double disadvantage to them, by keeping the French from taking aim at us, and the sooner firing them with ours as well as their own smoke.

It was great cowardice for an admiral to lay by at random, if not twice cannon shot from the enemy, and there to keep perpetually firing upon them; direct treachery to command the Dutch upon service and not effectually to second them, which had been done if he had laid by with his stern to England and not towards the French shore; then the French would have been afraid to have weathered the Dutch. Had the wind really failed to bring him to the French, he might, by anchoring, soon have been brought as near them as he pleased. Had the French acted like seamen and anchored, as the Dutch did, to free themselves upon the first turn of the tide, all the Dutch maimed ships had been theirs, and so many of ours as had, by a late or hasty anchoring, fell thwart any other of our ships' hawsers¹ [and] drove into their fleet; and by pursuing the advantage of destroying the Dutch squadron, were² able to seize all our heavy sailing ships before they could have got to the Nore, whither the French might have chased us without danger.

¹ MS. has 'hawsers.'

² Sc. would have been.

Our gentlemen captains have had the honour to bring in drinking, gaming, swearing and all impiety into the navy, and banish all order and sobriety out of their ships; and have further this ill effect, as to bring seamen to covet to act like gentlemen when gentlemen should learn to act like seamen. It was once my fortune to trace a gentleman captain's sea journal of a 4th rate ship, in which I found he was at times 460 days in port and (put all the days together) he was but 146 days at sea during that voyage. More examples of this nature I have met with. It is as possible for us to beat the French at sea by the present management of affairs, in fleets or separate fowl ships or with gentlemen captains, as for a hundred fat oxen upon Salisbury Plain to catch one greyhound. If we continue this foolish way of fighting in a line, only perform to begin,¹ and trust to that more than to our conduct, we may live to see ourselves destroyed as the Spanish Armada in 1588, who kept to their line till scattered and undone by our fireships.

By fighting in a line the coward hides his cowardice; while the Dutch observe it not, but value every man's actions by the damage he does or receives from his enemy. It is true that by fighting promiscuously, men are subject too oft to shoot their friends as well as enemies; therefore shoot with discretion; that is, hold your hand while in smoke, and be sure it is your enemy before

¹ It is impossible to say whether this nonsense is all the transcriber's, or how much of it is the author's. The meaning of it would seem to be—'If we continue . . . in a line (a formation which we should use only for beginning an action) and if we trust to that foolish way more than to our conduct, we may, etc.'

you shoot, and that you are in half gun shot to your enemy.

In all the sea fights against the Dutch in 1652-53 no other methods was observed than keeping to their flag as much as they could. The first fight off Dover, at Portland, and in June '53, and in July (when Tromp was killed) were all out of order; courage and conduct swayed each captain to do his best. Our guns, being for the most part shorter, are made to carry more than a French gun of like weight; therefore the French guns reach further and ours make a bigger hole; by this the French has the advantage to fight at a distance, and we yard arm to yard arm.

The like advantage we have of them in shipping; although they are broader and carry a better sail, our sides are thicker and the better able to receive their shot; by this they are more subject to be sunk by gun shot than we. Our courage may be the same it ever was, but our conduct infinitely differs from what it was formerly.

For instance: Captain Nicholas Heaton commanding the Sapphire, a 4th rate frigate of 36 guns and 180 men, came up, in the Bay of Biscay, in June 1654, with Captain Colaert of 36 guns and 250 men, Captain (since Sir Edward) Spragge of 26 guns and 150 men, a patache of 4 guns, bound for the West Indies, from Rochelle, with a Rocheller of 12 guns bound for Greenland. Heaton having a clean ship got her clear, and came up upon Colaert's weather bow, who,¹ (making what they were by his prospective² and intelligence before) fired his lee broadside within

¹ So in MS. The sense requires 'and'; or at any rate, it means Heaton.

² Sc. telescope.

pistol shot, gun by gun leisurely, as they came to bear upon the enemy, and tacked thwart his broadside and gave him all his guns not shot off before; then, down mainsail and stood away. After an hour, having loaded all his guns great and small, spliced his shot ropes, and got all ready, tacked and served Spragge as he had done his brother; and so alternately, for eight hours, till the afternoon, the wind increasing and having received shot in his masts and yards, lost them,¹ with the loss but of three men killed, for which the enemy lost scores, and by it were forced back, to the overthrow of their voyage. Heaton stood away leaving them to stop their leaks, took the Rocheller, and brought him into Plymouth.

So Captain Parker in the Briar, a small two-deck Dunkirk built frigate, of 22 small guns, having about 60 souls aboard of which above 10 boys, his ship very foul under water, took the Fox of Ostend—a much larger and broader ship of 18 guns and 150 men, clean tallowed, having but one deck—by avoiding the other's clapping him thwart the hawse, and getting his minion and falcon shot in baskets upon the upper and quarter deck and according² his men on the gun deck to come up as soon as they had fired their guns, and raised their ports to pelt the enemy, by flinging those shots out of their hands as they attempted to enter the Briar.

That gentlemen captains has not³ been in a great part, if not the sole cause of the destruction of our seamen, I further prove. A gentleman is

¹ Sc. Colaert and Spragge; they seem to have been private men of war, armed, probably, for Charles II.

² So in MS. Perhaps it should be 'ordering.'

³ This 'not' is clearly in error. It entirely alters the very obvious meaning.

put into the command of (suppose) a 4th rate ship, complement 200 men. He shall bring near 20 landsmen into the ship, as his footmen, tailors, barbers, fiddlers, decayed kindred, volunteer gentlemen (introduced to help to bring in popery), or acquaintance as companions. These shall have the accommodation of master's-mate, midshipman, quartermaster, trumpeter, coxswains etc. etc. and too oft their pay, while others do their duty for that of an able seaman or forced to share the extra pay with some of their consorts, or such as deserve it not. Next he covets to have all the rest of his complement able seamen, to the denying an officer the privilege of a servant [which] custom has given him with a seaman captain; and if he presses masters of small vessels or masters'-mates, boatswains, gunners or carpenters of big merchant ships, they shall fare no better in their accommodation and wages than others before the mast; and to be sure, [he] will always have more aboard than his complement. Now all the gentleman captain brings aboard him are of Bishop Williams' opinion, that God Almighty made man to live ashore and it's necessity that drives him to sea. When on the contrary a seaman as soon as he has the command of a 4th rate ship of 200 men, has none belong to him but such as devote themselves to the sea, as to a trade, and by it only expects to raise their fortunes.

Admirals. { Sir F. Drake. Sir Jno. Hawkins.
 { Gen. Deane. Coll. Rainsbro. Sir
 { Jno. Narbrough, Sir Wm. Penn.¹

¹ These names are given in the spelling of the MS. It is not more wrong than the biographical details.

Vice Admirals.	{ Sir W. Batten, Sir Jno. Lawson, Cap. Badile, Cap. Tiddman. Cap. Peacock. Cap. Goodson. Sir C. Mings. Sir Jno. Harman, Sir Jno. Berry.
Rear Admirals.	
	{ Sir Richd. Stainer, Capt. Houlding, Capt. Deacons, Capt. Sampson, Sir Jno. Wetwang &c.

All these came to deserved honour from having been cabin boys.

Sir Richd. Haddock, Sir Cloudsly Shovell, and Capt. Lawrence Wright (present Admiral¹ at the West Indies) had the same beginning.

By this a captain's retinue know presently their station and duty, are true spies upon every officer's miscarriage that reflect upon the captain, and are led to take the more notice to signify their capacity to judge of things and to bespeak their captain's putting a true value upon them for their preferment, when² gentlemen captains' retinue values none but of their own stamp, for whoreing, swearing, drinking and gaming; know nothing of any man's ability or neglect, and tells tales as he finds the captain angry or displeased with the men, or himself obliged or disobliged by him.

A seaman will be content with the complement of men allowed, if but half of them seamen; as Sir John Narbrough, when he went his last voyage in the Foresight, took aboard many officers' servants out of the ordinary, before the mast, and in six months had them fit for his purpose. This way a seaman-captain breeds up more seamen from being landsmen, trouncers³

¹ Commodore only. He came home early in 1693.

² Sc. while.

³ 'Waisters.'

and boys, than the casualty of fights, drowning, sickness &c. While the gentleman captain (as the buck rabbit eats his young) destroys his breed of seamen, by casualties of his own making, as by sending his boat for water, wood &c., at unseasonable time of day, weather or tide, or his pinnace ashore upon slight occasions at unseasonable times. A seaman has none about him but what deserves preferment; a gentleman-captain, only such as promote pleasure. A seaman, in chasing, takes care of the masts, rigging, endeavours to know the trim of his ship &c.; a gentleman captain speaks big, cries Let all stand! until all comes by the board.

Then, the masts, yards &c. are reported to be too small &c., by which a sailing ship have come to lose that property, by being over-masted, over-rigged, over-gunned (as the Constant Warwick from 26 guns, and an incomparable sailer, to 46 guns and a slug), over-manned (vide all the old ships built in Cromwell's days now left), over-built (vide the Ruby, Assurance &c.) and having great taffrails, galleries &c. to the making many formerly a stiff now a slender sided ship, bringing thereby their head and tuck¹ to lie too low in the water and by it taking away their formerly good property, in steering, sailing &c.

The French, by these defects of ours, make war with the sword (by sending no small men of war to sea but² clean) and we (by cruising in fleets or single ships foul) with bare throats, as Lucan said of Cæsar's and Pompey's soldiers.³ A seaman, by inspection, knows how to find out an extravagant expense or demand of stores brought

¹ Their stern.

² Sc. except.

³ *Pharsalia*, vii. 269-72.

for his hand to vouch it ; a gentleman, remaining ignorant how to contradict, signs implicitly ; or otherwise, hinders the service by refusing to sign it because he loves not the officer.¹ In convoys, a gentleman seldom takes any ship under his convoy but some of them are took from him, although he seldom fail of taking convoy money, and that at exorbitant prices ; a seaman, by shortening sail in the night, and lying by early in the evening to bring his convoys together, and by making early signs to tack in the night, shorten sail upon the shift of wind, or its over-blowing, rarely loses any. A seaman takes up less of the ship for his accommodation than he may ; a gentleman claims the steerage for his grandeur, quarterdeck for his jars, pigeons &c., forecastle and waist for his hogs, sheep, hens &c. and oft-times all abaft the mainmast upon the upper deck.² A seaman is familiar amongst his men, talking to several on the weather, upon deck all night in foul weather, gives the most active a dram of the bottle ; a gentleman has a sentinel at his great cabin door to keep silence in the belfry, and oft-times beat his master for not coming to him forthwith when he rings his

¹ Distrust or an ignorant idea of economy might equally well be the reason. It is within the writer's knowledge that, some fifty years ago, a ship lying in the Peiræus sent to Malta a demand for a certain sum of money. The Admiral Superintendent, wishing to economise, sent only half of the sum asked for ; which, as the immediate payment was urgent, obliged the paymaster to cash a bill at a rather heavy discount.

² At this date and for more than a hundred years after it, the upper deck was the upper gun-deck, which was afterwards called the main deck. 'All abaft the mainmast on the upper deck' was thus what was long spoken of as 'under the half deck,' and seems from the text to have been colloquially divided into the belfry, or foremost part of it, and the steerage, or after part of it ; as to which see Falconer's *Dict. of the Marine*.

bell in the night, although it's not his watch, to answer his impertinent ¹ questions ; by which you have few good masters left in the navy, and nothing less than a lieutenant's place will serve a merchant of a small vessel so much do they dread being a master of any of the King's ships—vide Captain Potter, present master attendant at Sheerness, who chose to be a gunner of the Antelope a 4th rate ship, [rather] than go master of a like rate, the which he had been several years before.

Find but a way, and practise it, to catch the French privateers, you at once cool their courage ; enable yourselves thereby to put a dread on their coming near a fleet of your merchant ships, by sending a clean ship on convoys, at appointed times, not oftener than once a year to remote parts, and very early (in August) to recover your men for the great ships in the spring, and those merchant ships that go abroad to be of the greatest force to resist an enemy. Prefer the most knowing ; turn none out of employment without a hearing and cause publicly assigned ; put none into employments but such as know the duty of the meanest person he is to command. Till this is practised, England can neither be safe or happy.

We act as if King Louis had the management of our naval affairs. Six or ten clean tallowed men of war, not over gunned, and constantly recruited as any grow foul, lying at convenient distances in the Soundings, would be incomparable lanterns to guide and bring our straggling rich but very heavy London merchant ships into port ; the want of which, in a little time more, will destroy all your trade, by captures and wrecks of your homeward bound merchant ships, and

¹ Sc. not pertinent.

thereby rob this kingdom of her best seamen, beyond all the other ways of gunshot, sickness &c.

Before gentlemen came to command in the navy and direct our maritime affairs ashore, we were able to fight with all the world at sea—as the French king at this day with all Europe by land. Since the year 1660, that gentlemen came to command at sea, we find ourselves under a necessity to make up our fleet with a third part French to fight the Dutch, or a third part Dutch to meet the French. In a little time more, this method will reduce us to but one third part of the strength of our neighbours, Dutch or French.

Upon the whole, if the number of days a gentleman captain lays in port unnecessarily, his supernumeraries, over-manning, [over]gunning and spoiling the sailing of his ship, the small judgment he has to increase seamen, secure them from drowning, and his ship from stranding, annoy his enemy or secure his convoys, or prevent the great waste or theft of stores made by his officers through his ignorance to sign and interest to get them passed, be put together, the crown will at all times be better able to secure trade, prevent the growth of the naval strength of our enemy with £100,000 under a natural sea admiralty and sea captains (witness the Dutch), than with three times that sum under land admirals and gentlemen-captains.

We have forgot the old way of laying upon the quarter or bow of our enemy ; yet the Dutch retained it in two wars with us afterwards, viz. upon the Victory; Sir Christopher Myngs commander, and the Prince Royal, when Sir Edward Spragge wore the blue flag at main topmast head in her, and when Sir John Harman commanded the Henry, and when he commanded the Charles the

Second ; and several others had (by scipper thrum cappsons)¹ their jackets well thrashed, although our best heroes were enclosed in walls of brass, by keeping in the trade from father to son, while we forgot to fight any other way than at twice cannon shot distance from the enemy, or catch a Tartar by our great courage ; beginning to learn late and despising the trade, although we get our bread by it, thereby leaving the most daring of our friends to be destroyed by our enemy, while the gentlemen look on with a 'Damme, I took him for a coward,' or 'Let him take his share as I have done,' a slight matter having sent him a-packing.

Heretofore, if a seaman had offended in a private ship, he was called aft before the officers, viz. lieutenant, master and his two mates, the gunner, purser, boatswain and carpenter, summoned for that purpose into the great cabin, and the corporal ordered to set a sentinel on the great cabin door ; and the person accused brought in and after examination and proof (*vivâ voce*) has his punishment sentenced by majority of votes. Since the gentlemen came into the navy, all is done at the will and pleasure of the commander, without hope of relief at a court martial, the Scotch law taking place thereof : Shew me the man and I will tell you how his cause shall go. Many men, by vigorous punishments, have been forced to desert their ships with ten and fifteen months pay due to them, by severe usage,—several abroad in foreign ports, where, by marrying, they are for ever alienated from their country ; there being, as James

¹ This may perhaps mean 'Captain Woollen Jersey' (analogous say, to Master Tarry Breeks) as opposed to Captain Velvet Jacket. Scipper, a Dutch captain of a smack ; thrum, coarse woollen yarn ; cappsons (? = *campesons*), quilted doublets. —See Smyth's *Sailors' Word Book*.

Howell¹ says of the Spaniard and French, a natural as well as accidental antipathy between the genius of seamen and their gentlemen commanders, as King Charles I and King James II found experimentally true.

Captain Foster of the Phoenix, a 4th rate frigate, in October 1653, taking a rich Dutch ship going to Stockholm to lay up there as a mercer's shop all winter, discoursed the master of the prize, an ingenious Dutchman, what should tempt them to make war upon us, when the wind blowing westerly on our coast for more than three quarters of a year, did thereby make all our headlands and bays far better harbours than any they had? and that our country, like eagles' wings, lay extended over the body of theirs for 120 leagues from Scilly to the Maas² in Holland one way, and thence to Orkney the other, and their trade lying by our ports, our fisher boats, turned into men of war, were able to destroy them? that our ports were open to trade when theirs were frozen up; and could trade ourselves by keeping along our own coast to any part of the world, while they should be forced to a tedious navigation round Ireland for the Straits, Spanish and St. Ives³ salt trade and wine from France?

The Dutchman replied that what he said was true, but they had newly ended a successful war against the Spaniard; were well skilled in sea fights, had many ships sailed well and expected to force us speedily into a peace by blocking up our ports with their many capers. That we had

¹ *Instructions for Foreign Travel* (Arber's Reprint), 37.

² Maze, in MS.

³ St. Ubes, or more properly Setubal.

but a small navy, like him that had but one pair of breeches, which when torn, would oblige us to lay a bed till mended. That we were a divided people, and they had our King Charles II with them, whose interest they hoped to fight us with &c. At last, said [he], their mishap arose by an accident, viz. the late Prince of Orange (King William's father) attempting to seize the Bank of Amsterdam (as his enemies reported); and dying soon after, the enemies to that family (in the nonage of K. William) prevailed with the States to put out all his friends, by sea as well as by land, and put in gentlemen, creatures of their own; so, says the Dutchman, by this we came to fight you with gentlemen captains, and you us (by a like jealousy of turning out all the King's captains (that were gentlemen) with seamen captains; by which you came to beat us. But if ever we should fight you again (for the mastery of the sea) with seamen captains and you us with gentlemen captains, we shall beat you.

*IV.—THE FIGHT WITH THE FRENCH,
ANNO 1692*

An Account of the most important transactions relating to the Royal Navy and the fight with the French, Anno 1692: written by the Earl of Nottingham.

Before the King went on board,¹ his Majesty resolved on the attempt of St. Malo and Brest as the places which were most dangerous, the one to the trade, and the other to the safety of the

¹ For his voyage to Holland, 5th March.

nation. In order to the execution of those designs, he ordered the Duke of Leinster, Lord Galway, and Mr. Russell to meet and concert the proper methods of performing those designs. They met several times and there attended them a person, lately come over from France, with a minute description of those places, and to show how true the account he gave of those places was, he offered to go on board the fleet, and did go accordingly, that his life might answer to the truth of his assertion.

26th February.—His Majesty communicated his designs upon Brest to the Committee of Council, and accordingly I prepared heads of Instructions to Mr. Russell, which on March 1st, being the next time the Council attended the King, were read and approved, but the King did not sign them, but ordered Mr. Russell to consult with the flag officers of such a draft of Instructions as they should judge proper for that and all the operations of the next campaign.

5th March.—Orders were sent to the victuallers of the navy and commissioners of transports, to provide victuals and ships for the men designed for the descent.

27th March.—The Council of War having determined nothing, particularly in relation to Brest or St. Malo; and it being necessary as well as ordered by the King a draft of Instructions should be prepared by them, such a draft was by the Queen's order of May 3rd and 17th demanded of Mr. Russell, who on 13th May sent me only his own opinion, as is hereafter mentioned. However, in the meantime the preparations went on for ships and provisions for the men designed for the descent. But the news of the French designs upon England interrupted the measures that were

taken for the descent; and the fleet, not being manned, it was of absolute necessity to break through all protections, and the admiralty was directed to take all the seamen of the transport ships and send them to the fleet.

11th April.—Mr. Russell was directed to acquaint the flag officers with the French designs, and to consider a proper station for the fleet to prevent them, and so as not to be intercepted by the French before the Dutch came, who were to sail the 22nd; and Mr. Blathwayt¹ was written to, to press the sending them, one by one ready as they were.

13th April.—Orders were given to Rear Admiral Carter to go on the coast of France.

19th April.—All the ships except the first and second rates were ordered to fall down to the fleet off of the Foreland; and Mr. Russell was ordered to consider what further orders were fit to be given, whether to go to sea and where to cruise to prevent a descent, and whether the 1st or 2nd rates may not go on this occasion to the rendezvous.

20th April.—The Admiralty was ordered to send the fleet to the Flats off of the Foreland, and Mr. Russell was directed to distribute the men on the Flats, so as to be fit to sail.

22nd April.—The Admiralty was directed by the Queen to order Mr. Russell to sail with the fleet out of the River to the Flats off of the Foreland.

23rd April.—Sir Ralph Delavall was ordered to sea with all but the first and second rates, and that the Flats was to be the rendezvous of the fleet, to which Sir R. Delavall was ordered to

¹ William Blathwayt, secretary at war.

retreat if he met with a superior strength; but the great ships did not sail till Mr. Russell came on board, who took his leave of the Queen on the 29th April, on which day Admiral Almonde with a considerable number of Dutch ships arrived in the Downs, and went to the fleet in the River on the 3rd May, on which day the Queen hearing he was still in town, ordered him so to do, and to consult with the flag officers the services proper for this expedition as formerly ordered.

26th April.—The Queen ordered Mr. Russell to direct Sir R. Delavall to proceed to Havre de Grâce to pursue his former orders.

27th April.—Sir Ralph Delavall's squadron was directed to be strengthened as much as may be.

29th April.—All the Dutch ships under 3 decks were ordered to join him.

5th May.—I sent Mr. Russell notice that the French fleet was believed to be at sea and pressed him to sail, and the Admiralty was directed to send him orders accordingly to sail to the rendezvous, which was then appointed to be between Cape de la Hague¹ and the Isle of Wight, whither Sir Ralph Delavall and Rear Admiral Carter were also directed.

6th May.—I acquainted him that the French fleet sailed on the 2nd and told him Sir R. Delavall's orders, which were to join the fleet in the speediest manner and to send advice to Mr. Russell.

7th May.—He writes that the most proper rendezvous was on the Ness or Beachy,² but

¹ The MS. has Cape D'Hogue. That it is merely a mistake in spelling is evident by a reference to Burchett, p. 462.

² Sc. Dungeness or Beachy Head.

would obey his orders of the 5th, and I pressed him then to sail to the westward.

8th May.—He sailed by Dover with a fair wind.

9th May.—I repeated to him, as the Admiralty had ordered, that the rendezvous was to be off the Isle of Wight for him, Delavall, Carter, and the Dutch; and that he should act, as by the advice of a Council of War. He stopping in Rye Bay,

10th May.—I sent him word that the French fleet was on our coast, and sent duplicates to all the ports upon the coast. On that day Sir Ralph Delavall and Carter joined at St. Helens.

11th May.—By the Queen's orders, Mr. Russell was directed to call a Council of War and to attack the French, if strong enough, they being in the Channel, and therefore a battle was much to be wished with this advantage; and to have six or seven ships to prevent the transport of the French troops whilst he was westward.

13th May.—These orders were repeated, and that he should search out the French fleet.

He saith the fleet is joined; that if he had not sailed the minute he did, he had been still at the Nore, and it was done contrary to the opinion of the pilots; that the wind had blown so hard that he could not purchase his anchors till yesterday, and several were forced to leave theirs behind them. He takes the French designs of landing to be at an end till they beat us, which he believes they will not attempt unless forced, or that we go far westward, and leave the coast naked; but six or eight frigates on the Normandy coast will prevent it, and our troops may embark and land at St. Malo, which place by the first information is easily taken, while the fleet lies to the westward to protect them; this may oblige the French to a

battle, and if we beat them, we may follow them, not as they did us,¹ but into their harbours, and embarking the soldiers, go for Brest and do a lasting service for England.

14th May.—Mr. Russell writes that he did not think it advisable to search [out] the French fleet, unless within a little distance; and that the fleet being joined, he did not believe the French would meet us this summer; and that it was not advisable to leave any ships on the French coast, by sending away any of his number from the fleet.

15th May.—The Council of War agrees with Mr. Russell not to search [out] the French fleet beyond St. Helens without certain advice that they were on the coast, but to proceed to Cape de la Hague,² to return to St. Helens, but cannot resolve upon instructions for this year's service.

From St. Helens, 15th.—Mr. Russell writes that he approves this resolution and will execute it; that the Guernsey pilots were come from the French coast.

17th.—Hereupon the Queen sent him the orders of May 17th; that by having some ships as formerly directed on the 13th, which seemed not to have been said before the Council of War, the designs of the French descent were provided against; and that the whole naval power should not be employed about Cape de la Hague and St. Helens, and the noise of a descent should not frustrate the whole summer's service; and that this being his opinion to such a proceeding, would justly be censured,³

¹ Sc. in 1690, after Beachy Head. ² de Hogue in the MS.

³ This confused and incomplete sentence perhaps means:—That if Russell was of opinion that the summer service should go on, his permitting the French threat to stop it would be justly censured. This is a mere guess, and in any case, Russell sailed on the 18th, on definite news that the French fleet was off Portland.—Mayo, *Medals and Decorations*, No. 80.

and therefore he was to consider of the said orders at a Council of War, and to leave ships on the coast of Normandy, and proceed with the fleet to Brest, since the French could not get in, and to consider what further to propose, that the Queen might order it if she approved thereof; but to lose no opportunity which, upon intelligence, he might have, in expectation of such orders. I wrote to himself to press his looking after the French fleet.

19th May.—I wrote to him that the French were seen off of Portland; and in case of a battle, which might draw him westward, he should remember to leave some ships on the coast of Normandy, as directed. The Admiralty were directed to hasten the ships in the river to the Downs, and there to expect their or Mr. Russell's orders.

Off Cape de Barfleur. 20th May.—Mr. Russell gives an account that the French were beaten;¹ that he was steering away to Conquett Bay, the wind fresh easterly; and that he hoped to destroy their whole fleet.

21st.—The Queen's orders were sent to all the ships that had not been with the fleet, to go on the coast of Normandy; and orders were sent to the English and Dutch at Falmouth, to tell them of the victory and to sail to join the fleet, which was in pursuit of the enemy; and I wrote to Mr. Russell to acquaint him with those orders, and that he should send some ships to the Shannon, for convoy of the artillery which was necessary for the descent.

*La Hogue Bush.*² *23rd.*—Mr. Russell gives

¹ Battle of Barfleur, 19th May.

² Bay. Apparently an attempt to reproduce the Dutch bocht' = bight. The French attempt was 'bougue.'

an account of the victory ;¹ that Sir John Ashby and Almonde had lost sight of the French off of Guernsey, which he laments ; believes that they are got into St. Malo ; he intends to advise with the flags about sending a strong squadron to the westward, which may possibly meet the French going to Brest, and to send another along the French coast to Dunkirk. He designs to go to St. Helens, but judgeth the Downs most proper.

23rd May.—Mr. Russell complains of the Queen's orders of the 17th ; gives reasons for his going to Cape de Hogue,² viz :—from this place the descent was to be made, hither the French fleet was coming to convoy them, and its appearing on our coast could be no danger to England ; and saith the event hath justified his opinion.

26th.—I signified to him the Queen's approbation of sending a strong convoy to the westward ; that there was no need of sending another further than Dieppe, because there were ships before Dunkirk ; that he should stay at St. Helens and not come to the Downs, to be ready to execute the designs he knew of ; and that the Queen would send some lords to consult with the flags and general officers [on] the method for an invasion, for the sooner an attempt was made the better, while the French were under a consternation, and to send some ships to the Shannon for the artillery.

Six Leagues from La Hogue, 25th May. Mr. Russell writes, that he had resolved at a council of war, to have gone westward himself with fifty ships to Forne³ Head, in hopes to have met the

¹ La Hogue, 23 May.

² This must be a mistake of the author ; the Bay of La Hogue is meant, if not Cape Barfleur.

³ Probably C. Porsal. On a chart of the date, the Porsal Rocks are marked Forne Isles.

ships which the Dutch, and the Admiral of the Blue¹ lost sight of; but hearing by a Genoese that he met twelve French disabled ships off of the Start, bound for Brest, he concluded it was in vain to go thither to look after them. He was resolved to come to St. Helens with the fleet, except some ships sent to Havre de Grâce, to look after five French ships he believed were there.

²Now is the time if you were able to make a descent. I believe we may be free from any attempts they will make in our country as yet. I say this because you will have ships enough for the fleet and for all the services the Admiralty used to be so much concerned for. I will immediately put what ships are able for the sea in the best condition I can; if masts may be had, all will be fit for service immediately.

27th May.—He hoped but could not be positive that a few days will fit, if not *all*, yet most of the ships for the sea. It will be necessary to consider what the fleet shall do; to cruise is of no use; if the men for the descent can be got ready, now is the time; if this cannot be, he knows not what to propose. I acquainted him that hearing he was in sight of Portsmouth, the Queen resolves that no time should be lost to prosecute the descent, and had ordered the Lords Rochester, Portland and Sidney, to go to Portsmouth to consult with him, the sea and land officers, the proper measures.

31st.—They went on the 28th and returned on the 31st. I acquainted Mr. Russell that two French ships were off of Beachy; and on the 26 and 27th four more were off Dartmouth, and took notice of the advice he had received from the

¹ Sir John Ashby.

² This seems to be an actual quotation from Russell's letter.

Lord Jermyn that a squadron of French ships were in St. Malo.

While the lords were at Portsmouth it was agreed by the flag officers that the fleet should sail as soon as possible, with sixty men of war, and go off Ushant, sending some frigates to see what ships were in Brest water, and to act against the enemy as the flag officers judged best; that the fleet should sail without staying for the land forces, and Mr. Russell to send advice from thence with all speed.

1st June.—In pursuance of the flag officers' advice, the Queen ordered Mr. Russell to send immediately some ships and fireships to Newfoundland, to destroy the French there; and to send a squadron of such ships as were ready to Cape de la Hague, to cruise two or three days to annoy the enemy, and if no opportunity for it, to return to St. Helens.

Portsmouth, 1st.—Mr. Russell writes that he designed to go to sea with the English and Dutch ships that are in the best condition, and leave the rest to be refitted.

2nd June.—Mr. Russell acknowledgeth the letter from the Lord Jermyn about the ships at St. Malo; that he knows not what to make of it; he intended some ships to look after the French off of Beachy and Falmouth, but that the ill weather had hindered him. That the captain of the Chatham chased two French men of war into the Alderney.

2nd.—I wrote to Mr. Russell to send a list of what ships he desired to keep for the main fleet, including the Newfoundland ships and those designed for the coast of Normandy; that the rest might be employed in cruising.

3rd.—The Queen sent orders to Mr. Russell to direct the squadron designed to go off Cape de la

Hague to proceed to the Soundings and cruise eight or ten days for protection of the Oporto fleet and merchant ships daily expected, and then to return to the fleet in such manner as he judged fittest for the service, unless the flag officers should judge it not fit to hazard the squadron without more force to be added to it.

3rd June.—I writ to him that I had advice from Guernsey that the French ships were at St. Malo, and that it was thought some fire ships might do great execution.

Spithead, 4th.—Mr. Russell gives an account of the condition of the fleet, and proposes some ships to be sent to Chatham; he does not apprehend a greater strength from the enemy than we shall be, all services performed; he should communicate the Queen's orders of the 3rd and send the result. If there was any probability of the French ships being at St. Malo, certainly the Governor of Guernsey would send some vessels thither to know the certainty, that measures might be taken to destroy them; that sending from hence, the return of the ships [would be in shorter time]¹ and then to order a squadron of ships upon the coast, which must not be less than the greatest part of the fleet if the French be thirty-three, and probably the French ships from Brest may join them, and all this will be hardly feasible at this time unless he was certain they were there; 'tis too late to repair [the omission],¹ but if the French had been followed at first by the ships he left off of the Casketts, there would have been a good account of them.

5th June.—Mr. Russell writes he was cleaning two 4th rates at Portsmouth, two 5th rates at

¹ Omitted words supplied by conjecture.

Plymouth, and a fireship all ready to join them, which will be ready in a few days, and then they shall go for Newfoundland ; he will send the names of the ships for cruising on the coast of France while the fleet is to the westward, and how strong the main fleet may be ; he desires no more than ten.

6th.—I sent Mr. Russell an account that I received from France, that the ships were certainly at St. Malo, and that it agreed with the news I sent him from Guernsey, and that I hoped, since our squadron unfortunately did not pursue the enemy, the honour was reserved for him.

6th June.—The Queen upon this intelligence ordered him to send some frigates on the coast of St. Malo, and to get some little vessel at Guernsey to go near St. Malo and discover what French ships were there, and how they lay ; with orders to bring him an account to such place as he should appoint ; and ordered Mr. Russell to sail, with the English and Dutch which were ready, with the first wind to Cape de la Hague, and so westward to meet the frigates sent to St. Malo ; or if the French were there or upon that coast, he was to proceed thither and take or destroy them ; but if this cannot be done without land forces, he was to send notice of it, that such forces as he judged requisite might be immediately embarked and sent to him, and in the meantime he was to cruise, so as not to give the enemy suspicion of his designs, and yet so as to prevent their getting away to Brest ; but if no French ships were at St. Malo, or nothing can be any way attempted, he should pursue his orders of June 3rd.

Spithead, 7th June.—Mr. Russell takes notice of the ill weather and that he could not call together the flag officers to consider the last orders of her Majesty.

9th.—I then sent him a further account that the French ships were at St. Malo, and so I hoped he would retrieve the misfortune of their escape ; for this would put an end to their pretensions at sea, and therefore ought to be attempted, if there was any prospect of success by any means.

9th.—Mr. Russell writes he hath sent two frigates to Jersey to get a boat to go with them to St. Malo, to discover the enemy's ships there.

10th.—He writes that he had a list of the line of battle, which would be about seventy-five sail ; and also a list of the ships for the coast of Normandy, the cruisers, and those sent to the admiralty,¹ which with the 4th rates that they have already, will be sufficient for the service they have to employ them in.

10th June.—In another he saith he thinks himself strong enough, and shall be able to send some constantly to clean, and some few to cruise on the coast of Ireland. He cannot send ships for the transport ships at Bristol till he gets to the westward.

11th.—I wrote to him about the Rupert which was in the line of battle, that she should, as much as might be, be in a readiness for the West Indies. I wrote also about the Winter Squadron and to desire his opinion of them, and a squadron for the Mediterranean. I confirmed to him the news of the French ships being at St. Malo and to pray his opinion what might be done concerning them, and what would be requisite to enable him to destroy them.

12th.—Mr. Russell writes he was impatient of

¹ This very awkward expression seems to mean the list ordered on the 2nd.

the ill weather, and that Captain Meese¹ should sail with his squadron the next day.

13th.—He writes his opinion about the Winter and Mediterranean Squadron, and in another he writes that the prisoners, taken by the Clowdisley galley,² assure him, that the French vice admiral of the blue and twenty-five more ships and fire-ships were at St. Malo, almost despairing, and wanted an opportunity to get to Brest; he himself inclined to go with the fleet before St. Malo, but the pilots said it was not safe; however when the fleet is to the westward of St. Malo, something might be attempted to destroy them, to which the land army would be of great use; this additional blow to the enemy would be worth two provinces in France.

14th June.—I told him the transport ships were ordered to Portsmouth with all speed, and the troops would be embarked and follow him, though I hoped he would not lose an opportunity of destroying the St. Malo ships, in expectation of them. I proposed to him the ordering Captain Meese to cruise about La Hogue; to pretend sometimes to land, that the late King's army might be kept thereabout from going to St. Malo, that the opposition might be less at St. Malo.

14th June.—Mr. Russell sails from St. Helens.

15th.—I acquainted him the West India squadron was designed to sail by the 1st August, that the ships designed thither might be in the way. I told him some things were to be attempted at Newfoundland, that Captain Gillam³ might be informed of them; that I hoped he would succeed

1 George Meese: see Charnock, *Biog. Nav.*, ii. 278.

2 This was a privateer: the prisoners were brought into the fleet by a Dartmouth ketch. Burchett, 470.

3 Thomas Gillam; see Charnock, *Biog. Nav.*, ii. 253.

at St. Malo, and desired him to send an account of what he found practicable.

Off the Bolt. 17th.—Mr. Russell writes that if the enemy be still at St. Malo and the weather permits he hoped to keep to the westward of them, and there will consider with the flag officers what may be done and how, which he will give an account of; if land forces and the shallops lately built be necessary, Captain Benbow is a prudent, gallant man and fit to be advised with.

23rd.—I acquainted him that Captain Benbow apprehends the attempt of St. Malo dangerous without land forces, but with them, he does not doubt of good success; that the transport ships were fallen down the river, and as they arrive at Portsmouth, the troops will be embarked. I prayed him to send a convoy to Milford Haven for the transport ships, if he had not already done it, the Dolphin alone being too weak.

That Captain Benbow thought Brest also not hard to be attempted with the fleet and land forces, and was willing to go on any of those services. In the meantime, till our troops come to you, I hope the St. Malo ships will be hindered from getting away.

24th June.—I writ him the Queen's commands to Captain Meese to pretend sometimes to land and to keep the coast in continual alarm, and thereby facilitate the attempt on St. Malo.

At Sea, 25th.—Mr. Russell takes notice that the troops were to be embarked at Portsmouth; approves that Captain Meese should alarm the French coast, as I had proposed to him; that he was gone from him. He had sent some ships to the Seven Islands to take some men from the shore; no ways to prevent the ships getting out of St. Malo and going North about if they will

venture it ; but by lying before the port, if it may be—of which he will advise with the pilots—but if it can be, it will cause the French to bring down all their troops, and render the attempt more difficult ; but something ought to be hazarded for the destroying those ships.

*In sight of the Start, June 22nd.*¹—He saith the Dragon is ordered to convoy the transport ships from Bristol ; Captain Gillam will sail to Newfoundland the first favourable weather.

*23rd June.*¹—He saith that having yesterday received an account from Captain Meese of the French ships being at St. Malo, he called a council of war, who, upon the unanimous advice of the pilots that the fleet may ride safely off Cape Barrel resolved to proceed thither ; he saith it was impossible to keep the former station agreed on, for bad weather which forced them away ; besides the ships at St. Malo might get away and go away eastward ; if any attempt can be made with a probability of success, it shall be pushed ; whether the land men be ready or can be serviceable he cannot judge.

28th June.—The Queen ordered Captain Meese to come immediately to Spithead, with the English and Dutch with him.

29th.—I told Mr. Russell that all the transport ships and forty shallops were fallen down the river and will be convoyed to Portsmouth ; that the troops, which I believed to be about 12,000 men, besides dragoons, were so posted as to be embarked in a few days ; that two bomb vessels would be at Portsmouth by the time the troops embark or else would follow. I told him Captain

¹ The misplacing of these entries would seem to imply a delay in their coming to hand.

Meese was sent for to Spithead, to convoy the transport ships and assist in carrying some men, if shipping were wanting—as there would be, if those from Bristol did not come ; and therefore I desired him to send all the tenders he could spare.

1st July.—I sent letters with the Queen's orders to the governors of the Caribbee Islands, to be sent with all speed, and the duplicates of them within a fortnight after the first were dispatched. I again prayed him to send all the tenders he could spare to Portsmouth with all speed, for there would be 14,000 men to be embarked.

2nd July.—Captain Meese arrived at Spithead.

30th June.—Mr. Russell takes notice that he had been driven twenty leagues beyond Ushant, which confirms him in his opinion that so great a fleet should not be ventured at sea, but where there is room to drive any way for 48 hours, or may anchor and ride in the Channel ; six hours on either side, makes a lee shore ; and if Providence had not put in his head early in the morning, to bring to, the fleet had been in danger. He designs for St. Malo, though by what he is informed by the pilots, he hath but little hopes of doing anything there ; nor is it possible to lay any way on the enemy's coast to the westward, to intercept them in their passage to Brest, so that if he finds he can do nothing, he will come to Torbay and expect orders. He cannot see that any service can be done by the fleet, but only protecting the country, unless we can land on the enemy, and what that may do he cannot judge. He hopes the latter part of the summer may make amends for what is past, for he never saw so bad weather.¹

¹ *June 24th.*—This morning the wind sprung up fresh northerly, with filthy, rainy weather— . . . The Almanacks call this Midsummer Day. It may have been so formerly, but

4th July.—I received Mr. Russell's of June 30th and wrote to him by the Queen's command, that though I had often acquainted him with our preparations of sending land forces to join in the attempt of St. Malo and the ships there, and that if nothing could be done by the fleet alone, he should endeavour however to prevent their getting away to Brest, yet that her Majesty thought it necessary I should again write to him on this subject; that the transport ships were sailed towards Portsmouth, the troops ready to be embarked, Captain Meese ready to convoy them, and consequently, they might sail quickly to join with the fleet to hinder the French from escaping out of St. Malo, though I pretended not to prescribe the methods; that the letters from France say that they were in pain for the ships at St. Malo; that Tourville was sent thither to try if it was possible to get them away; that Captain Meese had alarmed them and crossed their designs; so that if the fleet alone cannot attack them, nor lie safely in a station to intercept them, yet a squadron might hinder them from attempting to get away, though the fleet should be forced off of the coast; because they will scarce venture to sea, without sending out scouts to discover where our fleet is. The safety of the fleet was of that importance that I did not pretend to advise, and he was to make the conclusion from this letter, but only that the Queen was resolved to have the destruction

I am sure it is not so now, for we have had no summer yet. Good God! How it blows and rains. I dare challenge any day in winter to compare with this Midsummer Day for cold, rainy and stormy weather. *June 25th.*—Lord! Here's winter all the year round, and the weather as bad or worse than it was on Midsummer's Day.—Richard Allyn's *Narrative of the Victory etc.*, 46.

of the St. Malo ships attempted if possible, and earnestly recommended it to his care that the opportunity be not lost before the troops join him. He should send notice to Portsmouth with speed where the transport ships should join him, so also the victualling ships from Plymouth and if we did not hear from him, I believed that they would be ordered towards St. Malo.

3rd July.—Mr. Russell writes that the pilots would not venture over to St. Malo, the weather being thick; he distrusts their judgments; he is informed by a captain that hath used the St. Malo trade, that there is not good ground for above forty ships to ride in, for which reason he will call a council of war to consider whether the whole fleet should proceed or only a detachment to view the place, and how the fleet may ride; and if no service can be done, it is better not to appear before the place. The council of war resolved it was not fit the whole fleet should anchor before St. Malo; that a squadron of it be detached to get an account of the place and of the ground for the fleet to ride, if hereafter an attempt should be made; and the fleet to proceed twelve leagues off of the Start, and Vice Admiral Rooke was ordered, with Captain Farrell, to examine the ground for ships to ride in and to get an account of the ships at St. Malo. Mr. Russell enclosed also an account he had from some English (one of which is a sensible man) that escaped from St. Malo, viz. :—that by the islands going into St. Malo, there are thirty guns on the one, and fifty on the other as they believe; and when out of command of the islands, you are within the command of the town. That they were and are still in great consternation, fearing our fleet would come and burn their ships. The men of war above Solidor rode within pistol

shot of the town ; the town is not strong to the land ; that all their water comes from Solidor, which if cut off, the town cannot hold out ; but there is no damage to be done in their harbour by ships, but if a great number of boats should come they would be in such consternation that they believed the ships might be destroyed, but with great hazard.

4th July, Postscript.—He saith he has received mine of the 29th June ; that he could not then answer every particular, but that he might without much consideration. That if the number of men to be landed did not exceed 12,000 men, they can be of no use at St. Malo, which hath double the number fit to bear arms. If these be all that are for the descent, the best use for them will be to land at La Hogue, and take away the cannon which the French have fished up.

6th. Under sail off of Guernsey.—Mr. Russell writes that he would send the first packet to the Barbados, but wanted a vessel to carry the second, for which the Goodwin Prize was very proper ; he could say nothing of the intended descent till the return of Vice Admiral Rooke, and then he shall better judge whether the whole or part of the fleet may ride off St. Malo ; yet if the design be on the place, there may be ships sufficient to protect their landing ; he will send the tenders to help transport the men. He gives his opinion in some matters relating to the West India expedition.

7th July.—I acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Russell's of the 4th and 6th instant ; that the Queen continued her resolution of an attempt upon St. Malo ; that the fears of our enemies and the reports of Richard Beere encouraged our hopes, and Captain Benbow thought it very

feasible to destroy the town and ships, but though the French might have more men than we sent, yet they were not formed troops, and ours would be between 14 and 15000 men besides dragoons; that our expectations were raised, and therefore, as his servant, I entreated him not to leave it possible to be objected to him that he had permitted anything that might prevent the escape of the French ships before our troops joined him, and a resolution should be taken of land and sea officers. The Goodwin Prize was sent him. The complaint of the mischief from privateers was very great and therefore he would do very well to send some ships to the Admiralty, which they wanted; I proposed to him to consider of the number, and quality of the Winter Squadron, which the Admiralty could not do, not knowing the condition of the ships with him so well as himself. I proposed also the laying up of a considerable number of ships at Portsmouth in the winter, to be the readier to join the Winter Squadron and to prevent any attempt from France in the winter; that I hoped he would put it out of the power of France to attack us.

Off the Berry, 8th July.—Mr. Russell owns the receipt of mine of the 4th. He can say no more of St. Malo till Vice Admiral Rooke returns. By the uneasiness of the French about their ships there, it seems they think the place not difficult to be attempted; but¹ to us, that are not acquainted there, the report of the rapidness of the tide and its setting from one rock to another, of which there is abundance there, makes it appear something hazardous to go on with our ships; but what I say is only by hearsay, and

¹ This seems to be a quotation.

possibly the place may be more facile than I imagine. The destroying the place and ships would be of great consequence to England. He hopes he hath not been wanting hitherto in preventing the French ships getting to Brest, though with no small hazard of the fleet; and observing that the Queen resolves to have the destruction of the St. Malo ships attempted and recommends it to his care that an opportunity be not lost by their getting away, he apprehends that if that should happen the blame would fall upon him. He knows but one way to prevent their getting to Brest, if that be the only port in France they must go to, which is by the fleet lying in Camaret Bay,¹ which, if the Queen commands, shall be done. The transport ships are not come nor can come from the river while the wind is westerly; with these westerly winds the French cannot stir, but I must constantly be in their shore, in expectation of south or south east winds, which will bring them away; with which winds, if I am not near that shore, I cannot reach them. If the tenders are still wanted he will send them.

11th July.—I wrote to him to send the tenders to Portsmouth and Southampton that the men might not be crowded. I hoped the troops would be speedily embarked and that he would have good success at St. Malo, if the ships can be prevented from getting away before the attempt be made.

Torbay, 10th July.—Mr. Russell had been at sea, but driven back. He then received a duplicate of [my letter of] the 7th.

In my recommending him, in every letter, the preventing the escape of the St. Malo ships, he was confirmed in what he wrote in his of

¹ Lamerett in MS.

the 8th. He repeats that if the ground off St. Malo is not good, the fleet cannot be there without apparent danger ; that he had sent to know what ground there is ; that there is no place where the fleet can cruise with safety, to prevent the St. Malo ships getting to Brest ; the accidents of weather will give them an opportunity to get in ; against this no mortal man can object. By the saying the people's expectations were raised, he concludes the destroying those ships at St. Malo is thought easy. If there be any that say so, he wisheth them in the fleet ; for this he will say, that he will venture to do what any man on shore will advise, yet if the adviser bear a part ; no man shall go further than himself. He saith Give me leave to observe one passage in your Lordship's letter ; that when the army joins, a resolution shall be taken what to do, as a council of land and sea officers shall advise. I do not know how able the rest of the flag officers are in that case, but for myself I can only deliver my judgment what the fleet can do in order to protect their landing, and in my humble opinion, that should be observed before the men and horses embark. If they must keep the sea till the place where be determined, weather may put them under so many hardships that they will be of little service on shore. You will please to consider the season of the year is so far advanced as six weeks will conclude what [you] call summer, of which I have not yet had one day since I came out. I heartily wish for the nation's sake the town and ships of St. Malo may be destroyed, without the least regard to what advantage may accrue to me from it, having less in my head of that matter than 'tis possible for you to imagine. Probably the difficulty will not be greater than what is suggested to your Lordship ; but I believe

I may affirm that half of the number of men a month since would have performed what can be expected from double the number now; for as their fears are greater, so their industry hath not been less to secure both as much as 'tis possible for the place to admit of. He sent a list of the fleet to me and the Admiralty, and saith what ships are ordered from the fleet will not affect him, believing we shall have no after dispute with the enemy's fleet this summer.

13th July.—I answered Mr. Russell's letter of the 10th and told him that he might remember that himself had proposed the attempt upon St. Malo; and because it was feared the fleet alone might not succeed in it, all possible preparations have been made to send the land forces; and because the delays have been so great, it was necessary to acquaint him that the Queen continued her resolution against St. Malo, and consequently to recommend it to him to prevent the French ships escaping from thence, as far as was possible and consistent with the safety of the fleet, especially since people had conceived great hopes of success. That it became him¹ to write this in duty to their Majesties and friendship to him; that the troops would be speedily embarked, and I desired him to appoint a rendezvous for them and the fleet, and to send a frigate from time to time off of Brest to get advice of the French there, which might be of use in future resolutions.

14th July.—The Queen ordered Mr. Russell to act with the fleet in concurrence with the troops in execution of their² designs mentioned in the Instructions to the Duke of Leinster, which³

¹ Sc. me.

² Sc. their Majesties.

³ Sc. so far as they.

shall be judged fit in a council of war; and in the first place required him to consider and execute what may possibly be attempted at St. Malo for the taking and burning of that place and the ships there; to prevent¹ such other measures against the enemy in such methods as shall be judged feasible at a council of war, without expectation of further orders.

The instructions to the Duke of Leinster were to embark the troops to join the fleet, and though the Queen would give no positive orders, her Majesty recommended the destruction of St. Malo and Brest, the French magazines at Brest and Rochefort, the transport ships at La Hogue and Havre de Grâce; and if all or any of them were practicable, her Majesty ordered him to execute the same, in such manner and in such order as should be judged most proper at a council of war.

Torbay, 13th July.—Mr. Russell writes that Vice Admiral Rooke was ordered from St. Malo, who told him he believed Cancale² was the most proper place for landing; that he saw about thirty-five sail, including privateers, ready to depart, which Mr. Russell believes they would with the first steady S or SE wind. He would sail as the weather permitted and lie in such station as he might do the best service, according as a council of war should advise; he would send the rendezvous as soon as agreed on; for the present, it was eight leagues south from the Start; and hopes the several accounts and informations he sent might be useful as to the intended descent. He sent a copy of the Instructions to Captain Gillam; the *Wild Prize* should sail to the Barbados, with the Queen's orders, with the very first wind. Mr.

¹ To initiate.

² MS. has *Concat*.

Russell enclosed a letter of the 5th instant, which the Lord Jermyn wrote to him, telling him that part of the St. Malo ships were in the Race, and the rest were ready to sail; that the late King's army was at La Hogue still; that he had sent him the best pilots of the island for the coast of Brittany.

The Resolutions of the Council of War, held by Vice Admiral Rooke were:—

1. That it was infinite hazard for the whole fleet to come before St. Malo.

2. That it was not possible for that squadron to destroy the French ships, because the pilots would not take it in charge to carry in any ships or fire-ships, till¹ he offered £100 to a pilot.

3. For this reason the whole fleet is not better capable of destroying the French ships than this squadron.

4. That a squadron of ships in the summer season may be ventured to lie before St. Malo to cover the transport ships, in case the descent be near the place, provided the whole fleet be posted so as to secure them from the eastward and from the westward.

14th July.—Mr. Russell sent the resolution of the Council of War where it was most proper for the ships to lie to prevent the ships getting from St. Malo to Brest, which were designed to attack that place, viz. ten or twelve leagues south from the Start; that a small detachment of light ships should be within sight of the fleet to the SW, and scouts to the southward of them; that with the wind westerly, the rendezvous should be at Torbay; with the wind easterly, to ply up ten or twelve leagues south of the Start. He saith he

¹ So in the MS. Burchett (p. 473) has 'though.'

had sent this day all the tenders to Portsmouth, and desired the Queen's commands speedily, how to proceed with the fleet.

17th July.—The transport ships arrived at Portsmouth. I writ to Mr. Russell to tell him that I had an account from Flanders that a considerable part of the army which was at La Hogue was sent to Flanders, and eight battalions were sent to the Rhine, and that there was yet a camp at La Hogue; that an intercepted letter writ from La Hogue, saith that the ships at St. Malo could not get away, by reason of the English fleet that watched them; that there was a fair opportunity for the English to make a descent, if they were bold and undertaking; but they believed the English did not think of it. Upon this intelligence it seemed the French could not have many formed troops at St. Malo; that our troops were about 14000, which, with 3 or 4000 seamen, would be a better army than the French could have; that I did not think we could besiege St. Malo, but the troops might bombard the town, whilst the bomb vessels did the like at sea, or if the bomb vessels could not do it alone, that the troops might possess themselves of the batteries upon the river; that since Vice Admiral Rooke thinks a squadron might lie before the town, those ships and our boats will prevent the enemy's attempts on the bomb vessels, and since the buildings of St. Malo are of wood, high and close, it seems not hard to burn the town, and consequently that nothing can oppose his ships going up the river to burn the French ships.

The next thing to be thought of is Brest, which our troops would not be strong enough to take, but the ships not being laid up may be destroyed if our ships can pass the batteries, or

if our troops can take them. However, if the ships at St. Malo can be destroyed, we may then, without our great ships, proceed and destroy the ships on the stocks and the magazines at Port Louis and Rochefort; and what he proposed of taking the guns fished up at La Hogue may be done at any time, being within our Channel, and therefore should be the last thing to be tried. These things I only proposed to him, who could best judge of the feasibility of them, and that he should regard this letter no otherwise than as an argument of wishing well to my country and to himself, who will have the honour of so considerable a service.

18th July.—I acquainted Mr. Russell that the transport ships were at Portsmouth; that the troops would be embarked by Wednesday, and would sail to the rendezvous which he resolved on in his letter of the 14th, unless he sent other orders to meet them; and therefore if he could think of a more proper one, he should send notice by a frigate. If they went directly to Guernsey, it would be a shorter voyage for the troops.

19th.—The tenders arrived at Portsmouth. Mr. Russell writes that he had sent Captain Nevell,¹ with thirty English and Dutch ships to lie ten leagues north, from the west end of the Isle of Bass,² and ordered two ships to lie between Breache³ and Seven Islands, two between the Seven Islands and Le Bass, and two between Le Bass, and the Forne, and all to lie under the shore. This he thought the best posture whereby to intercept anything that came eastward or westward; the remainder of the fleet to lie in the

¹ John Nevell; see *D.N.B.*

² Ile de Batz.

³ I. Brehat or perhaps S. Brieuc.

appointed station. He hath heard nothing from Captain Nevell, which makes him conclude that the French did not sail from St. Malo with the last easterly wind, and believes they will not stir till winter. The Wild Prize sailed with the last easterly wind; the Instructions to the commanders from Mr. Russell, were dated 16th July; he will endeavour to get intelligence of the ships at Brest, and hath had ships off of the coast for some time.

22nd July.—I sent him a list of the ships designed for the West Indies, that he might order them into port as soon as he could spare them, so as to be fitted by the end of August. I acquainted him most of the troops were embarked and the last would be so this day.

Off the Start, the 19th July.—Mr. Russell writes that the James galley had taken a privateer, which said their orders had been sent often, and often contradicted, for laying up the ships at Brest; he was on board the St. Philip when burnt at La Hogue, and gives an account of the ships burnt there, agreeable to what I had sent Mr. Russell. The captain of the James galley wrote an account that the three decked ships at Brest were disarmed; but that some others were hauled out of the harbour into the river, upon apprehension that the English would come and destroy them. The remainder was in Brest Road. The inhabitants of Camaret were removed for fear of a descent.

19th.—In another, he saith he believed the French great ships were disarmed, and thereupon proposed, as his opinion, the laying up of our great ships, and that the rest of the fleet would be strong enough against any enemy that will oppose.

Torbay, 22nd.—By reason of the weather and more convenient taking in of victuals, he was

come into Torbay ; to-morrow he would go to his former station and send ships to relieve those on the French coast. In answer to my desiring him to appoint a rendezvous for the transport ships, he saith Really I am not able to tell you ; only I think not in the sea. Either they should come to the fleet, or the fleet to them, lest accidents hinder the joining. Doubtless the less time they are on board, the better for them and horses.

26th July.—The Queen taking notice of the advice received from Captain Wilkins,¹ that he had seen a squadron of French men of war off of Ushant, and that he apprehended they were the ships of St. Malo gone to Brest, and that it would be too late to attempt the destroying them at St. Malo ; therefore her Majesty ordered Mr. Russell, notwithstanding the order of the 14th, to consider what was proper to be attempted at Brest, for the destruction of the ships in the bay, and he was ordered to execute that resolution without expecting further orders. He was also ordered to send a frigate to St. Malo, to be more certainly informed whether the ships were still there ; and if nothing could be done at Brest, then to consider at a council of war, of those other enterprises that were recommended to him and the Duke of Leinster ; and before he returned with the fleet, her Majesty recommended to him the burning of St. Malo, though no French ships of war should be there.

26th July.—I wrote to him that I supposed he might have already received an account from Captain Wilkins to the same effect with that

¹ Probably Michael Wilkins, at this time a lieutenant in command ; see Charnock, iii. 91. The identification is, however, quite uncertain.

which I enclosed in the Queen's orders, which were founded on this intelligence ; that I hoped Captain Wilkins was mistaken, and that the St. Malo ships were still there ; in which case her Majesty's intentions were that he should pursue his orders of the 14th.

26th July.—The transport ships sailed from St. Helens ; wind at NE.

Torbay, 24th.—Mr. Russell saith Yesterday he had the advice from Captain Wilkins ; that he will not be positive they were not¹ French ships, but believes they might be Captain Nevell's squadron, they being pretty near the station appointed to Captain Nevell.

Torbay, July 25th.—He (Mr. Russell) acknowledgeth the receipt of mine of the 18th and that he had called a council of war, where notice being taken that the troops were embarked, it was resolved to sail with the fleet to Spithead to join the transport ships, if the wind be westerly ; but if easterly, the fleet should remain at Torbay, and expect them ; and accordingly he had sent an express to the Duke of Leinster, to acquaint him with this resolution. It was also resolved that a squadron of fifty capital ships under Sir John Ashby should be sent to lie fifteen or twenty leagues north from the Isle of Bass.

P.S. Mr. Russell adds he could say a great deal on the manner of these proceedings, not only as to the delay of the descent, but ordering an army to cruise for a fleet, and when joined, to consider what shall be resolved to be done with them.

Orders were sent to Mr. Russell to send in the

¹ So in MS. The 'not' would seem to belie the meaning, and is possibly a transcriber's error.

Ruby, Advice, Chester, Experiment and Hawk fireship, to be cleaned for the West Indies.

28th July.—Upon the joining of the fleet and transport ships, at a Council of War of sea and land officers.

Resolved,

By the flag officers, that nothing can be done with any ships of the fleet against the St Malo ships till the town be so far reduced by the land forces as that our ships shall not be much annoyed by the enemy's guns in the attempt.

Resolved,

By the land officers, that the troops can do nothing without the assistance of the fleet.

But though the flag officers are of opinion that an attempt might be made at Brest with some hopes of success if the summer season was not so far spent, yet now 'tis not fit to attempt anything against the enemy's ships there; and the land officers are of opinion that the troops can do nothing there without protection of the fleet.

The flag officers thinks 'tis not safe for the fleet to attempt anything against the enemy at Rochefort, the season being so far advanced; but the flag officers think the fleet may lie on the coast of Normandy till the latter end of August to protect an attempt upon Havre de Grâce, La Hogue, or any place thereabouts and, Resolved that the fleet lie on that coast accordingly.

The flag officers also, Resolved that something might be attempted at St. Malo or Rochefort with probability of success, was not the season so far advanced as not to admit of the fleet going with safety to see whether anything can be done in those places.

29th July.—Mr. Russell writes a very long letter with reflections upon the whole;

31st.—Whereupon the Queen ordered Mr. Russell to detach immediately, under the command of a vice admiral, all the English and Dutch ships of 3rd rate and under, with twenty fireships, and the transport ships, with the troops, galliots, and the well boats, with orders to proceed as near St. Malo as could be with safety to the ships; the commander to send in such frigates and fireships as he should judge proper into the road of St. Malo, to support the bombarding of the place and the descent of the troops; and the remainder of the squadron to lie in such manner as was resolved on at a council of war by Vice Admiral Rooke, to prevent the approach of the French ships from Brest and to succour the frigates in St. Malo Road if the French should come and attack them. Mr. Russell was to go with the rest of the fleet to Torbay, supplying the well boats with such men as he could spare. That the ships at St. Malo, if any there, should also be attempted, if the burning of the town succeeded, or sooner, if there was an opportunity for it; that her Majesty did not think fit that any attempt should be made as yet, at La Hogue or Havre de Grâce. Sir John Ashby was also ordered to join Mr. Russell with the first and second rates, and to send the rest to the coast of St. Malo. The Duke of Leinster, had also orders suitable to those above, and I acquainted Mr. Russell with those orders to Sir John Ashby and the Duke of Leinster, and that the Queen appointed Captain Benbow to command the well boats and galliots, being recommended by Mr. Russell, unless Mr. Russell could pitch upon a fitter person; and that as soon as the attempt on St. Malo was over or found impracticable, the squadron should return to St. Helens, sending notice to Mr. Russell that he might do so too.

Off the high lands of St. Albans, 30th July.—Mr. Russell encloseth a result of a council of war at that day, that upon consideration of the Queen's orders of the 26th. They do not see any reason to differ from their opinion of the 28th relating to Brest and St. Malo ; but the destruction of St. Malo being so particularly recommended by the advice her Majesty received, though 'tis believed the ships of war are escaped from thence, 'tis resolved the fleet shall sail to St. Helens, as the most proper place to be kept entire, to put in execution her Majesty's commands, which, if contrary to the opinion of the council of war, we desire may be positive ; and Mr. Russell writes he is uneasy to find some service expected, and yet that nothing can be done of consequence to England ; and that if 'tis believed the St. Malo [ships] are escaped, Sir John Ashby should be ordered away from his station to join the fleet.

1st August.—I acquainted him that I had delayed sending the messenger with the orders of the 31st July till I could receive her Majesty's pleasure from his letter and council of war of the 30th ; that her Majesty had directed her said order of July 31st to be sent to him, and that I should acquaint him that she had commanded several lords of the council to go to Portsmouth to consider with him at a council of war what was to be done in this conjuncture, who would be at Portsmouth to-morrow night. Accordingly the Lord President, the Lord Steward, Lord Chamberlain, Earl of Rochester, Lord Sidney, Lord Cornwallis, and myself went to Portsmouth on the 2nd of August, but Mr. Russell and the officers adhered to their former resolution.

*V.—THE ATTEMPT ON BREST, 1694*¹

Sir,—After our departure from St. Helens which was on the 29th past, we met with little winds, veerable to the northward and southward of the west, and oftentimes calm; we used all imaginable diligence, to get out of the Channel, which we did not accomplish till the 6th instant, at which time the wind being northerly, Admiral Russell kept on to the SWward with 32 English and 15 Dutch ships of the line of battle, and of both nations there were 11 fireships and 6 frigates, a list of which I here enclose, compared with the French in and gone to the Mediterranean. My Lord Berkeley left here with 18 English and 11 Dutch ships of the line of battle, and of both nations 12 fireships, 6 frigates and 5 bomb vessels, and we had on board the fleet about 6000 land soldiers. We directed our course to Ushant, in order to go to Brest, and on the 7th instant we anchored in the evening, with our fleet from St. Matthew's Point towards the narrow going into Brest Sound, keeping out of shot of the shore, but were entertained with bombs from the land on Camaret side, also from both sides going into Brest Sound and along the north shore almost as far as St. Matthew's Point; and although we were out of gunshot yet to my wonder the bombs reached where we rode, which I am confident was two miles and a half, rather more than less; I am also convinced by reasonable argument, contrary to my former opinion, that if one of the great shells fall into one of our ships and burst, it will quite destroy her. Here we rid all night, taking care with our boats

¹ There is no clue as to either the writer or the addressee of this so-called letter.

and brigantines, that the enemy made no insult on our store ships and small vessels. The 8th instant in the morning, the weather very foggy, but about 7 in the forenoon it cleared up, and the signal being made, we embarked all our land forces in our boats and tenders, in order to land them in Camaret Bay ; but discovering there were forts and batteries of guns, and lines and trenches, near where we intended to land, we sent 7 frigates, whereof 3 were English and 4 were Dutch, to batter the aforesaid fortifications, the better to facilitate the landing of the soldiers. The ships that went on this service were commanded by my Lord Carmarthen, who placed them with a great deal of skill and performed his duty with much bravery and hazard. Between 3 and 4 this afternoon 4 or 500 of our soldiers landed, most of them grenadiers, and Lieutenant General Tolmach landed with them ; but they were so warmly received by the enemy, that Tolmach was shot through the thigh, and with difficulty was brought off ; and the rest, not being able to advance by reason of the intrenchments and fortifications and number of horse and foot upon the shore, inso-much that most of our men that landed were either killed or taken prisoners, the rest of our soldiers returned on board, we having lost 5 of our well boats, which were grounded and left on shore, which the enemy burnt upon the retreat of the soldiers. My Lord Carmarthen came off with the ships, all but one of the Dutch frigates of 32 guns. I am pretty well satisfied the French knew of our coming, and may easily be persuaded they knew where we intended to land, they being more particularly fortified at that place, though at other places they had industriously provided to oppose our landing. I suppose about 300

English and Dutch seamen suffered in this skirmish, that is were killed, wounded or taken prisoners, for several men suffered in our well boats and other boats, and few men escaped from the Dutchman that was sunk. This evening at a council of war it was considered whether we should attempt any other place with the land forces, but General Tolmach declared he had not power to carry the forces anywhere else. It was also considered if the fleet could not go into Brest Sound, and bomb the town. 'Twas thought too great a hazard to go in with the fleet, unless we could be certain we could ride without reach of their bombs, for it is most of our opinions that if a shell break in any ship, it will disable if not destroy her. Then 'twas considered if the frigates and bomb vessels might not go in and bomb the town, but that was also thought unreasonable and impracticable, 1st because our number of frigates are few, and those much disabled with this day's action; 2nd we know not the enemy's strength, which might probably be sufficient to take both frigates and bombs; and 3rd our number of bomb vessels, being but five, is very insufficient to perform so great an undertaking. In all this you see we make no difficulty of passing their castles, there being no other danger than the hazard of their shot and bombs, which they can ply at you all the way through the narrow land, [from]¹ the rock in the middle of the narrow. Therefore was concluded we should return to Spithead, and there expect further orders; so on the 9th in the morning, we weighed and stood to sea. About noon I saw 4 galleys; they came down the Channel and went into Brest; this evening the

¹ Omitted word, filled in by conjecture.

Dreadnought sailed for England with General Tolmach.

10. To-day, about 11 leagues to the northward of Brest, the Elizabeth came to us with 8 bomb vessels.

11. To-day, a Dutch rear admiral with 4 great ships from Holland joined us.

THE JOURNAL
OF
M. DE LAGE DE CUEILLY
CAPTAIN IN THE SPANISH NAVY
DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1744

Translated from the French by
LIEUTENANT THOMAS G. CARTER, R.N.

INTRODUCTORY

THE battle of Toulon—or of Cape Sicie, as the French and Spaniards have preferred to call it—fought on the 11-22 February 1743-4, has been, from the very day, a subject of controversy and criticism. The detailed accounts of it which have been published in England are all taken—directly or indirectly—from those written by the very angry Admirals to a very angry public, and, to some extent, from the reports of courts-martial held on various subordinate officers; the trials of the two Admirals, owing, presumably, to their inordinate length, have never been published and have been but little read. The French and Spanish Admirals had no occasion or opportunity to publish detailed accounts, and thus foreign narratives, both French and Spanish, have been drawn from those published in England, and from that unofficial, but not unbiased, story which is here related in English for the first time.

Even in its native French it has not been very accessible. Manuscript copies of it were circulated from the very first. More than two years later, a Dutch publisher—apparently without authorisation or assistance from M. de Lage—had some copies printed. It must be supposed that the issue was small, for at the present time no copy can be traced except one in the Bibliothèque Nationale. There is not one in the British Museum nor—as far as can be discovered—in any other library in England. Appeals in *Notes and Queries* have elicited no response, and the efforts of Mr. Quaritch, extending over more than three years, have met with no good success. Fernandez Duro, in his *Armada Española*, quotes it at second-hand from Guérin, so that, presumably, there is no available copy in Madrid. All

this is not, of course, to say that there is no other copy in existence, but merely that the book is now very rare, and probably always was so. It is conceivable that angry Spaniards or their friends bought up and destroyed as many as they could. So far as it was spread abroad, it seems to have been by MS. copies, none of which—if we may judge by the silence of our historians regarding it—found its way into this country. The copy from which the present translation has been made is a transcript of such a MS. in the possession of the Boston (Mass.) Athenæum, which most liberally allowed us the use of it for the purpose.

It is quite impossible to say in what relation our MS. stands to the printed copy, still less to De Lage's original. Transcription, so often repeated, leads to certain inaccuracy, and quite explains the not infrequent omission or perversion of words or sentences, which have had to be filled in or corrected by conjecture, quite independently of the curious liberties with the language, which may be fairly attributed to the author's long absence from France in a Spanish-speaking country. Such—to give instances of them—are *les voiles embossées* (p. 231), and *la proue du gouvernail* (p. 241). But none of these is of any great importance. The story is plain enough; and though the braggart tone in which it is written and the writer's evident bias against the Spanish Admiral—who, indeed, notwithstanding his rank, had no pretensions to be a seaman—excited disgust among the Spaniards at the time, and give rise to distrust now, a careful consideration of its statements leads to the conclusion that, on the whole, the author believed he was giving a true account. No doubt, he has made mistakes in fact, no doubt he has written nonsense when pretending to explain things of which he was obviously or necessarily ignorant—such as the behaviour of a projectile on striking the water, or the intentions of the English Admiral. But in this he is by no means singular; others, before and since 1744, have given erroneous descriptions of the incidents of a battle and fatuous explanations of their meaning, without losing all claim to credit. De Lage's

relation of what took place may be accepted as fairly accurate, from his point of view; and it must always be remembered that his pamphlet is largely responsible for the foundation of French opinion on the subjects touched on. It only remains to say that the translation here offered is as literal as the state of the original has permitted; and that no attempt has been made to controvert or discuss the many debatable statements which it propounds.

Of M. de Lage's early antecedents, nothing seems to be known. Throughout his whole narrative he implies that he is, essentially, a seaman, with a wide experience in or connected with the conduct of fleets and fleet actions. It is quite impossible that he had any such experience. He may, indeed, have been a cadet in the French Navy at Malaga (1704) or a lieutenant in the Spanish Navy at Cape Passaro (1718), but, if so, in neither case had he any responsibility or opportunity of knowing what was going on. Sea experience, of a sort, he probably had, but certainly not such as he claims by inference. For the story of his life seems pretty clear. It is that, having followed Philip V. of Spain, he went out as an adventurer to South America, and in some way—presumably commerce—acquired considerable wealth. When the war between Spain and England broke out in 1739—or possibly before—he returned to Europe, and by self-assertion and a free expenditure of money, obtained a commission as captain in the Spanish Navy and an appointment to the command of the *San Isidro* of 64 guns. This is the *Saint Isidore*, whose destruction in the port of Ajaccio is described at p. 222. It is, perhaps, no convincing proof of De Lage's seamanship that the ship, having put into Ajaccio, dismasted and strained, on the 24th February, 1742 N.S., was still refitting on the 6th October, and was barely ready for sea on the 1st March, 1743 N.S., when the English squadron came in and she had to be burnt. The rest of De Lage's Spanish service is told by himself. Naturally, after the story of his *Journal* got abroad, whether false, as the Spaniards

were bound to declare it was, or still more naturally if it was in the main true, the Spanish Navy was no place for him. He returned to France and distinguished himself by a brutality and unscrupulousness in fitting out some private men of war, which would almost suggest that much of his boasted sea experience had been gained as a pirate in the South Seas, were it not that it was to Spanish shipping that the pirates had principally to trust. This part of his life, however, does not concern us here.¹

As an introduction to the Narrative of De Lage and his estimate of the results of the battle, it will not be out of place to give a short notice of the political situation at the time, and of the proceedings of the fleets from the English point of view. In the beginning of 1744, England had been at war with Spain for more than four years. With France she was nominally at peace; but the old *entente* was dead; there were many causes of friction, commercial and dynastic; as the ally of Austria, which was at war with both France and Spain, England's soldiers had met French armies in Germany—as at Dettingen (16–27 June 1743), and England's ships had fought with French squadrons at sea, in the dark—as in the West Indies (7–18 January 1740–1), or in the Gut of Gibraltar (25 July–5 August 1741), and her fleet had been for the last two years blockading the Spanish fleet in the French port of Toulon, and preventing the transport of Spanish soldiers for the reinforcement of the Spanish army in Italy. As this phase of the blockade equally affected the French, and as they were unable to send the urgently needed reinforcements through the Alpine passes which were held in force by the hostile king of Sardinia, orders were sent from Versailles to the French Admiral, M. de Court, to accompany the Spanish fleet to sea and to repel any attack which the English might make on it.

Such orders, assigning him a purely defensive attitude,

¹ It may be read in some detail in V. Brun, *Guerres Maritimes : Port de Toulon*, i. 314 *seq.*; or Laughton, *Studies in Naval History*, 314 *seq.*

placed De Court in a very difficult position, especially as the English had a considerable numerical superiority ; and Mathews realised, as he could not help realising, that the French Admiral's object would equally be gained if, whilst avoiding an engagement, he could draw the English down to the southward and so leave the Gulf of Lyons open to the Spanish transports.

The incidents of the battle and of the courts martial which followed it have been often described and are, presumably, familiar to everyone.¹ There are, however, some points of determining interest, which have been persistently misrepresented and on which there is a good deal of misunderstanding.

It is commonly known that Admiral Mathews, in addition to his charge as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, was also plenipotentiary at the Court of Turin, and that he was thus very little with the fleet during 1743. But that, of itself, however gross a blunder on the part of the home government, does not offer an adequate explanation of the fact—frequently stated, and confirmed by the evidence at the courts martial—that the fleet was never exercised at sea and had never once formed or attempted to form a line of battle. In Mathew's absence, the command devolved on Vice-Admiral Lestock ; and it is in his wretched health that the explanation is perhaps to be found, not only of his keeping the fleet persistently at anchor, but also—in part at least—of his fatal petulance on the day of battle. A few weeks before this—3rd–14th January 1743–4—in replying to a letter from the Duke of Newcastle to the effect that the Government considered Lestock the fittest person to succeed to the command, if he should be obliged to resign it, Mathews wrote that he would stay on ' let the consequence be what it will, till this Hurly-Burly shall be over,' and as to his possible successor, he added :

¹ Those who wish to revive their recollection will find a fairly full account in Beatson's *Naval and Military Memoirs*, i. 196 *seq.* and a more critical one in Mahan's *Types of Naval Officers*, 21 *seq.* There is a short notice of it in the article on Mathews in the *D.N.B.*

‘ I took the liberty of giving your Grace my opinion in regard to Mr. Lestock before I left England ; I did the same to Lord Winchilsea and Lord Carteret. I shall not therefore say anything more to your Grace at present on that subject, only to state one fact, namely, Mr. Lestock is a cripple at best, subject to very severe fits of the gout, has been lately much out of order, and is, at this instant, so very weak that it was with great difficulty he could get out of his ship to come on board me to be sworn for his commission. He returned much fatigued, though supported by his Captain up and down the ladder. Should any accident happen to me when we come to action, I humbly conceive he is by no means able to go through the fatigue which such a command and in such a conjunction will require. It’s true he can sit in a chair, but that is all he can possibly do, except God should work a miracle.’¹

It has been said and repeated over and over again that the results of the courts martial were absurd ; for Mathews, who had fought, was cashiered, and Lestock, who had not, was acquitted, promoted and employed. The country at large accepted and still accepts the opinion which Campbell, writing—as he admits²—in absolute ignorance of details, neatly packed into few words: ‘ Mathews might want head ; Lestock certainly wanted heart. The one might deserve censure ; the other ought to have been shot.’ As to the many captains and other officers against whom charges were brought, who were tried and subjected to various punishments, Captain Mahan has said the last word. It is absurd to suppose that a dozen or more English seamen, all, at the same moment, became cowards. Their fault was not cowardice but ignorance, the rust of a long peace, in which neither they, nor the service, nor the country had taken ordinary pains to keep their minds up to the level of their possible

¹ Home Office Records : Admiralty, 102.

² ‘ By what extraordinary evidence the members of the court martial were influenced, I know not.’—*Lives of the Admirals*, iv. 50.

duties ; they were thus quite unprepared for an emergency, and when they found themselves in a position which they could not understand, they stood astounded and did nothing. With some men, such a state of mind was chronic—possibly is so still ; and it was against it that Nelson entered the celebrated caveat : ‘ In case signals can neither be seen nor clearly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy ’—a legacy of the great commander which is often quoted without the ‘ very,’ the one most important word in the sentence.

With Lestock we are not here concerned ; but as to Mathews—the man who fought—what he was tried for, what he was condemned for, was for not fighting. No doubt the disorderly way in which he ran down and engaged, with the signal for the line of battle flying, formed a very principal article of the charges against him ; but if this had been all, a censure would probably have been considered sufficient on a man who had fought well. But it stands out clearly in the evidence, and still more in the questions asked, that the Court did not think he had fought well. It began to doubt when it was proved that in the close engagement with the *Real Felipe* and her seconds, the *Namur*, Mathews’ flagship, hauled her wind and drew off, leaving the *Marlborough* to bear all the pounding which the Spaniards could inflict on her. It looked very much as if the Admiral had had enough of it ; but this was satisfactorily explained by evidence that a great number of the breechings of the lower deck guns—26 in all, though at different times—had carried away, and that there was some delay about reeving new ones. A similar series of accidents threw the *Devonshire*, Hawke’s flagship, out of action on the 14th October, 1747,¹ which brought home to the Admiralty the necessity of having the establishment altered.

But beyond all doubt, what weighed very heavily—most heavily—with the Court were the facts that the fleet had deserted the *Marlborough* and *Poder*, and had

¹ Burrows, *Life of Hawke*, 183.

fled to the north. It cannot be supposed that Mathews then or at any time understood that his action was capable of being so described, and, indeed, could scarcely be described otherwise. To the Court it seemed to present no ambiguity. It was repeated to them over and over again that when the French fleet came down on the starboard tack to the relief of the Spaniards, the English fleet tacked to the north; that in doing so, they were avoiding the enemy, were endangering the Berwick, and were deserting the Poder and Marlborough; that the French retook the Poder, and might, if they had chosen, have captured the Marlborough, which could not have made any effective resistance. The particular wording of one question as to this movement of the English, illustrates the working of the Court's mind. It was addressed to Captain Lloyd,¹ who at the date of the action had been first lieutenant of the Berwick, and had taken possession of the Poder.

Q. Can you recollect or tell nearly what number of the enemy it was that drove the Berwick [from the Poder on the night of the 11th]?

A. The whole French squadron.

Q. Did the whole French squadron equal or exceed in number and force the whole van and centre of his Majesty's fleet?

A. I believe the French did not . . .

Q. And did a large body of H.M. fleet run away from a division of the enemy's fleet and leave them in possession of the only prize H.M. fleet had taken that day, and desert that ship which had distinguished herself by taking her?

A. Our fleet stood from her, which obliged the Berwick to follow them upon the French fleet's coming down upon her.

There is much more to the same effect, but what is here quoted shows the temper of the Court plainly enough, and supplies the information which Campbell

¹ John Lloyd, died a vice-admiral in 1778. Charnock, v. 478.

was unable to get, and which no one, since his time, has thought of looking for.

The result of the battle is clearly before us. The British fleet went to Port Mahon to refit ; the French and Spanish fleets met, as De Lage describes, at Cartagena ; but the blockade of the Gulf of Lyons was raised and Spanish transports passed and repassed at their will. It was for this that, on the part of the allies, the battle was fought ; the British aim was to maintain the blockade, and this they did not succeed in doing. There is no possible doubt that the advantage was with the allies, and though we need not, perhaps, speak of it as a defeat, there is no question but that it was a ' miscarriage.'

Notes indicated by *, †, &c., are original, by M. de Lage.

JOURNAL OF M. DE LAGE DE CUEILLY.

Memoirs of Mr. De Lage de Cueilly, Captain in the Navy of the King of Spain, Commander de Ninojosa del Valle in the Order of Santiago in Estramadura, Knight of the Order of St. Louis and Commander of His Most Christian Majesty's Squadron in the Mediterranean during 1745 and 1746. Containing his account of the campaign in 1744, with remarks on the principal events.

Published at Amsterdam by François Girardi in 1746.

NOTICE BY THE PRINTER.

HAVING been fortunate enough to have seen a copy of the Journal of M. le Chevalier de Lage, written by him during the Naval Campaign of 1744, it seemed to me so interesting and so straightforward that I thought the public would be pleased to have it put before it.

The Chevalier keeps very carefully to the facts throughout his journal. He gives praise or blame respectively to those worthy of commendation or reproof. Frenchman, Spaniard and Englishman, each will find in this account every detail necessary to provide food for reflection, whether it be on the rewards granted to Don Navarro,¹ on the disgrace of M. de Court, or on the action taken in England against Admiral Mathews. Everyone knows that after the battle of the 22nd of February 1744,

¹ The printer is here following De Lage, who mostly uses this style, quite unknown to Spanish and equivalent to Sir Navarro in English. The Spanish form would be Don Juan.

Don Navarro, then in command of the Spanish ships as chef d'escadre, was, on his arrival at Cartagena, raised to the rank of lieutenant-general, honoured with the title of marquis and awarded a pension of 4,000 livres.¹ But the fate of M. de Court, the commander in-chief of the combined Franco-Spanish forces, was very different. A few days after his return to Toulon he received the royal order to leave the command in the hands of M. de Gabaret, and to retire to his estate at Gournay, whence, however, he went to Paris, and, when he considered the opportunity favourable, to Versailles. As for Admiral Mathews, he was exposed at London to a more formidable tempest than ever he met at sea. He had attacked the Royal Philippe so boldly that he might well have overcome her: his ship, the Namur, had been so beaten as to be in no condition to support a second battle, and from the evening of the 22nd February he had had to fly his flag on board the Russell. A strong, violent wind obliged the fleets to separate and to put into their several ports, and Mr. Mathews with all haste made Port Mahon, there to repair his ships and get them ready for sea, where the French would not venture to put in an appearance.² At the same time part of his force was employed in fortifying Villefranche and Nice. If he was unable to prevent the capture of these two places, he at least rendered a great service to the King of Sardinia by embarking in his ships the troops which had been engaged in their defence, and must necessarily have been captured by his Serene Highness the Infante Don Philippe, as their communications with Piedmont had been cut. However, he had hardly arrived in England when he was brought to a court-martial and has had to defend himself against almost as many charges as the Spaniards fired shot at him. It is difficult to find either in Ancient or Modern History a campaign, either by sea or by land, the results of which have been so different for the commanders of the two opposing forces.

One can count, too, on the good faith of the journal

¹ The French *livre* was, at this date, worth about 18*d.* English.

² *Les François n'oseroient point y paraître.*

of M. de Lage, because the events recorded in it occurred in the sight of many persons who are still alive, so that they can be easily verified—which is the reason why I have hastened to print this work. Lest it should make the book too long I have omitted the log of the St. Isidore, the ship of which the King of Spain had given M. de Lage the command on the 1st August 1741. There is, on the other hand, one addition—the certificate of service given to M. de Lage by Don Navarro, which is here translated from the Spanish; it will show, in a few words, how much the story of that campaign does honour to his bravery and good seamanship.

' Certificate of Service given by Don Navarro to the Chevalier de Lage.

' Don Juan Joseph Navarro, Vianna-y-Bufalo, Major-General¹ in the army of his Majesty the King of Spain, Ensign in the Company of Gentlemen-Cadets² in the Navy, Commodore³ in the Royal Navy and commanding-in-chief the ships employed in the Mediterranean, etc.

' I know and I have witnessed the service of Don Gil-Fernando de Lage de Cueilly, Knight of the Royal and Military order of St. Louis, who, in the squadron which, under my command, sailed from Cadiz on the 19th of November 1741, had command of the ship St. Isidore of 68 guns, in which he carried out his duty with distinction in every respect; and particularly in the encounter with an English convoy on the 29th of November under the escort of two men-o-war of 70 guns,⁴ to which he, with the whole squadron, gave chase, and outsailing the other ships, maintained himself a gunshot distant from them till nightfall, when we signalled him to abandon the chase; also on the 18th and 22nd of December, when we met the English squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Haddock.

' He continued to render equally good service during the voyage from Barcelona to Italy for the transport of

¹ *Mariscal de Campo.*

² *Gardes-la-Marins.*

³ *Chef d'Escadre.*

⁴ Cf. *post*, p. 256.

his Majesty's troops, during which expedition the fleet having sailed from Spezia was overtaken on the 17th February 1742, near the Hières Islands, by a storm from the NW, in which several ships had their masts carried away; the St. Isidore lost hers, and was so damaged as to be in danger of sinking, having her hold full of water. The accident compelled M. de Lage, in order to lighten his ship, to have eighteen of his guns and all his anchors thrown overboard; by which means and by his excessive and continuous labour he succeeded in conducting his ship to the port of Ajaccio in Corsica on the 24th February. He there refitted his ship as well as he could, till, on the 6th October in the same year, there arrived at Ajaccio two of the enemy's ships with a xebec,¹ bent on carrying off the St. Isidore which they believed to be disarmed. But seeing her crowded with men, recruits whom the captain had collected, they withdrew without being able to attack her.

'Meanwhile, M. de Lage, fearing some new surprise on the part of the enemy, got his ship ready for sea, but was forestalled by the English, who entered Ajaccio on the 1st March 1743, with a squadron of five ships of the line, a xebec and a fireship.

'On the following day, the English approached the St. Isidore to within pistol shot, without M. de Lage being able to hinder them; and then, so as not to violate the neutrality of the port, they sent him a summons to surrender his ship to them. He, however, firmly refused to do so and sustained the attack which they made on him.' Finally, seeing that it was impossible for him to resist such superior forces, and that neither the citadel nor the town were taking any part in his defence, he set his ship on fire, so as to avoid surrendering either her or the King's flag to his foes, and, with his men, escaped to the shore. When he foresaw that he would be attacked by the English he had wished to erect batteries on shore for the defence of his ship; but everything that he asked for, for this purpose or to provide for the safety of the men, was refused him.

¹ *Schabeck.*

‘ After this occurrence M. de Lage returned to Toulon, where he was brought to a court-martial to examine into his conduct, by which procedure the truth of all that has been reported here was established, so that his Majesty has absolved him from all the charges levelled against him by the Genoese and has given him leave to go to Paris for three months.

‘ As testifying, should it be necessary, to the preceding statement, I have given this present declaration, on board the ship *Real*, in the inner Road of Toulon, on the 26th of October 1743.

‘ Signed, JUAN JOSEPH NAVARRO ; and sealed with the impression of my arms.’

*JOURNAL OF MR. DE LAGE DE CUEILLY,
CAPTAIN IN THE NAVY OF THE
KING OF SPAIN.*

I left Toulon for Paris on the 10th November 1743 and passed through Chambéry, in order to pay my respects there to his Serene Highness the Infante Don Philippe. The Prince received me with his usual kindness, and after a stay of two days I hastened to get on to Paris. My first visits were to the Spanish Ministers, who were then three in number : the Count de Montijo, a grandee of Spain, plenipotentiary to the Emperor Charles VII., coming back from Frankfort ; the Prince of Campo Florido, Captain-General, Ambassador to the King of France ; and the Chevalier del bene,¹ Lieutenant-General in the Navy, Ambassador to the Court of Russia. I was presented to the King, to the Queen, and to the Royal family, and to the Ministers and Secretaries of State of the Court of Versailles by the Prince

¹ So in our MS. ; but ‘ del ’ is not Spanish, and Fernandez Duro (*Armada Española*) knows no Bene. The name should probably be ‘ Delfino.’

of Campo Florido ; and I had reason to be well satisfied with the welcome accorded to me on all these different visits.

I soon received orders to return to Toulon, and I arrived there on the 29th January 1744. The next day I went aboard the Royal Philippe to pay my respects to Don Navarro, who handed me an order from the Spanish Court, dated at Pardo on the 13th January, to serve in the Real, and I embarked on board her on the 13th February, so that I should not have to go ashore again. On the 14th it was resolved to disarm four Spanish frigates of 50 guns—namely the Galga, the François Xavier, the Paloma, and the Retiro—so as to complete the ships' companies of the other vessels,* and the Spaniards now had no more than a dozen ships, the list of which and the names of the officers in command are as follows :¹

The Real or the Real Felipe of 110 guns commanded by Don Juan José Navarro, Commo-dore, and by D. Nicolas Geraldino and M. de Lage, capitaines de vaisseau as second captains.

* The disarming of the four frigates was strongly disapproved of by M. de Galifet,² Capitaine de vaisseau. He advised M. de Court to oppose it, because a large number of ships do not fail to create an impression, and because a ship's company of 1,000 men ought to suffice for the Royal Philippe where, however, Don Navarro had put aboard more than 1,300.³

¹ The names which in the original are given in the French equivalents, or misspelt, are here given in the Spanish from Fernandez Duro's *Armada Española*, vi. 300. The armament is left as stated by de Lage.

² It does not appear that he had any official post. He did not serve afloat after 1733.

³ The state and condition of the Spanish ships and their crews is discussed by Brun, *Guerres Maritimes*, i. 287 seq.

- The Santa Isabel of 84 guns. Don Ignacio Dau-
tevil, capitaine de vaisseau.
- The Constante of 62 guns. Don Agustin Iturriaga.
idem.
- The Hércules of 60 guns. Don Cosme Álvarez.
idem.
- The América of 56 guns. Don Anibal Petrucci.
idem.
- The San Fernando of 62 guns. Conde de Vega-
florida. *idem.*
- The Brillante of 56 guns. Don Blas de la Barreda.
idem.
- The Soberbio of 60 guns. Don Juan Valdés.
idem.
- The Poder of 60 guns. Don Rodrigo Urrutia.
idem.
- The Alcón of 54 guns. Don José Rentería.
idem.
- The Neptuno of 54 guns. Don Enrique Olivares.
idem.
- The Oriente of 58 guns. Don Joaquin Villena.
idem.

The French squadron was composed of seven-
teen ships, four frigates, three fireships, and a
hospital ship, of which the following is a similar
list.

*(The list is here omitted : it is to be found with
fewer blunders, in every Naval History.)*

From the 14th February till the 19th, calm
or an east wind prevailed, which was adverse to
the departure of the fleet from the roads of Toulon.
On the 19th, the wind having hauled round to
the north-west, about eleven o'clock the General¹

¹ By General, he means the Commander-in-Chief, the French
Admiral.

made the signal to unmoor.¹ The Spaniards were persuaded that we should not sail at all. At four o'clock in the evening, the *Volage* and the *Léopard* fell on board each other, and that so violently that they found themselves obliged to make signals of distress, and to go and anchor off the *Viguettes*. This accident caused the General to make a general signal to anchor, about six o'clock in the evening. As for us, who were already outside—for we formed the van division—we found ourselves to leeward, having been obliged to wear; and so we passed the night under sail, with a French frigate ordered to keep very close to us.

On the 20th, with the wind at north-west, we found ourselves near enough to the French to anchor with them; but the signal to make sail having been made, all ships were a-way by ten o'clock, with the exception of the *Léopard*, which had orders to return to Toulon for repairs; most of her crew had been taken out of her and distributed among different French ships. M. de Court having sent some orders to Don Navarro, I went to confer with that officer and everything was then arranged.*

* The Spaniards did not wish to form the van division at all, nor to go into the *Hières Islands*; ² they feared that if they tried to do so, they would be crushed. The French did not wish to mix their ships with the Spaniards because they had no confidence in either their courage or their seamanship. They said that by fighting in different divisions there would be greater emulation between the squadrons, and that besides, they feared that the English would not wait for the fleet, in the roadstead of *Hières*, which it was only possible to enter with a leading wind; and in fact they did leave it on the approach of the Combined Squadron.

¹ *De se mettre sur une ancre.*

² *Entrer dans les Îles d'Hières.*

These orders prescribed what was to be done if the English left the Islands by one channel as the combined squadrons were entering by the other: it was then laid down that the French ships which had not already entered, as soon as they perceived this manœuvre, should crowd sail to make the other entrance.

On Friday the 21st, the wind being at north-west, calm and variable, we passed the night making short boards, so as not to get far from the land. Next morning the English set sail and taking advantage of the off-shore wind left the Hières Islands by the main entrance, stretching away to the southward; they had all left by half-past three. Don Navarro sent me to M. de Court to agree on certain signals to be used in the fight. I asked Don Navarro to sign the requests which I had to make of the French admiral, and went first on board the *St. Esprit* to take a coast pilot, and returned to the *Real* after having completed the business. We were not getting any closer to the enemy, nor they to us, for it was too late to begin the action.

On Saturday the 22nd, the wind being easterly, at noon *Notre Dame de la Garde* at Toulon bore NE, distant 8 leagues. The English were then ranged nearer to the coast than we were and had the weather-gage; of which they took advantage to edge down and extend their line parallel to ours. At this time M. de Court was in the centre, M. de Gabaret formed the van division, and Don Navarro with the Spaniards was in the rear. About noon we were under reduced sail—top-sails, foresail and spritsail—in single line.*

* It was considered a mistake on the part of the Spaniards, that they shortened sail; it increased their distance from the French and gave to the English an opportunity to attack

Admiral Mathews, who flew a square flag at the main and a red flag at the fore,¹ pushed home his attack together with his two seconds,² which like the flag-ship were of three and a half decks, and attacked us within pistol shot. We expected him to pass along our line till he found himself opposite our commander-in-chief, but, contrary to all expectation, firing a gun and hoisting a jack at the mizen peak,³ he bore down on our ship right before the wind. When he was a musket shot off (we were on the larboard tack) he fired a gun and ran up a red flag at the same yard as that at which he was flying the jack;⁴ he then rounded to, also on the larboard tack like us.

It is the rule that the chaplain of the ship should give absolution before battle; one of ours—and we had three in the ship—began an exhortation which would have lasted a long time if I had not interrupted him. I got up on a bench alongside of him and, after waving my hat and shouting ‘Long live the King,’ I said: ‘My Lads,⁵ the chaplain absolves us for all that we have done; I have advised him to go to the cockpit where his duty calls him.’ As a precaution I had

them. By crowding sail they might have escaped having to fight to leeward of the English.

¹ He was Admiral of the blue; the red or ‘bloody’ flag was for very many years the signal to engage.

² These were the Marlborough, 90, and the Norfolk, 80.

³ This was the signal for the line of battle ahead—*Fighting Instructions* (N.R.S. xxix), 188, Art I—but it had been flying for some hours.

⁴ This would seem to be (*op. cit.*, 190, Art XI) the signal for flag officers to come into his wake or grain, though it is by no means clear.

⁵ *Messieurs*.

placed myself behind him, for I was afraid that his zeal in wishing to encourage the men to weep for their sins might take away their courage; for indeed I was once witness of such a deplorable scene—everyone weeping for his sins and no one thinking of fighting. Since that time, I have composed this as a discourse for the chaplains of those ships which I have commanded: ‘My lads, I exhort you to do your duty well. You are about to fight our enemies; it is for the glory of God, and of the King your master, that you are going to fight. I give you absolution and I pray that the Lord of All¹ may accept it. Long live the King.’ On this occasion, the presence of Don Navarro prevented my giving this discourse to the chaplain. After which I went to my quarters on the fore-castle, where I was in command.

As soon as the English Admiral was in line on the larboard tack, he fired three shotted guns, which was the signal to begin the fight. We at once replied with all our artillery and musketry. At our second broadside, Admiral Mathews was obliged to haul his wind a little in order to increase his distance from our artillery, and at the same moment—as it appeared to me—the musket-cartridges in the poop-cabin² caught fire from which came a very lively musketry fire, which ceased with the smoke. This accident, together with our continuous fire, appeared to distress him a good deal. So at least, I judged by his subsequent manœuvres. The English Admiral and

¹ *le Souverain Maître.*

² *la chambre du conseil.* Romme gives, as the English equivalent, ‘the coach,’ a term which, in his day, had been obsolete for more than a hundred years, but then meant ‘the great cabin under the poop.’

the two ships which acted as his seconds were very close to each other.*

The foremost of these, having fired on the *Constante* of 62 guns, commanded by M. de Iturriaga, which was our second ahead, this latter was obliged to quit the line ; and another English ship, which was stationed astern of Admiral Mathews and his two seconds, vigorously attacked the *Hercules* of 60 guns, commanded by Don Alvarez, our next astern, which gave way a little in order to get under the lee of our ship. Another English ship of 70 guns placed herself ahead of these, and fired at us from some distance. The enemy's van approached our main squadron and the fight became general.

The English Admiral's action laid his second astern open to our broadside. We cannonaded her so vigorously that she lost her main and mizen masts and flagstaff. But if we damaged her, we were also much damaged. Shot from all sides were flying round the *Real*. Mr. Mathews had sworn to sink her, and his ship was still firing at us with her stern guns. This furious combat had lasted about two hours when a message came to me on the fore-castle that I was wanted on the quarter-deck.¹ I thought I should there receive some orders from Don Navarro but he was not on deck ; he was below, in the cockpit.² I

* In a sea-fight it is impossible to be too close together ; the distance from the stern of one ship to the bows of the next ought not to be more than 60 toises [120 yards] so that each ship may have only one opponent to fight with. The Spaniards were not nearly close enough, which is the reason why one of their ships had to fight two or three English.

¹ *le gaillard*.

² *à fond de calle* : which is literally ' the depths of the hold.' But in 1744 and even later the ' hold ' comprised ' all the interior

saw only the captain, M. Gerardin, bathed in blood which was streaming from a large wound in his forehead. On the point of death, he was taken down to the cockpit where there were already a great number of wounded. The quarter-deck was covered with dead piled up on top of one another; the guns could no longer be served; everyone had been killed or wounded. Of all who had been there, I only found there alive Casamara, a Genoese, *Capitaine de frégate*; Don Ignacio de St. Just, the Chief of the Staff;¹ Don Pedro Sagardia, *lieutenant de vaisseau*; Don Antoine Saleta, lieutenant of grenadiers, a cadet² and a pilot. I left Don Antonio Pendrichi,³ *Capitaine de bombarde*, to command on the forecastle. Don François Morales, Captain in the Seville Regiment of Grenadiers, was killed while talking to me, and several other persons were struck down. Such was the state of the Royal Philippe from the time I took over the sole command till the end of the fight.

The English ship which we had dismasted had managed to set ⁴ her headsails—foresail, fore topsail cavity of the ship below the lower deck,' and included various store-rooms, bread-room, some cabins, the orlop deck and the cockpit, which is defined as 'the place, under the lower deck, where the wounded are dressed in time of battle' (see Falconer, *Dictionary of the Marine*). It appears afterwards that it was to this place that—according to de Lage—Navarro had betaken himself.

¹ *Major de l'Escadre.*

² *Garde de marine.*

³ These names are all unknown to Fernandez Duro.

⁴ The expression here, if rightly copied, is peculiar: *avait ses voiles de l'avant—mizaine, hunier et perroquet—embossées*. The Baron Mercier de Lostende, late French Naval Attaché in London, has kindly suggested that the meaning is that the sheets having been cut, the clews of the sails were stopped to the yards.

and fore topgallant sail. We also had suffered much in our rigging ; without waiting to refit, we put the helm hard up, but there was little wind, and thus the Englishman kept his station. Her captain was Mr. Cornwall, a captain of great merit and a friend of mine ; nor was he the only one that I had in the English squadron. He was killed during the action, but his ship did not cease to fire into our quarter, which is the angle that the stern forms with the side of the ship and where there are no guns. Her fire cut all our upper works to pieces and killed many of our people. We were unhappily obliged to divide our fire between two other ships ; and these, which were on our bow, continued firing on us, while we could make little return. About half past three, Admiral Mathews hauled his wind and his fire ceased, as did that of his seconds ; so I ordered our own lower deck guns to cease firing. An affected bravado is quite out of place when the pressing need is to put one's self to rights. The English Admiral was the first to cease firing ; but I must admit I was weary of it and I had reason to be so, for the whole force of the enemy's attack had fallen on the Real.

I availed myself of the time to clear the fore-castle and quarter deck, and to throw the dead bodies overboard.¹ But, in spite of the pitiable state that the Real was in, I did not fail to observe that the English Admiral sent a boat on board a frigate and hoisted, for the third time,

¹ *jetter à la mer tous les morts*. The more usual practice, of the French at least, was to keep them till they had an opportunity of burying them on shore—even if the delay involved burying them temporarily in the ballast. Levot, *Hist. de la ville et du port de Brest*, ii. 114 ; *Annales d'Hygiène publique*, 2^me serie, xii. (1859), 243, 254 ; Blane, *Diseases incident to Seamen*, 110.

a yellow pennant at the mizen peak and fired several flashes of powder.¹ At the same time I saw that several French ships were engaged very warmly : but it was not easy to see all that was going on, as their line was very long and as, from their being to leeward of the English, the smoke hid them.

I got up on a gun on the larboard side and to my astonishment saw Admiral Mathews, with four or five ships, returning with all sail set, to the attack on the Real ; and at the same moment I was told that a frigate was closing us from aft. I got up on the poop² and recognised the frigate to which Mr. Mathews had sent his boat. Judging her to be a fireship, I had some guns on the starboard side made ready to receive her, and then, so that I could watch her, mounted on a gun on the same side. It is not possible to look out-board from Spanish ships without getting up to some considerable height, because they build their upper works very high so as to afford protection against musketry and grape-shot. While I was considering the best means of saving the Real from this fireship, I heard a voice three paces away from me saying : 'Gentlemen, we are assembled here to decide on what steps are to be taken ; there is not a moment to lose ; my advice is to haul down the flag and surrender ourselves : it is the only way to save our lives and protect ourselves from this fireship which is on the point of setting us on fire.'

I should have taken this discourse for a dream, if the words 'haul down the flag' had not wakened

¹ *à la vergue d'artimon un flamme jaune avec des faux feux de poudre.* There was no such signal ; it is probably described from an imperfect recollection of Art. VI—*N.R.S.* xxix. 189.

² *sur la chambre de conseil.* Cf. Romme.

me up more than the appearance and approach of the fireship. I looked behind me and saw a circle formed round M. de Casamara, the Genoese, who, at the departure from Cadiz, had been flag captain on board the Real. On seeing the fireship he had collected Captain Pendrichi, the Intendant Don Carlos Ratamosa, the Major St. Just, and Lieutenant Don Pedro Sagardia, and had held forth this harangue to them. It is not difficult to influence people's spirits on such occasions, and it did not call for any eloquence to persuade them. However, without leaving my gun, but with a manner both haughty and scornful, I said to them: 'Gentlemen, no doubt you have forgotten that I am here and alive. I have told the King that His Majesty's flag shall never be given up to the enemy while I am alive. I shall not fail to-day in so glorious an engagement. Look then, gentlemen, to your courage for the means of destroying this fireship and think of nothing else. I promised this also to the Comte de Maurepas, through M. de Sallé¹ his first secretary, to whom I wrote on our departure from Toulon; that is my opinion and let it be yours. 'Go,' I said to the Intendant, 'to the lower deck² and get the guns to bear; and promise a reward to him who shall sink the fireship.'

I gave the same order, for another battery, to the Major Saint Just; I sent Captain Pendrichi to his quarters on the fore-castle, and Lieutenant Sagardia in a boat to meet the fireship and tow her off. These orders were promptly executed,

¹ The man's name was really Salley. He was Maurepas's private secretary. See *MSS. of Lady du Cane* (Hist. MSS. Com.) 271 and *passim*.

² *à la première batterie.*

and I added to Mr. Sagardia : ' Neglect no means of putting the bows of the fireship to leeward of the Real, even though she should be on fire ; and see that you drive off the enemy's boat.' *Enseigne de Vaisseau* Don Pedro Arigoni and Don Juan Gaiosa, a *garde-la-marine*, placed themselves under the bows of the fireship with such intrepidity that the English crew was disconcerted ; they fired a light gun and some musketry at the boat, but could not hit it as the boat clung to her bows. The fireship's boat passed to larboard.

Meanwhile the four Spanish ships which were to leeward and astern of the Real opened fire with all their guns on the fireship, without any of their shot hitting her. She came to within about fifteen yards of us. As soon as she was seen through the ports we fired three guns at her, the effect of which was so immediate and so lucky, that she would have sunk if the English had not made haste to set her on fire. In less than a minute she blew up. I was surprised, for a fireship ought to be much longer before exploding ; but either they had no wish to burn us by a slow fire or else the cannon shot had upset their train. Wreckage of every sort fell on board our ship, but no damage was done by it. I myself was covered with burning fragments.

Before the explosion of the fireship, I had seen two young officers dressed in blue and a third, somewhat older, in red and green, who, with five or six men, were doing all they could to grapple us. They were on the forecastle of their frigate¹ and behaved with remarkable courage, regarding death with infinite scorn, so that I admired their gallantry. I heard them give the

¹ *leur frégate.*

order for setting fire to the train ; they could then have saved themselves by throwing themselves into the sea, if they had not been so determined to grapple the *Real*. I saw them blown up in the air and followed them with my eyes to the height of their foretop, without their clothes changing colour ; but at that height they were enveloped in flames and reduced to a cinder ; they fell alongside the *Real*, light as corks and not two feet long. Their gallant behaviour made me suppose they were officers of the English admiral,¹ and had promised him to burn the *Real* or die. They had kept their word, with courage worthy of everlasting fame. I owe this justice to their memory and to those to whom they belonged, on whom the glory that they acquired is reflected. When opportunity offers, I shall inform Admiral Mathews of it and the Admiralty at London. My own resolution to save the *Real* was not less firm than that of these three officers to destroy her. Only death itself would have prevented me from keeping the word which I had given to the King of Spain and to the French Minister of the Navy, and indeed any officer who thought differently would be unworthy to live.² *

* M. de la Roche-Allard had the same sentiments. A French captain who had struck to the English, to excuse himself, said to M. de la Roche-Allard: 'They were four ; what would you have had me do ?' 'Sink,' replied M. de la Roche-Allard ; 'the King would not have to be pitied for losing a ship and a man like you.'³

¹ *officiers de l'amiral anglaise* : i.e. presumably, on the Admiral's staff.

² *tout officier qui penserait, serait indigne de jour.*

³ It seems impossible to fix this incident. Roche-Allard, a captain of 1689, did not become *chef d'escadre* till 1720 ; he died in 1745, at the age of about 85.

However, five or six of the fireship's people had thrown themselves into their boat ; two of them we killed, and the others escaped. I ordered our own boat to come back on board, for I was already losing sight of it ; but I had to send it to tell the ships of our rearguard, which had not taken any part in the action, to close with the *Real* and to stand by her during the night. The two fleets had thought me blown up and burnt ; but at the loud shouts of ' Long Live the King, which I gave when the fireship had disappeared, all our own ships were reassured, and on board the *Real*, those whom death had spared embraced one another, like people returned from the other world. I thought we were clear for a time and perhaps I should have been so for some time if the *Brillant*, an armed merchant-ship, had not opened fire on the ships which had come with the English Admiral to engage me to larboard while the fireship laid me on board to starboard.

The good sailing qualities of this fireship, which sailed like a bird, threw her on me and under my fire which caused her destruction before the big English ships were within gun-shot ; and they, the fireship having blown up in this futile manner, did not fire a shot at me. It was already late, so they meant to reserve their attack until the morrow, while I, although prepared to reply to them, had no desire to be the aggressor. But the feeble *Brillant* must needs fire, and the enemy commenced to thunder his broadsides at me again. This last attack was the most furious of all. Admiral Mathews was on my beam and I gave him the full force of what his ships were giving me a taste of.¹ I did not wish to divide my fire

¹ *je lui rendais en gros ce que ses vaisseaux me donnoient en detail.*

among so many enemies, so I gave orders to all the batteries to fire only on the Admiral, who was thus sadly knocked about. I saw huge splinters fly off from the ship's side, her booms, and the head of her bowsprit. During this time, all the five ships were firing at me, and the Hercules, which was my second astern, and the San Fernando were supporting me. The Santa Isabel could not fire more than two or three broadsides, as this ship was the last of our rearguard and the English had not approached near enough for her to be able to cannonade them. We do not know why they remained at such a distance, unless it was for fear of being doubled on by the French, which would have put them between two fires.*

It was about six o'clock in the evening when the enemy's fire ceased. I then gave orders to the Major to stop the firing in all our batteries. I was obliged to do so, to avoid firing on the Brillant, which, after bringing about this second combat, had drawn ahead, alongside of me, on the side on which I was engaged. Had she passed any further ahead, in the smoke and with night coming on, she would have been sunk by my fire. M. de Court, who had seen the fireship blow up and the last fight begin, had gone about with all the advanced division † to come to my assistance ;

* The English ought not to have expected to be doubled on by the French who had far fewer ships. Apparently this was one of the charges brought against Mr. Lestock on his arrival in London—that he remained so far from the battle—but there are few naval actions in which all the divisions approach the enemy at the same time and in station.

† M. de Court had tacked before the Royal Philippe's second fight, but we were too preoccupied to see him : he went

but the wind being light, a slight swell running, and the van about three-quarters of a league distant from the Real, considerable time would be required before he could reach me. The enemy's van had also tacked, and their line was less than musket-shot distance from the French ; but neither the one nor the other fired, and they were wise, for fights by night are often the cause of friends mutually destroying each other.

The French Squadron covered me on all sides, which I learnt only by M. de Court's boat, having on board the first Major, the Chevalier de Saliez.¹ The state of the Real, as that officer saw her, was truly pitiable. Never had ship received so many shot ; the masts were all badly wounded ; the sails cut to pieces, as also the shrouds and running rigging ; all the yards carried away and fallen on deck ; the main yard in its fall had broken in three pieces ; the cabins under the poop were destroyed ; the number of dead and wounded was prodigious ; few of those who were on the poop, or quarter deck or forecastle were without wounds ; most of them were dead, including four commissioned officers and a *garde-la-marine*.

The Chevalier de Saliez asked me, on behalf of M. de Court, if I was in a condition to recommence the action on the following day. ' You can rely

about after his fight with Mr. Rowley and the enemy's van ; and before that he had signalled his own van to tack : finding they did not obey, he sent M. de Massillon, his second major, to carry the order to the vessels of the van division ; on which they tacked immediately.

¹ He was killed, when in command of the *Gloire*, on 14th May, 1747:

on me,' I replied, 'if I can keep my masts up; but send me 150 men to repair my damages.' At once carpenters, caulkers, and sailors from the French ships began to stream on board the *Real*. All hastened to send their boats to succour me, with a zeal worthy of the French Navy: I passed the night in mending the shrouds, and for the better securing of the masts I housed the topmasts, in readiness for the battle next day.*

They told me after the battle, that Don Navarro had gone up from the cockpit to his bed. I went at once to see him, thinking him dangerously wounded. I found him quite at ease, with a compress over his ear held in position by a handkerchief which passed under his chin and was knotted over his wig. He told me that he had another wound in the leg; embraced me, and praised me highly. To put a stop to this, I went on deck, where I had plenty to do, and said to M. de Saliez: 'You can see Don Navarro.'†

* The French admiral was resolved to continue the fight though he had only seven Spanish ships with him: there was only one thing which vexed him, namely, that he could not close with the English who were to windward of him. On this account, he was very particular in his orders to the whole squadron, so that not one parted company during the night. All ships regulated their course by his poop lanterns, which must have been equally visible to the English.

† On the first day and the second, Don Navarro received the officers of the French boats who were on board, with the greatest demonstrations of gratitude to the French admiral for the assistance which he had given him. He attributed the cessation of the fight to the bold advance of M. de Court, who, regardless of the superiority of the English, of the loss of one Spanish ship, and of the defection of three others, had placed himself between the Spaniards and the English, and so exposed himself to the whole of their fire.

I said the same to all the French officers who came aboard the *Real*, and that Don Navarro was in a condition to give orders, although the fight had only ceased an hour before. I heard from M. de Saliez that M. de Court had fought with one of the English flagships, either *Lestock* or *Rowley*,¹ who was in command of the van division, and that his ship had avoided the approach of the *Terrible*, on board which ten men had been killed or wounded; that the head of the rudder² had been carried away; that the *St. Esprit* and *Ferme*, seconds of the French Admiral, and the *Sérieux* had also been engaged with English ships; but that they had not ranged further ahead towards the French van than the *Ferme*; notwithstanding their advantage in having larger ships and in greater numbers than the combined Squadrons.

I must do justice to the courage of the Spaniards in the *Real*; the bravery shown by the officers who had charge of the three gun-decks below could not be improved upon; and above,³ the rapidity of the fire was as great as that of the musketry, while there were few lost shots: the officers and the *gardes-la-marine* showed themselves worthy of the King's favour. Don Carlos de Ratamosa who was attached to me as an aide-de-camp, carried out all my orders with as much alacrity as intrepidity. He told me afterwards that, having received my orders to get the lower-deck guns pointed at the fireship, and thinking himself lost, he fastened several pieces of cork

¹ With *Rowley*.

² *la proue du gouvernail*. Which is either a transcriber's error, or 'proue' is used in a very unusual sense.

³ *sur le pont*, which, as contrasted with *les trois batteries d'en bas*, can only mean *les gaillards*.

on himself, so that he should be able to throw himself into the sea when the fireship laid us on board. 'There is nothing wrong in that,' I said to him. 'I am the only one in the ship who ought not to show the least sign of imminent peril. On a second occasion, firm resolution will be less difficult. In the worst danger one acts as is natural until after a voyage to the Indies.'

Anyhow, every soldier, every sailor, even the boys, had shown courage and intrepidity, and deserve to be rewarded. The defence and preservation of the Real bear witness to the truth of what I say. I have had men of every nation under my command, and never has anyone failed me in battle. In the affair of the *St. Isidore*, on the 2nd March 1743, a quarter of an hour before the fight, cloths dipped in sulphur were already wound round the masts of the ship to burn her rather than surrender her. I even sent my boat to the hospital to bring away about twenty of my convalescent sick, who came on board without any objection, although they saw that I was going to fight the ship to the very last, and that if they were wounded they could never escape the flames. At the same time, I sent ashore about a dozen children who were of no use in a fight and could not have saved themselves; it has always been my care to expose those only whose duty it is to be exposed, and to take the necessary precaution for their safety, treating them as men of honour and not forcing them to their duty like poltroons.*

* When it has been finally decided to fight, one fights without thoughts of surrendering; the enemy will the more respect you, and sometimes a way of escaping from the danger will show itself. It was thus that the late M. Cassard,

My object in writing this is that people may understand how everything depends on the character and ability of the commander, who has no right to throw the blame of a shameful surrender on the cowardice of his officers and his men. It was thus that I passed the whole of the night of the 22nd to 23rd on the quarter-deck, directing the labours of the French who had come to my assistance. In spite of the fatigue I had endured, I ate nothing but some bread, nor did I drink anything but water. It was impossible to get anything else ready, and, moreover, time was pressing far too much to give it a thought, for it was absolutely necessary to save the masts; indeed, without the Frenchmen they would certainly have fallen during the night, and then we should have had to burn or sink the *Real*, for she had no topmast which we could have used as a fore or main mast. I cannot speak of the behaviour of the other Spanish ships, for I was too much occupied in defending the *Real* to pay any attention to them. I only noticed that the *Poder*, after losing all her masts, had surrendered to the English, and that another Spanish ship, having

in the war of 1700, managed to get away from seven English ships of war, three of which were larger than his own.¹

¹ Cassard was a distinguished privateer of the War of the Spanish Succession, and was made by Louis XIV successively *lieutenant de vaisseau*, *capitaine de frégate*, *capitaine de vaisseau* and *Chevalier de Saint-Louis*, although he never served in the Navy. After the peace he fell on evil days: was ruined in a lawsuit, which he thought unjust; and, saying so with what was considered undue licence, was incarcerated in the *Château de Ham*, where he died in 1740. The incident of his escape from seven English ships of war is not improbable, but is, as yet, unknown to history.—Lacour-Gayet, *La Marine Militaire sous Louis XV*, 79–81.

quitted the line, was making off before the wind.* The *Soberbio*, which had been astern and to leeward, now closed the *Real* and fired two or three guns at the enemy.

On the 23rd, the wind was at east ; and having been so since the previous evening, we remained lying to till the morning ; the Spaniards then found that they had become widely separated from each other, but the French ships were well together. At seven o'clock, I saw two ships to windward, which fired a few shots. I judged that one of our ships was in action with one of the English. M. de Court at once made the signal to his fleet to chase, and made all sail so as to get to the Spaniard and assist her ; but on the approach of the *Terrible* the Englishman withdrew, and we saw him join his squadron which bore up towards him ; the Spaniard made sail to join the French and after communicating with the *Terrible*, passed on and rejoined our squadron. From a boat which she sent to the *Real*, we learnt that she was the *Hercules*, commanded by Don Cosme Alvarez. We were surprised at this, for she had kept her station the evening before, as

* When the *Poder* had been captured, the English put on board her an officer, whose name was Mr. Vernon,¹ and twenty-three men. When the ship was retaken, Mr. Vernon said to M. de Saliez, who had been sent on board by M. de Court, that the French should think rather of retreating than of retaking the *Poder*, and that the English were going to attack them with all their force. But when the 23rd passed without a fight, he complained bitterly of Mr. Mathews and still more of the captain who had sent him without daring to follow him in order to secure the prize.

¹ Edward Vernon, 4th lieut. of the *Berwick*. This is corroborated by the evidence of Capt. Lloyd at the court-martial on Mathews. Admiral Sir Edward Vernon died in 1794.

long as was possible after the fight; she was next astern of the *Real*, whose lanterns were alight all night, but at daybreak she found herself surrounded by English ships, at a distance from us of nearly three leagues: during the night she must have gone on the starboard tack, while we were on the larboard, though without sail. Beyond doubt what occasioned this action of the *Hercules* was that, when the French had come to our assistance, the English had left and gone about on the starboard tack to get out of their way. Don Alvarez thought that the English ships had remained around the *Real*; that she was lost to the King, and that the French, on the starboard tack, were making for Toulon; whereupon he resolved to follow them and abandon the *Real*; so he steered on Mathews' stern light, thinking it was *M. de Court's*, and that was the explanation of what happened; it would have been much worse for him if the French had not hastened to his assistance.

We also heard by the crew of a boat from the *Poder* which had escaped to a French ship when the English captured her, that she had been vigorously defended against several of the enemy's ships, that she had lost all her masts, that the English had taken off her captain and several other officers and that they had put an officer and twenty-five men aboard her but could not retain her; *M. de Court* had recaptured her, in full view of the whole English fleet, and after taking three or four hundred men out of her, set her on fire. The French General was at that time lying to under topsails, at two gunshots' distance from the enemy, to cover us while we were effecting our repairs. Between midday and two p.m. the English made signals by

flags and guns to recommence the action ; but seeing the French were ready to receive them, they remained quiet.*

* When M. de Navarro withdrew to the cockpit to have his wounds dressed, the sergeant who kept watch on the main hatchway to prevent those who were only very slightly wounded from going down, stopped him ; and it was only after some argument that he gave way. As a matter of fact it was the first sea-fight that Don Navarro had been in ; for he had been in nothing but Infantry regiments from his youth, and when he turned over to the sea-service, held the rank of Colonel in the Regiment of the Crown. Milanese¹ by birth, he has always been specially attached to the Queen, and she it was who took him out of that corps to serve in the company of *Gardes-la-Marine*, when it was first created in Spain after the French model : he was still an ensign in that company, although in 1744 he was a commodore.

Sea-service is so entirely different from land service that it is not surprising that Don Navarro lacked experience. This is why one sees endless expeditions fail ; for those who conduct them have neither the talents nor the experience to make them successful. The fleet called The Invincible Armada, which King Philip II of Spain sent to England, perished miserably, merely on account of the mistakes of the Admiral, a grandee of Spain, but certainly no sailor. It was useless to tell him that he ought to take shelter in some port before the tempest, and then fall on the fifty English ships which he could have easily destroyed. His regular reply was that he was sent to England, and not to fight with English ships—which accordingly gave him a very uncomfortable time of it. Every profession requires its own particular talents and experience, if success is to be hoped for ; and if much experience is necessary for land warfare, sea fighting demands much more. For it is not in a harbour, or by carrying out boat exercises, or by conducting galleys that one learns to command a fleet. M. de Pointis at Cartagena, and M. du Guay Trouin at Rio di Janeiro, would have failed had they not been good sailors ; and one cannot become one in a day, nor yet at a court. But the pity of it is that sovereigns cannot recognise this.

¹ According to the probably better informed Vargas y Ponce, he was born at Messina, son of a Spanish father and a Sicilian mother. He was 11 years old when he went to Milan.

Here it is right that I should name the officers and *gardes-la-marine*, who fought so bravely on board the *Real*, together with their stations and rank.

It has been judged unnecessary to give the list of the officers of the *Real*, with their stations. Any interest it may have is purely biographical, relating to men of no historical importance. The only point about it which seems worthy of remark is that four out of the six lieutenants are noted as 'Biscayan.'

There was also on board the *Real* an old Neapolitan pilot, seventy-five years of age, who steered the ship during the whole battle, very carefully and in accordance with the orders given to him. When M. de Lage was close to him he said in a most cheerful tone, 'All right, Captain; the enemy will certainly not catch me.'

By the evening of the 23rd, M. de Court judged that the English would not renew the fight. The wind was easterly, almost calm, and the weather fine. The *Diamant* had, by his orders, sent on board to the *Real* 100 men taken from the ship's company of the *Poder*, and with them came Don Capillo, a *Capitaine-de-Frégate*; and besides these, we received a good number of the *Poder's* men in boats of the French ships which had taken them from their ship. This was a timely relief for us, for it repleted the loss of men, that we had sustained during the fight of the evening before. On the evening of the 22nd I had issued orders to the Master Gunner to fill cartridges for the guns and to collect all the grape¹ we had, so that we might know how we stood as regards ammunition for another battle. When this was done, the gunner reported to me that what with

¹ *tout ce qu'il y avoit de mitraille.*

round shot, what with grape,¹ there were still 6,000 rounds left, which was much more than I expected, considering the heavy fire we had kept up upon the enemy from the beginning of the action.

As I expected that Admiral Mathews would not allow the 24th to pass by without fighting, I proposed to M. de Navarro that I should go on board M. de Court myself to fix the station of the Real. My idea was to place her in the centre, where she would be—as it were—the bulwark² of the combined fleet. Don Navarro replied to this that I was in charge and could do as I thought fit. So about 10 o'clock in the evening of the 23rd I went aboard the Terrible. M. de Court was in bed and M. de la Jonquière, the flag-captain, told me in the fore cabin, where he was, with all the officers, that the Admiral was so fatigued that it would be cruel to awaken him.³ 'It will be enough,' said he, 'for you to tell us what brings you here.'

'What I have to say,' I answered, 'is a very simple matter. You know that Don Navarro is wounded; that M. Gerardin is lying unconscious, and that since 2 p.m. yesterday, when M. Gerardin was wounded, I alone have been in command of the Real; that the ship is now without the support of her two seconds; and that our rear-guard has fallen to leeward: so now, that we may not suffer from these mischances when the action is renewed, I have come to let M. de Court know, as well as you, gentlemen, that I do not think it well that those Spanish ships which still remain in a condition to fight should

¹ *ou en boulets ou en mitraille.*

² *le rempart de l'armée.*

³ De Court was, at this time, 78. He lived for another eight years.

make a division by themselves ; that I should wish to be placed in the centre, with the *Santa Isabel* astern and the *Terrible* ahead ; each Spanish ship to be placed between two French, and thus our centre will be invincible. There are three of our ships missing : the *Constante*, *Neptuno*, and *Oriente* ; it was their defection that occasioned the loss of the *Poder*. Do not oppose me with the argument that you are not at war with the English : the second fight will only be a continuation of the first ; and besides, the point is to defend the *Real* and to bring her to a harbour where she may refit. If M. de Court does not agree to this arrangement, I tell you that, with the Spaniards, I will place myself a gunshot distance away from you, and you shall watch the English surround and destroy me ; but I will never surrender the *Real* as long as I live. You shall be witnesses of the burial of a Spanish captain, a Parisian, shrouded in the wreck of the Spanish Admiral.'

M. de la Jonquière at first replied that a Spanish ship would be very ill placed between two French ships, because the difference of language would cause confusion in manœuvring. Afterwards, when it was time to separate, he said that the defection of three Spanish ships which had left their station on the day of the battle, made him afraid for the result of such a course : that hoping for something of the same kind to happen, the English might cut the line and put everything in confusion : that the three Spanish vessels which had left the line ought not, on account of being slightly damaged, to have quitted their station, for they had only to join with the French frigates or the fireships which were to leeward ; there they would have had support, and would have

had plenty of time to carry out repairs, and at least to put themselves in a state to make up numbers. 'You have observed,' he continued, 'that the English did not chase them when they made sail for Catalonia; much less would they have chased them under the guns of our frigates.'

'That is all very well,' I replied to M. de la Jonquière, 'but what I propose has not so much against it as you think. In fact, the most serious reason against it is that the Real will be the object of the English fire; and when once the Spaniards are all together, if they must be sacrificed, I will myself conduct them into the middle of the foe and you shall admit that I have left nothing undone to discover among my friends and comrades of the glorious French Navy the most certain means of preserving the Real and even of making her useful to the whole fleet. Finally, Gentlemen, I was most unwilling to make my proposal to you by the Major of our Squadron. Against our regulation, I have left my ship, but my impatience, and the urgent necessity of settling the order of battle, persuaded me that I ought to communicate it to you myself.' My proposition was agreed to, M. de la Jonquière promising me, on behalf of M. de Court; and I embraced my French friends with a cheerful heart, promising them that my six thousand rounds of shot should be freely bestowed on Admiral Mathews.*

* At first sight, it seems surprising that the Real should have been able to resist the furious attack of enemies so determined on her destruction; but three causes worked together for her preservation. First, the thickness of her sides, which was of thirty-seven inches, and of very hard oak. Second, the custom the English had of firing much more at the masts and sails of a vessel than at her hull. Third, the difficulty of hitting a ship below her waterline: lower-deck

I was somewhat heated whilst making this harangue, but of all the refreshments which were offered me I took only a glass of water and capillaire, which was presented to me by M. de Saint Aignan,¹ the son of the Duke. I then hastened on board the *Real* to tell M. de Navarro of the success of my trip, and he approved of all that I had done.

At daybreak on the 24th we found the English had disappeared. As the combined Squadron was lying to, and as the French had never lost sight of the *Real*, which could not move, we may fairly say that the English had abandoned the field of battle and the sea in order to go and refit. About eight o'clock the *Hercules* made a signal of distress, by a red flag in the mizen shrouds and firing a gun: when he did this he was about half a six-pounder gun shot to leeward, with his topsails furled, and M. de Court signalled the *Diamant* to run down to her. But the *Hercules*, without waiting for the French ship which was bringing assistance to her, made all sail for Cartagena; and though the French admiral with his whole squadron bore down on her, he could not come up with her without abandoning the *Real*; so he regulated his pace by ours, being even

guns, twenty-four and thirty-six prs., being only five feet or so above the water, should strike the water a good way from the side of the ship which they want to hit three or four feet under water. Above all, if the enemy's ship is rolling only a little, as is usual with large ships when there is very little swell running, a shot which has to go a distance of 100 fathoms under water will have lost much of its force, if it loses in the proportion of the much greater resistance of water than air; indeed a shot which has travelled 100 fathoms in the water will have no more force than one which has gone 1,000 fathoms in the air.

¹ 1712-1788. Lieut. de Vaisseau, 1741: Vice-admiral, 1781.

obliged from time to time to heave to to wait for us. Leaving the Admiral in this manner seemed most extraordinary conduct on the part of the Hercules. At noon we reckoned that we were 14 leagues south-east of Cape Croll.¹

On the 25th we continued our course, the wind fresh and steady at east, as it had been since the previous noon, till to-day at noon when it fell calm; the Castle of Montjuich at Barcelona then bore NWb.W. In the evening, at 11 o'clock, M. de Court made a signal to alter course, and held on to the south-east on the larboard tack. On my informing M. de Navarro of it, he answered that he wished to get to Cartagena, so as to refit his squadron. During this time, M. de Gerardin, the flag-captain, died of the wounds he had received in the battle. Don Navarro had his body thrown overboard without ceremony, like that of a common sailor.² 'If we make any display,' the Admiral said, 'the whole squadron will think that it is I that am dead.' These orders I had carried out; but the Admiral certainly gave them because of some disagreement which he had with M. Gerardin.

By this time our squadron consisted of but seven ships—the Real, the Santa Isabel, the San Fernando, the America, the Brillant, the Soberbio, and the Alcon. Of these seven, the Santa Isabel, the America and the Soberbio had good sailing qualities. On the 26th the wind being pretty fresh from SSE, varying to NE, we saw two ships under the land. On my making the signal to chase, the America soon overhauled them, when they turned out to be French ships wishing

¹ Possibly Cape Creux. In 24 hours, with a fresh easterly wind, they were off Barcelona.

² *un simple matelot.*

to speak us. They were from Havre de Grâce and bound the one for Marseilles and the other for Cette. One of them told us that the previous evening, when off Tarragona, they had met two Spanish ships making their way coastwise towards Cartagena; and added that one of these ships had her sails all shot through; also, that in the Gut of Gibraltar he had spoken two English ships of war. 'Look out for their fleet,' I said to him; 'the French and ourselves have had a battle with them.'

Next morning Cape Salou bore NNW, 10 leagues; the Castle of Montjuich, NNE, 15 leagues. By noon we had Dragonera SSW, 19¹ leagues. As we were speaking the French ships the evening before, we had seen a large vessel at anchor off Barcelona, but had not been able to make her out. By the 26th we had made the topmasts and topgallant masts,² on which we had been working ever since the battle, fairly safe; for fear lest the masts, being so badly wounded, should carry away under the weight of the large sails, we used topgallant sails as topsails and topsails for courses, and we had stoppered the shrouds. This was work which had been done by the seventy carpenters and sailors sent us by M. de Court on the evening of the battle, and they ought to have been paid by the Spanish Navy, just as the Marine Intendant at Toulon had paid the Spaniards who worked in the Arsenal there.

All through the 27th the wind continued variable between north and east, as it had been since noon on the 26th. By the evening, Cape San Antonio bore NW $\frac{1}{2}$ W, 7 leagues. The

¹ *dix et neuf*: the Spanish idiom.

² *nous achevâmes de passer les mâts de hune, de perroquet et de fougue.*

fatigue which I had endured night and day for some time, brought on a very painful attack of gout. On the 28th, the winds having been variable between west and south east, Cape San Antonio still bore NW, 7 leagues. On the 29th we had variable airs from south-east to north west; at noon, calm; Cape San Antonio NE $\frac{1}{2}$ N, 9 leagues. On Sunday 1st March, the wind variable from south east to south west; at noon, calm, Cape Palos bearing SW, we sighted two vessels towards the land. I at once informed the Admiral of this, so that he might make a signal to the America to go and reconnoitre them. After a while, a boat from one of these ships came alongside the Real and informed us that they were two Dutch merchant ships, bound for Marseilles.

On 2nd March, the wind continued variable between SE and NE; at noon, calm; Cape Palos, NE, 7 leagues. That evening,¹ at about ten o'clock, we made out some ships² on our bow, heading towards the North-east; they were then so near that we could see their hulls. I immediately ordered the bell to be rung, and to prepare for battle. Notwithstanding the great pain I was in, I rose at once, and roused out the cadet who was also sleeping in the great cabin. 'We are very near these ships'³ I said. 'They are English,'⁴ he replied; 'four merchant ships and three men-o-war of 50 guns, bound for Port Mahon.' 'You are dreaming,' said I. 'Not at all,' said he; 'an officer from the America told our Chief⁵ so; it was my watch and I overheard

¹ *La veille*; but the context shows that it was the evening of the 2nd. See p. 260.

² *ce vaisseau*. Assumed to be a transcriber's error for *des vaisseaux*.

³ *ce vaisseau*.

⁴ *Ce sont des Anglois*.

⁵ *notre Commandant*.

all he said.' 'Why have you said nothing about it to me?' I asked him. 'I thought,' was his reply, 'that M. de Navarro had ordered an officer to tell you of it.'

As I had not seen anything of this officer I was extremely surprised that our Chief should have treated me in this manner. I never went¹ into his cabin, but he said the most polite things to me. He had once even assured me that as soon as Major St. Just arrived at Madrid I might depend on being made a commodore, and he would give me his word for it. I made no reply to this, because I thought I did not need his good word to obtain this promotion: indeed I thought I might flatter myself that my services told sufficiently in my favour, and my reception had always been such that I took for granted I should be remembered in any promotion.

At all events, I went down and said to M. de Navarro: 'I am surprised, Sir, that you did not inform me when the captain of the *America* sent you word that seven English ships were close to us.' 'We are in no condition to do anything else but continue on our voyage,' he replied, 'so I did not wish you to hear anything about it.' 'Ah, Sir,' I said, 'if I had been informed, the *Isabel*, the *Soberbio* and the *America* would by now be cleared for action, and would be ready to begin at the signal of three guns. Our other ships and the *Real* would have fallen on either the ships of war or the merchantmen. Had I commanded the *Santa Isabel* I should have attacked and taken at least two of the men-o-war.'

This was not a piece of empty brag. The *Isabel* of 84 guns is vastly superior to the three

¹ *Je n'alloit jamais.*

English 50-gun ships. Her guns are 24 prs.; they carry only 16 prs.; and the thickness of the wood in her sides is more than double that of the English: no captain who knew of this superiority would fear the result of such an action. But unlucky are the fleets whose admirals have neither theoretical knowledge nor practical experience; they either do nothing or they do everything in a rash and silly way. It is a great advantage which we have at sea to know and to be able to see what forces we have against us. On shore it is impossible to tell the depth of a battalion. The fate of this English convoy would indeed have been similar to that of the convoy which came out in 1741, under the command of Mr. Cornwall in the *Bedford* and *Elizabeth*, and on the 29th November, mistaking us for Englishmen sailed right into the midst of our squadron.¹ These would probably have done the same, for they had seen us before night-fall, and being ignorant of our sortie from Toulon took us for English.

‘We had seen them before dark,’ M. de Navarro said to me. ‘I knew nothing about it,’ I answered warmly, and leaving him in bed, added that I was going to see how we could repair the loss which his silence had occasioned to the service. I went and sat down in the gangway opposite the mainmast, and soon everything was ready for fight. The English came down to join with us; and keeping the weather-gage, passed ahead of us about a 12 pr. gunshot off to

¹ This meeting was on the 14-25th November, not the 29th. Captain Cornwall’s *Journal*, which is remarkably neat and full, does not admit that there was any mistake, and agrees entirely with the account given by Navarro (*ante*, p. 221) except in the date.

windward. We did not alter our course. They detached a xebec to reconnoitre us, which ran down to within a musket shot of us, flying the English flag.¹ I had ordered perfect silence to be kept, and to hail² in English; but the San Fernandez, our second astern, shouted to me in Spanish to ask what they should do with regard to the xebec; by which we were discovered. The Englishman, hearing another language than his own spoken, immediately put his helm down; and I did not fire on him, so as not to alarm the convoy who would, I hoped, come down to speak to us. But I was greatly annoyed to see them pass across our bows, in full view and almost under our fire, without my being able to give any order which could be of use.

However, I noticed that one of them could not weather³ us, and her captain noticed it too; he tried to go about on the other tack, but I fired a 16-pounder at him, and the Santa Isabel, our second ahead, also fired at him; on which he bore down on us, with his flag flying, quite believing that we were English. We shouted to him to heave-to and send on board; but instead of waiting I sent the Real's boat to take possession of the vessel.

[Meantime their boat brought] a passenger, who, with the [boat's] crew [came on board the Real and]⁴ told me that the ship mounted 12 guns; that she was from London bound for Port Mahon, and had a crew of 18 men, four women and two

¹ *son pavillon Anglais au vent*—eleven o'clock at night: it seems curious.

² *saluer*.

³ *ne pouvait pas nous doubler*.

⁴ The MS. appears to be defective. These words are conjectural.

men passengers : their cargo, they said, was leaf tobacco and some stores for officers of the garrison of Port Mahon ; and they were in company with three other merchant ships under convoy of three men-of-war of 50 guns : namely, the Newcastle, Captain Fox ; the Leopard, Captain Forrester ; and the Antelope, Captain Canmore.¹ One of the men-of-war carried sixty thousand Portuguese gold pieces for the military chest.

The hulls of three armed men-of-war would be worth at least 150,000 piastres and the merchant ships another 100,000.² ' Good God,' I cried, ' what a loss ! ' And that, too, without counting the cargoes and everything else that was in the ships. I was going to present the English captain and another officer who came aboard with him to Don Navarro, who was still in bed. He, however, did not wish to see them. ' You are captain of the Real,' he said ; ' you can do as you like with them.' I do not know whether he was sulking or was reflecting, but, in either case, it was not the time for it. I was not the only one to notice his bad temper. In fact he had very good reason to be in a bad temper. If he had taken the convoy, as he easily might have done—for every advantage in an action lay with him—he would have done the English almost irreparable damage by this one blow, for besides the merchandise, these ships were loaded with stores for the

¹ The captain of the Antelope was Robert Maynard. There was, at that date, no Canmore in the navy. With this exception, the details here given are quite corroborated by Captain Fox's *Journal*. It is not, perhaps, unworthy of notice that three years after, Fox—who was described by Keppel as ' an unsettled, silly man '—was superannuated ; and that the very next year, Lord Forrester was dismissed the service for continual drunkenness. Maynard died in 1750. See Charnock.

² Bailey gives the piastre of this date as worth about 5s.

fleet. For more than eight months Admiral Mathews had been waiting for these supplies of provisions, clothing, and ammunition. Had we captured them, the English would have found it impossible to take the sea again at all for a long time, and still less to have kept any large number of vessels there. The Island of Minorca of itself provided so little food that if they had not been able to draw it from Tuscany, by way of Leghorn, they could not have remained in the Mediterranean so long as they have done. A numerous fleet indeed cannot exist for more than two months without feeling the want of many things which Port Mahon could not furnish to the English.

The irresolution of Don Navarro had made my heart sick, and I do not think it will be considered surprising. On leaving him, I told the two officers that all their private belongings would be returned to them. 'You can have my cabin on the starboard side,' I said; 'everything will be safe in there.' The English captain was called Palgrave, and his ship was the Hargrave; the officer captured on board her was Mr. Hardy, kinsman of Admiral Hardy.¹ As I was acquainted with his family, I congratulated myself on this opportunity of showing some civility to a member of it. As I had given them my cabin, Don Navarro invited these gentlemen to his table; and as for me, I slept on a mattress in the poop cabin, with the door open so that I could speak to the officer of the watch if I wanted to do so, without his having to leave his post.

At daylight I saw the other six English ships

¹ Sir Charles Hardy the elder, who was at this very time employed in seeing a fleet of victuallers and store-ships to Lisbon.

to leeward, still not very far off and unsuspecting ;¹ but when they saw the ship we had captured, they made all sail for Port Mahon. On the 3rd,² the wind was still variable from SW to NW ; at noon Cape Palos, WSW $\frac{1}{2}$ W, 8 leagues. On the 4th and 5th the wind continued the same ; at noon on the 6th, Cape Palos bore NW, 6 leagues.

On the 7th, at daybreak we saw, two leagues to windward of us, a pretty large squadron which I thought was the English ; but Major St. Just, noticing through his glass the length of their mizen-yards, recognised them for French, at which we were much reassured. A little later, a frigate came down to us and we were able to distinguish signals of recognition, which we mutually made and acknowledged. We were greatly pleased, for joined with the French, we had nothing to fear from the English. Our Chief was in mortal terror of the land ; if he had only steered from point to point along the coast of Spain we should not have been so long in reaching the port of Cartagena ;³ and I had several times told Don Navarro so, in the presence of the Major, the Intendant, and some of the other officers ; adding that we were running no little danger in keeping out so far from the shore ; with which he entirely agreed in my presence, but at night would make away from the land, which was what compelled me to give him my opinion⁴ before the other officers.

¹ This is incorrect. The xebec, which Fox calls the settee, had brought back word the evening before, that the strange ships were Spanish.

² This marks the meaning of ' *la veille,*' ante, p. 254.

³ The coast pilot recommends ships going south to keep in with the coast where the adverse current is not so strong.

⁴ *parler du service.*

The waters in which the French had rejoined us were those in which they had joined with us on the 18th December 1741; and the same French admiral had then been our security against the very superior English squadron commanded by Admiral Haddock. To-day its presence was no less advantageous to us, for it was still possible for us to meet the English fleet.

The officer sent on board the *Real* by M. de Court made very well grounded complaints to Don Navarro about the separation of the two squadrons. 'Since the night of the 24th,' said he, 'our General has been sending frigates ahead and on both beams to search for you, and he himself has made every effort to find you. He anchored at Alicante for eight days for news of the squadron, but hearing nothing of it—although M. de Caylus,¹ the Viceroy of Valencia, dispatched couriers all along the coast—he sailed again to look for you and escort you to whatever Spanish port you wanted to go to.' Don Navarro, having no good explanation to offer to all this, put the blame of his separation on the winds, and showed no gratitude to the French General for the service which he had wished to do him on this occasion. Indeed it even seemed as if he had forgotten those of the day of battle, for which he had expressed so many thanks at the time.

By noon, Cartagena bore NNW, 5 leagues. We here met two vessels belonging to the Order of Malta, coming from Cadiz. They sent their boat first on board M. de Court, and saluted him with 21 guns, which the French Commander

¹ Brother-in-law of the celebrated Madame de Caylus, and uncle of the Chev. de Caylus, who had commanded the French Trident in the battle off Toulon. See *MSS. of Lady du Cane* (Hist. MSS. Com.) *passim*.

returned with 15. Their boat then came to the Real, when they saluted with 17 guns to which we replied also with 15; after which salutes we each set our course again, we for Cartagena, and the Maltese for Alicante. About 8 o'clock that evening, a heavy gust of wind split the courses of the Real and drove us further from Cartagena, from which we were, at the time, only about a league distant; in fact this accident caused us no small inconvenience on account of the bad state which our rigging was in.

At noon the next day we were 12 leagues away from the port, which bore NNE, while the French squadron, which passed through the squalls, without putting before the wind like us, and remained close to the land, could have got into the port. However, M. de Court was anxious for our safety and preferred to remain outside, to see us right into the harbour. On the next day, the 9th, we were again on the point of entering, so M. de Navarro hurried off Major St. Just and Capt. Pendrichi to the America, with orders that they were to be landed as soon as possible. The Major had orders to take our Commander-in-Chief's dispatches to the Court, but he was not to take any other letters than those in the packet of dispatches. Admirals who have to take such precautions are certainly afraid that their conduct will not be approved of.

On the 10th, about 4 p.m., we anchored in the Roads of Cartagena. Ever since the junction of the squadron with the French, I had been mentally relieved from any fear of meeting the English; but the pain of my gout was very troublesome, although it did not prevent me from working the ship and conducting the fleet. I had taken on myself to keep in with the shore during the

preceding night, so that we might take advantage of the sea breeze which gets up about eleven o'clock in the forenoon; and but for this precaution, we should have been even longer in sight of the port without being able to enter it, for the land breezes would have driven us out to sea each evening. As it was, a part of the French squadron, forming the rearguard, anchored in the entrance of the harbour, while the rest made short boards outside all night, so as to go in next day with the sea breeze.

We found in the harbour three of our ships—the *Hercules*, the *Oriente* and the *Constante*, of which ship the captain, M. de Iturriaga, had been killed during the fight; this was indeed a sad loss to our squadron. I have since heard that M. de la Jonquière, the French Chief of the Staff, who was well acquainted with his bravery and capacity, had remarked, on seeing the *Constante* quit the line: 'M. de Iturriaga must certainly have been killed'; and this was only too true. On our arrival we learnt that the *Neptuno*, which during the action had left her station, running off before the wind, was at Barcelona and that her Captain, Olivares, a knight of Malta, had been killed, as well as many others of her people. This officer was much regretted in the navy because of his youth, merit, and generosity, his great wealth and his kindly disposition, all which made him many friends.

I have since been told that the original authors of what was noised abroad in Spain, and so also in France, against the French squadron, were the men belonging to the *Neptuno*, who, on arriving at Barcelona, spread the report, by word of mouth and by writing, that only the Spaniards had fought with the English; that the French, far

from assisting them, had actually sacrificed them ; that some French ships had even fired on the Spaniards, and that when the English and French had fought, it was without shot in their guns. Such hatred was engendered by the credit which these false rumours received at Barcelona, at Valencia, Malaga, and Pampeluna that the people were not content with offering insults to the French residents at those places, but even threatened to burn them out ; and, as a matter of fact, wood for this purpose was piled up at the the doors of some French houses.

While the French fleet lay at Cartagena our Chief had a notice posted throughout the town forbidding people to insult the French—a notice both offensive and useless, for the French were in too great numbers at Cartagena for them to be insulted with impunity.

The French ships, which had passed the night at sea, anchored at 11 o'clock in the forenoon, outside in the Roads ; but the *St. Esprit*, which was making a good deal of water, came into the harbour in the morning to effect repairs. As Don Navarro had sent the Major of our squadron to Madrid without letting him know, M. de Court also sent his Major, M. de Julien. It was unfortunate for him that our Chief's letters arrived first at the Spanish Court, and thence also at Versailles. Prepossession almost always does harm, and at the courts of princes more than anywhere else. Ministers are always anxious to know the truth, but they do not like to admit that they have been hoodwinked.

On our arrival at Cartagena it was proposed to M. de Court to assemble a Court of Inquiry to examine in detail into the conduct of each captain of his squadron, from the time of our departure

from Toulon ; it was wished that he should inquire into all that had passed during the battle ; why some of the Spanish ships had quitted the line when they were scarcely damaged ; why the French van had not tacked in compliance with the General's signals ; and why the Spanish squadron had parted company with the French ; but M. de Court answered to all this kind of thing : ' I am not going to be a public accuser. If the King himself¹ asks me for any further explanation I will give it him.'

For Don Navarro to give a detailed account of the fight would have been difficult. If he had been on deck² during the action, as M. de Court was, or if he had asked me about what had occurred after he was wounded, the Relation which he sent to their Majesties would have been filled with facts which ought to be known, so that everyone might be recompensed according to his merit ; but he did not consult anyone about it and wrote just what he thought fit.

There were two different sets of Spaniards who complained of the conduct of the French General : those, namely, who had quitted the line in direct opposition to all the laws of war, and those who wanted the French to declare war on the English. The first sought to veil their shameful behaviour ; the second wanted to facilitate their own peace with England by drawing an additional enemy into the field against her. Neither of them would have declaimed against the French nor even against Don Navarro—for they found fault with him as well—if in sending my journal to the Court I had included³

¹ Le Roi même.

² sur le pont.

³ j'y eusse ajouté.

in it the declaration of the surgeons in the cockpit, or if M. de Court, in sending word of the splendid defence of the *Real*, had explained how and by whom it was made. But the French General could not possibly have written otherwise than he did. He could not see from the *Terrible* that Don Navarro was wounded, that he was not on deck, that M. Gerardin was incapacitated, that I was in sole command; he could only see that the *Real* was making a very gallant defence, that she gave no sign of flight or surrender, and that her fire drove off every English ship which approached her. In fact, after the battle, Don Navarro himself had told the French Major, who was sent on board by M. de Court, how much he was indebted and how grateful he was to the French squadron which rescued him from a very difficult position, and to me who had taken the command after he and M. Gerardin were wounded.

While we were at Cartagena M. de Charron, Intendant of the French squadron, came on board the *Real* to see me and said that there was a courier going to the French ambassador—if I wished to take advantage of it; or that if I wished I could write by M. de Julien who was going to Madrid. As the gout had prevented me from writing hitherto, I got the French Secretary to make some extracts from my journal, which I sent to the King of Spain and to the Comte de Maurepas at Versailles, adding to them this observation: ‘I will not lose time in refuting the several fables which are current among our men in respect of the battle we have fought. Some say they saw a three-decked ship which was ahead of Admiral Mathews sink; others have furnished sketches of the battle, in which there is

not the least foundation of truth. I cannot allow downright falsehoods of this kind to be imposed on the King and his Ministers; as testimony to which I sign these extracts from my journal.

‘On board the *Real*, in the Roads of Cartagena, 11th March, 1744.’

On the 14th March I went ashore in M. de Navarro’s boat, being unable any longer to endure the suffering caused by the gout, besides which I was in great need of a rest. On the 16th the *Neptuno* came into Cartagena; her captain, Don Olivares, had died two days after he was wounded and had been buried at Barcelona with military honours. On the 18th Don Navarro received his patent of Lieutenant-General, and a salute¹ was fired to announce this favour of the King’s. It caused people in the squadron to ask one another how this piece of good fortune had come to him. The French asked the Spaniards about it and more especially they asked the French pilot who had been on board the *Real* during the battle and had then been wounded in the face, but had refused to go below, and had seen everything that was done for the defence of the ship.

Before sufficient time had passed away for people to forget the principal circumstances of an action so glorious for the ship’s company of the *Real*, for him who had commanded her, and for the French who drove the English away from her, I wished to have authentic testimony of where Don Navarro was while I was in sole command; and here it is: It is that of the three surgeons of the *Real*, Don Raphael Prius, Don Benoit Faboada, Don Pierre Corbin, and Don

¹ *plusieurs coups de canon.*

Juan de Bustamente, the First Apothecary to the Fleet, who was on board the same ship. These officers write :

‘ We certify that among the wounded officers who came down into the cockpit on the 22nd February, the day of the battle, the first was Don François Morales, Captain of Grenadiers in the Regiment of Seville, who had been mortally wounded in the head at the beginning of the action ; a quarter of an hour afterwards, they brought down to us Don Alvarez Padilla, horribly wounded in the belly, who died at once ; the third was the Admiral, Don Juan Joseph Navarro, who had a wound on the ear, with a contusion on the left cheek, which we dressed, but did not dress any wound on the leg ; it was very slight and we had plenty of other wounded coming down at every moment. He remained in the cockpit, seated on a cable, until the end of the battle, when, after saying his prayers, he went up to his cabin and to bed, where his foot was dressed. About two hours after the battle began, the first Captain, Don Nicolas Gerardin, was brought down with a mortal wound in the forehead.

‘ We did not leave the cockpit during the whole of the battle, because we were ignorant of the danger we were in of being burnt by the fireship with which the English were trying to grapple the Real, and it was only after the fireship had been destroyed that we heard of the danger from which we had escaped. Don Nicolas de Arrambido, a Lieutenant on the lower deck, came to the main hatchway and shouted down to the Chief the good news that the fireship had blown up without doing us any damage, thanking God, and praising M. de Lage de Cueilly,

who was then in command. They also told us in the cockpit that the same M. de Lage had prevented the people from striking the flag, as was proposed when the fireship came in view.

‘In order that the plain truth of all that we saw and heard may be set forth, we now sign this statement, regardless of cost or any inconvenience which it may cause.

‘At Cartagena. 18th March, 1744.’ [*Follow the Signatures.*]

This statement was widely different from the conversational accounts and letters of M. de Navarro, and people may form their own opinions about it. On the 21st Don Navarro learnt by express that the King had honoured him with a Castilian title with the rank of Marquis, and with a pension of 4,000 livres for him and for his descendants.* If kings knew all their good servants they would need to give too many rewards altogether; but it is difficult to tell the truth before a throne.

On the 25th I received a letter, dated the 22nd, from the Bishop of Reynes, then Ambassador of France at Madrid. In it he congratulated me on the glory which I had acquired on board the *Real*, and added that he had forwarded the packet containing the extracts from my Journal for his Majesty to M. Arnaud, first *valet de chambre* to the King.

* The title of ‘Marquis de la Victoire’ was given to Don Navarro by Spanish priests who, on hearing that the King had honoured him with a Marquisate of Castile, got up in their pulpits to eulogise the valour of the Spaniards, and hailed Don Navarro as *Marquis de la Victoire*; and poets, in their romances, published that twelve Spanish ships had fought with forty-seven English. Here is the title of one such piece which was printed at Cartagena. [*Title, in much mutilated Spanish, is here omitted.*]

The packet was forwarded to good purpose, for M. Arnaud wrote to me, on the 17th,¹ from Pardo, strongly advising me to send my journal to be read to their Majesties, who had remarked, 'We have a very good mind to put De Lage in charge of this ship,' His letter ended with a request for my private opinion as to the conduct of M. de Court during the battle, for the Spaniards were crying out loudly against it. M. Pierre, too, the *surgeon accoucheur* to her Royal Highness the Infanta, who wrote to me a little later—27th March²—also warned me in the plainest terms, that the Spaniards were vehemently accusing the French of having sacrificed them to the English. These reports, so disparaging to the French nation, and which, as I remarked before, had been noised abroad through the Provinces, had now reached the Court, and were soon circulated in every town in Spain, in many of which the French were actually insulted, and threatened with being burnt out of their houses.

In point of fact, M. de Court's manœuvre had been most prudent and, at the same time, most gallant. He had fought when it was right to do so and, when opportunity served, came to the assistance of the Spaniards, and by his bold measure, obliged the English to draw off. During that night and the next two days he covered the Spanish ships, and during that whole time was offering battle to the English, who, having the weather gage, could have attacked had they not been afraid to do so. He had sent a hundred and fifty men to the Real, to put her in a state to defend herself and remain at sea ;

¹ April, apparently ; but for the rest of the story the dates are in utter confusion.

² So in the MS., but possibly April is meant.

and in full view of the English, he had recaptured the only Spanish vessel they had taken. All this had been done in the open light of day, and could be questioned or denied neither by the English nor Spaniards. Common justice and honour have compelled me to recount what took place on this occasion.

In all ages, success in war or the lack of it has given rise to much idle talk, not only amongst military men, but also amongst men who never saw either a fleet or an army or a battle; but no notice should be taken of any account of a battle, unless it is by persons who were in it and did their duty in it. It is an everyday experience, that those who never were near a battle complain most loudly of those who have taken the brunt of the fighting; and I know very well that some such have written, both to Madrid and to France, things as false as they are scandalous and to which they have not dared to put their names. It is only the truth that is ready to show itself in daylight. The defence and preservation of the Real, against the very persistent attack of the English Admiral supported by four or five of his heaviest ships, and the saving her from a fireship which had been, with great daring, brought to within fifteen yards of her stern, tell clearly enough to sailors all over the world that the captain who commanded her was a man determined to perish rather than surrender. The glory which, as he believes, he there acquired will provoke to an obstinate defence all who may, at any time, find themselves exposed to similar danger; his success will show them that there is always a way out as long as a man has hands and a clear head.¹ It is quite certain that the bold front he

¹ *des bras et de la tête.*

displayed to so many foes prevented the English from renewing the action on the 23rd. At the same time, I must say that the evolution of the French General and the good order of his squadron had much to do with it, for, but for these, he would have been satisfied with driving off the leading ships of the English, and would have thought that he was rendering the best service to the State by taking advantage of the night to retire. But with sixteen ships, four of which had no right to be in the line of battle, the General threw himself in the way of more than thirty English ships, in order to relieve the Spaniards who had then only seven in any condition to fight.

Before he left, M. de Court was visited on board the *Terrible* by Don Navarro; and, to the surprise of everyone, the Spanish Admiral, who had been wounded in the leg in the action, came up the ship's side with no further assistance than that of the ordinary ladder.¹ As there had been but little time since the battle to cure a wound in the foot, people naturally concluded that this had not been serious. The visit was very short and very stiff; the Spanish Admiral complained that we had engaged to leeward of the English, although he had been assured that there should be no battle unless we were to windward. There would have been some reason in such a complaint if M. de Court had left the roads of Toulon without having the weather gage of the enemy, or if, the wind having changed in their favour, the French General had attacked the English. But when the wind veered and gave the English the advantage, it was im-

¹ *monter sur le vaisseau sans autre secours que de l'échelle ordinaire.*

possible to avoid having to fight to leeward of them—except, that is, by running away and re-entering Toulon. Of these alternatives, the first would have been too shameful: M. de Court would never have run away, even if he had been abandoned by everyone; and, as for returning to Toulon and waiting for a favourable wind, the orders from the Court were too strict to be disobeyed.

The action taken in London by the Admiralty against Admiral Mathews and Vice-Admiral Lestock was similar to that taken in Queen Anne's reign against the seven English captains who allowed M. Cassard to escape.¹ We now learn that the conduct of Mr. Lestock, the Vice-Admiral, has been justified; but whether justified or condemned, the trials must always be deemed eulogies of the defence of the Real and of the French General's manœuvre. The Englishmen were accused of not having been victorious when they had the superiority both in numbers and size of ships. Their defence was that the Real was too well defended and that the French Admiral had manœuvred too cleverly after having repulsed Admiral Rowley.

The English Admiralty thinks itself so superior at sea—not only in ships, but also in skill and

¹ Without the date, it is impossible to speak positively. It can only be said that no such court-martial can be found. The only one which has the remotest resemblance to it is one held at Gibraltar on 24th Aug. 1704, 'to enquire into the circumstances of the chase of some French men of war off S. Palo on 8th May by eight English ships (named).' There were six French men of war, of from 60 to 70 guns. They fled, keeping in a body. Three English got near them, of 70, 50 and 40 guns, and as the others were far astern, it did not seem prudent to attack. All acquitted. There is nothing to guide us in the suggestion that Cassard may have been one of these six.

in courage—that it has been driven almost to madness by learning of the undaunted bearing of the little French squadron which had not a single three-decked ship, in presence of the numerous English squadron in which there were seven or eight.¹ But if the English were as brave and as skilful in manœuvring as their ships were numerous, they let slip a splendid opportunity of publicly showing it. They certainly had more ships than were necessary for closely engaging the whole of the combined squadrons, and they had, too, the wind in their favour. The *Real* at least, could not have prevented herself from being boarded as, for lack of sails, she had scarcely steerage way. But they were so much afraid of boarding that they did not dare to detach one or two ships to take possession of the *Poder*, which had surrendered; for any English ships which followed the *Poder* would have fallen to leeward of the French and would have been themselves liable to be boarded and captured.

On the 4th April, M. de Court finally set sail to return to Toulon. It was no fault of mine that the French squadron sailed without that of Spain, for I had written to the Minister that fifteen days' work from the date of our arrival at Cartagena would be sufficient to get even those ships which had suffered most in the action ready to go to sea with the French. To this I got no answer, and ever since then the Spanish squadron has remained in port inactive.

On the 10th² I received two months' leave from the Court and three months from the

¹ These were the very ships which Mathews complained of as useless.

² It is quite impossible to reduce these dates to order.

Treasurer, to go to take the waters at Archena,¹ in the kingdom of Mercia, and arrived there on the 12th² but left next day to go to Aranjuez, a royal residence some six leagues from Madrid. On the 9th² I reached Aranjuez and immediately went to the house of our Minister, the Marquis de la Ensenada, where I wrote my name, so that he might know that my first visit was to him. Thence I went to the French Ambassador's, but at the sight of my rough clothing the valet de chambre told me that his master was asleep. I was on the point of being met with a similar refusal at the apartments of her Royal Highness the Infanta, but I was recognised by one of the Ladies in Waiting, who announced me as a 'sauvage de l'Isle de Corse.' Her Royal Highness received me with the same marks of goodwill with which she has always honoured me, and kept me for more than an hour, during which time the French Ambassador, having come to pay his respects, I told him that I had been refused admission at his house on account of my appearance, at which the Infanta was much amused. After kissing her hands I told her that, as she was aware, I ought not to have gone to see any member of the Royal family before paying my respects to the King, but that in these clothes I was *incognito*; and most humbly begged that she would make my excuses acceptable to their Catholic Majesties.

On the 10th I saw the Minister, who promised to present me to the King. I asked the Prince de Maseran, who was captain of the Gardes du

¹ It is written 'Archint,' but there does not seem to be such a place. Archena is noted for its warm springs and the ruins of a Roman bath.

² It is quite impossible to reduce these dates to order.

Corps who were on duty, when I should be able to see his Majesty. But as he was not then to be seen, I dined with this gentleman and afterwards made several calls. Several of the gentlemen about the Court put many questions to me as to why the French had abandoned the Spanish squadron and had sacrificed them to the English—to which I replied by showing my journal and copies of the extracts from it which I had sent to the King; but the prejudice they showed convinced me that secret motives had excited this very prevalent discontent with the French.

On the 12th I learnt, by the Gazette of Madrid, of the promotion of the officers of the squadron which had fought against Admiral Mathews, and that I had been made a commander of the Order of Santiago at Hinojosa del Valle in Estramadura. I was assured that, in making this promotion, the King had been guided entirely by the list which, in accordance with his orders, Don Navarro had drawn up. I was not included in the promotion, though I had a right to expect it after Don Navarro's promise, even if what I had done did not entitle me to it. But there are people to whom nothing is so unpleasant as the recollection of those who have rendered them important services.

I spent some days in paying visits and in dining with the gentlemen of the Court and the ambassadors, and on the 19th I had the honour of being presented to their Majesties and of kissing their hands. The King told me that he was pleased with what I had done; and the Queen spoke to me for some time in the most gracious manner. On the 20th I had the honour of presenting to the King my memorial, in which I set forth my services and a list of the moneys due

to me for the upkeep of the St. Isidore ; and on the 22nd I humbly requested the Queen to bear my memorial in mind, to which she answered that she would do so.

On the 23rd the Minister told me that the King had given me the command of the Hercules, and that I had only to call at the Navy Office ¹ to be ready at once to go to sea. On the 30th he repeated these orders, but I was not a little worried as to the obeying them. 'What!' I said to myself, 'Command the Hercules!' On the other hand I did not wish to displease their Majesties. It was at this time that I heard that Don Navarro, who had no longer signed himself as anything but Marquis de la Victoria, was bitterly reproaching and threatening the surgeons and apothecary of the Real who had given me their statement as to the wounded officers in the cockpit, where never had been a captain who merited any such title as Marquis de la Victoria. By the way, this title cost me four pistoles ² of Spanish money, which M. Chatelain, controller of the victualling, won from me ; for, being unwilling to believe such a thing, I had laid him a bet against it. It was also about this time that I received the following letter from M. d'Auteuil,³ Commodore in the Spanish Navy, dated 13th May, at Cartagena :

' I have heard with pleasure, my dear Sir, that the baths have done you good and that you have

¹ *au departement.*

² The pistole was a gold coin worth 17s.—Bailey.

³ This name is here written ' d'Auteuil,' which is very possibly the correct form. Fernandez Duro prints it ' Dautevil' and Vargas y Ponce, ' Dantevil.' The tenor of his letter certainly suggests that he was French or of French family.

gone on to Madrid. I think in this you are quite right, for our Chief was in despair at the statement about him which you have obtained from the surgeons of his ship, and he has made them give another retracting the original one, by threatening them with the galleys and their ruin in the service. He was no less offended by your showing your journal, and presently he will see the reply to the false and calumnious letter which he wrote against the French to M. Marin, *Lieutenant des gardes-la-marine* at Cadiz. It is to be hoped that this reply will be printed in Spanish, for it is not right that such villainy should triumph over the truth.¹

‘ Our Admiral has had orders a few days ago to put to sea with some of the ships, but as he himself is not fond of taking risks, he placed me in charge of the detachment. The Court sent me orders to return to the port, which I did on the 8th, with the five ships which were under my command. Goodbye, my dear Sir. I trust you may preserve your health and, with it, your friendship towards me; for it is impossible for me to have the honour of being more devotedly,

Your very affectionate

D’AUTEUIL.

To revenge myself somewhat for the loss of the four pistoles which the title of Marquis de la Victoire, now carried by M. de Navarro, had cost me, I took care that the King should be told about it. He seemed very much displeased with the assumption of such an extravagant title; for in fact, M. de Navarro was at no time General of the combined squadrons and had neither taken

¹ *que l'iniquité triomphe de la vertu.*

nor sunk any one of the enemies' ships, great or small; three chaplains, eight surgeons and all the men who were handing powder in the cockpit had seen him there very shortly after the beginning of the action and knew that he had remained there till the end of it; the first surgeon had actually told him three times—'Your wound is quite trifling, Admiral, and does not in the least prevent you from going up on deck.'¹ But Don Navarro preferred to tell his beads seated on a cable, and to leave the responsibilities of the fight to the two French captains, poor Gerardin and myself.

It seems impossible to understand how M. de Navarro could dare to take such a pompous title as that of Marquis de la Victoire, when neither the English nor the French had ordered a Te Deum to be sung. The French General came best out of the battle: he repelled those who attacked him; he came to the assistance of the Spaniards when they were being handled pretty roughly by the English, from whom he took the only prize which they had made; he gave time and means to the Real to carry out her repairs, and finally he stayed for two days in presence of the English, who did not dare to attack him, although he had with him only seven Spanish ships, one of which (the Real) was in tow of the Isabel; of all the Spanish squadron, only the Hercules astern and the America ahead were near enough to share the danger. The other Spanish ships had had little or no part in the fight with the exception of the Poder, which was dismasted and taken; on seeing which, three

¹ *Vous n'êtes point blessé, rien ne vous empêche de monter sur le pont.*

of the Spaniards had quitted the line, and a fourth had abandoned the squadron on the next day.

Only the French kept their station and stayed for two days and two nights on the field of battle. That this glory is theirs cannot be disputed: their recapture of the *Poder* in sight of both Spaniards and English is a certain proof of it; for, in fact, as she had been totally dismasted and taken possession of by the English, it was not possible to get her away during the twenty hours or more that they [the French] were masters of her; and, at last, when she had to be abandoned to the winds and waves [they set her on fire], in sight of all three squadrons she blew up on the 23rd about 10 p.m., about three or four leagues to leeward of the French.¹ I am thus persuaded that M. de Court was led to retreat by other motives than appear by his conduct before, in or after the battle, or else that officers have reason to fear contingencies which render it necessary for them to serve in combined squadrons.

The Maréchal de Broglie had good reason to know this. On my way from Paris to Lyons I met many officers of his army, who all assured me that it was to his ability and bravery that the King owed the preservation of the army which he had led from the heart of Germany, though surrounded by the greatest dangers;² but an ally who threatens to leave you in the lurch often forces on you measures to which you strongly object, and even the sacrifice of officers of distinguished merit.

¹ In this and the following paragraph the MS. is more than usually defective and corrupt.

² This splendid piece of service was performed by the Maréchal de Belle-Isle—not de Broglie—17–25th December, 1742. See the Duc de Broglie's *Frédéric II. et Louis XV.*, i. 137 seq.

This is what I said and what I wrote when I saw the promotion of M. de Navarro, who gathered the fruits of my labours and of the danger to which I had exposed myself. All the civilities which I received from the gentlemen of the Court could not compensate me for not being promoted, and the annoyance which I suffered caused me to resolve never to serve under him again if that did not involve the failing in my duty to the King and the Royal Family.

When I call to mind the questions which were put to me at the Spanish Court by all sorts of people as to the battle of the 22nd February, I cannot refrain from repeating some of them, as well as the answers which I made, brusquely or gravely, according to the rank of my interrogators. I will not name them, for the same questions were put to me by different people, whom I answered according as they were more or less well informed. I was, then, often asked: Why we had not boarded the English? Why we had not sunk them? Why the French had suffered so little loss? Why the Poder had not been taken in tow instead of being burnt? Why we had not gained the weather gage from the English? Why the van¹ of the enemy had not fought? Why the French were so late in tacking to come to the assistance of the Spaniards?

These were the principal questions which were continually put to me. Those who understand sea affairs and who have read my journal with care, will not require to read what follows to see what answers I made; but I recapitulate them here for the sake of those who, without being sailors, are yet interested to hear about them.

¹ *L'avant-garde.*

In a sea fight the ships are arranged in a single line, each one astern of another, and do not turn either to right or to left in order to present one side after the other to the enemy ; in this way they engage only on one side, unless they are attacked on both sides at once. Had the English extended their line along the whole of that of France and Spain, then the French van would have been engaged as well as the centre and the Spanish rear. You must ask Mathews why he did not so extend his line, for he had at least twelve ships of the line more than the combined squadrons. He threw himself upon the Spanish rear, and left his own rear without an enemy, because he wanted to separate the Spaniards from the French. If the Spanish line had been cut, then the Spanish ships would have been doubled on by the English rear ; but the resistance made by the Real, as well as by some other Spanish ships, upset his calculations and rendered his rear useless ; and the French General having tacked, the English were compelled to give up the fight. In doing that, they kept so close to the wind that the French could neither double on them nor get near enough to them even to engage.

M. de Court tacked at once, as soon as his fight with Rowley ended ; and that, although the Terrible's wheel had been shot away by a cannonball which had entered M. du Tillet's¹ cabin and taken off the leg of the man who was steering, and although the gallery on the larboard side was on fire. The fire was put out with as much nonchalance as if it had been merely putting out

¹ Presumably a Lieutenant ; possibly one of the brothers Le Gardeur de Tilly, father or uncle of Le Gardeur de Tilly, Captain of the *Eveill e* in the West Indies, 1780-82.

a fire in a chimney ; for the firm resolution of the General inspired all hands, and by his activity the flag captain happily provided for everything. The General had need of all his resolution, both that day and night and the next day, to enable him to recapture the Poder—which the Spaniards did not attempt to do ; to keep all the ships together and in line, so as to cover the Real and give her time to repair her damages and get ready for a renewal of the battle. For that, however, the English had no wish ; otherwise, they could at their pleasure have come down to us, while we could not go to them as they were to windward of us. To be able to board them,¹ we must have had the weather gage, and the English, having it, and fearing such engagement, were too good seamen to allow us to take it from them.

Even then, the general boarding² by a whole squadron is a very hazardous project, to say nothing worse, though it is quite easy for one ship to board another when both are anxious to do so. But if one of the two wishes to avoid boarding, the other will have much trouble to get alongside, at least unless she is much the better sailer and manœuvres better as well. But it is hardly possible for a whole squadron to succeed in such an attempt. Those ships which failed would fall one on board the other and would be exposed to many different sorts of accidents ; the confusion would be horrible, and it would be impossible for the Admiral to see what

¹ *pour aller à l'abordage.*

² *l'abordage general.* It must be remembered that De Lage is here writing avowedly for a shore-going public, and that to a French or Spanish landsman, boarding seemed the main end of naval fighting.

was going on and to give orders for assisting those who had need of it.

It is with a squadron of galleys that a general boarding can and ought to be made, and that with good success ; for oars will take them wherever their commander chooses ; but with ships, he has to lay his course and trim his sails according to the wind.

If the French suffered little loss, they owe it to their heavy fire which drove off the English van ; and if that had not suffered so much from the fire of the four French ships engaged, it would have renewed the action when the French went to the assistance of the Spaniards and when they covered them on the day after the battle.

The French General made the signal to tack in plenty of time, but it was not seen, either because of the smoke which covered the *Terrible*, or of the lack of attention by the van.

Not only at Madrid but also at Paris and, indeed, in the whole of the two kingdoms people expected to hear that the combined squadrons had sunk the English. At Madrid they said—‘ Two Spaniards ought to smash at least three English ’ ; and at Paris—‘ Two Frenchmen ought to take three English.’ They seemed to fancy that the English had neither guns¹ nor men. Talk sense, and without prejudice. The English fight well, and if they have a fleet with a greater number of ships and guns, a victory over them must be very expensive to their conquerors. If the Spaniards had had twelve ships like the *Real*, they alone could have resisted the attacks of the whole of the English fleet. If the French had had twelve three-decked ships the English

¹ *ni canons ni bras.*

would never have dared to attack them. It is with large ships against small ships much as it is with heavy cavalry against hussars; for the latter are good in a pursuit but of no use in a battle; and so were most of the French and Spanish ships—good only for cruising against merchant vessels. The *Poder* could not be saved by the French, for all her masts were gone and she had several shot-holes below the water-line; it was enough to have recaptured her and to have taken out of her the three or four hundred Spaniards whom the English had left in her, as well as Mr. Vernon and his twenty-four men. The fact of this ship being abandoned by the English, and of the French being able to recover her crew in sight of the enemy, shows that the English had been very roughly handled in the fight, and that the French General was much less afraid of a second action than the English were. They were above a month refitting at Port Mahon, and [even then] their ships were not all in a state to take the sea.

When I talked like this, they listened to me and seemed to be convinced; but directly after they came back to their original prejudice against the French General, and seemed to think that the *Terrible*, a two-decked ship of seventy-four guns, might have been able to crush five or six heavy three-decked ships of ninety guns. 'It is as if you expected,' I would say to them, 'one of our harriers to eat up five or six of the very big English mastiffs.' But people who have had the worst of a fight cannot understand reason when they are persuaded that victory ought to have been theirs; and the hardest of all to undeceive are those who know nothing of war, and are determined never to expose themselves in it.

If it is true that, on shore, large battalions triumph over small ones, it is more certain that great ships will crush those which resist them. On shore, if the bravery on the two sides is equal, stratagem and ability may stand in place of numbers ; but at sea ruses and tricks go for nothing and are seldom tried. There are no woods or ditches or screens to hide one's force behind, and the whole battlefield is exposed to view. Gun fire, too, is very uncertain, because of the motion of the ships. These are under way when they fight and, indeed, it is dangerous to heave-to ; for a ship, when hove-to, presents now her bow now her stern to the enemy, who is thus able to pound her, while she has no opportunity of returning the compliment.

If in a line of battle, two or three ships have been so disabled that they are unable to manœuvre, they can no longer keep in the line. If they are to windward of the enemy they fall down towards him ; but if they are to leeward, they sag further to leeward, and so out of reach of his guns. This is no little advantage ; but it would take too long to discuss the question as to whether it is better to engage to windward or to leeward of the enemy ; only this I will say : Should the wind be pretty fresh, it is better to be to leeward of the enemy, for his lower batteries, in which are his heaviest guns, are useless to him, while yours will have full effect. But if the wind is light, as is usual in battles at sea, it is better to be to windward, for then one can close or draw off from the enemy at pleasure.

What is to be thought of the English custom of firing at the masts rather than at the hull of a ship ? or of that of the French, of firing at the hull rather than at the rigging ? Each of

these methods has its own advantages. As a matter of fact, a ship taken is of more value than a ship sunk ; but whether is it easier—to disable a ship or to sink her? If the fight is at very close quarters—at musket shot for instance—it is easier to sink her ; but at a distance of 1,000 or 1,200 yards it is easier to disable her, for at such a distance the shots have no longer strength to penetrate the sides, but have still enough left to damage the masts or cut up the rigging.* An enemy approaching you from to windward falls down on you if he is disabled, but if struck under water he must draw off to stop his leaks. As a general rule, however, when to leeward of the enemy, fire at his rigging, so that if disabled he falls down towards you and is taken ; but, if to windward, fire at the hull. If you have several opponents, it is still more necessary to fire at their hulls ; for if one sinks it strikes fear into the others.

On the 2nd June I presented a new memorial to the King, with a certificate from M. Duprès, his first surgeon, showing the necessity I was under of going to France to re-establish my health. His Majesty appeared surprised and merely answered 'Well.' I sent the permit for three months' leave, which the Minister had given me, to the French ambassador to be sent to the French consul, so that it should be registered, which required both time and formalities. On the 5th, I had the honour of taking leave of their Majesties and of the Royal Family and of kissing their hands. After visiting a number of gentlemen

* M. De Lage wisely made his own lower batteries fire at the hulls of the English ships which approached him within musket shot, for he thereby made Mathews haul his wind, and the other English ships draw off.

to take my leave, at 10 o'clock in the evening I met a friend whom I had failed to find at home. 'I wish you *Bon Voyage!*' he said to me, 'but I will not keep from you the fact that the King and Queen told me to-day that they willingly gave you the leave you requested on account of your health, although they are convinced that as soon as you are on the other side of the Pyrenees you will quit their service. Think it over carefully, for you will offend their Majesties who have a regard for you.'

'I know,' I replied to him, 'where his Majesty got that opinion; but you may assure their Majesties, on my behalf, that so far as lies in me I shall never quit their service. You are aware, if I may use such an expression, that I love the King personally; that I have never stayed at Court except with the Marquis de Valouse, Grand Equerry to his Majesty and permanent Chamberlain; that I have always been most friendly with those of his gentlemen who are most attached to his Majesty, and that for thirty years without interruption. That is all I can say.'

On the 6th June I started in a carriage for Madrid, to continue my journey thence into France.

Note by the Printer.

Such is the journal of M. De Lage de Cueilly. If it should become possible to have those of the different campaigns which he has made in the Mediterranean, in the Ocean and in the Indies—we shall put them before the public, who will be certain of finding in them the gallant sailor who fights his battle before he sings of victory, and who has escaped the greatest dangers by making the best use of those resources which art and a gallant spirit have provided him with.

SALE OF DEAD MAN'S EFFECTS

[Paybook of Gloucester.]

[Memoranda of this kind have seldom been preserved and then probably only by accident. This has no personal interest, but to some extent illustrates the dress of seamen at the date. Since the recent disastrous pulping of the Pay Books at the Record Office, the original no longer exists.]

Account of clothes &c. sold at the mast of His Majesty's ship Gloucester, belonging to James Bearcroft, Gunner, D.D., the fourteenth day of March 1750.

No. S.B.	To whom Sold.	Species.	Sums.
228	Mr. Gidley ¹ [ab. Barth Gidley]	One pair of silver shoe and knee buckles, one hat, two pair of white stockings, two chequered shirts, two white shirts, a silver headed cane, and a pair of silver breeches buckle	02 12 00
449	John Joggett [ab.]	One old blue coat, one green cloth waistcoat with gold lace, and a pair of breeches	02 5 00
334	Thomas Eliot [ab. Elliott]	One old cloth coat, white coat and breeches, and one waistcoat	02 0 00

¹ There is no official way of telling whether an ab. is really an ab. or a young officer—midshipman or master's mate—for whom there is no vacancy in his proper rating. The presumption is that an ab. distinguished as Mr. was the latter.

290 SALE OF DEAD MAN'S EFFECTS

Account of Clothes, &c.—continued.

No. S.B.	To whom sold,	Species.	Sums.
524	[ab.] Richard Dobbs	One chequered shirt, a cloth waistcoat and breeches, wig, pair of stockings and handkerchief	00 18 00
672	[the number is wrong ; 61, John Davys, gunner's mate.] John Davys	One gold-laced hat, three white shirts, and two pair of stockings	00 16 00
376	[ab.] John Lyons	One old white shirt, one wig, a white coat, pair of breeches, 2 pair of stockings & a handkerchief	00 14 06
645	[ab.] Henry Williams	Three pair of old stockings, black waistcoat, pair of breeches, a wig and handkerchief	00 10 06
285	[ab.] William Pritchard	Two pair of drawers, 4 pair of stockings, one handkerchief, a wig, and a napkin	00 7 06
549	[carpenter's crew.] Thomas Writtle	Two old white shirts, napkin, a case, pair of drawers, and five old pair of stockings	00 5 06
785	[number wrong ; 185, Charles Blomer, ab.] Mr. Blomer	A chest, odd things, and three sheets	01 2 06
229	[number wrong ; 228, BartGidley, ab.] Mr. Geadley	A bed bolster, pillow, blanket, and quilt	02 0 00

SALE OF DEAD MAN'S EFFECTS 291

Account of Clothes, &c.—continued.

No. S.B.	To whom sold.	Species.	Sums.
169	Thomas Whitehead [ab.]	Cash	00 1 09½
27	Mr. Millichamp charged to his servant [Thomas Pethen, Purser's servant. 13, Lawrence Milli- champ, Purser.]	2g. 2q. of rum	00 5 00
335	Mr. Masters [William Masters, cor- poral.]	Four stocks, a cap, and pillow case	00 2 06 <hr/> 14 0 09½

These are to certify that I have received the poundage for my son, Lawrence Millichamp, Purser. Witness my hand this 16th day of June 1753.

WM. MELLECHAMP.¹

¹ The father signed with *e*, the son signed with *i*.

JAMES WATSON TO ADMIRAL
ROBERT DIGBY

[By favour of Colonel the Hon. Everard Digby.]

LeithTender : Leith Roads. 12th June, 1797.

Sir,—On my arrival here yesterday, I learned with sorrow and regret, the death of Governor Elliot.¹ The irreparable loss which Mrs. Digby has sustained by this misfortune will I know be a very great shock to her sensibility, but I trust she will not allow it to affect her more than it ought.

To lay before you the horrid scenes I have witnessed of late, where all order, discipline and subordination has been trampled under foot—scenes which I can never think upon but with abhorrence—is the cause of my troubling you at this time. I therefore presume to send you a narrative, similar in substance to that which I transmitted by this post to H.R. Highness the Duke of Clarence and to the admiralty.

On the 24th ult. I sailed, in consequence of the orders I had received, for the Nore, having 122 new raised men on board. No idea at that time existed of a disturbance being among any of his Majesty's ships there. In approaching Yarmouth Roads on the 29th, where I proposed anchoring, I observed three sail of the line, one frigate and a sloop, with red flags at the fore topmast head,

¹ Andrew Elliot, formerly Lieutenant-Governor of New York : brother of Admiral John Elliot ; uncle of Gilbert Elliot, first Earl of Minto ; and father of Mrs. Digby.

which I conjectured was the signal of insurrection. I judged it most prudent to push forward, and called on board a Russian man-of-war at that time lying there, where I had my suspicions confirmed, but could not find that any thing of a similar nature was going forward at the Nore. Of consequence, I proceeded up [the] Swin, and the day after, at 5 P.M., brought the ship to an anchor above the buoy of the Mouse.

Next morning, I found the fleet in the utmost disorder. I was surrounded by armed vessels, and told if I did not hoist the red flag the tender would be sunk. The contagion spread like fire among the volunteers, who, stimulated by some deserters and other villains then on board, made an attempt to take possession of the vessel, without success. Here I cannot help observing, to the honour of my own ship's company, only 29 in number, officers included, that at this time, when my existence depended on personal exertions, when, guided by the impulse of the moment, I was reduced to the necessity of throwing myself into the midst of the mutineers, they rallied round me; and so superior is the energy of a few men, when conscious of acting in a good cause, that the multitude were brought to subjection in a moment. How I felt afterwards at seeing every possibility of escaping rendered impracticable by the 5 men of war I passed in Yarmouth Roads coming fast up, all in a state of mutiny, is not easy to be described; I had no resource but to bring the ship to, in the midst of the fleet. I was dragged like a culprit before their infernal tribunal, to answer for my conduct, and every one under me summoned to give in his complaint. Fortunately, however, nothing of any kind was alleged against me; and the man himself that guides their whole

proceedings, having been formerly under my directions, was obliged to give his testimony in my favour. This circumstance having afforded me some share of popularity among them, I used my utmost endeavour to turn it to the best advantage; and under pretence of speaking in my own defence, I took occasion to advert to that subject which ought to be nearest the heart of every man that loves his country, and said everything my imagination or abilities could suggest to bring them to a sense of their duty. I was ordered to desist; yet many of their delegates followed me out and declared in the strongest terms their regret at the situation to which they were reduced.

Their president and leader, Richard Parker, to whom I have before alluded, was originally put on board the tender about the beginning of last April as a volunteer, preferring that situation to remaining in prison where he had been confined for debt. He, at that time, told me a plausible story of his misfortunes, which induced me to put him in the mess with my midshipmen; about a month thereafter he was turned over on board a revenue vessel, to be conveyed to the fleet; from which vessel, he unluckily did not succeed in an attempt to drown himself. During my detention at the Nore he spent much of his time with his old messmates in the tender, through whom, and even personally, I worked upon him by every possible means; but whenever the subject was broached, his brain took fire; he seemed intoxicated with a sense of his own consequence, and uttered nothing but incoherent nonsense, which could be mistaken by nobody but a poor deluded seaman. I however succeeded in putting his popularity to some hazard, by causing him to be made completely

drunk, knowing his propensity that way, and the punishment with them attendant on such an offence. In this state of inebriety, he exposed himself in an attempt before the volunteers &c. to display his powers of oratory. How far this had its effect, I know not, because the supernumeraries were taken on board the Sandwich, and I had the good fortune to work out a release for my vessel, which I effected with much difficulty on the evening of the 2nd inst.

I hope you do not think I am trespassing too long upon your patience in this tedious narration, but I have taken this liberty under the idea that every thing relating to this lamentable subject must be interesting. I am happy in being able to say from every thing I have observed, that the great body of the seamen are averse to these proceedings; it is their having cut off all communication between the ships except through the means of the delegates, and the tyranny which they exercise, that keeps them so long together. Their jealousy sufficiently demonstrates their uneasiness; for although the construction of my vessel in point of sailing, filled with riotous new-raised men, and my people in a manner panic struck, precluded the possibility of making an escape, yet every motion was watched, and a great number of mutineers always kept on board, for fear an attempt should be made to carry off their president. I have only now to beg you to be assured of my everlasting gratitude; and Mrs. Watson joins me with her earnest prayers for your health and happiness. I have the honour to be

Sir, your most devoted humble servant


JAMES WATSON.

FROM
THE LETTER BOOKS
OF
SIR CHARLES THOMPSON, BART.
VICE-ADMIRAL

SELECTED AND EDITED BY
ADMIRAL SIR T. STURGES JACKSON, K.C.V.O.

INTRODUCTORY

THE Letter-books from which the following Orders and Letters have been selected, are mainly filled with the usual routine, of a most ephemeral interest. They now belong to Vice-Admiral Francis G. Kirby, to whom they were bequeathed by Sir Charles Thompson's granddaughter, and by whom they have now been very kindly put at the service of the Society.



THE TACTICS OF SIR JOHN JERVIS

The following diagrams appear among the 'orders received' by Vice-Admiral Thompson, and follow two general memoranda by Sir J. Jervis, giving the orders of battle and of sailing of the fleet, and both dated 28th March 1797. The last six diagrams are preceded by explanatory notes by Sir R. Calder, the Captain of the Fleet; one bears the date 19th August 1796, the others are undated.

No note accompanies the first diagram (Plate I). It represents the enemy's line broken by the British fleet who appear to be about to concentrate on the enemy's weather division. The leading British ship is shown as tacking, while the rear ship has either tacked or wore to prevent the enemy's weather division from bearing up and thus effecting a junction with their lee division. The diagram therefore gives a fair representation of the battle of St. Vincent at the moment when Nelson quitted the line, except that the British fleet is shown on the port and the enemy on the starboard tack, while on the 14th February the converse was the case. On the supposition that this diagram was issued six weeks after the battle and without any explanation from the Captain of the Fleet, it seems to show that Jervis not only verbally approved Nelson's conduct in quitting the line, but ordered a similar movement on the part of the rear ships to be made in future under the same circumstances. On the other hand, if this diagram had been known to the admirals and captains before the date of the action, Nelson cannot be said to have taken an entirely independent course. He would merely have done, as No. 13, what should have been done in the first place by No. 17 in the line. The credit due to having acted before the signal was made, would still be his, but there would have been nothing original in his manœuvre. However it is most probable that if the diagram had been of old date it would have been explained by 'R. C.', and that it was added by Jervis after the battle.


(PLATE II)

The French fleet formed with the wind abeam, each ship two cables length asunder, the English fleet formed parallel in like manner at 12 cables or about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to windward, when the signal is made to bear up five points (which will be seven points from the wind) and for each ship to close with and engage her opponent in the enemy's line :—It is to be observed that when the headmost of the enemy's line No 1 is arrived at F. which is nearly one mile from her first position, the headmost ship of the English fleet will then have sailed nearly one mile and half in the same space of time of twenty minutes and will have arrived in her proper station at E, opposite to her opponent in the Enemy's Line.¹

Exd. R. C.

¹ In this diagram, the arrow is shown as against the wind. In all the others, it is with it.

SECRET



(PLATE III)

The fleet formed in a right angle or eight points of the compass, each squadron placed four points on the admiral's quarter, *agreeable to the line of battle*, and each ship steering due north, with the wind SEbE from which position the admiral will be enabled to form an obtuse angle of 135° (or any other angle), his line of battle abreast, the order of retreat, and also the starboard or line of bearing, conformable to the signal 32, as he shall judge proper, in the shortest time possible.

Victory, 19th August 1796.

Signed,

ROBT. CALDER.


(PLATE IV)

When the English fleet have bore down on the enemy half way on the EbS course:—The French fleet if meaning to prolong the attack, may possibly bear up in succession four points and steer SE. The English fleet must then force sail and bear up, also in succession, one point: the English fleet will then be eight and the French six points from the wind. Each ship to bear up instantly her opponent does, by which they will preserve their bow and quarter line, until they arrive at their prescribed distance, when they are to haul up and engage, each her opponent, as before directed.


Signed,

ROBT. CALDER.

SECRET



SECRET



(PLATE V)

When the English fleet have bore down on the enemy half way on the SEbS course, we will suppose the French fleet, in order to prolong the attack, to bear up together and lead large four points, steering SE with the wind on the larboard quarter; the English fleet must then alter their course together, one point to starboard, steering SSE; and force sail. The English fleet will arrive up with them in the same manner, as if they had not bore up from their first position.

Signed,

R. CALDER.


(PLATE VI)

When the English fleet have bore down on the enemy half way on the SEbS Course:—We will suppose the French fleet, in order to procrastinate or frustrate our attack, to wear together, and steer SW with the wind four points on the starboard quarter. The English fleet must then alter their course together to starboard six points, steering SWbS and increase sail. By this manœuvre the English fleet will arrive up with them in the same manner on their starboard quarter in lieu of the larboard, as if they had not wore in their first position, having the wind three points on our quarter.


Signed,

ROBT. CALDER.

SECRET



SECRET



(PLATE VII)

When the English fleet have bore down on the enemy half way on the SEbS course, we will suppose the French fleet to wear in succession, force sail and come to the wind abeam on the other tack. The English fleet must alter their course together ten points to starboard, when the fourth or fifth ship of the enemy's van [is] in the act of wearing and steer WbS, shorten sail and keep the maintopsail shivering, by which manœuvre the rear and centre of the French fleet will be greatly annoyed in wearing and their van unable, from their position, to fire upon our ships, until they have opened astern of their rear ships. The English fleet will be enabled to close up with them in the same manner on their starboard quarter in lieu of the larboard, as if they had not wore, the lines being reversed.

Signed,

ROBT. CALDER.

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO GODOY

Memorial¹ presented by Citizen Perimon, French ambassador, to His Excellency Godoy.

The French Directory, having heard with astonishment and surprise the unexpected issue of the naval engagement between His Catholic Majesty's squadron and the English, I am commanded by an express just come to my hands, immediately to lay before his Majesty the two motives that have contributed to the malign loss, which, with remarkable disgrace to its honour, the Spanish flag has experienced.

I, most excellent Sir, am well persuaded that your Excellency's justice and rectitude will not permit those false reports to reach the King's ears, by which a detestable policy would willingly disguise so shameful an action by confounding virtue and guilt, with a view to impunity. But lest, under this misfortune, the King should incline to receive an impression from the false excuses, which, in such circumstances, the culpable are industrious in framing, I shall not do justice to the confidence with which I am honoured by my nation, if I do not refute in his Majesty's presence as many as attempt to confound truth with falsehood.

Before that moment arrives the executive Directory orders me to give your Excellency this information that you may carry it up to the King.

The arms of Spain have at all times supported

¹ There is no explanation of the manner in which this came into Thompson's hands.

the character of distinguished valour, talent and military skill, which is peculiar to them; only in these late days have they degenerated, causing all Europe to change its system respecting that superiority which Spain was in possession of for many ages.

'Tis the infirmities of Governments to be seized with certain cancers which contaminate and corrupt the State. To save the body politic from perishing, caustics and the knife must extirpate the root of this pernicious weed. The navy, most excellent Sir, has given an evident proof of this irrefragable truth. They, in place of humbling the English pride, which had begun to decline from the high opinion to which she was elevated by her natural haughtiness, has raised her insolence to a height unparalleled.

From this so powerful cause, commerce, the basis of your monarchy, is going to suffer an irrefragable loss; the whole nation detests the vile proceedings of the navy, and weeps with respectful apprehensions for the misfortunes that must ensue.

The squadron would not fight (let us withdraw the veil from treason); they have bartered and compromised the national honour,—so it has been made to appear to the Directory by authentic and sure documents. That Directory, ever watchful for the honour of her allies, cannot see with indifference such turpitude, tending to produce the most pernicious and fatal consequences.

I, most excellent Sir, in the name of the Directory, entreat your Excellency to dispose the mind of the King with inflexible resolution to chastise this enormity, stifling for a moment the dictates of paternal affection.

The undersigned entertains this hope and that your Excellency will be pleased to give an answer to this Memorial, that it may be transmitted to the Directory.¹

Signed,

PERIMON.

THOMPSON TO LORD SPENCER

29th March 1797.

. . . With respect to the dignity of a Baronet, as it is an honour that was never conferred on the second in command of a fleet after a victory obtained over an enemy of equal or superior force, if it can be done with propriety, I beg leave to decline it; being perfectly satisfied with his Majesty's approbation of my conduct, which I consider a sufficient reward for any services a subject can perform.

LORD SPENCER TO THOMPSON

4th May 1797.

. . . I have ventured to assure his Majesty of the sentiments which I am persuaded you are impressed with on the occasion, without expressing any unwillingness on your part to the acceptance of the distinction, concluding that it would not be agreeable to you to remain the only one of the flag officers on that memorable occasion undistinguished by any reward; and in consequence the proper steps will be immediately taken for passing your patent at the same time as that of the other admirals.

¹ A queer translation of a queer document. It is a good example of the manner in which France bullied her wretched ally.

SIR J. JERVIS TO THOMPSON

Ville de Paris :
Saturday evening,
8th July 1797.

Dear Sir,—The Sentence will be carried into execution at nine o'clock tomorrow morning and I am sure Mr. Ward will do his utmost to prepare them for the awful moment.

Yours sincerely,
J. JERVIS.

THOMPSON TO SIR J. JERVIS

Prince George : 8th July 1797.

Sir,—I have received your letter signifying your intention respecting the sentence. Whatever orders you give will certainly be complied with, but I should apprehend that you did not advert to tomorrow being Sunday, a day on which I believe no sentence of death was ever carried into execution.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant

C. THOMPSON.¹

[Thompson arrived at Spithead on the 22nd October when he was ordered to shift his flag to the Formidable

¹ This is presumably the letter which caused Jervis to insist on Thompson's recall (see Nicolas, *Dispatches*, &c. ii. 409n). No other has been found; and though the remonstrance in this can scarcely be called 'censure,' it must be remembered that Jervis, as a former commander-in-chief at the Leeward Islands, was not likely to be ignorant of the quarrel, only two years before, between Thompson and Sir John Laforey (*Barham Papers*, ii. (N.R.S., xxxviii.), 414 seq.).

and place himself under the orders of Lord Bridport. The Channel fleet at that time remained in home waters, a squadron, principally consisting of frigates, keeping watch on the enemy in Brest.

Many letters written and received at this period relate to the distribution of disaffected men among ships ordered on foreign service. There were still smouldering embers of the mutiny. In 1798, disaffection was actively encouraged by the Irish rebels, and the United Irishmen appear to have had representatives on board most of the Channel ships.]

BRIDPORT TO THOMPSON

Royal George : Spithead.

31st March, 1798.

Herewith you will receive the copy of an anonymous letter addressed to me, dated the 20th inst. which I enclose for your information, and I have desired the several captains and commanders under my orders to be particularly watchful of the conduct of their ships' companies with a view to the discovering whether any discontents of the nature pointed out do actually exist, and if so, to explain to them the impropriety of manifesting by their actions, any disaffection, and endeavour to convince them, that their complaints are either groundless, or arise from causes which cannot be prevented. But in case any reasonable ground for complaint should appear, are to assure them in the most explicit terms, that every means will be taken for obtaining redress ;— cautioning them at the same time against the artifices of designing and disaffected persons, who are actively employed in forwarding the views of the enemy, by suggesting subjects of discontent amongst the seamen of his Majesty's fleet, and

endeavouring to shake that loyalty, with which their character has always been so particularly distinguished.

[*Enclosure.*]

My Lord,—I am sorry to say that Jacobins are busy about another mutiny in the fleet. The plea now to be made use of is the detention of prize-money in the hands of the agents of government. Great caution and great watchfulness are necessary. The actors in the dark plot are always at work. Endeavours should be made that no real cause of complaint should exist, and the moment that complaints are set on foot, some intelligent officer should talk to the men and show them that their complaints are groundless, or at least arise from the necessity of the case. Advertisements are daily appearing in the papers, that, I know, are to be the ground-work ; and when the French are ready to come out, our efforts will be palsied by their infernal intrigues among our sailors. Early care may prevent much. No more, from a hearty wellwisher to

Old England.

[In June 1798 Thompson was ordered by the Admiralty to proceed to the coast of Ireland with the *Queen Charlotte*, *Formidable*, *Robert*, *Russell*, *Lancaster*, and *Repulse*, and to 'cruise very diligently for the purpose of intercepting any supplies of men, arms, and ammunition which the enemy may attempt to convey to Ireland for the use of the rebels there, and to use your best endeavours to take or destroy any of the enemy's ships which may appear on the Coast.' Thompson was thus placed under the orders of Vice-Admiral Kingsmill, Commander-in-chief at Cork.]

VICE-ADMIRAL KINGSMILL TO THOMPSON

Polyphemus : 25th June 1798.

Enclosed is extract of a letter sent me from the admiralty, stating that two Delegates from the Committee of United Irishmen are about to take their passage from Hamburg to England in the American ship *Minerva*. Orders have in consequence been issued to the several cruisers, in the event of falling in with the *Minerva*, to detain and bring her into port. You will please give instructions accordingly to the ships under your orders.

[*Enclosure.*]

Hamburg.

The Two O'Finns, brothers, natives of Ireland, Delegates from the United Irishmen and members of the Secret Committee of that body, are now, or will shortly arrive, in this town on their return from Paris and that they are to take their passage to England, probably Ireland, in an American ship called the *Minerva*, Captain Barr, which arrived at the mouth of the Elbe on the 8th of May and has since been lying in the river. The Names of the O'Finns are Edmund and Francis.

[*Description follows.*]

CAPTAIN MANLEY TO THOMPSON

Mars, at Sea. 29th June, 1798.

I am sorry to inform you that there are on board his Majesty's ship under my command, a number of Irish who have shown a spirit of

disaffection, and, we have every reason to think, want to form a party to act hostilely against his Majesty's liege subjects. Although we have taken every precaution to prevent their diabolical designs, I should think it proper, with your approbation, that some of those we suspect of being the most violent, should be got out of the ship.

THOMPSON TO EVAN NEPEAN

Queen Charlotte, at Sea. 6th July 1798.

[*Extract.*]

Enclosed is a letter from Capt. Manley of his Majesty's ship Mars respecting the state of the company of that ship, and I have the pleasure to observe, for their Lordship's information, that her ship's company, since the date of the said letter, brought aft to Captain Manley 20 of the ringleaders and principals concerned, but cannot give any particular proof to convict the parties. They, however, treat them as they deserve and never speak to any of them. They are all Irishmen.

CAPTAIN JONES TO THOMPSON

Defiance, Cawsand Bay.

19th August 1798.

I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of the present state of the disturbance which has taken place on board his Majesty's ship under my command, Sir Alan Gardner having already transmitted to their lordships an account of what had happened at sea. I have now forty-five men in confinement, against many of whom

nothing stronger can be brought than their having wished success to the rebels in Ireland, and said they would have joined them had they had an opportunity; but many more of them have made use of seditious speeches, which I think can be proved. I have a great variety of evidence, but not so full as I could wish. I beg, Sir, you will submit it to their lordships, that before I write for a court-martial on any of those men, that a person conversant in these affairs might examine the evidence I will lay before him, to point out such men as he thinks may be convicted on clearest proof. I am sorry to say, Sir, that there are very few Irishmen in this ship, it is my opinion, who are not in some measure concerned; and, although I had not been able to discover their direct intention, yet I firmly believe, from doubtful expressions overheard, it was to get possession of the ship and carry her either to France or Ireland—I believe the latter—and there to land her guns and stores. You may well conceive how the major part of these people have been misled. They were always told that the rebels were successful in Ireland, and could they procure the assistance of the Irishmen in the fleet they would carry the country before them. I have learnt, that while the ship was last in Cawsand Bay, a man just from Ireland had been on board the *Cæsar* and *Defiance* and had communication with some of the men now in confinement; he gave himself out to be the brother of one of them.

[In consequence of this application the *Defiance* was ordered to Spithead, where a court-martial was held on the men implicated. The court sat from the 8th to the 14th September. Sentence of death was passed on nineteen men, eight of whom were recommended to

mercy, eight to corporal punishment and imprisonment, and one was acquitted.

The following oath was administered to the Irish rebels on board the *Defiance*. 'I swear to be true to the free and united Irishmen who are now fighting our cause against tyrants and oppressors, and to defend their rights to the last drop of my blood, and to keep all secret; and I do agree to carry the ship into Brest the next time she looks out ahead at sea, and to kill every officer and man that shall hinder us, except the master, and to hoist a green ensign with an harp in it, and afterwards to kill or destroy the Protestants.'

The last sentence was hardly calculated to commend itself to the majority of the men !]

THOMPSON TO NEPEAN

Queen Charlotte in Cawsand Bay. 22nd August, 1798.

In consequence of the enclosed information I have ordered James Mahon belonging to the *Mars* into confinement till enquiry is made of the different offices if there is anything against him. From his conduct as set forth, he certainly appears to be a suspicious person. His papers have been examined, but nothing has been found against him. He has not been put in irons, only a sentinel over him to prevent his having any communication with any of the ship's company until I know their Lordships' pleasure. I have reason to believe he goes by his proper name.

There has been an attempt made to raise a party on board the *Queen Charlotte*, and a paper was signed by fifteen which has been destroyed. The ringleader is now in irons, but hitherto we have not been able to find sufficient against him to bring him to a court martial; a number of seditious songs were found in his chest; they were most

of them such nonsense that, although they serve to show the man's intentions, they would not be sufficient to convict him at a court martial, as their lordships will perceive by perusing them, except the one marked a B in the corner, which was written by his messmate James Coleman who was discharged at Spithead into the Puissant for harbour duty. They were all written by himself, he says, for his amusement. Possibly in a day or two we may be able to get to the bottom of the business ; otherwise I shall order him a severe flogging, and warn the ship's company of his intentions. I have no doubt but many on board were concerned with him, but at the same time I believe the well disposed are at least ten to one, and that the ship is fit for any service she may be ordered upon.

[The Admiralty, by letter of 24th August 1798, approved of Thompson's proposal to deal summarily with the case of the man belonging to the Queen Charlotte.]

CAPTAIN HOME TO THOMPSON

Cæsar, Cawsand Bay. 23rd August 1798.

The court martial which has been sitting to try the conspirators of his Majesty's ship under my command being now finished, having sentenced six men to suffer death, two to corporal punishment and twelve remanded to the Cæsar as suspicious persons, I have the honour to enclose you a statement of the ship's company as they now stand in order that you may judge how far it would be prudent or safe to send the ship to sea with her present complement.

Confined on board as suspicious persons and men whom we know have taken the oath of United Irishmen and joined with the condemned conspirators, but against whom we have not sufficient proof to convict . . . 39

Remanded by the court-martial, of the conspirators who were brought to trial, but against whom there was not sufficient proof to convict 11

Acquitted by the court-martial altogether 3

Prisoners on board the Cambridge who were sent in the first instance as suspected persons, but who were not named in the charge 15

The whole number of 68 have taken the Oath 68

Their Lordships have ordered Sir Richard King to take from us 20 of the worst men and give us 20 equal ratings in their room, which will leave on board 48 United Irishmen. 48

This is the present state of suspected persons in the complement of the *Cæsar*, and which I hope you will transmit to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for their information; besides which I have now on board 87 Irish against whom there is no suspicion. I am in hopes their lordships will judge it prudent to remove the whole of the men whom we are next to certain have taken this oath, which would certainly leave the ship in a comfortable state. At the same time I beg to observe that I am ready to take the *Cæsar* to sea with any proportion of those men which their lordships will judge proper to send me, only noticing that the three principal witnesses who have discovered the plot have repeatedly given me warning that it would not be safe to allow the men in question to sail again in the ship,

because they are convinced they will take the first opportunity to put their designs in execution, and they judge that although there are no more United Irishmen known to them, yet their suspicion falls upon the rest of the Irish also.

[The Admiralty ordered the *Cæsar* to remain in port till after the execution of the six condemned men. Further direction would then be given as to the disposal of the others.]

THOMPSON TO LORD BRIDPORT

Queen Charlotte, in Cawsand Bay.

26th August 1798.

[*Extract.*]

The *Cæsar* I expect will sail as soon as I have an answer from the admiralty what are to be done with the men she has on board, which were concerned in the mutiny. Two were punished yesterday, and it was so well laid on that they could not bear more than from 70 to 80 lashes each; six were condemned to death, and many who were thought equally guilty, were acquitted for want of sufficient evidence. There has been a plot going on in the *Queen Charlotte*; the ship's barber who was, I believe, very deep in it, had 199 razors in his chest, with a number of seditious songs, which he had been copying for distribution if possible. However I shall endeavour to avoid a court-martial which must create delay, and there are already too many ships in port—I fear for a length of time.

CAPTAIN J. IRWIN TO THOMPSON

Queen Charlotte, in Cawsand Bay.

30th August 1798.

Enclosed is a letter I have just received from Dennis Kellihar, a seaman belonging to his Majesty's ship under my command, who I have had with me and questioned him on the subject. He says on or about the 12th instant, at sea, Charles O'Neal, a seaman belonging to his Majesty's ship under my command also, called him into his berth and desired him to sign a paper, which he believes was intended to excite a mutiny; for that on looking at it, it appeared of so dangerous a nature that he, Dennis Kellihar, instantly tore it. Charles O'Neal then called him a traitor to his God and Country.

Having been previously informed that Charles O'Neal had papers supposed of a mutinous tendency, in his chest, on examining it, I found several seditious songs and one hundred and ninety nine old razors. I therefore have to request that you will be pleased to apply for a court-martial on the said Charles O'Neal for the crime before mentioned; and also on Patrick Molloy, a seaman belonging to the Queen Charlotte, for being privy and signing the supposed seditious paper above mentioned and for aiding, &c.

[*Enclosure.*]

With my humble duty to your Honour, I hope the perusal of these few lines will not give offence. The cause of my writing is as thus. I do not wish, before the Saviour of Mankind I acknowledge, to exculpate those men by my assertion; nor neither shall I criminate them by a wrong evidence; but

II.

Y

shall disclose, impart, and communicate to the court the whole as I know; likewise I do not wish to have it said my name should be brought in question in taking these men's lives, but wish them a fair trial. There is for instance :

George Chammard, Marine
Daniel Hogan
William Hudson
Hugh Dougherty

Evidence I wish may be taken to Court. I subscribe myself, &c., &c.

DENNIS KELLIHAR.

CAPTAIN SQUIRE TO THOMPSON

Atlas in Cawsand Bay.

14th November 1798.

The Marines named in the Margin [*15 in number*] having shown symptoms of disaffection during the last cruise, and conceiving it not safe to keep them on board H.M. Ship Atlas under my command, I have therefore to request that you will be pleased to issue an order to discharge them to head quarters Plymouth.

ORDERS BY SIR JOHN JERVIS

[The following memoranda and letter from Sir John Jervis (afterwards Earl of St. Vincent), or his Captain of the Fleet, addressed to Lord Garlies (afterwards Admiral and eighth Earl of Galloway), then Captain of the Lively frigate, belong at the present time to one of his granddaughters, Mrs. Athol Chichester, by whose kind permission and by the aid of Mr. Rhuvon Guest, they are now printed from the originals.]

Memorandum by Captain Calder.

When the Fleet is formed in Two Squadrons :—

The ships of the starboard or weather squadron to wear the colours of the commander in the second post, with their pennants at their fore topmast heads; those of the larboard or lee squadron to wear the colours of the commander in the third post, with their pennants at their mizen topmast heads. All other ships, frigates, sloops, &c., are to wear the colours of the commander-in-chief, with their pennants at their main topmast heads.

When the Fleet is formed in THREE squadrons :—

The ships of the van squadron to wear the colours of the commander in the second post, with their pennants at their fore topmast heads; those of the rear squadron, the colours of the

commander in the third post, with their pennants at their mizen topmast heads ; and those of the centre squadron, with all other ships, frigates, sloops, &c., to wear the colours of the commander-in-chief, with their pennants at their main topmast heads.

The van squadron to carry their vanes at their main topmast heads ; the rear, at their fore topmast heads, and the centre and all other ships, frigates, sloops, &c., at their mizen topmast heads.

ROBERT CALDER.

The Right Hon. Lord Viscount Garlies,
Commander of his Majesty's ship *Lively*.

NOTE.—The vanes are to be three breadths or about thirty inches broad, and six feet long. The upper part of the frame to run nearly the whole length of the vane ; the under part to be $\frac{1}{4}$ shorter. The colours to be of equal proportions, whether vertically or horizontally divided.

The vanes of the frigates to be proportionably less.

General Order by Sir John Jervis.

[Signed]

Victory : at Sea. 9th May, 1796.

When the fleet is formed on the larboard line of bearing from each other, although sailing on the starboard tack ; or the contrary, on the starboard line of bearing when sailing on the larboard tack, as per signal 32, the Admirals of squadrons or divisions, as well as the leading ships on each tack, are to preserve their prescribed bearings from the *Victory*, and the leading ships are also to keep their proper bearings from

the admirals of their squadrons and divisions through every alteration of course and change of wind, always holding it in remembrance that the sole object of relative bearings is that, when the fleet tacks, either in line of battle or order of sailing, their respective admirals are to be right ahead or right astern of them according to their place.

Should the wind come forward when in a line of bearing, the leading ship becomes the axis, and all the ships of her squadron or division should make sail and hug the wind in succession as much as possible, the sternmost ships most, in order to obtain their bearing of one, two, three or four points, according to the shift of wind, so that when tacked, as before mentioned, they shall form an exact line ahead of each other when seven points from the wind; and on the contrary, should the wind come aft, the sternmost ship of the squadron or division becomes the axis, and those ahead of her are to make sail and cling to the wind, the headmost ship most, for the like purpose; and as the fleet is ever seven points from the wind, the ships can very easily obtain their stations in either case.

J. JERVIS.

Memo. by Captain Calder.

[Signed]

Victory : at Sea.

3rd November, 1796.

The advanced frigates who are stationed to look out from the fleet are to keep two points on the admiral's bows, day and night, as far distant as they can clearly observe all signals made. In the day they are to be from one to three leagues, and in the night from one to three miles distant

from the admiral, according to the weather. They are to speak all vessels, without signal, by day and night, that they can without parting company ; and if they should obtain any intelligence they may think of consequence, they are to inform the admiral thereof without loss of time. Every morning, at 4 o'clock, they are to make sail ahead of the fleet, so that they may be at the prescribed distance, according to the weather ; and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon they are to shorten sail and drop to the proper distance on the bows of the admiral for the night. All night signals should be avoided as much as possible by these frigates, as they always cause confusion, more or less, in a fleet. Should they discover any superior force to themselves, one of them is to return to the admiral and report to him such discovery ; the other to lay between the enemy and the fleet to watch their motions. And if they should discover the enemy's fleet, the frigate which is left to watch their motions is to give the admiral every information of their movements, agreeable to the general Printed Instructions delivered out by the admiral.

ROBERT CALDER.

The Hon. Viscount Lord Garlies,
His Majesty's Ship *Lively*,
on the Larboard Bow, to look-out.

LORD ST. VINCENT TO LORD GARLIES.¹

[*Holograph*] Ville de Paris : at anchor before Cadiz.
31st July, 1797.

My dear Lord,—Whitshed having told you all about us, I have not wrote to you so oft as your obliging attention to me demanded. We have completed our four Calendar months in this blockade, and except the loss of three or four bower anchors have had very little wear and tear indeed. The people are healthy beyond example, to which the salubrity of the air, plenty of good fresh beef, excellent water, constant supplies of onions, ripe fruit of the best kinds and every sort of vegetable in great [abundance]² from Faro, Tavila, Villa Real and even from Cadiz, have contributed largely ; but I ascribe much to the bedding being aired and shook twice a week and remaining exposed to the air several hours each day, to cleanliness and adherence to a good system of economy established in the whole squadron.

We have had five executions for mutiny and a punishment of 300 lashes given alongside two disorderly line of battle ships and the frigate to which the mutineer belonged. He took it all at one time and exhorted the spectators to mind what they were about, for he had brought it upon himself. Two men have been executed for sodomy, and the whole seven have been proved to be most atrocious villains, who long ago deserved

¹ This letter is an interesting comment on the quaint sentence in Lord St. Vincent's letter to Admiral Markham of 19th May 1806. (*N.R.S.* xxviii. 52 and *n*).

² Conjecture. Word omitted in the MS.

the fate they met with, for their crimes. At present, there is every appearance of content and proper subordination.

I have never withheld a letter, even when the delegates rode triumphant at Spithead. Of course they are delivered with the same dispatch, now that Admiral Richard Parker and his associates are dealt with according to law.

I am very much concerned that any event should have happened to interrupt the repose of the Uxbridge family, the loss of any branch of which is a public one, for the stock is excellent. Pray give my kind love to Lady Jane¹ and tell her I am proud of her having rebuked you for not naming her in a letter to me, and that I shall be happy to assure her in person of the high respect I entertain for her. I am very glad everything relative to your marriage was settled satisfactorily, and no man living more heartily wishes you every possible happiness than

Your very affectionate,
humble Servant,
ST. VINCENT.

You are perfectly right not to think of a ship pending a negotiation for peace.

¹ On 18th April Garlies had married Lady Jane Paget, daughter of the 1st Earl of Uxbridge.

SOME LETTERS OF LORD ST. VINCENT.

I.—LORD ST. VINCENT TO EVAN
NEPEAN.¹

THERE is no reason to doubt the genuineness of these letters, but they have no 'pedigree.' They are in the handwriting of Lord St. Vincent, but there is no knowledge of where they were or of what was happening to them, till their appearance a few years ago in a second-hand book-shop, from which they were rescued by one of our members, Mr. R. Lionel Foster, who has now kindly permitted them to be printed.

[*Holograph*]

Tor Abbey, 9th November, 1800.

My dear Nepean,—It is evident from Lord Nelson's letter to you on his landing, that he is doubtful of the propriety of his conduct. I have no doubt he is pledged to getting Lady H. received at St. James's and everywhere, and that he will get into much *brouillerie* about it. Troubridge says Lord Spencer talks of putting him in a two deck ship. If he does, he must give him a separate command, for he cannot bear confinement to any object; he is a partisan; his ship always in the most dreadful disorder, and never can become an officer fit to be placed where I am.

We have experienced a tremendous gale of wind here, the wind has suddenly flown to the

¹ Secretary of the Admiralty; made a baronet in 1802. Twenty years before, 1780-1, he was purser of the *Foudroyant*, with St. Vincent, then Captain Jervis.

NW, and blows impetuously. I look for the captain of the Naiad every hour ; I rejoice that he is in a frigate, for he would have been too impatient in one of these undisciplined ships of the line.

I hope Mrs. Nepean, the children and you have escaped colds, which I am told are prevalent in London, and I ever am yours most affectionately,

ST. VINCENT.

By doubling the *Courageux*, she may be made something of. I am glad *Rule* has plucked up spirit—Sir J. Henslow appears to have none, as pr. enclosed.

ST. VT.

Enclosing

Sir John Henslow to Lord St. Vincent

Navy Office, 6th November, 1800.

[He is much gratified by the account St. Vincent gives of 'the very good qualities of the *Ville de Paris*,' and by his 'honourable mention' of Sir Thomas Slade, the writer's 'esteemed friend and patron.']

The construction of large ships does not attach to us here ; so far as a subordinate situation would allow, the principle has been combated : that not pleasing, orders, accompanied with principal dimensions for our guidance, has been sent us ; and your lordship is too well acquainted with mankind and the nature of service not to know that sanguine ideas, when once adopted, is not easily to be resisted, particularly with those who consider themselves in authority to be obeyed. There now, however, appears to be an inclination to return to our former size of 74-gun ships, in particular ; and those ships which have lately been contracted for, as well as some to be built in the king's yards, are of dimensions nearly similar

to the Leviathan,* or rather to the old French Courageux, with a little increase of length.

It has been the idea that our 74-gun ships should carry their midship ports six feet above the water. If that idea had been persisted in, they must have been constructed to draw much more water to obtain that advantage; but in obtaining that qualification, one very essential one would have been lost sight of—that of making them safe for our harbours, and the docking them, for the latter of which great expense has already been incurred and the service put to much inconvenience.

[All thoughts of lengthening the Victory have been given up, and in her present repair no alteration will be made except giving her an additional port forward upon the gun deck.]

II.—LORD ST. VINCENT TO EVAN NEPEAN.

[*Holograph*]

Tor Abbey, 17th January, 1801.

My dear Nepean,—You let drop the other day the want of men as in the way of producing a larger fleet; you know as well as I do from an old and intimate acquaintance with the ways of port admirals, and their gang, that on board the Cambridge, Royal William, the flag ships in the Downs and Nore, there will be found seamen enough to give a just proportion to four or five ships of the first class, for you may be assured the two first named, are worse than ever they were. It will be necessary to fit out a number of gun boats; and all the ships of the line should carry launches from 36 to 38 feet long, with breadth in proportion, to face the flotillas of Sweden and Russia, which are numerous.

Nelson was very low when he first came here, the day before yesterday; appeared and acted as if he had done me an injury, and felt apprehension that I was acquainted with it. Poor man! he is devoured with vanity, weakness, and folly; was strung with ribbons, medals, &c. and yet pretended that he wished to avoid the honour and ceremonies he everywhere met with upon the road. He imparted to me, that he expected to serve with Sir Hyde (2nd in command) and return to me, when the campaign was over, unless Lord Keith vacated, in which event he looked to the Mediterranean command with confidence.

Yours most truly,
ST. VINCENT.

Let me have the new Navy Lists when they come out, and ask Mr. Lewis to give an Army List when they are ready to deliver. ST. VT.

Simcoe is the only man you have to command the troops intended for the diversion against Copenhagen. ST. VT.

The enclosed anonymous letter relates to Sir Henry Trollope, and is true. I also send you drafts of the launches I propose for ships of the line.

ST. VT.

Enclosing

Anon. to Lord St. Vincent.

My Lord St. Vincent,—I have just heard that Brixam market is very well supplied with pork fed on board the men of war, and thinking you would like to know it and want some, send for the ship fed and to ask for the baronet's and rear-admiral's; two as fine, I hear, as ever was seen in a market and cheap.

A. TRAVELLER.

OPERATIONS
ON THE
COAST OF EGYPT

1801

INTRODUCTORY

THE following letter from Charles Inglis, commander of the *Petrel*, to Lieutenant Thomas B. Young, was lent to me by the writer's grandson, the late Captain Charles D. Inglis, with permission to copy and print it. He is unfortunately no longer with us, and cannot answer various little questions which suggest themselves, such as: Was Lieutenant Young a relation? How did a letter sent to Young come into his hands? We must then content ourselves with knowing that it did come to them; and that Young was certainly an intimate family friend as will sufficiently appear, though several passages which refer only to family and private matters, have been omitted. The rest is an interesting account of the operations of the fleet under Lord Keith, and of the army on shore, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, so far as they fell under the writer's personal knowledge.

He is perhaps better known in the navy as the first lieutenant of the *Penelope* in her celebrated engagement with the *Guillaume Tell*, for which he had been promoted.

COMDR. INGLIS TO LIEUT. YOUNG

Petrel : Marmorice Bay.

[Holograph]

January 10th, 1801.

My dear Tom,—I received your journal letter, in black and red, on the 4th instant by the fleet. I am much indebted to you for it ; I assure you it is one of the most agreeable ones I have received since I left England. It is a budget of news to me ; consequently a fund of amusement. I received the letter and papers you mention by Courtenay Boyle, but never received any per Niger. As you observe, I have reason to be thankful for not having joined the *Queen Charlotte*¹ and I thank you for endeavouring to do away their fears at Berry about it.

I find you are at the old trade of blockade.² I have likewise, I think, had my share of it, from the blockade of Malta, to that of Alexandria. I have not a doubt, as you say, that the fleet are kept in good order when under so able a commander as Lord St. Vincent. . . . I am sorry to hear you have lost your old friend Captain Bertie ;³ I mean not as a friend, but captain only ; although I doubt not, but in the end it may be of

¹ Burnt off Leghorn, 17th March 1800 ; crew, except 167, perished.

² Young was at this time a lieutenant of the *Windsor Castle*, flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell, off Brest.

³ Albemarle Bertie ; died admiral, bart., and K.C.B., in 1824. He had just left the *Windsor Castle* to take command of the *Malta*.

service to you, particularly as he had recommended you to Lord St. Vincent, with whom I hope you are, ere this time. I would recommend you to stick to the old boy; you know his character; although it may not be immediate promotion to you, it may eventually be so. . . .

I thank you for your congratulations on my promotion and appointment to so fine a sloop. She is certainly not one of the largest, but I am perfectly satisfied, and only want to be alone for a few months on good ground to get something to make the pot boil in the peace. . . . Your fears about the war not lasting long enough for you, I hope may prove without foundation and not last long either. Even if the contrary, I believe I know you sufficiently to judge you are philosopher enough not to mind it. It is what my mind has been made up to for some time, and I now almost wish for peace. I begin to feel myself no child,¹ and there is little satisfaction in spending the prime of life fagging at sea with so little prospect of doing anything; particularly to a married man, if he can help it, which is not exactly my case. But we must hope and look forward to better times. Your wishes that I may make sufficient prize money before the peace to purchase the little estate at Berry, I thank you for; I shall do my best, as it has been my intention for some time past.

January 15th, 1801.—Here we still remain with as little prospect of sailing as the day we arrived. Wooding, watering and exercising the troops, &c. &c. . . .

January 18th.—You must know the Petrel had the post of honour in leading the fleet into

¹ Inglis, at this date, was about 34.

this place. I fell in with them at sea, and offered to lead them into the Gulf of Macri, where I had been before with the Captain Pacha's fleet and Lord Keith ordered me to do so the next morning. During the night a gale of wind came on from the SE, so that we could not fetch. My signal was made to come within hail, and my opinion asked if I could carry them into any other place. I offered to bring them in here, and my signal was made to lead.¹ It was an arduous undertaking, considering circumstances—a gale of wind, hazy weather, a lee shore and dangerous coast. I fortunately pricked for the port within quarter of a mile, although during the day we hardly ever saw half a mile ahead.²

January 25th.—Here we are still, with people growling at the tardiness of our operations, judging that the enemy may be strengthening their situation on the coast.

January 28th.—The Petrel and Port Mahon are just run out of Marmorice, ordered off Alexandria to assist Minotaur, Northumberland, Penelope, and Florestina, in the blockade of that port, and to make our observations for the information of the commander-in-chief. Our station was between Aboukir and Damietta. Nothing new till the 6th, when we took a bombard in Aboukir Bay and thought best to burn her. On the 9th I ran aground in chase, but instead of telling a long story, I will give you the log and a letter I was obliged to write to my commodore on the occasion, having started all my water. Viz.—

At 10 a.m. running down along shore between Aboukir Castle and Rosetta, saw

¹ Cf. Parsons' *Nelsonian Reminiscences*, p. 80.

² This scarcely bears out Parsons' 'we all of us discern it, my lord.'

two sail endeavouring to warp in over Rosetta bar. At noon within gunshot; out pinnace, and fired several broadsides at the vessels and 2 gunboats who had hauled out for their protection; stood into 3 fm. shortened sail and put the helm up, but found, in nearing, the ship took the ground. Hove all aback, out boats and sounded; got the small bower anchor out on the larboard bow and hove a strain. At 2, got the best bower out astern and hove a strain, without success, the enemy keeping up a constant fire on us without effect. Began starting the water; got the shot into the boats, and hove a considerable quantity of ballast overboard to lighten the ship. Quarter past 4, she began to start; $\frac{1}{2}$ past, hove her off and weighed the best bower. Three quarters past, weighed the small bower and run the ship a little off shore. Half past 5, hove to; employed stowing the anchors, securing the guns, clearing the decks, and boats ready for hoisting in. At 8, took the prize in tow. Treble reefed the topsails, and ran the ship off WNW.

I was likewise under the necessity of writing to the senior officer about it, for fear of getting into a scrape about it, as water is scarce and I started all but 50 tons.

Sir,—I beg to acquaint you that at meridian yesterday, when endeavouring to get possession of two vessels warping over the bar of Rosetta, his Majesty's sloop under my command took the ground, and after carrying out two bower anchors &c., and every exertion being made, she could not be hove off without starting almost all her water, getting the shot

into the boats, and throwing a considerable quantity of ballast overboard. I thought fit to do so to prevent the ship being endangered by lying there after dark exposed to the fire of the gun-vessels in Rosetta, as well as the critical situation of the ship should the wind come round to the westward during the night. At sunset she was got off without damage or farther loss than the water and ballast above mentioned. The ship's pinnace got possession of and brought out one of the vessels, laden with wine, oil, soap and sundry other merchandise. I have the honour to be, &c.

February 12th.—I have just received orders to proceed off Alexandria and then keep in as close as circumstances will admit, to apprize the squadron should the *Egyptienne* and *Justice* attempt to escape, which I am sorry to say has got in within these few days past with supplies from Toulon.

February 27th.—You will see by the following letter to my commodore, that I am still unfortunate, the loss of a good master, a good boat, and nine of the very best men in the ship.

Sir,—Having fallen in with the *Penelope* on the evening of the 23rd inst. off Alexandria, I was desired by Captain Blackwood on the 24th, to receive on board the *Petrel*, Major McHarris, and Major Fletcher, both engineers, and then stand in shore with them to reconnoitre the coast, while he proceeded to join you in the NW quarter. Having executed that service on the 25th (so far as from Marabout to the castle of Aboukir), stood to the eastward and ran into Aboukir Bay, but not being able

(for want of water) to get the ship close enough for them to make their observations, I anchored there for the night, and at their request, sent the ship's pinnace with them this morning, under command of Mr. Thomson, master of the *Petrel*, to give assistance in making observations on the coast and sounding near the entrance of Lake Madieh, and with strict injunctions not to endanger the boat by approaching too near the coast.

About 7 o'clock the report of a gun was heard, and soon after saw a gun-boat in pursuit, firing her bow-guns and musketry at the pinnace, at that time apparently not more than a cable's length ahead of her. In a few minutes, had the mortification to see the pinnace brought to, taken possession of by the gun-boat and towed in shore. I weighed and made sail, but not with the least prospect of being able to render assistance or recapture the boat, she being in the wind's eye of us, in shoal water, and blowing strong. The perseverance of the boat in endeavouring to effect her escape so close under the bow guns and volleys of musketry from the gun-boat, which outsailed her, gives me reason to fear that some of the officers and boat's crew must have suffered before she surrendered.

*February 29th.*¹—I have received a note which was sent out by a truce from Alexandria this day, by which I am sorry to find that Major McHarris was killed before the surrender of the pinnace and all the others are safe but made prisoners. The fleet are reported to be in sight this moment—good-evening.

¹ So in MS.; probably 28th is meant.

March 1st.—On my joining, I was ordered to take the Cruelle cutter under my orders, to run in and place her on the shoal in Aboukir Bay, and to stand off and on, for the guidance of the fleet into the bay this morning, where they are all now safe at anchor ; but blows too strong to land or have any communication. This morning a Lieutenant Francis Stanfell joined as first lieutenant of the Petrel. I suppose you must know him, as I understand his family lived sometime in Gosport. He left your friend Larcom in the Hind lately.—I brought Milner from the Penelope, with me. I have rated him mate of the Petrel, and will do what I can for him when he has served his time ; but between you and I, I am not ambitious of having him as a lieutenant in the Petrel. He is a good young man, but, if I judge right, he never will make either a seaman or an officer ; at any rate, not a bright one.

March 5th.—The gale still continues to blow so hard as to prevent our commencing operations ; nothing but signals of distress all over the bay to-day from the transports ; such as parting cables, striking on shoals &c—but as yet none has gone on shore. It is now evening, and I think the sun sets better than we have seen it for some time past. The Romulus, this day arrived from Malta, brings intelligence of French and Spanish squadron being in the Mediterranean ; if true, you must have let them get out. Lord Keith likewise informs me to-day that we are at war with the Danes and Swedes. I think we must have peace now. We cannot fight the world.

March 8th, evening.—The weather is more settled—The Petrel being one of the ships appointed to cover the landing this day, gave me an opportunity of being eye-witness to the gallant conduct

of a portion of our army to-day. At daylight this morning, 5000 troops were assembled round us small craft in shore, ready to start when all was collected. At 8, the signal was made for the boats to push for the shore, and instantly the French opened a galling fire from 7 field pieces and 2 howitzers, which they had been preparing for our reception for some days past. As the boats approached the shore, grape and canister shot were flying at no allowance. But nothing could intimidate them, many were drowned by boats being sunk, and numbers were shot getting out of the boats and on the beach while forming. They indeed behaved admirably. It is hard to particularise when all behaved well, but the steady and intrepid conduct of the ever well-behaved 42nd regiment was remarkable. The Scotchmen, when they landed, finding it soft sand, threw away their shoes and, without firing, marched up with charged bayonets to the enemy's left wing, which gave way; but their cavalry returned and charged before our troops were regularly formed, which caused a little slaughter and confusion. But they were repulsed the first time, and returned to the charge a second and third time, with as little success. In fact, the result of the day's business is, that we have effected a landing, and obliged the enemy to retreat some miles.

8 o'clock evening.—I was obliged to weigh in the afternoon and run off to the fleet with a number of wounded, and this moment returned to the anchorage with 200 troops of the second landing.

March 9th, evening.—It has been blowing so fresh as not to allow the remainder of the troops to land to-day. I ventured on shore and walked

with Captain Cochrane¹ to our advanced posts about five miles from the beach, where I saw Sir Ralph Abercromby, &c., &c. I am sorry to find that we have sustained such loss; he says that the returns of killed, wounded and missing amount to 630—principally the 42nd, Coldstream Guards, and Corsican Rangers. I walked over the spot where the battle was fought yesterday, a shocking sight, but there are parties of seamen employed to-day on shore burying the dead.

March 10th.—The troops have all got on shore to-day and the Petrel ordered, under the command of Penelope, to cruise before Alexandria.

11th.—This morning I joined the Penelope, went on board to breakfast. During breakfast a strange sail in sight and Captain Blackwood sent the Petrel after her. The stranger got within view of Petrel, and after standing a few guns, ran on shore. The first lieutenant very imprudently sent boats in to endeavour to get her off or destroy her, where there was such a surf that both boats were beached and stove, and could not get the people off again.

March 13th.—Tried to get the people off yesterday, but could not do it. To-day, I had a large raft made and set a boat's sail on it; veered it onshore and by that means have got them all on board—but the ship now entirely without a boat. The vessel run on shore proves a Greek, laden with supplies for the enemy. I do not believe she will lay there 12 hours longer without being destroyed by the surf, and so provide plunder for the Arabs, whom I see are collecting about her. A lucky thing for the people [that] they

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane. Here, in charge of the landing.

have got off, for by this time they would have been a head shorter.

March 14th.—Our troops in advancing were seriously opposed, which brought on a general action; great loss on both sides. Our army suffer principally by the advantage of their enemies' flying artillery, which they certainly manage well—with 8 horses or mules to each gun; the 90th and 42nd regts. suffered most in the action. I understand the 90th lost upwards of 200 men.

March 21st.—Still off Alexandria with the Flora, Penelope, Florestina, Pique, Cynthia, Victorieuse and Malta schooner; have orders today to be on the alert, as 6000 troops under convoy of two frigates were seen on the 20th of last month off Corsica, supposed to be bound for Egypt.

March 23rd.—On the 21st about an hour before daylight, the French army, consisting of about 9000 men forced our outposts and got into the English camp almost before it was known; consequently another general action took place, which lasted till near 11 o'clock. I understand it was the most determined and obstinate battle that has been known during the war. The enemy were obliged to retreat, but I am sorry to say, not without great loss on our side, and, what is most to be regretted, Sir Ralph Abercromby, the commander-in-chief, among the number. He received a ball in the hip, and continued 2 hours after on his horse, till the horse was killed and they both fell. He afterwards was found grappling with a Frenchman who was attempting to take his sword from him, when one of the 42nd came up and bayoneted the Frenchman. Sir Ralph regained his sword and returned again to his

post. After the action he was removed on board the *Foudroyant*; but what with loss of blood, fatigue, and the irritation of the ball being lodged in his hip (and that perhaps a copper or brass one, as the French have many) a mortification took place and he died on the 28th. I may venture to say there never was a man more beloved and now regretted than he is; his loss is much felt as an experienced general as well as an amiable man. In fact, the whole expedition, from the highest to the lowest, adored him.

March 26th.—I am told that the 42nd regiment, in consequence of their being so much irritated with the enemy (for having shot one of their people who was in the act of burying a Frenchman the day before the action, and several other wanton acts of the enemy, as well as having all their officers but one killed and wounded), passed the word along the line that they intended neither to give or receive quarter, which I understood they rigidly attended to. I am informed that at one period of the battle, our line were without ammunition having fired it all away, 60 rounds. When the French cavalry charged on our right wing, the front rank received them on their bayonets, and the second and third literally kept them off and knocked a number of them off their horses by pelting them with stones. Our loss since the first day of landing is believed to be about 1900 men killed and wounded; but I am happy to hear that a number of those that were wounded on landing have already returned to the army, and that the troops continue to be healthy. The loss of the enemy (as acknowledged by the prisoners taken in the last battle) amounts, in the whole, to near 4000. These conquerors of Italy think as we do,

that in all their campaigns they never saw such desperate fighting.

March 27th.—As it is reported that a reinforcement of French troops expected to join the Army of the East (as they term themselves), Sir Richard Bickerton with six sail of the line arrived here this morning to blockade Alexandria, viz.: Swiftsure, Ajax, Northumberland, Kent, Minotaur and Tigre, and you may naturally suppose that we small craft are constantly poking in shore among the rocks; so that I've plenty to do, and more so, as I've no master.

March 30th.—I have received this day, two boxes, which I understand arrived in Aboukir Bay by the *Déterminée*, one containing two coats and the other the sword which I troubled you to purchase for me; as also a letter in one of them, dated 25 December, from Mrs. Inglis, by which I find that you are all well at home and that you are in London, I suppose doing the needful.

The last promotion of admirals, I suppose has occasioned a number of changes in the Channel fleet, which I hope you have benefited by with respect to a ship, if not already in the *Ville de Paris* with the commander-in-chief. It is reported here that Lord Nelson is coming out with the command in the Mediterranean; with what truth I cannot say, but think it very probable, as I am told our present commander-in-chief has publicly spoken of his intentions in resigning the command. For my part, I have as little to expect from one as the other; but if I was obliged to give a voice on the occasion, I should say: Lord Nelson.

April 5th.—We are just now returning to our station having been drove off by a heavy gale at NW, the prevailing wind here; it is believed to blow 10 months in the year from that quarter.

I heard on the 2nd that there probably would be an opportunity of sending letters to England in the course of a few days. I understand the *Flora* is going, I suppose with the remains of Sir Ralph, &c. &c. I have missed one opportunity, by the *Louisa* brig having sailed 10 days since, but it was not my fault, for by cruising here I knew nothing of it for some days after she sailed.

April 6th.—I have just spoke the *Pearl* who has come up with intelligence that the French squadron may be daily expected. I have spoke the admiral this evening and informed him of it, and he has made the night signal that the enemy are supposed to be near.

7th.—The saying is made good ‘ After a storm comes a calm ’ ; we have been becalmed all this morning. Lord Keith has been in sight to the northward all day, coming to join I suppose in consequence of the intelligence. He has made the signal that an opportunity will offer for sending letters home, which makes me conclude this, there being nothing farther of consequence to acquaint you with. This news puts us commanders in spirits, in hopes that a successful action may make some post vacancies. I need not tell you how glad I shall be to hear from you at all times, and believe me, dear Tom, to remain,

Yours most truly,

CHAS. INGLIS.

April 8th.—We were not able to join Lord Keith last night for want of wind, but this morning have and find the *Flora* is going for England. I beg you to acquaint Mrs. Inglis of your receiving this, for fear the one I wrote to her just now may not reach.

C. I.

THE MEMOIRS
OF
GEORGE PRINGLE, Esq.

CAPTAIN, ROYAL NAVY

1795-1809

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF

INTRODUCTORY

FOR these Memoirs of the early service of Captain George Pringle, the Society is indebted to his grandnephew, Dr. G. L. Kerr Pringle of Harrogate, who has most kindly put not only a type-written copy but the autograph MS. at the disposal of the Secretary. Its title explains its meaning; it is Pringle's own narrative of his service as a lieutenant or young commander during the stirring years 1801-1808, and may be accepted as perfectly honest. Some part of it, referring to the time when Pringle was first lieutenant of the *Renard* and *Clorinde* (*post*, pp. 357-64) overlaps the story set out in the letters of and relating to the Hon. W. Cathcart, which we had the privilege of printing in the *Miscellany*, i. 263 *et seq.*, and incidentally corrects some trivial errors of date which Cathcart, with youthful carelessness, was guilty of. The necessity of comparing these dates with the official and contemporary record suggested a further examination into the exactitude of some of the incidents described by Pringle, as the result of which it may be said that the Memoirs are throughout in substantial agreement with the ships' logs, though giving fuller details, and sometimes reflections or minutæ, which, when devoid of naval or historical value, it has seemed better to omit or abstract. Otherwise the Memoirs are printed *verbatim* from the autograph, with no attempt to smooth the rugged inelegancies of an unpractised writer.

George Pringle, born in Edinburgh on the 10th December 1778,¹ was the second son of Dunbar Pringle, merchant in Edinburgh, a cadet—apparently—of the Pringles of Torsonce. This family was connected by marriage with the Pringles of Stitchell, and it is just

¹ The MS. says 1779; the official record—'date of the baptismal certificate, 2 Jan. 1779' practically says 1778; and, from sundry family notes, Dr. Kerr Pringle is of opinion that this last is correct.

possible—though there is no corroborative evidence—that, in the days of grey-haired midshipmen, George Pringle owed his promotion to the rank of lieutenant at the age of 23, in some measure to the influence of Admiral Thomas Pringle (*Barham Papers*, i. 2*n.*).

Dunbar Pringle, with one daughter, had five sons, of whom the eldest, Robert, became a merchant in Leith, with continental interests which often called him abroad. He happened to be in France at the time of the declaration of war in 1803, and was, with several hundred other British subjects, detained and imprisoned at Verdun, whence, with better luck than the bulk of his fellow prisoners, he managed to escape; he got to the coast and on board an American ship which took him across the Atlantic; and so eventually he reached England, after stopping for a while at Jamaica in June 1804, to nurse his brother George through a bad attack of yellow fever (*post*, p. 363). He died, without issue, in 1840. Dunbar, the 3rd son, died at the age of 22, a midshipman in the *Clorinde* (*post*, p. *ibid.*). The 4th, James, entered the army; served as a subaltern in Spain, in America, and in the occupation of Paris; retired on half pay after the peace, and settled in Canada, where he died in 1860, leaving issue. The youngest, John, was a Writer to the Signet in Edinburgh, but—on his appointment in 1821 as sheriff-substitute of Banffshire—settled in Banff, and died there in 1840, leaving issue, three daughters and three sons. Of these last, one was a banker; another is the present General George Pringle; the eldest, John Pringle, M.D.—the father of Dr. G. L. Kerr Pringle—was in the medical service of the E.I.C., retired in 1864 with the rank of Deputy Inspector General, settled in Edinburgh, and died, at the age of 80, in 1898.

George, the 2nd son, 'the subject of these memoirs,' as he generally styles himself, being left an orphan when only eleven years old, was placed in a boarding-school and a few years later in business in Edinburgh; but not liking this, at the comparatively ripe age of sixteen, he left it and 'entered the naval service of his country.' What he did in it, he has told himself.

CAPTAIN PRINGLE'S MEMOIRS.

[On 6th June 1795, George Pringle entered on board the *Vengeance*, gunboat, belonging to the Portsmouth Station, and commanded by Lieutenant Robert Wilson ; but whether he had any previous acquaintance with or invitation from Mr. Wilson is not stated. In her he was borne as landsman, gunner's mate and midshipman till the 10th February 1796, when he was moved to the *Artois*, Captain Sir Edmund Nagle, one of the distinguished frigate squadron under Sir John B. Warren. In her, in the ratings of able seaman and of midshipman, he served, till her wreck on the 31st July 1797 caused him to be appointed to the *Suffisante* brig, employed on the north coast of France. In her, as midshipman and master's mate, he remained for nearly four years, doing the duty, as he says, of lieutenant and sometimes of acting master, and conducted into port a great number of the sloop's prizes.]

After having served his time [George Pringle] passed his examination for a lieutenant at the Navy Office in August 1801, and on the 17th November was appointed Lieutenant to the *Renard*, a sloop under the command of Captain Spicer,¹ at that time lying in Plymouth Sound.

On the 18th December the *Renard* was sent

¹ Peter Spicer, posted 29th April, 1802 ; died 1830, aged 64. See Marshall, iv. 577.

to Bantry Bay with dispatches to the fleet at that time lying in Bearhaven. In crossing to Plymouth from this place on the 30th December 1801, the *Renard* was in great danger of being shipwrecked on the Scilly Islands in a hard gale of wind. The indraft of St. George's Channel had carried her 24 miles to the northward of her reckoning in two days.¹ Some people said they saw the breakers; and by the bearings of the light, they could not be far from them.

[The gale was fierce from WNW; it was flood tide and 'the sea running so high from the westward that it washed the cutter off the booms and the jolly-boat from the stern.' The danger was extreme, when 'providentially,' the gale abated and changed to East.² The ship stood to the South and so escaped.]

In the morning the wind coming more northerly, they stood up Channel and next day arrived at Plymouth.

The *Renard* was shortly afterwards employed between Spithead and Plymouth, until the 20th May 1802, when she sailed with sealed orders, under the command of Captain Aldham³ and having on board, as passengers, Lieutenants Hunt, Heron, Foster, and Green. When the sealed orders were opened the course was directed to Barbados, where they arrived on the 1st July and in an hour's time sailed for Martinique. Here

¹ It must have done so, very considerably. The log has 29th Noon—St. Agnes, E, 30 miles (i.e. by dead reckoning). 30th. (29th civil time), 9^h 15^m; p.m.—St. Agnes Light SE $\frac{1}{2}$ E, 2 or 3 leagues, seen from the foreyard. And they had been standing to the southward all the time.

² 9 p.m., wind WNW; 10, do. and variable; 11, do; 12, do. and E; 1, do.; 2, EbN.

³ George Aldham, posted 1805; died 1833, aged 61. See Marshall, iv. 911.

they joined company with the Excellent and the Leeward Island squadron. At this time, in consequence of the Peace of Amiens, preparations were making to evacuate the island, and the Renard was employed in taking in stores and cordage for Antigua. Happily she was not large and could take only a small quantity on the deck occupied by the crew, or the evil might have been greater. As it was, before she got quit of them at Antigua, one half of the ship's company were attacked with fever, and twenty were sent to the hospital there. Luckily proper remedies were applied on the very first symptoms of the fever, and before our leaving English Harbour, they were in a convalescent state and returned to the ship. Shortly after this the Renard was dispatched to England, when after a passage of [34]¹ days she arrived at Plymouth on the 12th September,² 1802.

The Renard was paid off all standing³ and recommissioned again on the peace establishment. Both the lieutenants were appointed to her again, but Mr. Southesk wishing to go on half-pay, Captain Aldham applied for a junior lieutenant, which caused Mr. Pringle to [be] first or senior lieutenant. When the Hon. Captain William Cathcart took the command on the 4th October, the ship at this time had just got in her lower masts,³ and the extreme difficulty of getting

¹ By the log; blank in the MS.

² In this Pringle is not quite accurate. The Renard anchored in Plymouth Sound at 8 p.m. on the 2nd September; on the 6th she went into Stonehouse Pool and discharged her powder; on the 7th went into Hamoaze; on the afternoon of the 15th she went alongside the sheer-hulk, got out her foremast and bowsprit, and warped back to her moorings. On the afternoon of the 16th she was paid off.

³ On the 22nd September she had again gone alongside the sheer-hulk and got her mainmast out.

seamen to fit the ship was very much felt ; however, with a sergeant's party of marines and an old man or two, the ship was soon got ready and, on receiving orders, sailed to Waterford on the 19th¹ November to complete her own crew and raise men for the fleet. The Renard scarcely had left Plymouth before the wind increased to a gale¹ and shortly came to the southward and forced them to go into Falmouth.¹

Here they staid until the wind abated, and on the 25th¹ sailed for Waterford again ; but going to the southward of Scilly, the wind came to the NNW, and after some days [they] made Cape Clear. Here again the wind came to the west and freshened to a very hard gale, and very unexpectedly they made the Hook lights. This gale blew from SW so that they had a lee shore and a flood tide and were indeed in a perilous situation. It was about 11 o'clock at night and a pilot could not be got then, and no one belonging to the ship had ever been on the coast before. The hands were called on deck ;² the night was dark and dismal, and there was little time for consultation. The word was passed to ask if any person on board had been in Waterford, and it fortunately happened that there was a supernumerary, a passenger on board, who belonged to the place but had left it when he was a boy. After some questions had been put to him by the subject of this memoir as to his knowledge of the place, he agreed to run us into Craven Bay, where we might anchor if we did not see the lights on Duncannon Fort. We then bore away, all hands being on deck on the look out ; fortunately we

¹ These dates, the gale, and the going into Falmouth are exactly corroborated by the log.

² Cf. *Miscellany*, i. 315.

got sight of Craven Head and shortly afterwards of the lights on the fort. The most difficult part was yet to come ; for on the bar was only 12 feet water, there was a heavy sea on, and the Renard drew 11 ft. 6 in. ; it was, however, half flood and if the ship could keep in the passage there was water enough. They were fortunate enough to do this and anchored inside at 12 o'clock at night of the 2nd December.

Any person acquainted with the dangers of Tramore Bay and the Wexford coast will easily perceive that this was a most providential escape. But it ought to be remarked that it appears most probable that they got more directly into this situation by not making proper allowance for the flood tide and the indraught of St. George's Channel.

The next day the Renard went up the river through the King's Channel and moored before the Town of Waterford, and after completing her complement¹ and raising several men for the fleet—the preparations for war having commenced—they, on 28th March, sailed for Plymouth, where they arrived on the 30th with a number of volunteers and imprest men. A great part of her crew was then discharged to man the ships fitting out for sea, but on the 2nd April her crew were all sent on board again, with orders to victual, get a cable, anchor and stores on board, and be ready to sail by the next day's post. To mend the matter, Sabbath day was on the 3rd and it blew a gale of wind from the southward. By working night and day the vessel was got ready ; but as they were obliged to work out upon the ebb, before the boats came on board with the greater part of the running rigging

¹ Cf. *Miscellany*, i. 320.

they had to get under way, so that they beat out of the Sound towing all the boats with part of the running rigging, stores and coals, etc., for the voyage. In this way they sailed with sealed orders to 50 leagues SW of the Lizard. The anxiety to know where they were going to was not little. They had parcels addressed to nearly all parts of the British Dominions. However, they got to their station and found they were bound to Barbados, where without any particular occurrence, except losing their main and mizen top-masts, they arrived on the 7th May 1803.

At Barbados they found the *Centaur*, Commodore Hood,¹ and the *Argo*, from the coast of Africa, with the *Busy* and *Hornet* sloops. The next day they sailed again in company with the *Centaur* and *Argo*. It was expected that they had brought out orders to commence hostilities, but this did not appear to be the case, for the next day they boarded several French vessels having troops on board, bound to Martinique, which were suffered to pass on their voyage. On the 16th May they arrived again at Barbados, and on the 18th sailed and joined the squadron which were cruising to windward of Martinique. On the 22nd they parted company with the squadron and sailed for England; and after boarding many valuable French West India ships, which they suffered to proceed, being ignorant of the commencement of hostilities, they arrived at Plymouth on the 4th July. On the 15th, they sailed on a cruise, and on the 15th August, in the night time, they escaped being lost on the *Roches Douvres* [where they must have struck, had the ship missed stays, which—providentially—she did not do].

¹ Afterwards Sir Samuel Hood; died vice-admiral and commander-in-chief in the East Indies, 1814.

The *Renard* continued cruising between Isle de Bas, Guernsey and the Start, until the 26th September, when she arrived at Plymouth and refitted. She was then ordered to Spithead, fitted for foreign service, and the 1st January 1804 sailed from Spithead with the West India convoy, under the command of Rear Admiral Dacres in the *Courageux*. The first four or five days the wind continued fair, but afterwards they had a series of severe gales from the West and WSW, and on the 27th January the *Renard* parted company with the admiral and a great many of the convoy. Before this period, however, the *Courageux* had suffered very much by the severe weather; she had carried away several tillers, sprung her fore-yard and fore-mast, and latterly hove part of her guns overboard; and the night before parting company she made the signal for the *Renard* to stay by her. At this time it was blowing a strong gale and [we] were lying-to under storm sails. It is supposed the admiral had wore in the night; the *Renard* wore at daylight with a division of the convoy, and they were not so fortunate as to join again. This happened when Cape Finisterre bore SE, distant 150 miles. On the 30th January the wind became more favourable, and they were enabled to get to the southward of Cape Finisterre on the 1st February; on the 10th they saw Madeira SSE. But this very protracted voyage was still further protracted by light airs and calms and westerly winds within the tropics, until the 19th March when they arrived at Carlisle Bay, Barbados.

At this place, two days after their arrival, they were rather surprised to see Admiral Dacres arrive, not in the *Courageux* but in the *Franchise* ¹

¹ Pringle has written this 'Française': but not only did

frigate, with the remainder of the convoy. It appears that they had wore when they parted company and put back to Plymouth; remained there a fortnight; shifted his flag into the Franchise and sailed again, and after a short passage arrived two days after the ships that had been 79 days at sea. After the convoy had got a supply of water, on the 24th March they sailed from Barbados to Jamaica. On the 26th, the Franchise captured a small French privateer schooner one day from Martinique; this prize was afterwards destroyed. On the 3rd April the admiral parted company on his way to Kingston, and the Renard was ordered to take the ships bound for the north-side of Jamaica under her charge and on the 9th she arrived at Port Royal.

Soon after they arrived here, Captain William Cathcart was promoted to the command of the Clorinde, a fine French frigate captured at San Domingo; and afterwards, at the request of Captain Cathcart, the subject of these memoirs was appointed to be first lieutenant,¹ after a handsome compliment from Sir John T. Duckworth on the occasion. Every exertion was made to get the Clorinde ready for sea, but the climate soon rendered every exertion unavailing; the yellow fever broke out in the Clorinde and many other vessels. Several officers in the Renard died, among whom was the captain that succeeded Captain Cathcart in the command.² The Clorinde lost one third of her officers and men and she was at one time so totally deserted that the flag ship was obliged to send a petty officer to take charge of

Dacres arrive out in the Franchise, but there was no Française in our navy.

¹ 16th April 1804.

² Cf. *Miscellany*, i. 330.

her, all the officers being dead or on shore at sick quarters. Mr. Pringle here had to regret the loss of relations and friends. His brother Dunbar, who was a midshipman with him in the *Renard* and *Clorinde* departed this life; and he had just performed the last office that one mortal can do for another in this transitory life when he caught the fever. Instant and powerful medicines were administered; and by these means and the kind and affectionate attentions of his brother Robert (who had arrived only a few days before from France and America) [his life was saved].

While he was lying on his sick bed, his friend, the Hon. Captain William Cathcart departed this life. . . . During this time the two junior lieutenants left this transitory life. When Mr. Pringle returned to the ship he was not yet able to walk alone; but his new captain, McDonald, son of the lord chief baron of England, paid him every attention that he could desire, and after seven or eight days he was able to take the day duty upon himself. On the 12th June 1804, the *Clorinde* sailed for England and endeavoured to go through the Windward passage; but after three days' attempt they abandoned the intention and bore away to go through the Gulf. On the 17th June, when off the Isle of Pines on the coast of Cuba, they captured a small felucca privateer, which they disarmed and disabled in her sails, and gave to the crew as they had a great number of French prisoners on board already. On the 28th June, at that time running out of the Gulf of Florida, Captain McDonald departed this life, to the great regret of all who knew him. He was a promising young man of about 20 years of age. He died of fever after three days' illness. In the evening he was committed to the deep

from the cabin window and minute guns were discharged.

The command now fell upon the subject of these pages ; his feelings may be easier felt than described. The number of messmates and shipmates, among which was a brother and no less than three captains, that he had lost, all in the short space of two months and eight days, was sufficient, indeed, to cause an excess of sorrow of heart ; and nothing but the obligations he owed to his country and the service could have enabled him to undergo the charge of conducting a sinking ship across the Atlantic ; so that the more the danger, the more his feelings was overcome by a sense of duty.

The *Clorinde* had before been leaky, but shortly after this event happened, it increased to an alarming degree. The prisoners were put upon full allowance and divided into divisions, so that all the pumps might be occupied night and day ; but even this was insufficient to prevent the leak gaining on them, and at one time during the night there was upwards of six feet of water in the hold. This, however, was got under by renewed exertion at the pumps. The night had been squally, and as in the night time a small proportion of the prisoners could only be entrusted upon deck, they were unable to the task, as the watch of the crew had been occasionally called from the pumps to attend the sails. Luckily the weather had never been worse than a fresh gale, for the ship was altogether in a crippled state. She had been a long time in the West Indies ; her topsides were very open and her rudder had only met with a partial repair after being knocked off at S. Domingo.

The tiller had been fitted into the rudder head

with a broad shoulder, so that when it became loose in the rudder head, there was no way of wedging it in or driving it home, for the shoulders. We soon found the effect of this French mode of equipment ; for upon the very first heavy swell on the beam we encountered, our tiller was broke close by the rudder head. Here again there was no iron hoop round it to hook a tackle on to get it out, so that they had the greatest difficulty in getting the stump out. The tiller was at length repaired, and to prevent the accident happening again the subject of these pages had it secured by hatchbars round the rudder head with woodings and wedges, which effectually prevented any accidents again, and was much approved by the master builder at Plymouth on arrival.

The defect of the rudder had only been remedied two or three days when the lower caps were found rotten, and steps were taken by lashings to prevent any serious accidents to the topmasts should the caps give way altogether ; and as they were more than half way across the Atlantic, hopes were entertained that the danger was not great as the leak had not increased lately, and the weather generally speaking continued moderate and the wind fair. But when they were enjoying the sanguine hope of soon seeing their native land once again, they were once more placed on the brink of destruction. The leak increased so suddenly that the pumps could no longer keep the ship free of water ; no means was left untried, but all was unavailing. Diligent search was made for the place of the leak, but [in] a vessel so crazy there was little chance of meeting with it. The casks were however removed from the side in the hold (for she had no orlop deck) and at length a very considerable stream of water

was found to issue in upon them under the larboard chess-tree. At this time the weather was moderate and they were on the starboard tack ; the ship was instantly wore and put on the larboard tack ; the larboard guns were run in and the ship was heeled to starboard as much as it could safely be done. When these operations were finished, it was found that the leak was only occasionally in the water. It was a butt end of one of the planks that had started, and which after considerable exertion was secured, so as to enable them to continue their course homewards without any additional labour at the pumps. The weather continued moderate and the wind fair during the remainder of the passage—[providentially].

On the 19th July 1804 they anchored in Plymouth Sound. The ship was moored with her bower anchors, and, in swinging to the tide during the night, the cable caught some part of the keel nearly amidships ; and although every method was taken to clear it, yet it was evening before it was accomplished and the ship in safety. During the time that this occurred the ship was put in quarantine (although several passengers had already landed), and a communication was sent to the admiral to that effect and stating the dangerous situation of the ship, having no spare anchor or cable. A lighter was sent from the dockyard with an anchor and cable to their assistance. A few days afterwards the *Clorinde* was ordered up Hamoaze and prepared to be paid off. On the 21st August her pennant was hauled down.

Mr. Pringle being now on half pay, he went to London and waited on Sir John Colpoys, then in the admiralty, who received him with great friendship, although quite unacquainted with him except

by letters on the subject of the qualities and state of the *Clorinde*. Mr. Pringle's object was to move the admiralty that they would promote him to the rank of commander, but at this time they would not comply with his wishes, but the first lord of the admiralty promised to bear him in mind and not forget him. He, however, was promised any ship, station, or captain he wished to sail with. At present, however, his object [was] to proceed to Scotland and renew his strength which had received so great an attack of debility from the yellow fever and the arduous duty which he was just relieved from.

After getting his accounts in the way of passing at the Navy Office, he set off for Scotland and arrived there on the 3rd October, and he remained there till the 22nd November. On the 24th he was appointed first lieutenant of the *Jason* frigate just launched at Woolwich, Captain William Champain.¹ After fitting out at Woolwich and getting the ordnance stores on board at Gravesend, the *Jason* sailed from the Nore on the 22nd February 1805 to the Cove of Cork. There the *Jason* remained until the 23rd March, collecting a convoy for the West Indies, when she sailed with them for that place. During this time nothing but the common routine duty happened; on the 7th [April]² they made Madeira, where they lay-to for a few hours and made sail again for Barbados and arrived there the 2nd May, and sailed again on the 4th, and on the 9th arrived at Tortola.

¹ Pringle has, as an afterthought, inserted here, 'and Com^d Ogle.' It is impossible to say what it means. In 1804 a commander had no place on board a frigate; independent of which, Charles Ogle, a captain of 1796, was the only Ogle then on the active list, and he was on half-pay. There was no Commander Ogle.

² Corrected by the log. Pringle wrote 'May.'

On the 11th sailed again, and a few days afterwards anchored at Prince Rupert's [Bay] to water. Here they received information that the French fleet was lying at Martinique and was said to be preparing for an attack on Prince Rupert's [Bay], Dominica, where the Jason was lying. Captain Champain, on getting this information, asked the subject of these pages what was, in his opinion, best to be done and received for answer, that as soon as the water was completed, the best way would be to put to sea and join the senior officer at Barbados, and where we had left Sir Francis Laforey¹ in the Spartiate, 74.

The Jason was shortly wooded and watered, but remained at anchor assisting Sir George Prevost and the garrison in completing the defences of the Cabretts.² The Jason was hauled further into the bay to bring her guns to bear on the Isthmus and to flank the landing place, the boats rowing guard at night and the springs out ready to bring her broadside to bear in the direction wanted, and her marines landed to assist the garrison. This was the state of things when the guard boats discovered the French fleet making towards the bay from the south, on the morning of the 6th June 1805. After daylight, they came in sight in succession and appeared to be standing along shore to the northward, consisting of 18 sail of the line, 5 frigates, 2 brigs, and a schooner. The Jason, having everything prepared, had only to wait the attack; but the

¹ Son of Sir John Laforey who fills so many pages in *The Barham Papers*, vol. ii.; see p. 104n.

² This would seem to mean the headland, on which there was a small settlement and a hospital; East and West Cabri are the two peaks of the Bluff. Or it may have been the name of what is now Portsmouth.

enemy had no such intention, and the breeze freshening they soon passed out of sight.

The next day the *Jason* sailed to the southward and joined Lord Nelson and the British fleet coming round the SW Point or Point Salines, Grenada, on the 9th June.¹ Captain Champain was the first person who could report to his lordship that he had seen the enemies' fleet, and as soon as he knew their situation, he said to Captain Hardy, 'Hardy, There is life in a musle² yet,' and the *Jason* was instantly ordered to proceed to Montserrat for information. Here she joined the fleet again and proceeded with them to St. John's, Antigua, and anchored there on the 12th June.

The same evening the second lieutenant of the *Jason* died; and on the 14th the subject of these memoirs was taken ill with the fever, and was unable to do any duty till the 13th July. He, indeed, had never sufficiently recovered the extreme debility occasioned by the fever which he had while in the *Clorinde* at Jamaica. The *Jason* was now upon the Barbados station, and generally cruising to windward of that island; and on the 25th July he was again attacked with fever and dysentery, in so alarming a degree that the surgeon recommended that he should be invalided and take the benefit of a change of climate for the recovery of his health; but on

¹ Cf. Nicolas, vi. 452.

² 'There's life in a mussell yet' seems to have been a peculiarly Scotch expression, and must be taken here as rather what Pringle thought appropriate to Nelson's feelings at the time. It is difficult to imagine Nelson, for the only time in his life, breaking out in a bit of Scottish vernacular, and Champain picking it up and repeating it to his first lieutenant.—Bohn's *Handbook of Proverbs*, 258; Lean's *Collectanea*, iv. 148; *Notes and Queries*, XI. iv. 476.

arriving at Tortola on the 31st July, the fleet for England were getting under way and Mr. Pringle was too weak and debilitated to be removed. The Jason then sailed on a cruise, and on arriving at the Mona Passage and beating to quarters, Mr. Pringle was permitted to be accommodated with a chair—a very unusual thing on board of a king's ship—on the quarter deck.

On the 3rd August in the first watch, the weather moderate, the water smooth, and the ship steering EbS or ESE, the Jason struck on the shoals off Cape Roxo.¹ Luckily an American ship that had been detained the day before was in company; yet, notwithstanding every exertion was used, by laying out anchors and lightening the Jason of some of her guns, shot, water, etc., it was not until the following day in the afternoon that she was again afloat in deep water sufficient to anchor in. It was a very providential escape. . . . The ship suffered no injury and little loss, except a bower and stream anchor, and the anchor and cable of the American ship in company, which was purchased from her in this emergency, and she was permitted to pursue her voyage unmolested. It may be remarked here that all the officers of the Jason were strangers on this coast, and that it is most probable that as there is a strong current usually setting to the northwards through the Mona Passage this current had deceived them and drove the ship during the light winds far to the north of the situation they supposed they were in; and it may be remarked that had the lead been carefully hove, it would have likely prevented the accident altogether,

¹ Or Rojo; the SW point of Porto Rico.

although it must be confessed that here the soundings are very irregular, as you have in some places very deep water at one cast, and the next the ship would most likely be on shore ; and this is particularly the case should the course be across the shoals which lie four or five miles from the cape and may be said to extend in a SE and NW direction.

On their passage to windward, they captured two Spanish schooners on the coast of Porto Rico and arrived at Tortola on the 17th July, sailed again on the 27th to the southward, calling at St. Vincents and Carriacou on their way to cruise to the windward of Barbados where they fell in with, and captured, after a twelve hours' chase, the French national corvette *La Nâïade* of 18 long 12-prs. and 175 men, and, on the 15th October, arrived at Barbados with their prize. This vessel was purchased for H.M. service and named the *Melville* in honour of his lordship at the head of the admiralty.¹

Nothing particular occurred during the remainder of the year ; the *Jason* was attached to the squadron cruising to westward of Martinique, and for a short time Admiral Cochrane,² the commander-in-chief, had his flag on board of her, during the passage from the squadron to Barbados and back again.

In the beginning of the year 1806, the *Jason* was stationed to cruise between Antigua and St. Kitt's and detained several vessels laden with French property. In the month of March, Captain William Champain was appointed to the *Amelia*

¹ Lord Melville had resigned the post of first lord in the middle of April. It seems curious that, six months later, it was not known at Barbados.

² Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane.

frigate, and Captain John T. Cochrane,¹ son to the commander-in-chief, took the command of the Jason. She was then sent upon the Spanish Main, and captured a number of small Spanish craft up the gulf of Cariaco or Cumana. This petty warfare luckily did not continue long, the Jason being, after some time, more stationary near the Virgin Islands. Hereabouts, near the Sail Rock and Sombrero passage, the Jason captured the Spanish polacca El Carmen and about a dozen other vessels.

After destroying a fort at the west end of Porto Rico, where the Jason unfortunately lost several men killed and wounded, a brass swivel taken, and the Maria schooner greatly disabled, the Jason returned to Barbados on the 1st July, and shortly after she resumed her station at the Virgin Islands. Here the Jason rode out a very severe hurricane in Tortola Roads, with the loss of an anchor and part of a cable. During the hurricane, the wind shifted and the cable swept a rock, and in this perilous situation they rode it out until the wind abated. The Hart sloop of war was drove on shore and all the vessels in Tortola Harbour. The Jason shortly after went to Barbados, being relieved by the Pallas, Captain King.

On their arrival at Barbados she was sent to cruise off Surinam, and on the 27th January 1807 fell in with the French ship Favorite² of 26 guns and 170 men and the Argus corvette. The Wolverine had parted company the night before

¹ Thomas John Cochrane, *b.* 5 February 1789, confirmed as captain of the Jason, 23 April, 1806. See *D.N.B.*

² In the previous January, the '18-gun ship sloop Favourite' (James, iv. 178), got in the way of a French squadron on the coast of Africa, was captured, and commissioned in the French service. The Argus was a brig.

from the Jason, owing to her having sprung her foremast, but she could be seen from the Jason's deck when the Favorite struck to the Jason after a short action, in which the Argus attempted to join ; but a few shots from the Jason made them alter their mind and make off, and the wind falling light, she escaped. Mr. Pringle was sent into Barbados with the Favorite, and as she had been formerly in the British service, the kindness of Captain Cochrane made him suppose that his father would have promoted his first lieutenant to command her. This was, however, what is called an admiralty vacancy, and officers had already been sent from England to fill them up as they occurred on the station.

The Jason returned to Barbados on the 1st March with her foremast sprung ; and after getting in a new foremast in Carlisle Bay under the peculiar circumstance of there being a heavy swell on, which caused the vessel to roll so much as to endanger the sheers and mast very considerably. After being refitted they sailed on the 12th March, and after capturing a Spanish schooner laden with mules, the Jason in June repaired to Antigua and was here . . . hove down ; . . . the rise of the tide being so small in the West Indies as not to admit of [the construction of wet docks]. In July they sailed for Tortola and off St. Martin recaptured an English ship, the Freedom. She ran on shore, and the launch being sent to assist her with an anchor, the master of the Jason was killed, the enemy having unexpectedly opened a fire of musketry from the high land near her. The vessel floated off herself and two of our people having been drove below by the fire of the enemy, assisted to haul aft the sheets, until assistance was sent them.

The next day the Jason and the prize arrived at Tortola and sailed on the 1st August in company with the admiral and a convoy for England. When near Bermuda the Jason was dispatched to that island, with one of the convoy that had sprung a leak. After this service was effected, the Jason proceeded to Halifax and there joined the admiral again. She was soon afterwards sent with dispatches to New York, which was during the time of their Non-Intercourse Act (Aug. and Sept. 1807)¹ so that they could not get a pilot to conduct them into the anchorage at Sandy Hook. They, however, got in by their own knowledge acquired by the chart, for all on board were strangers to the place. The Columbine sloop of war was lying there at the time, and nothing could prevent the desertion of their men, and the Jason soon was found to be affected in the same way. In a day or two she sailed up to the Narrows and anchored there, still without a pilot, and next forenoon Captain Cochrane went on shore to New York; and although there was a lieutenant and midshipman in the boat, she lost four of her crew by desertion. It appears they were enticed by the populace and offered protection. The moment they jumped out of the boat they were surrounded by thousands and marched off in triumph. The boat came on board and all remained on board very quiet.

As the subject of these lines was first lieutenant, he presumed that this protection to the deserters would, of course, induce many to try it by swim-

¹ Pringle here makes a technical error. The Non-Intercourse Act belongs to 1809; what the Jason suffered from was Jefferson's proclamation of 2nd July 1807, forbidding the entrance of British men-of-war into the harbours of the United States. See Mahan, *War of 1812*, i. 161, 214 *seq.*

ming from the ship. He had the after and foremost guns on the quarter-deck loaded with canister shot and primed, and this was more particularly the case as they had got about 20 or 30 new men before they left the West Indies ; but it never once entered his head that there was such a thing as a mutiny plotting, because he saw no cause for such an event. However he soon had reason to think otherwise.

A little before 8 o'clock, in the month of September—I took no note of the day¹—Mr. Horatio James, midshipman, reported to the officer of the watch that the people were assembling in numbers upon the fore-castle and gangway. Immediately on hearing this, Mr. Pringle jumped up on deck, and when upon the main deck called out 'Officers, to arms !' and pulling out a boarding pike from under the half deck and pointing² up [the] after ladder, got on the quarter deck. He kept near the after ladder to keep it clear, that the officers might be able to get to his assistance. At this time a party of the mutineers had got abaft him where the arms were kept ; many were between him and the gangway and to these he addressed himself, ordering them instantly to go below, as they would answer at their peril with their lives. Words had no effect ; it was dark, and he was obliged to charge them with the boarding pike ; and having slightly wounded two, they gave way in a mass, tumbling over one another into the main deck and down between decks, unshipping the gratings and all the shot

¹ By the log, 5th September ; 7.35 p.m. By this time the logs kept civil date.

² So in the MS. The writing is much clearer than the sense. It would almost seem that Captain Pringle meant to write 'jumping'

boxes which had been placed on them by the mutineers, to prevent the well disposed part of the crew from coming on deck. The noise of the gratings and shot boxes falling down and the hurry of the mutineers to get out of sight caused a great confusion. Mr. Pringle had cleared the gangway, but thinking that he might be cut off from the quarter deck, he returned there and found all of the officers on deck and the most of the marines getting under arms. The gunner reported [that] when he came up on deck, he found a party of the mutineers endeavouring to break open the arm chests and another party preparing to lower down the quarter boats. The timely appearance of the officers on the quarter deck prevented these designs being executed.

A search was now made for the wounded men. A division at a time were examined but without getting any clue as to who had been upon deck. Some bloody clothes, however, were found in the manger. As the people's clothes were all numbered, this at once proved who the man was that was wounded. He was found, after a considerable search, stowed away, and this led to the discovery of the plot. It appeared the mutineers had divided themselves into two parties—one below, to seize the officers and secure them, and the others to lower down the boats, prepare them to embark and desert to the shore. It is not easy to say what they would have done to the officers after they were overpowered, but it was clear the officers escaped this calamity only from the circumstance of the mutineers on deck demonstrating their intention before the party below could get an opportunity to rush into the gunroom and seize the officers, as it afterwards appeared that means had been taken to extract

the arms from the officers' cabins by the armourer, under pretence of cleaning them. . . . The mutiny being quelled, precautions were taken to prevent a rising again; and about midnight Captain Cochrane arrived on board and was a little astonished to find what had happened.

Many particulars are here omitted, but they are in evidence in the minutes of the court-martial held on board the *Acasta*, at Halifax in Sept.-Oct. 1807, when twelve of the mutineers were condemned to be hanged; six of whom were recommended to mercy, four were respited and two suffered death.

Since leaving the West Indies, Mr. Pringle had been much affected with asthmatic complaints and at several periods he had been unable to do duty. This happened to be the case the night before Captain Cochrane went on shore at New York. Notwithstanding, before Captain Cochrane left the ship, he sent for him and gave him the orders he had to leave, which is a very unusual thing when an officer is sick. Had it not been for this circumstance, Mr. Pringle would not have been on deck much during the day, as was usual with him. As it was, he had come on deck to see how the routine duty was going on, and at the time of the people's dinner. It afterwards appeared this had been the cause of preventing a number of the crew deserting with the yawl, which was fast to the guesswrap¹ boom, with her sail up for drying, the coxswain of the boat having asked permission of the officer of the watch to set the sails on pretence to dry them, that all things might be ready for them to escape to the American shore. It appears that they were

¹ So written; Smyth (*Sailor's Word Book*) prefers 'guest-warp'; it seems to have been unknown to Falconer.

twice during the day in the act of getting into the boat to desert, but the first lieutenant coming upon deck made them afraid to proceed.

The day after this attempt at mutiny, a seaman was discharged, having got proofs of his being an American citizen. A pilot came on board and they proceeded down to the anchorage at Sandy Hook, and soon after sailed for Halifax, and arrived safely there. After the court-martial on the mutineers was over, which continued for about a week, and the two men executed ¹ on board the *Jason*, she sailed on the 17th October for Bermuda and the Barbados; and after experiencing very stormy weather in making Bermuda, they arrived at Barbados in November.

At this period Sir Alexander Cochrane, the commander in chief, had gone with a part of the squadron and some troops to take possession of the Danish Islands, Santa Croix,² St. Thomas and St. John's. They made no resistance but capitulated on the summons, after ascertaining that the ships had troops on board. The *Jason* was ordered to cruise for the homeward-bound Danish East India. For this purpose she put to sea, standing to the northward from Barbados and got into latitude 22° N. Here the wind came to the northwest, and they stood to the eastward and had a remarkably fine run to the Porto Praya in the Island of St. Iago, one of the Cape Verd Islands. Here they watered with great difficulty, owing to the surf which at times is very high here, although the wind was blowing off the shore. It is said to be occasioned by the current setting into the bay.

¹ 12th October, 8^h. 15^m. a.m.

² This curious name for a Danish island seems worth preserving.

The supply of fresh provisions appeared to be very limited, yet the price was moderate considering the prices in the West Indies. The fruit, particularly oranges, were very good and cheap, about 4 or 500 for a dollar. The cattle are of a very small size, something like the Alderney breed, and the horses were very small and of fine symmetry. The island appeared to be burnt up for want of moisture and upon the whole had a sterile appearance. The *Jason*, after leaving this island, anchored for a day at the Island of Foggo, which has a volcano, but no harbour—just an open beach with a tremendous surf running. Luckily the beach is steep and the natives are well accustomed to the operation of landing goods and passengers by carrying them on their shoulders through the surf.

The *Jason* proceeded after this to cruise, but without any success. At two days' sail to the SW they met in with calm and torrents of rain; this weather continued for ten days; by that time they were about half way between the two continents. The *Jason* arrived at Barbados in February 1808, when she was sent to Virgin Island Station, and continued there until June, when Mr. Pringle was removed to the *Belleisle*, 74 guns, bearing the flag of Sir Alexander Cochrane, the commander in chief—Mr. Pringle having been placed on the admiralty list for promotion, and the *Jason* on the point of leaving the station for some time. No occurrence took place worthy of note on board the *Belleisle*.

At this period Bonaparte had got the peninsula of Spain in his possession, and he endeavoured all he could to get the sway or command of the Spanish colonies. For this reason a great number of vessels had been sent out with dispatches to

Martinique, but they had been captured or destroyed by our cruisers ; but some of these vessels had got into Cayenne and the governor, to get them into Martinique, fell upon this plan. He fitted out an old vessel, a sloop, as a cartel for the exchange of prisoners and sent her to Barbados with a request that, as she was leaky and in want of being repaired, the authorities would allow them in the first place to proceed to Martinique, to forward that purpose, as it could not be done at Cayenne. It so happened that a cartel the day after, or about that time, arrived from the French islands to leeward and, as usual, a strict lookout was kept on them and a guard placed on board of each. The vessel from Cayenne had been searched for paper, but without effect, and the admiral still suspected that their coming was to cover some design and ordered Mr. Pringle to search her and take any person with him that he thought proper. He took the master to assist him and after a very strict search nothing could be found. However, going into the cabin and examining the beds, he found one that apparently [had] been opened and new sewed up, which stimulated him again to renew the search. An open cask of bread was standing in the cabin and Mr. Pringle inquired if it had been searched, and one of the men or the master said he had looked into that, but had not taken all the bread out. In this barrel, on the bread being all taken out, the dispatches were found, which were taken to the admiral, and he thought them of so much consequence as to dispatch the *Subtle*¹ schooner with them to England,

¹ The *Subtle* weighed and made sail from Carlisle Bay at 8 a.m., 19th July ; at 7 a.m., 18th August, Lieut. H. F. Senhouse (see O'Byrne), 'went on shore with the dispatches' from Plymouth Sound, and at 7^h 40^m the schooner anchored between St. Nicholas and the mainland.

and sent a frigate down to Cumana and La Guayra to communicate with the Spanish authorities and offer them British protection ; and this was the first foundation of the present Colombian State. Ever since that period, they never have been wholly subject to the mother country. The master of the cartel was sent to England and the officers and crew made prisoners of war, the vessel being condemned as a legal prize.

Shortly after this circumstance, the Belleisle proceeded to Marie Galante and Antigua, where Mr. Pringle was promoted to the command of the Pultusk sloop of war on the 5th August 1808, at that time repairing in English Harbour, Antigua. The Pultusk was a small brig of 200 tons burthen and mounted ¹ caronades with a complement of 100 officers and men. She sailed very fast by the wind in light weather, but her accommodation could not be expected to be good, from her size. She had been formerly a French privateer, named Austerlitz. In her present state she was leaky, and was therefore obliged to be hove down ; her bottom copper spiked, caulked and new coppered. Her former commander was appointed to the Recruit, a very fine 18 gun brig.

On the Pultusk being ready for sea she went to St. John's Roads, Antigua, and there took on board as many French prisoners as she could safely accommodate—for her own crew were much reduced in number and strength by sickness. However, every precaution was taken to prevent their rising, and to defeat such an attempt should it occur. What made it likely that they would attempt such a thing was that the Pultusk passed between Deseada and Guadeloupe and the prisoners were all prize-masters, and the most daring

¹ Blank in MS. ; James rates her as of 16 guns.

set off them belonging to privateers out of Guadeloupe where, could they have got the command of the *Pultusk*, they would have been safe in less than an hour. However, although several of the *Pultusk's* crew overheard them consulting about making an attack, yet nothing of the kind took place, and they were all safely lodged in two or three days on board the prison ship at Barbados. The *Pultusk* then was placed under the orders of Captain Ballard¹ of the *Blonde* frigate and continued to cruise to windward of Barbados, without anything worthy of remark taking place.

At the end of the year she was ordered to *Marie Galante* with dispatches and joined the squadron under the command of Captain Pigot in the *Latona*, at that time employed in blockading the *Saintes* and *Basseterre*, [of] *Guadeloupe*. At the former of these places the French frigate *Junon* was lying waiting an opportunity of escape for putting to sea. During this time *Guadeloupe* was under a strict blockade, and several vessels were captured entering *Basseterre* by the *Pultusk*. One of these vessels, the French brig *Admiral Decrès*, ran on shore under the batteries at Point. The *Pultusk*, however, anchored with a spring on her cable, within pistol shot of the shore, with the sea breeze blowing on the land, and drove the enemy from [the] heights above the brig where they had assembled to protect her. During this time the boats boarded her and having got fast a hawser, the *Pultusk* hove her off the shore. The prize then made sail. The *Pultusk* was so close to the shore she had no room to get under way, and was obliged to cut her cable and make sail off the land. The prize was sent to *Antigua* under

¹ Volant Vashon Ballard; died, a rear-admiral, in 1832. See Marshall, iii. 187.

charge of the Demerara sloop, Captain Dowers,¹ who hove in sight after the vessel was captured, having been into Basseterre Bay with a flag of truce. It is remarkable that no one was wounded on board the Pultusk, but this was no doubt owing to the excellent position she anchored in. The prize was a brig from France laden with flour, cordage and various articles, mounting 10 guns carronades, but the crew, supposed to be about 30, escaped on shore.

A short time before this the *Junon* escaped from the *Saintes*; she was pursued by the *Latona*, who fell in with her in the *Sombrero Passage* after having been engaged by the *Horatio*, Captain Scott, belonging to the *Halifax Station*.²

After the capture of the French brig by the *Pultusk*, she was ordered to join Sir Alexander Cochrane, the commander in chief, at that time with the squadron and the army under Sir George Beckwith, attacking the island of *Martinique*. On arrival at *Martinique* they found the admiral lying at anchor in *Casse Navire Bay*, with the most of the squadron and transports, assisting the army in erecting batteries and transporting guns, mortars, shot, shells, etc., to the siege of *Fort Bourbon*. The *Pultusk* was dispatched for a further supply of shot, shells and gunpowder to the island of *Grenada*, after the batteries had opened on the enemy, which they did on the Sabbath evening. *Fort Bourbon* lies on a very commanding eminence over the town of *Fort*

¹ William Dowers.

² 10th February 1809, The *Junon*, brought to action by three brigs, was then successively engaged by the *Horatio* and *Latona*, and struck only when her captain was mortally wounded and she was completely dismantled. A few months later she was recaptured and set on fire. See James, v. 4-6, 47-8; Troude, iv. 62-3, 78-9.

Royal, which is situated close to the margin of the sea beach on the north side of Fort Royal Bay, so that the appearance of the siege from a vessel in the bay during the night (for it was in the night that the incessant firing was kept up) was most terrific and awfully grand, beyond any language that we have that is able to convey any idea of the sight. The incessant report of some hundreds of cannon from 18 to 32 pounders, the whizzing of the shot and shells through the air, the fiery tracks of the shells crossing each other from all situations and at all elevations and curves—for some of them were from howitzers; the frequent explosion of the shells in different situations, and nothing to disturb this pandemonium game but the stillness of a West Indian evening.—Reckless must that heart be, who can see the work of death and destruction going on without feeling an inward horror at the event.

When the *Pultusk* arrived at Fort Royal Bay with the shot, shells and gunpowder, the white flag, the signal for a truce, was flying on all the French works; and the capitulation of the Island of Martinique and its dependences being concluded, and there being no more occasion for the stores brought by the *Pultusk*, she was ordered with them to Grenada again, and on her return Captain Pringle was appointed to the *Amaranthe* sloop of war, a fine brig of sixteen 32 pr. carronades and two 6 pr. long guns, with a complement of 121 officers and men.

After Captain Pringle took the command to the *Amaranthe*, at that time lying in the Carenage of Fort Royal getting some trifling repairs, he asked the first lieutenant what time he expected they would be ready for sea. He replied, in a fortnight. However, after Captain Pringle was

on board two days, she was got out of the Carenage into the Bay, and next day went to water at Casse Navire. During the day a French schooner came into the bay, and was captured after a short chase in which the *Amaranthe* shared. They shortly afterwards sailed to St. John's, Antigua, and convoyed to the northwards two merchant ships bound for England.

Hitherto this memoir is written from a perfect recollection of the circumstances, assisted by notes of the dates taken from letters, orders, and other sources, but what follows is not only from recollections but also from the log.

Note.

With this, Captain Pringle's MS. comes to an end. Of a second part, no trace has been found, and Dr. Kerr Pringle thinks that probably it was never written.


Captain Pringle continued in the *Amaranthe* till July 1814 when, at St. Thomas's, he was posted into the *Venerable*, 74, flagship of Rear-Admiral Durham, then commander-in-chief on the Leeward Islands Station. He remained in her for only a year, and in Carlisle Bay, on the 23rd July 1815—whether at his own request or not does not appear—he was superseded by Captain John Thomson. He had been in the West Indies for more than ten years, and may well have felt that he had had enough of it, now that peace had returned. He had no further service, and for the rest of his life resided with his youngest brother John, at first in Edinburgh, but from 1821 onwards at Banff. Dr. Kerr Pringle thinks that it was during these later years that he wrote the foregoing memoir. It seems not unlikely that death marked the interval he had planned between ending the first part and beginning the second. He died at Banff on the 21st September 1834. There, in the churchyard, he is buried beside his brother John and his sister-in-law. A modest stone records his age as 55.

THE PEDIGREE OF THE NAVAL
DUNCANS

IN the former volume of the *Miscellany* (p. 107) it was suggested that Henry Duncan, whose service is there traced, might 'very well have been a more or less distant relation of Adam Duncan, the victor of Camperdown.' By the kindly assistance of Mr. Hamilton Williams, of Captain J. S. Twysden, R.N., lately dead, and of Lieut.-Colonel A. B. R. Myers, of the R.A.M.C., I am enabled to confirm this, and to show, by an extract from the pedigree of the two men, that they were, in fact, second cousins.

It may be also noted that the married name of Henry Duncan's daughter Isabella, was Twysden, not Troysden, as it is erroneously printed in the *Miscellany*, i. 110, 168, 449, 462. Her husband was Thomas, second son of Sir William Twysden, Bart., who died, a captain in the navy, in 1801. See also *N.R.S.* xxxii. 421.

PEDIGREE OF THE NAVAL DUNCANS.



¹ See Lord Camperdown's *Admiral Duncan*, p. 2.

OPERATIONS IN THE SCHELDT

1809

CAPTAIN BOYS TO JAMES BOYS.

Lent by the late Rev. C. Boys of Wing, Rutlandshire, son of
Captain Boys.

Statira, off Bathz, in the Scheldt, 25th August, 1809.

My dear Jas,—I dare say you think you have heavy complaints against me for my silence, but I will not allow you to make them, but as I have so many reasons why, I will not give above one or perhaps two. The first is, I have been flying about in all directions expecting to be quiet sometimes, and from time to time, on that account, deferring writing to many of my friends ; and the next and grand one is, that I did not know how to direct to you after your leaving Lisbon. So much for that. I dare say by the English papers you must ere this have heard of a little business of ours off Santander, and that the result has been rather profitable to me—I suppose about 1,200*l.* ; and having so many prisoners I was obliged to return to England at the expiration of one month, instead of remaining on my cruising ground about four or five. In consequence of this return I have been attached to this grand expedition, which has in my opinion entirely failed from two causes—one from the ministry deferring the departure till a month at least had elapsed after it ought to have arrived at its destination, and not till some days after the

disastrous business with Austria was known in England; the next for giving the command to men who are as little calculated for it, as well as most of the generals employed, as it was possible to find in Great Britain. 'Tis really a deplorable thing that with means we possess, as well as the gallantry of the soldiers when brought before the enemy, that both should be sacrificed with impunity with so many men of service, to send Lord Chatham and a tribe of generals whose names are scarcely known out of St. James's, with the exception of Sir John Hope,¹ Stewart,² and Lord Paget;³ and this with the largest expedition which ever left by land; 'tis enough to make Mr. Bull shake his head. Above a hundred sail of men-of-war, all the finest frigates in the service, and nearly 30,000 soldiers came here to take the paltry island of Walcheren, which has been done with the loss of above a thousand of our most dashing troops; this day makes past the month since we landed. The commander-in-chief has been feeding at Middleburgh, and the day before yesterday only came to Bathz, to do what? to determine to go back again, and this after above two hundred sail of transports had come up the river, a most critical navigation, and giving us a most arduous piece of service in covering the retreat. When we arrived on the coast the enemy had not in Walcheren above 600 men; upon the surrender of Flushing we found about 5,000 prisoners, and about 2,000 had been killed or wounded, and we have heard from very good authority that had the troops which occupied South Beveland, which

¹ Afterwards fourth Earl of Hopetoun.

² Afterwards Lieut. General Sir William; the same that was with Nelson at Copenhagen.

³ Afterwards Earl of Uxbridge and first Marquis of Anglesey.

the enemy abandoned without showing the least resistance, crossed over at once, they might have entered Bergen-op-Zoom and marched straight to Antwerp, the enemy not having more than eight or ten thousand men for many miles round. But a month has wrought great changes; they are now supposed to amount to 60,000, about half the number soldiers and the remainder conscripts. This and the strength of Lillo, which must be taken before we can cross, is the reason why the business is abandoned. We are at anchor between two sandbanks, where there is just room enough to swing clear of each bank without touching the ground, about four miles below Lillo. The enemy have a chain and boom across the river just above Lillo, which is supported by thirty gun brigs, fire vessels, mortar boats, &c.; the line-of-battle ships are above them, extending above Antwerp, and all idea of getting hold of them is chimerical in the extreme. Had we been here in June we should doubtless have succeeded, and, on [the] other hand, now if we get back without further loss I shall esteem the country fortunate. Had we arrived here while the fate of Austria was uncertain and even favourable, the diversion would have been admirable and perhaps have prevented that disastrous battle of Wagram and the armistice, and I suppose by this time peace, Austria has been compelled to make. What will be the sense of the country upon this business is more than I can say; perhaps the occupying Beveland [and] the capture of Flushing will be made so much of that Johnny will be gulled into thinking he has done wonders. When the commander-in-chief arrived here he brought with him on a cart, I should think built for the purpose, two turtle. I landed at one of the

advanced posts before Flushing ; the army had then been ten days before it, losing men every day by the enemy's shells, without our having fired a gun against it ; when I met Colonel Hay,¹ and asked him where the General was, his reply more expressive than I can make by the manner in which it was given, but he said, ' I don't know ; somewhere in the rear ' ; and upon asking when the batteries were to open, ' God knows ! Everything goes on at headquarters as if they were at the Horse Guards ; it did not signify what you wanted, you must call between certain hours, send up your name and wait for your turn.' Sir Richard Strachan got so exasperated that he said, ' Damn me, if the army won't go on, we must ' ; and accordingly we (the frigates), ten of us, were ordered to force the passage of the Scheldt between Flushing and Breskens, which we did in high style. The enemy kept a tolerable fire of shot and shells from both sides, but fortunately without doing any of the ships any material mischief ; they struck *Statira* only three times, and that only in the rigging ; my fellows behaved incomparably well, and kept up from both sides a very fair fire. *L'Aigle* had a very narrow escape of being blown up ; a shell fell on board her, passed through the quarter-deck, main deck, and lower deck, and exploded in the bread room ; had it been three feet further forward it would have touched her magazine and then all would have been over. I went on board her after the business to see the effect of it ; after it burst, three large pieces of it came upwards and passed through the main and quarter decks, making great splinters

¹ Andrew Hay, afterwards major-general ; killed before Bayonne on 14th April 1814.

of the wood ; some of the smaller pieces of the shell stuck in the beams in the gun-room, and, singular to say, with all this explosion only one man was killed and one or two wounded. Amethyst had one man killed, and that is the whole extent of our forcing this redoubtable passage, which we all expected would have proved a devilishly hard piece of work. Sir Richard Strachan, who was on board a sloop of war inside, having come round Walcheren by Veer and the Rammekins fort, a passage for small things, has expressed his thanks in the most expressive terms, and desiring the captains of the frigates to send them to their officers and people. We had a most harassing passage up the Scheldt, both from the number of banks and having no pilots, being obliged to feel our way up. They have almost all of them been aground, but as yet Statira has kept free.

I do not at present see when I shall have an opportunity of sending this away to England ; not knowing how to address it, I send it to Mary to direct. I shall conclude this for the present, keeping the remainder of the paper to tell you anything which may happen between this day and an opportunity of sending it away. I have seen the Gazette account of your battle in Spain ; the loss has been very great, and the result highly honourable to our soldiers ; but I do not think the Gazette satisfactory. I am very much pleased to find your situation so agreeable to you, not only on your own account, but on my own, for, had it been the contrary, your going with me would always have been the subject of regret. Adieu, my good fellow ; believe me your sincere friend and affectionate brother,

C. W. Boys.

I was deuced near being hit the other day passing Flushing, a part of one of the fore-topmast dead-eyes, being shot away, came down upon the quarter-deck with the velocity almost of a shot, and struck the deck within a foot or two of my foot. Adieu, God bless you.

29th August.

Just time to close. Boat waiting. Did not know of the possibility of sending. God bless you.

FRUSTRATION OF THE PLAN
FOR THE
ESCAPE OF NAPOLEON
BONAPARTE
FROM BORDEAUX
JULY 1815

INTRODUCTORY

THE circumstances of Napoleon Bonaparte's surrender on board the *Bellerophon* at Rochelle have been made familiarly known by Captain Maitland's *Narrative of the Surrender of Buonaparte*; but though it is also known, in an otiose kind of way, that the whole west coast of France was carefully watched at the time, to guard against the possibility of his escape, it is perhaps, generally believed that he was bound to take ship at Rochelle and to be stopped there, as he was. Lady Graves-Sawle, in showing me the interesting letter from Admiral Baudin to her uncle, Captain (afterwards Lord) Aylmer,¹ woke me to a realisation of the fact that the securing Bonaparte after Waterloo was neither so simple nor so sure as we are now apt to suppose it, and led to my looking for further light on the subject. Unfortunately, the letters to which Baudin refers and the fuller account of events at Bordeaux, from the French point of view, even if sent, are not now to be found. Lady Graves-Sawle thinks it possible that Aylmer, in his later years, may have destroyed them, as private communications which ought not to be given to the public. If that was so, it is fortunate that she does not share his scruples, but has very kindly given me every facility for copying and collating the solitary letter which remains in her possession. The story is told at some length in Jurien de la Gravière's *L'Amiral Baudin* (pp. 95 *et seq.*); and the English and royalist official details are here added.

¹ Captain of 18th May 1805. See Marshall's *R. Nav. Biog.*, iv. 947.

L'AMIRAL BAUDIN TO CAPTAIN
AYLMER

Havre : No. 14 Rue Bernardin de
Saint Pierre.

[Holograph]

18 juin, 1833.

Mon cher Capitaine Aylmer,—J'espère qu'au moment où cette lettre vous parviendra, votre santé sera complètement rétabli. Vous devez passer l'hiver prochain en Italie. Je me propose moi-même de partir bientôt pour la Méditerranée. Puisse j'y trouver quelque heureuse occasion de passer avec vous des instants moins courtes que ceux pendant lesquels j'ai joui dernièrement ici du plaisir de votre société.

J'ai vu par la dernière lettre de votre sœur à Mme. B. que parmi les sujets de conversation que nous avons eu ensemble, un surtout vous avait particulièrement intéressé, et que vous désirez avoir quelques détails sur les circonstances relatives au projet de fuite de Napoléon aux Etats-Unis sur mon navire la Bayadère, projet dont l'accomplissement n'a été arrêté que par la subite entrée dans la Gironde du Pactolus et des autres navires sous votre commandement.

A l'époque dont il s'agit j'ai dû détruire tous les documents, soit officiels, soit confidentiels, relatifs au projets de Napoléon ; toutefois les faits et les dates se sont si parfaitement gravés dans ma mémoire, qu'aucune circonstance essentielle n'a pu m'être effacée. J'ai d'ailleurs trouvé plusieurs copies de correspondance particulière qui ont trait à cette affaire, et qui sans être de nature à compromettre ma tranquillité sous le regne de Louis XVIII, ont cependant une véritable caractère d'authenticité.

Mais, mon cher ami, le loisir me manque aujourd'hui pour rédiger une narration détaillée digne de satisfaire votre intérêt particulier et d'être mise sous les yeux du public, ce qui est, sans doute, votre objet. Je vais m'en occuper, et je vous la ferai passer incessamment. En attendant, croyez bien qu'en me dévouant pour sauver Napoléon, je n'avais d'autre vue que d'épargner à la France l'humiliation de voir un homme qui avait été son souverain, tomber entre les mains de notre plus implacable ennemi. J'avais été activement opposé à son gouvernement, mais je n'en considérais pas moins un devoir de défendre jusqu'au bout l'indépendance et l'honneur national.

Répondez, mon ami, aux questions suivantes :

1°. Avez vous conservé des copies de votre correspondance avec moi ? et l'original de ma longue lettre du 19 juillet 1815 ?

2°. Quels navires entrèrent les premiers dans la Gironde le 13 juillet ? Ne fût ce pas le Pactolus et l'Hebrus ? Mes rapports disent à 5 pm. Est ce bien exactement l'heure ?

3°. Combien d'autres navires étaient alors en croisière à l'entrée de la Gironde ? Quel était le capitaine de l'Hebrus ? Était il votre ancien dans l'ordre du service ?¹

4°. Lorsque le 11 juillet au soir, la flotte des navires neutres sortit de la Gironde, pensez vous qu'il y ait eu quelqu'un de ces navires qui ait échappé à la visite de vos croiseurs ?

Après votre réponse à ces questions, vous ne tarderez pas, mon cher ami, à recevoir le document que vous desirez.

Croyez-moi pour toujours,
 Votre très affectionné,
 CHARLES BAUDIN.

¹ Edmund Palmer, captain of 10th October, 1807.

LORD KEITH TO J. W. CROKER.

[Adm. Sec. In Letters, 159.]

Ville de Paris, in Hamoaze.

[Signed]

21st July 1815.

Sir,—Captain Knight of the Falmouth arrived last night from the Gironde, bringing the satisfactory intelligence of that river having been successfully entered without loss on the 13th instant by the Pactolus, Hebrus, and Falmouth.

I enclose, for their lordship's information, a copy of the Honourable Captain Aylmer's letter reporting his proceedings in the execution of this service, in which both Captain Palmer and he have shewn a commendable zeal.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

KEITH,
Admiral.

P.S.—I also enclose a copy of a letter from Captain Palmer of the Hebrus.

ENCLOSURE.

Capt. the Hon. F. W. Aylmer to Lord Keith.

H.M. Ship Pactolus in the Gironde.

[Copy]

14th July 1815.

My Lord,—I arrived off this port on the 3d instant, and in compliance with the wishes of General Donnadieu, sent in a flag of truce, with an aide-de-camp of the general's, for the purpose of communicating with the General Clausel, commanding at Bordeaux; but as two days more elapsed without any answer or news of the aide-de-camp, I sent another flag of truce in to a corvette

lying in the river ; and I learnt from her commander that he had received the most positive orders from General Clausel not to hold any kind of communication with us. In addition to this we received a proclamation, signed by that general, declaring Bordeaux and its whole vicinity in a state of siege and threatening with military execution any who manifested signs of disaffection to his government. The aide-de-camp, it appeared, was detained.

While this negociation was attempting, the Hebrus arrived with the charge of a small expedition with arms and supplies for the royalists ; and when it became evident that no good could arise out of any attempt to conciliate General Clausel, Captain Palmer made me a very strong representation upon the necessity, which he conceived there was, for his attempting to enter the Gironde and open a direct communication with the royalist party. I enclose you Captain Palmer's letter and also a representation to that officer by the Baron Montalembert upon the same subject.

Your Lordship will perceive that Captain Palmer makes a most urgent request to me to join my ship to those under his command, in order to force the entrance of the river ; and as after weighing the circumstances, I thought it my duty to accede to the proposal, I united the ships for the prosecution of the service. The General Donnadieu being anxious to pursue his mission on the coast, I dispatched the Larne with him to Passages.

On the 11th, the squadron weighed from an outer anchorage we had taken, and formed for the purpose of entering the river ; but, as we stood in, the enemy's corvette was perceived to weigh and

manœuvre in the north entrance, while five sail pushed out from the southern passage to sea. Under these circumstances it became necessary for the intercepting of those vessels, that the squadron should separate for the time ; and consequently the forcing the river was given up for that day. During the night the squadron united again, after having examined the vessels which, it appeared, had sailed in so suspicious a manner, which circumstance was developed by the embargo having been that morning discontinued in the river.

Yesterday, the wind being favourable, the squadron again weighed and formed in close line for entering the Gironde. The Pactolus led, the Hebrus followed, and the Falmouth brought up the rear ; the two former had transports in tow. As we proceeded, a person came off, with a message from the people of the town of Royan, saying, that they would not fire at us, if we did not assail them. We passed on, with the royal colours of France at the mast-head ; the tri-coloured flag flying along the batteries, which were all in preparation ; but no act of hostility occurred until we reached the heavy battery at Verdon, which opened its fire upon us, and continued it until the ships reached the anchorage. No injury, however, was sustained, and the squadron did not return a gun, for I was unwilling to disturb the feeling which appeared so generally and so happily to prevail.

Directly the ships were secured, a communication was sent up with a flag of truce, to General Clausel, by the Comte de Lastour, deputed by Madame la Duchesse d'Angoulême, and we are in expectation of his answer. In the meantime nothing can wear a more favourable aspect than the face of things in this river.

I beg to assure you that every measure shall be adopted, in conjunction with the Baron de Montalembert, to arm and organize the royal party and establish the power and predominance of his Majesty the King of France, in the vicinity of wherever our means can operate.

I lose no time in dispatching the Falmouth to your Lordship, and Captain Knight will explain our situation, as well as that we are taking every precaution in respect to the defence of the river, in the event of General Clausel sending down any strong force to stifle the spirit of the people. I shall also write to Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Hotham, and perhaps the rear-admiral may strengthen our means here, so that we may fully avail ourselves of such opportunity of pushing the royal cause with vigour and celerity and of cherishing the excellent disposition with which all here seem inspired. I have just learnt that the enemy evacuated the fort of Verdon last night, and retired with his garrison. We have sent a force on shore to dismantle and destroy the guns, &c. This is the fort which disputed our entrance, and it is a very strong work.

I have also the pleasure to add, that the propositions of the Baron de Montalembert and his mission have hitherto been everywhere attended with success. The forts and the positions are gradually pulling down their tri-coloured flags and hoisting that of their legitimate sovereign; and several of them have saluted the squadron upon their hoisting the white flag. While writing this letter, another battery has followed their example, and there now remains only the fort at Méche with the tri-coloured flag. Captain Palmer who was entrusted with the service has throughout directed it, and the accident alone of my being the

senior officer induces me to give the account to your lordship.

I have the honour to be. . . ,
F. W. AYLMER.

As it stands at present, I should remain here until I have your lordship's further orders if I am to proceed to cruise off C. Finisterre.

The American ship *Susquehanna*, Captain Caleb Cushing, who has been suspected of favouring the escape of Napoleon Bonaparte, we found lying in the river, ready to sail. We have examined her with all the care and scrutiny possible, but without success.¹

The disposable force under General Clausel in and about Bordeaux is estimated at about 10 or 11,000 men.

A gentleman has this instant arrived from Bordeaux, who left that place the night before last at 11 o'clock (Wednesday 12th), who states at that time there had been a rising of the inhabitants and that in their loyalty they had taken the white cockade and displayed the white flag, but that General Clausel had collected the troops and dispersed them, killing a few and wounding several, and that the military had rehoisted the tri-coloured flag.

The fort at Méche has just hoisted the white flag.

Captain Palmer to Lord Keith.

His Majesty's Ship *Hebrus* in the Gironde.

[*Copy*]

14th July, 1815.

My Lord,—I have the honour to state to you that I arrived off this port on the 6th, where I

¹ On the part that was to be taken by this and another American ship, see *L'Amiral Baudin*.

found his Majesty's ship *Pactolus*, and I learnt from Captain Aylmer that General Donnadieu (the French officer he had on board) was endeavouring to open a communication with the commandant at Bordeaux, General Clausel, and that an aide-de-camp had been dispatched in for that purpose; but as General Clausel thought proper to detain the messenger, and also to adopt the most decided measures to prevent any kind of intercourse, there appeared no prospect of any accommodation from any further attempt to conciliate him.

From the nature of this coast and the complete military possession which the enemy had of it, it seemed impossible that any free communication could be opened with the royalists unless I could effect an entrance into the river; and as the Baron Montalembert expressed the greatest anxiety upon the subject, and I possessed a discretionary power of passing into the Gironde, should I be of opinion that circumstances justified me in doing so, I decided, after the best consideration I could give the matter, that it was the most proper course I could pursue for the good of the cause I was employed on.

As I felt that the committing the transports and their lading in the river, at a time it was in full possession of the enemy, was a strong measure, and as there were serious obstacles to overcome in a well defended entrance and a hazardous navigation, I considered it my duty to render our means as effective as possible before the attempt was made; and as the *Pactolus* was on the spot, I stated my opinion fully to Captain Aylmer in the letter which I have the honour to enclose to your lordship, requesting the junction of his ship to those under my orders. Captain Aylmer having

acceded to the request, and being the senior officer, of course the command of the squadron devolved on him, and your lordship will learn from that officer the further proceedings of the expedition.

I have the honour to be . . . ,
EDMUND PALMER.

*Captain Palmer to Captain the Hon. F. W.
Aylmer.*

[Adm. Sec. In Letters, 159.]

His Majesty's Ship Hebrus, off the Gironde.

[*Holograph*]

10th July, 1815.

Sir,—I do myself the honour to transmit for your consideration, the orders delivered to me by Admiral Lord Keith relative to my proceedings with the small expedition under my command, by which you will perceive that I am charged with two transports containing arms, ammunition, clothing &c. &c. for the assistance of the royalists in the neighbourhood of Bordeaux, to be disposed of according to the judgment of the Baron Montalembert, Secretary to the French embassy, who is embarked here, with other officers joined in his mission. You will also observe that I am instructed to consult and meet as far I as can, the wishes of the Baron in the prosecution of the service he is charged with, and that I have a discretionary power given me to enter the Gironde together with the vessels under my orders, if I shall consider that circumstances justify my adopting such a measure.

You are aware, Sir, that from the nature of the coast, it is impossible, unsheltered and exposed upon it, to communicate with the royal partisans

in such a manner as to put them fairly in possession of the supplies I bring for the support of their good cause ; and the Baron Montalembert has, in this conviction, made me a very strong representation as to the necessity of his being placed in the river in order to carry into execution the objects he is employed to effect. I enclose you his letter and I beg to state that after giving the subject the best consideration I am able, I have decided upon the propriety of entering the Gironde and taking up an anchorage there. Since, however, to effect this, it will be necessary to force a passage by the batteries which defend its entrance, held by the enemy ; to attack a man-of-war lying there, and afterwards to occupy a position in a rapid river, the banks and resources of which are also in his possession ; and as I have only the ship I command, with a corvette, to perform this service, I have, under these circumstances, considered it my duty to request your co-operation in it, which I am of opinion will not only most materially assist in facilitating our entrance into the river, but also prove the best possible effect with regard to our operations afterwards, by imparting a consequence to the expedition and in inspiring the royalists with that confidence which is so peculiarly necessary at the present interesting moment.

There is also another object which I consider will be effected by entering the Gironde at this moment, namely, the perfect and complete blockade of it, particularly as it has reference to the escape of Bonaparte. That person is considered to intend attempting his flight from one of the southern ports ; and from the strong body of troops concentrated at Bordeaux, there would appear no place more eligible for his embarkation

than the Gironde. A corvette is now lying in the river commanded by an officer of trust, and she has entered from one of the other ports and taken her situation there very lately. All this looks like preparation, and should our squadron arrive critically to arrest his departure, the surrounding country may gather confidence from such an event, and the happiest consequences ensue. You know, Sir, how very difficult it is to blockade a port from the outside, and that if he once clears the land, the chances are greatly in favour of his ultimate escape.

I am aware, being an officer junior to yourself, I am hazarding an unusual request in asking your participation in a measure of this nature, adopted by myself and connected with a service you have not been charged with the management of ; but as you are upon the spot, with the means of affording the most powerful support to the movement which I hold it my duty to urge, I request, in the most earnest manner, that your ship may be joined upon this occasion with those I command, and at the same time that I shall be proud and happy to act under your orders as my senior, in the prosecution of the affair. I very willingly embrace and take upon myself all the responsibility of the act itself, and its consequences, considering that I am justified, from the circumstances which I have detailed, in making this strong request to you for that assistance, which I hold as necessary to effect the object with which I am charged.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

EDMUND PALMER.

The Baron Montalembert to Captain Palmer.

[Adm. Sec. In Letters, 159.]

At Sea. Off the mouth of the Gironde.

On board H.M. Ship Hebrus.

[Copy]

7th July, 1815.

Sir,—Fully impressed with the great advantages the royal cause will derive from your appearance in the Gironde (accompanied by the transports placed under your care) I think it my duty to request you, in the strongest manner, to anchor in Verdon Roads, and to enable me to convey to the loyal inhabitants of Bordeaux and its vicinity the assurance of support from the British government, and the knowledge of the speedy arrival of her Royal Highness Madame la Duchesse d'Angoulême.

I should not thus take the liberty to suggest my opinion on the future proceedings of the ships under your command, were I not thoroughly convinced that the 'moral' effect, produced by a protecting force in the Gironde, will, under present circumstances, materially influence the conduct of General Clausel, accelerate his submission, and afford to the royalists an opportunity to display their attachment for their legitimate sovereign. I feel the more confident in this way of thinking, as I know it to be perfectly concordant with the wishes of his Majesty's ministers, one of whom in giving me my instructions, most distinctly said that the object in view could only be attained by my entering the Gironde; and indeed had the least hesitation been expressed to me, I should certainly not have undertaken a mission which could present no other result than beating about in our present situation for an uncertain time.

Under all these circumstances and particularly bearing in mind the mighty events passing in the north of France, events which probably before this day have led to the occupation of Paris by the allies, I hope you will agree with me in the necessity of adopting a decisive measure ; and that you will feel yourself fully justified in acquiescing to my request, dictated entirely by the good of the service, and for the success of the cause we are both engaged in.

I have the honour to be . . .

LE BARON DE MONTALEMBERT,
*Colonel, et Secrétaire de
l'Ambassade de France à Londres.*

Captain's Journal, Pactolus.

[Official No., 2657.]

13th July, 1815.—Noon. Cordovan SE $\frac{1}{2}$ S, 9 or 10 miles. PM. Light breezes and fine. 1, Sent the gig in chase of a chasse marine. 1.40, Gig returned ; received a pilot from the chasse marine. 2.40, Weighed and made sail on the larboard tack (wind NNW), Hebrus, Falmouth and convoy in company. 3.30, Hove to. 4, Took the transports in tow. 6, Running into the Gironde. 6.30, Made signal to prepare to anchor. 7.15, In studding sails ; battery on Pt. du Grave fired several shot at us. 8, Cast off the brig ; shortened sail and anchored with the Best-Bower in 9 fms. in Verdon Roads . . . 11, Sent an officer with a flag of truce to Bordeaux.

Captain's Journal, Hebrus.

[Official No., 2379.]

13th July, 1815.—Noon. Cordovan Tower, SE $\frac{1}{2}$ S. 6 or 7 miles. PM. 1.26 . . . Received a

pilot from Pactolus. 2, Weighed and made sail for the river Gironde, Pactolus, Falmouth and convoy in company; cleared for action . . . 6.30, Passed Royan battery which had the republican flag flying. 7, Passed Pt. de Grave battery; they fired several shot at us, but all fell short. 7.30, Sent a boat on shore to Royan with a flag of truce. 8, Came to with B. Bower in 9 fms. . . . 10.30, Boat returned, having made the fort surrender to the summons.

EXTRACT FROM THE JOURNAL OF
ADMIRAL BENJAMIN WILLIAM PAGE.¹

Lent by Captain P. H. Page, Woollpit, Suffolk.

[*Memorandum at end : Holograph, and signed.*]

By the aid of Mr. E. H. Locker, 1836, I got the fine portrait of my first patron, Admiral Sir Edward Hughes K.B. by Sir Joshua Reynolds, 1785, and six fine and large paintings of the squadron, battles &c. with Suffren in India, 17th Feb., 12th April, 6th July, 3rd Sept. 1782 and 20th June 1783, by the famous Serres, the Van de Velde of his day, and is said to have cost the admiral £1,000, and on his demise given by Lady Hughes to Greenwich Hospital, and put into passages there—disrespectfully, I often said; and obtained and gave the portrait and four of the battle-pieces to the town hall of my native town Ipswich, where the good admiral resided in my youth and whence he took me, Charles Crawley, John Rix Blakeley and John Legget Cooke as mids. to his flagship *Superbe* 74, soon after Keppel's battle with the French fleet, 27 July 1778, and made us all lieuts. in the East Indies, whence I came home, 1785, with the admiral, being put on the list of lieutenants, 20th November 1784, as lieut. of the *Eurydice*, and paid off with her, July 1785. I gave money for the above paintings, and for the life size marble bust of Duke Wellington and a model of H.M. Ship *Caroline* fully rigged and placed in

¹ Died October 1845. Sec O'Byrne.

a glazed case, and a genuine sabre of the Sultan Tippoo Saib, all of which I gave to the corporation of Ipswich, who had voted and given me the honorary freedom of the borough, on my accompanying the Duke of Wellington to take up his freedom of Ipswich and as I had brought Sir Arthur Wellesley from his victories in India to England, as captain of Admiral Rainier's flagship, the Trident, 64.

Mr. Edward Hawke Locker of Greenwich Hospital, told me he got five thousand pounds as the prize agent for Sir Edward Pellew and Captain Peter Rainier, for the Spanish (Bombay built) ship Nancy, sold by Capt. Tasker to them as the fastest sailer ever then known) galleon from Mexico &c. to Manilla and taken by H.M. Ship Caroline, 1806, worth near £500,000; the Adml. Pellew taking the orders of Adml. Sir Thos. Troubridge from Capt. Rainier; and Mr. Locker told B. W. Page he copied them exactly, and Sir Edward Pellew signed and returned them to Rainier, thereby putting the Caroline under his command and getting one-eighth of all her prizes from that hour. Capt. Peter Rainier sent a duplicate of his receipt from the Company's treasury at Canton for forty-five thousand pounds sterling in dollars received from him, P. R., from that prize and his part of a quarter of her produce that cruise. Adml. Rainier was on a visit to Captain and Mrs. Page at Ipswich when he received and shewed them the bill &c. as above. Pellew got sixty thousand pounds by that ship, and died worth £300,000, as did Adml. Rainier. Mr. Locker repeated this to B. W. Page, Oct. 7th 1838.

‘WELL DONE, PHAËTON!’

IN the early 'fifties of last century, this phrase 'Well done, Phaëton!' was familiar at Portsmouth, and the prints of it were in every shop window. Some fifty years after the incident which it portrayed, I persuaded Lieutenant Gerald Maltby R.N., to ask his father-in-law, Sir George Elliot, who was captain of the Phaëton at the time, to enable me to place the exact circumstances on record. This he was good enough to do, and wrote the following:

Wimbledon, 11th November, 1897.

The date of 'Well done, Phaëton!' was August 11, 1850. I had my quarter-boats fitted on a plan of my own, so that I could drop them into the water safely, without regard to the rate of speed the ship was going. I had a life-boat's crew told off both by day and night, excused from other duties and stationed aft by the mizen-mast. At the time of the event, the squadron was sailing in two columns, line ahead, and Phaëton was leading the lee line, wind abeam, a strong wind, speed upwards of 10 knots. I was on deck when the cry of 'Man overboard!' came from the main-chains. I put the helm hard down and threw the ship up into the wind. The man stationed at the life buoy let it go close to the man, who could not swim. The life-boat's crew jumped into the lee cutter and the boat was lowered and let go without waiting for the speed to be stopped, and near the man and picked him up at the life buoy. The signal 'Man overboard' was hoisted, but followed

directly by the signal 'Man saved,' and was answered by 'Well done, Phaëton,' by Commodore Martin. If I had not always had a man stationed at the life buoy, as the man could not swim, he might not have been saved. The loss of a few seconds in letting it go, might have made all the difference.

Moral: Always have a man stationed there and a boat's crew ready. . . .

GEO. ELLIOT.

In reference to the foregoing, I begged Lieutenant Maltby to ask Sir George Elliot whether we were to understand that in 1850 it was a new idea to have a man stationed at the life buoy and life-boat's crew in readiness. His inquiry brought the following:

Wimbledon Common, 22nd December, 1897.

I believe it was quite usual to station a man by the life buoy, but I never heard of a life-boat's crew always ready at the mizen-mast to meet any sudden emergency, and no ship had their quarter-boats fitted for lowering like mine, in a speed of 10 knots, with safety, nor has it ever become a dockyard fitting. In the *Phaëton* and *James Watt*, I was able to save life by that means, supposing a man could not reach the life buoy, either by being injured when falling overboard, or being unable to swim; for a boat could get to a man floating, but the life buoy could not. . . .

GEO. ELLIOT.

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